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I.

THE CHANGING SITUATION OF THE JEWS IN GERM.ANY
On January 30, 1933, Hitler accepted at the hands
of Hindenburg

the chancellorship of the Republic, and

the situation of German Jewry became more precarious than
ever. This turn of events did not come about overnight_,

and German Jewry could not have been caught completely
by surprise.

In 1925, Marshal von Hindenburg, candidate of the
Nationalists, was elected president of the Republic. With
rightists in control of the Government, the Nation~~
\

Socialists

and other racist parties were free to grow

and carry out their anti-Semitic activities. These were
manifest in such actions as desecration of Jewish
cemeteries, attacks on synagogues, introduction of antiSemitic bills in the state and natiunal legislatures
and the publication of numerous anti-Semitic pamphlets
and newspapers.
Jewish students were among the first to feel the
pressures of anti-Semitism. University professors as well
as students were among

the earliest advocates of the philo-

sophy of racial superiority.
Boycotts against Jewish employees and workers preceded Hitler's rise to power. ~he Berlin Jewish community
even saw the need to establish a central employment bureau to reduce their impact.
The world depression of 1929 which also hit Germany

foreshadowed worse things to come for the German Republic
/ and its Jews. In 1930, the German economy was crumbling

I as

foreign loans and world trade, the main props of her

economy, collapsed. The boycotts, which were widespread
in the small towns before 1930,left man1 Jews in economic
ruin. Now, as business failures mounted and unemployment .
rose, anti-Jewish activities increased in number and
intensity. Jews were abused on the streets and in schools,
they were molested in theaters and cafes. Religious services
were disrupted and a number of Jews were murdered.
In the September 1930 elections, the Nazis made
fresh gains, and in celebration committed new anti-Jewish
outrages. With the depression worsening and Nazi influence
and power growing, Jewish unemployment increased while
discrimination and boycotts added to their economic plight.
Jewish New Years day, September 12, 1931, witnessed yet
another wave of such attacks.
LEGAL AND OTHER MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST GER!,1AN JEWRY IN 1933
Persecution intensified

after January 30,,

1933, but no legal action was taken immediately to
realize the program of the partt~ The National Socialist
leaders felt free to act only after the Reichstag

( the

deliberative and representative parliament of Germany)
had been diss·ol ved on March 23, 1933, and they had

1

assumed dictatorial power . Then a country-w;ide boycott
of "non-Aryans"

was announced by the government 1 and

anti-Jewish decrees followed each other in rapid succession.

THE BOYCOTT

It was to begin on April 1, 1933. For days in
advance press, radio, and mass meetings flooded Germany
with protests and complaints that the atrocities committed against the Jews had been a lie manufactured by world
Jewry. The German public was persuaded that it had to
retaliate by boycotting the nation's

Jews. On March 29,

1933, the party proclaimed a countrywide boycott of businesses conducted by Jews as well as of Jewish professional men.

The numerous local branches of the party were

advised to appoint Action Committees to propagandize the
boycott.
Under the chairmanship and direction of J·u1iu3
Streicher
Aryan"

the committees drew up directories of "nan-

merchants which were distributed to the public.

At a later date commercial and professional directories
were reedited, so as to either omit Jewish names or in-

dicate their ''non-Aryanu

character.

Non Jewish stores

were advised to display special German signs while "non-

Aryanst

enterprises were prohibited from doing so.

Stores

and offices owned by Jews were marked as such so as to

forewarn potential customers who were branded as traitors
if they failed to heed such warnings.

Throughout the

country, hotels, restaurants, and even food stores were
compelled to bear signs announcing that Jews may not buy
there.

CIVIL SERVICE
In the beginning of April 1933, a series of laws
were passed which, before the year was over, had practically excluded the Jews from participation in the social
and economic life of Germany.
The foundation of the entire structure of National
-

Socialist legislative discrimination against the Jews
consisted of section three of the law for the profession_._

___ al

Civil Service, issued on April 7, 1933.

I~ stipulated

that officials of non-Aryan descent must be.- retired and
honorary officials -discharged from office • 1 A non-Aryan
1 Gustav Otto Warburg, Six Years· of Hitler The Jews Under
the Nazi Regime (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1939), p. 53.

s
was defined as anyone who was of non-Aryan descent,
particularly one with Jewish parents or grandparents.
This held true even if only one parent or grandparent
and was particularly the case if one parent o~
grandparent was of the Jewish faithf This definition
applied to ~any non-Jews and was later extended t~
include even more.
The Aryan laws were established to eliminate those
. defined as Jews by the National Sociali~ts from participating in the life of the country. · The first to be
affected by the laws were the non-Aryans in the civil
service.

The only exception under the statutes were

made for those who were already serving as officials
on August 1, 1914, or who durlng the World War, had
fought at the front for Germany or her allies, or whose
fathers, sons, or husbands were killed in action in the

war. 2

The intent of the law was to remove all Jews from

government employ.
legislation.

The army remained unaffected by the

This was a matter of expediency rather than

a lack of concern for the racial purification of the army.

1 The American Jewish Comm i t~ee, Th~ Jews in Nazi Germanl
A Han~book of Facts Re garrl inR th eir Pre s ent ~itu a tio n
New Yor ,.: 'l' e American Je wish Cormn 1 ttec l 5
n 130
2 Ibid. , p. 12 4.
·
'
' .. •
•

2.'HE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS
The new legislation did not confine itself to the·
civil services. The liberal professions were also to be
"Aryanized~' As concerns lawyers, the new legislation
decreed that the admission of non-Aryan lawyers into
practice may be canceled. 1
Exceptions similar to those granted civil servants
were applied to the professions, but the concessions
were curtailed.

A National Socialist Lawyers' Society

was set up to replace the dissolved German Bar Association.
"Non-Aryan~" including those who were exceptions to the
April 7th law, were barred from membership.
"Non-Aryan

u

physicians and dentists were expell-

ed form their professions in a more gradual manner. ~NonAryantt

medical students were ihformed that they could

not receive authorization to practice.

As for a diploma,

it would be granted to them only as foreign nationals.
In other words, they were urged to renounce their German
nationality.

While practicing physicians could continue

..

in their calling, their expulsion from the National
and private Health Insurance service and the

boycott

deprived them of much of their clientele.

1 Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz
Na~i Polic Toward German Jews 1933-1939 (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1970, p. 105.

EDUCATION

In the field of education "non-Aryans" were expelled
from their positions in schools, colleges, universities,
and

from professional and scientific schools.

Aryan"

t

1

Non-

professors exempt from dismissal faced organized

efforts on the part of the Central Organization of
German Students (Deutsche Studentenschaft), to prevent
the carrying out of their teaching duties.

Aryan"

students fare much better.

attendance

Nor did unon-

Schools in which

was not compulsory, such as universities, were

ordered to reduce their •tnon-Aryan"

a maximum of five percent, and new

student bodies to
11

non-Aryan 11 admissions

were limited to 1.5 percent of the student body.i
•

Thus

by

i

the onset of 1934, with some exceptions

(mentioned above)

no Jews, "half Jews" or "quarter Jews"

could legally hold public office, receive or maintain
a position in the civil service, practice law, serve as

1 Warburg, .2.E.• cit., p. 130.

r

judge, notary, or juror.

Teaching in the public schools,

colleges, universities, or even technical institutes
became virtually impossible, as well as attendance of any
non-compulsory insititnte except within the framework
of the aforementioned limitations.

Furthermore, Jews could not belong to German
(Aryan) learned societies, sport clubs, art circles, nor

could they work in any of the arts including the theater,
opera, movies, music, radio or press.l: They were limited
as well in the fields of architecture and ~uthorship.

They were deprived of the right to practice medicine
or dentistry in any public service hospital (encompassing
most of the medical practice in Germany).

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

The fate of business was not much better than that
of the other fields.

It became increasingly difficult

for Jews to secure na\~ional or local government contracts,
which under National-Socialist "co-ordination" comprised
a significant share of the nation's business.

It was

made clear to officials that in placing orders, prefer-

ence was to be given to nAryans" and particularly to

1 The Amercan Jewish Committee, 2E.•

ill•,

p. 161.

q

loyal National-Socialists.
The stock and produce exchange were purged of "non-

Aryans'i

The large industrial cornorations and commercial

unions introduced "Aryan"

clauses concerning membership

into their consititutions.
The drive to eliminate Jews from business was
slower than the more comprehensive means employed in other
fields.

This relative leniency was due to fears of econ-

- omic dislocation rather than concern for the welfare of
the victims.
"Aryan"

The method of forcing Jews to take in

partners and give them a majority of the shares
I

in a corporation was one means

employed to prevent

dislocation or in some cases even complete collapse of
the t., Aryani zed"

enterprise.

MANUAL LABOUR

In the sphere of manual labour, the absence of
legislation preventing Jews from continuing in their
crafts has not spared

them.

tions prohibited "non-Aryan"

The numerous state associamembership, thus effectively

excluding Jews from membership in manual trade guilds,
which were ~ompulsory for the pursuit of artisanship

and handicrafts.

AGRICULTURE

.,o

In order to exclude Jews from agriculture, the
law of September 29, 1933 regulatine peasant holdings,
included a provision stating that only a person of
German or related blood could be a peasant. 1

DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

As early as July 14, 1933, a law was passed
depriving some Jews of German citizenship and
nationality. It called for a withdrawal of these
rights in a provision which applied in the case
where naturalization had been granted between the
9th of November 1918, and the 30th of January, 1933
and was later considered undesireable. 2 It was added
that Jews from Eastern European countries were
especially undesireable as German nationals.

A cmr.PREHENSIVE PICTURE

For a comprehensive picture of the predicament
of German Jewry, it is necessary to consider not only
the racial legislation but its application, as well as

1 Ibid., p. 167:.
2 Ibid., p. 170.

I

National Socialist Party activity1 such as the aforementioned organized boycott. ·
With the identification of party with state and the
usurpation of governmental positions by party members,
Na tional Socialist policy was able to assert itself in
the various organizations throughout the country.
In the courts the principle of equality before the
law was replaced by the principle of racial inequality;
the independence of the judiciary was replaced by a
system whereby judges were agents of the party, whose
position depended on adherence to party policy,

and to

whom great latitude was giv en in adjudicating and impos ing
a penalty ev~n where a l aw may not have b e en violated.

-

This situation led to the imposition of disabilities

on Jews long before statutes were enacted to support
them.

Thus for example, long before the promulgation of

the · Nure~berg Laws of September 15, 1935, which prohibited marriage between "Aryans" and Jews, the German courts

in numerous instances upheld and justified local officials
who refused to perform such marriages or granted divorces
to•~ryans' on the basis of racial principles.
Nurenberg on Easter 1934 to the
1
High Commissioner for Refugees was very revealing.
A report from

l

Report from Nure mberg to the High Commissioner for
Refugees (Jewish and other) coming from Germany
Easter 1934 ( March April)
James G. McDonald Papers, Columbia University New
York, file No 356. ( From n ow on to be cit ed a s
r., cDonald •P a pers)

I

I

/

While the German government continued to claim that no
difference in the economic field was made between "Aryans"
and "non-Aryans,"

the report pointed out that it has

become very difficult for Jews to obtain positions in
Christian concerns.

When Jewish firms were taken over

by "Aryanstt their Jewish employees were dismissed.
National Socialist newspapers no longer accepted advertisements by Jews. "Aryans"

who bought in Jewish shops

were photographed and had their pictures paraded through
the streets.

Posters appeared on the streets of

Nureim-

berg which read "Tell me whom you buy from and I will tell
you who you are,"
concerns. 0

or

"The German buys from German

Non-Jewish concerns displayed posters in

honour of German handicraft while "Aryan" lawyers and
doctors added to their shields in black-white and red
letters "German lawyer"

or 'German doctor~

Jews who

were prohibited from displaying such signs were easily
distinguishable from their nAryan°

counterparts.

The government which provided matrimonial loans
in the form of maintenance contribution receipts, only
granted "Aryan"
receipts.

concerns the right to receive such

By this and other means Jewish concerns were

put at a disadvantage.

For example: Jewish furniture

concerns were forced out of business.

Of the thirteen

J_

I3

existing concerns in Nur emberg, eleven had been taken
over by "Aryans."
All this was taking place in an atmosphere of
constant vituperation and vilification 1 often leading to
excesses in which Jews were assaulted, and in some cases
murdered.
Conditions varied throughout the Reich.

Nure.lrlberg 1

which was under the provincial leader Julius Streicher,
was particularly hard hit.

POST 1933 LEGAL AND OTHER .MEASlJRES TAKEN AGAINST GERMAN
JE"NRY

CIVIL SERVICE
By June 1934, about 2,000 state or municipal officials
with advanced training had lost their positions.

Although

some found employment in commerce and industry the majority
remained jobless and despera~~•

1

MEDICINE

Legally, "non-Aryan"
1

physicians and dentists who

Report to the High Commissioner for Re~ugees(Jewish and
other) Comin~ from Germany. June 5, 1934, p.10.
McDonald Papers file No 356.

I

were admitted to practice before 1914, who fought at the
front, served in a military hospital during the war, or
who lost a father or husband in the war, could continue
to serve as physicians under the Health Insurance Service.
But by 1934, claims certified by "non-Aryans"

for

compensation or pensions under the Social Insurance
regulations were no longer honored. This forced the
parties concerned to seek other than Jewish physicians.
By June 1934 out of a total of 9 1 000 Jewish or
"non-Aryan"

medical doctors before the National Socialists

came to power, only 5,000 were left in practice.

Of the

remaining 4,000 about 3,000 were prohibited from practicing within the framework of the National System of Medical
Insurance, while 1,000 were dismissed from hospitals.
Of these 4,000 physicians about 1,000 were able through
private capital and private practice to carry on for a
while. Another 1,000 found other employment or had a
private practice still large enough to support them. Thus
2,000 were left in difficulty and many of them emigrated. 1
LAW

B~ June 1934, the situation of Jewish lawyers was
lL Ibid., pp.

8,9. file No. 356.

I

I :

more serious than ·that of the physicians. Of the
5,000 Jewish lawyers in 1933, approximately 1,650

had been barred from prac~icing in court. Of those
who were still admitted to the bench, only 1,500
had adequate incomes, leaving the remainder, approximately
1,850, with insufficient earnings.

One factor responsible for this situation was
the 60 per cent decline in trials and transactions, both
under civil and criminal law, in comparison to 1932.
Of the remaining cases 50 per cent were conducted under
the stipulation of the poor law (i.e. cases in which the
state payed for the lawyer's services). Even among those
Jewish lawyers who were still admitted to the bar very
few were allowed to handle such cases. Thus, compared to

1932, only

20 per cent of all legal cases were open to

Jewish attorneys. But from amidst these cases Jewish
lawyers lost many, since corporations preferred to employ
"Aryans".
To the 1,650 debarred lawyers and the 1,850 in

need must be added another 500 who were completing their
professional training at the time Hitler rose to power. 1

1 : Ibid., pp.

7, 8. file No. 356.
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EDUCATION

The situation of Jewish teachers by June 1934, was
comparatively satisfactory. Of a total of 1,200,
600 had jobs in Jewish schools before the Hitler era.

The extension of the Jewish school system permitted the
absorption of another 300, while further expansion was
expected to provide for the rest. 1
The Jewish student population in Germany was
shifting away from the German public schools and towards
Jewish institutions. This was the case even with children
unaffected by the quota and was rather a measure taken
to protect them from abuses to which they were subjected
in the non-Jewish schools.
The National Socialist Government, which gradually
expelled Jewish children from state schools, gave subsidies
to their segregated elementary schools and payed Jewish
teachers pensions until

1939. Also in the early years

the Jewish educators of these schools were allowed great
latitude in setting up courses of study.
1

Ibid., p. 10.,. file. No. 356.
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CULTURE

While National Socialist policy was to eliminate
Jews from German cultural life, official permission was
granted for the creation of a Jtldischer Kulturbund.
The organization was able to employ numerous Jewish
artists and was permitted complete autonomy for a while.
But this was shortlived and soon everything had to be
submitted to censorship.
With the demographic and economic decline of
German-Jewry the Kulturbund faced dissolution but was
ordered to renew its work after the November 1938 pogrom.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

By 1935, the pressure on Jewish business had
reached the point where nearly the only sphere of activity
left Jews was to buy and sell amongst themselves.
National Socialist legislation, administrative
actions, and party activities were instrumental in the
segregation of German-Jewry. Numerous German towns excluded
- - - --

-- · -

-

--

-·-

Jews from their jurisdiction, while individual "Aryans"
were discouraged from having con.tac~ with them.
\

THE NUREMBERG IlAWS Ai.'1ffi EFTER .

On September 15, 1935, at a National convention
at Nuremberg, the Reichtag withdrew citizenship from all
the Jews of Germany. In what became known as the Nuremberg
t ·aws, a distiction was drawn between Staatsangehtlriger
(a state subject) and a Reich citizen. The former belongei

to the protective association of the German Reich while
the latter applied only t~ state subjects of German or
cognate blood and who demonstrated by their their conduct
that they were willing and fit to serve the German people
and Reich. The right of citizenship was aquired through

the grant of a letter of patent of· Reich citizenship. 1

1 Warburg, £E• cit., pp. 191-192.

See also Reich sgesetzblatt, 1935, p. 1146.

Thus the Jews, no longer citizens, were relegated to the
status of subject (StaatsangehBrige) and deprived of all
political rights.
Additional laws passed at Nuremberg and the November

15, 1935, decree relative to the Reich Citizenship and
Blood Protection Law, prohibited intermarriage as well
as extra-marital relation between Jews and Germans. 1
These laws also forbade Jews to employ female domestic
help of German or related blood under thirty-five years
of age.
Separate schools for Jewish children were ordered and
Jews were denied the right to display German flags,although
they were permitted to display their own colors (blue and
white). The same month saw legislation for the expulsion
of the remaining Jewish civil servants.
A report delivered by the High Commissioner for
refugees subsequent to the annoucement of the Nuremberg
Laws gave the following assesment of the situation in Germany:

"Since (the Nuremberg Laws) the situation
has became very much worse. _The decisive
factor was the new le ~islation announced
at Nuremberg du.ring the Nazi Party
Congress on September 15. Then the
Jews were decreed to be no longer
German citizens. That legislation,
obviously desi~ned to degrad~ those

1

Franz Neumann, Behemoth '1 he Structure and Practice
of National Soc~al ism 1·9 33-1944 ( New York: Harper
and Row, Publisher s, 1966), pp. 113-114.
1

z.o

to whom it applies, has opened the door
for wholesale discrimination. In no field
of activity can Jews in Germany now feel
secure. The limitations heretofore imposed
upon them in cultural and professional
fields are now being extended, one after
another, to their economic activities.
Among the first to feel the rigors of
these new restrictions are the Jewish
business~en . in the smaller towns. Already
they and their families are beginnin~ to
flee to the cities, where they hope to
gain, at least for a time, a measure of
immunity. But in the cities, too, restrictions
imposed by the law or threatened by Nazi
organizations, are so undermining Jewish
businesses and tne confidence on which
their success depends, that one must
anticipate ruinous financial losses. This
in turn increased the burdens on the
Jewish communities and at the very time
when it is officially decreed that German
Jews are not to have the benefits of the
winter relief program of the Government.
_ In short, all the infor~ation that
comes to me, as well as my own observations
during brief trips to Germany in August and
September, convince me that life in Germany
for large numbers of Jewish people, is
becoming almost unbearable." 1

A report issued on January

1937 2 from Germany

painted a grim picture. The open boycott was continuing
mainly in the small towns. But there, even food delivery

1 Talk of James G. McDonald delivered over the
facilities of the National Broadcasting Company
_ a_t 7:00 P.M •. J~ew York time October 11, 19.55.
I McDonald Papers, file · No 356.
!

2 Report submitted to the Council for German.
Jewry, January 1937, pp. 3,4,5. Zionist Archives,
New York

to Jews was affected. With the increasing shortage of
food and raw materials, only non-Jewish firms were
considered, resulting in the closing down of Jewish
firms. Jewish bookshops were ordered to deal only in
J ·e wish books and Jewish literature, which would make
survival impossible for most firms.
Jews who had been out of Germany for over three
months were refused reentry into the country. This
also applied to Jewish children sent to study abroad.
Other Jews who had left Germany for only brief periods
were summoned by the Gestapo, accused of having been out
· of the country for over three month, and given the
choice of either departure or the concentra~ion camp.
The winter help program may be used as another
indi_cator of the plight of German Jewry. It was first
introduced by the . National Socialist government to
help aLl in distress. In the winter of 1935-1936,
Jews were excluded from the General Fund, but were
permitted to carry on their own collection. In the
winter of 1935-1936 they collected RM. 3,644,000
and in 1936-1937 RM. 3,630,000. These funds went to
assist 83,76lpersons in 1935-1936, and 82,818
the

following year.

The

reduction

in

the latter year must be seen in light of the fact

that the Jewish population of Germany had declined by
20,000 persons in that period.
Besides financial assistance, food, coal, and
clothing were distributed. In Wuerttemberg only 15 per

cent of the Jewish population required help, while the
figures in the Saar region were 38 per cent, in ?,russia

34 per cent,. in Pomerania, 30 per cent. In Berlin 30,000
or 20 per cent of the Jewish population was assisted. 1

As the year 1938 wore on, the situation of German
Jewry progressively deteriorated. On June

9,

the Great

Synagogue of Munich was destroyed, then followed the
destruction of the Synagogues in Nuremberg and Dortmund.
On the 15th of June mass arrests of Jews took place.

,The victims were sent to concentration camps and were
released only after submission of proof of possibility
and intent to emigrate.

In its continuous effort to segregate the Jews of
Germany the National Socialist government enacted a
decree on August 17, 1938, 2 concerning itself with

Jewish first names. It stipulated that every Jew1 unless
he bad a name which was permissable, was required to add
Israel or Sarah. Jews born after the enactment of the
law could be given only such names as were provided
for in the minister's .ruling.
1 Based on report submitted to the Council for
German Jewry, October 19, 1937 p.2. Zionist
Archives, New York
2 Warburg, 2£• cit., p. 198.

<!Ill ~uly . 23, 1938, · ·a ruling required Jews to
apply for special identification papers~ On O~tober 5,
1938; a decree imposed special Jewish stamps on pas-sports
issued to Jews. 1

THE TAXEOVER OF JEWISH PROPERTY. ·

Total legislative exclusion of Jews from the
economic life of Germany was initiated by . a decree:

on April 26~ 1938,

2

which compelled· all Jews to register

their total domestic and foreign properties and prohibited
them to establish any new business without a permit.
On <lUly 6, 1938, 3 a statute was passed which made

Jews inelligable for licenses in a number of fields, such
as watchaman, information and inquiry agents, real estate,

agents, real estate administrators, loan corn.miss.ion agents,
marriage agents (with the exception of marriages among

Jews), and _guides.
A

decree of November 12, 1938, 4 forbade Jews to

1 Ne~ann, .2.E.• cit., p. 115~
2 Helmut Genschel, Die Verdr~ J nP der Juden aus der
Wirtschaft im Dri tten Reich GtHtingen: Musterschmidt
Verlag, 1966) p. 151.
3 Weumann, op. cit., p. 118.
4 Ibid., p.--Y19-.-

carry on handicraft, retail, or mail order business,
or to sell their wares at markets and fairs. It
requires the elimination of Jews from plant management,
authorized employers to dismiss their more important
Jewish employees, and co-operatives to expell their
Jewish members.
A decree issued on November 23, 1938,

provided

that Jewish businesses forced into liquidation be turned
over to appropriate groups in industry or trade for
safekeeping, appraisal, and possible disposal •
. This enactment, which only affected the retail and
handicraft business, was supplemented by another decree
on December 3, 1938,

~

which struck at every Jewish

industrial enterprise that could be forced into liquidation.
The government reserved the rig~t to appoint trustees to
supervise the clearance of such enterprises. It also
authorized the government to order any Jew to sell his
agricultural or forest lands as well as real estate. It
forbade Jews to aquire such holdings, or dispose of them
without special consent; nor could they mortgage them.
Jews were required to deposit all stocks and bonds in
a recognized bank and to obtain permission of the federal
minister of economics to dispose of them. An additional
1 Genschel, op. cit., p. 188~

decree on February 21, 1939, required Jews to surrender
their gold, platinum, silver, jewels, and similar
possessions to special purchasing agencies established
by the Reich.
A decree of October 31, 1938 stated that
exemptions allowable for children did not_ apply if
they were Jewish. On Rpril 30, 1939,

a decree was

promulgated denying Jewish tenets any protection
against notices from landlords.

1

By means of forced sales, Jewish enterprises
passed into "Aryan" hands with little compasation to
their owners. Pressure was applied to eliminate Jews
from partnerships with Germans, resulting in the
Aryanization of such enterprises. Jews were not only
denied protection from abuses by Aryan _competitors
but in some cases were victimized by their official
encouragement. Germans had the right to warm
customers

agaist buying

Courts granted

"Aryans"

from Jewish rivals.
the rieht to

1 Neumann·, 2.E.• c-i t., pp. 119-120.

withdraw

from long term contracts ~ith Jews. Protection of
labor legislation gradually became inapplicable
where Jews were concerned • .
By 1938, Jews were completely eliminated from

the civil service and the free professions, and the
destruction of their economic position on a massive
scale was at hand.

KRISTALLNACHT
On October 28, 1938, 15,000 Jews in Germany
holding Polish passports were served deportation
notices. Eventually 17,000 were rounded up and
transported to Poland, which denied them entry. 1
Herschel Grynspun, the son of one of these
deportees was residing in Paris at the time.

Possibly in ~•action to the deportation and att~ndant
cruelties, he assesinated Ernst Vom Rath, third

secretary of the German embassy in Paris.
This served as an excuse for a pogrom against
the Jews. The November 8,9, and 10, riots that followed,
oecame known as Kristallnacht. They wore organized by

the Party and resu~ted in the most massive destruction
of property and murder of Jews undertaken by the
National Socialists to date. It was accompanied by mass
arrests of thousands of Jews who were then sent
to concentration camps. The Reichsvertretung was shut

l Schleunes, ££• cit., p. 238.

down on November 11th and occupied by the Gestapo.
All Jewish political organizations were disbanded
after November 10th, but the Reichsvertretung was
later allowed to resume work. The emigration
department of the Palestine office (a division of
the Jewish Agency) and the Hilfsverein der . Deutschen
Juden (German Jewish Relief Association), as part of
~

the Reichsvertretung, were also allowed to continue;
althogh the Nazis had arrested employees of the
Hilfsverein.
Following the November riots, as punishment
for alle ged Jewish "hostility to the German people an
Reich", a fine of 1,000,000,000, marks was levied on
all Jews with property worth 5,000 marks or more.
This was labled an atonement payment (SUhneleistung).
---

The levy was to be raised as a tax of 20 per cent on
all property belonging to such Jews, and was made
· payable in in four equal installments.
As further punishment a decree of the· 12th of·
November 1938t compelled the Jews of Germany to pay
for all the damages to Jewish businesses and houses
incurred during the November riots. In order to pay
these levies Jewish property bad to be liquidated
and numerous holdings were wiped out.
1 Neumann, op. cit., p. 120-. , also Reichsgesetzb]att__
1938, p. r;79-:--

The November riots were the last manifestation
of mass anti-Jewish violence on the str~ets of Germany.
The mass destruction of property was harmful to the
economy of the Reich, reaction abroad was highly
critical, and the boycott against German goods spread.
Future measures against the Jews were more
professional, systematic and orderly.

CHANGING ATTITUDE OF GERMAN JEWS
According to Eliezer Livneh (Livenstein) most
Ger~an Jews thought that Hitler would not come to power.

They also did not expect that he would be as severe
with the Jews as he- was 1 • The -Jewish press varied in
its appraisal of the anti- Semitic element in the National Socialist program. The Zentralverein Zeitung • which

presented the views of the majority of German Jewry thought
before Hitler's _rise to power to fight anti-Semitism in
response to the National-Socialist threat~

During the

years immediately preceding the Nazi takeover it switched
to a political fight against National-Socialism,

The

Jlldische Rundschau already before 1933 broached the
idea that German Jewry would be in grave danger .in
case of a Natiopal Socialist tak~-over6 2
In the early stages

of -the Nazi rule .

most German Jews were against any strong action_ .in op~

position to Hitler. They did not take his threat at

.face value. 3 Important German Jewish leaders did not
1 Taped interview of Eliezer Livneh by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The - Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 6.
* Organ of the Zentralverein d~utscher Staatsbtlr~er
jtldischen Glauoens (anti-Zionist)
2 Werner Feichenfeld, Dolf r.1ich2.elis and Ludwig Finner,
Haavara-Transf er .Nach .PaH!stj.na und Eimvanderung Deut-

scher Juden lY33-1939 (J.C.b. Mohr
Ttibingen, 1972) p. 16.

3

Paul Siebeck)

Taped Interview of Nahum Goldmann by Avraham t-.1argaliot

Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew Unj_versity of Jerusalem, No 4.

consider seriously a total Jewish evacuation of Germ~ny 1 .The concept of cultural autonomy for~ Jewish
minority was seen as a possible solution to the Jewish
problem. This idea was brought up numerous times by
Robert ~cltsch 1uring 1934 in the Jildische Rundschau ~
Even some anti-z·onist Jews adopted similar concepts,
as was the case with the Deutscher Vortrupp GefolE5.=.

. schaft deutscher Juden, headed by Hans Joachim Schoep5i,.
This anti-Zionist group propounded the vBlkische idea
that the Jews were just another German Volk, just as
the Saxons were

Schoeps proposed that German Jewry be

given ~he status of · "l~gal entity" within the Third
·Reich~ The Zentralverein Zeitung wrote in recogni-

tion of the new situation, after the passage of the
first anti-Semitic legislation in April 1933, tha~
the Nazi view o! race and the Semites' unsuitability
in the national life of Germany has become state law~

It added that German Jewry, while denying the justice
of this, must yield to this force. 4

The Zionistische

Vereinigung fllr Deutschland declared that the Jews must
1 Ibid.

• jlldische Rundschau was a pro~Zionist newspaper~

2 Kurt R. Grossmann,uzionists and Non-Zionists

under Nazi Rule in the 1930s",Herzl Yearbook, Essays
··n Zionist Histor and Thou ht
Volume IV (New York:
Herzl Press, 1961-1962 , p.330.
· :; Karl A. Schleune, The Twisted Road to Aus9hwitz, Nazi
Policy towards German Jews 1933-1939 (Chic a go: Univer_s i ty of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 188.
4 Werner Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michaelis, Ludl
Haavara-Transfer Nnch Pal~stina und Einw
scher Juden 1935-19?9, (Ttibingen: J.C.B.
Siebeck, 1972), p. 16

Pinner,
_. rung Deut•
~nr, Paul

'1 /

take cognisance of their situation and muster the
strength not only to bear their fate, but even more
so, to rebuild their lives. And after the countrywide
anti-Jewish boycutt of April, 1933~ an article by
Robert veltch in the Jtldische Rundschau proclaimed
"wear it with pride, that yellow badge 11 • 1 Thus was
humiliation to be turned into a-source of pride.
The Zionist leadership itself was not united
on the question of what should be done. While _Weizmann
concerned himself only with emigration of German Jewry
rather than having them fight for their rights, Nahum
Goldmann advocated that they do both

2

. .

• The Jewish

assimilationist groups opposed both ·emigration and autonomy.This they believed would only serve to separate
them from the German people. The Ass6ciation of .Jewish
Veterans ·was opposed to emigration 3 • ~st German Jews
were _strongly attached to their country and its culture
and lived with the hope that the Hitler -era would soon

· pass.

1 Ibid • , p ~ · 1?.
2 Taped· interview of Nahum Goldmann by Avraham Margaliot,

Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; No 4.
3 Kurt R. Grossmann, 11 Zionists and non-Zionists under
l~azi Rule in the 1930s '; Herzl Year Book, Essays in
Zionist History and Thought, Volume IV (New York:
Herzl Press, 1961-1962), p.330.
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Number ot
Jewish
Emigrants

Year

1933
1934
1935

37,000
23,000
21,000
25,.000

.1936

1937
1938

1933 -- JID E 30, 1938.

(up to

June 30)

23,000
14,000

As graph A and table I show after the first shock
of 1933 subsided, emigration decreased (from 37,000 in

1933 to 23,000 in 1934). It 1s · well known ·that in those
early years there was even a return migration. The emigration trends of German Jewry follow the pattern of increased
pressure and its subsidence as applied by the National
Socialist$against it. Thus the letup in pressure resulted in

a

corresponding decrease in emigration. This de- ·

crease continued into 1935. The Nuremberg Laws, promulgated in the last quarter of 1935 brought. on a new wave
of emigration, as the increase for 1936 would indicate.

In 1936 there was a letup in persecution because the Olympie games were held in Berlin
by a ·decrease in emigration

••

This was again followed

•• •

l Kurt R Grossmann, "Zionists and non-Zionists under Nazi
Rule in .the 1930s 11 , Herzl YeaI Book, Essays in Zionist
History and Thought Volume IV . (New York: Herzl Press,
1961-1962), pp. 33.0-33I4
• Germany was concerned aoout unfavorable propaganda in connection with its teatment of its Jews. About 1936 Olympics see Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Did A
nicle of American Apathy (New York: Random Hous~' 196?
•• See table I and graph A.

Graph A,Total Jewish .Emigration from Germany
Compared to Emigrgtion of German Je~s
into Palestine (figures in thousands)
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1 See table I

2 See table II in chapter titled Migration from

Germany to Palestine.

The Nurenberg Laws of September 1935 convinced much
of German J"e\vry that there was no future · for them in that
·_c_o untry, and that the only hope tor the younger generation
was to leave Germany 1 • The National-Socialist persecution

united al1. sec1;ions and parties of German J .3 wry in tht)
work of relief, with the exception of the Socialists 2 •
In ·a March 1931+,_report by Norm.an Bentwich to James G. McDonald the former described the increased activity

within

the Jewi~h community of Germany as foll.ows:

.,There is general admiration for the way
in which the Jewish community is facing
its trials and there is great intellectual activity. Lectures are given all ·
over the country and the circulation
of Jewish newspapers is going up by
leaps and bounds and the concerts and
performances given by the Jtidischer Kulturbund in Berlin are exceptionally
well attended"3.
As Jewish children were forced out of German
schools, their number

attending Jewish schools increased,

so that by August 1934, out of about 60,000 Jewish schoolchildren 18,000 attended Jewish schools, and this number

as constantly growing 4 •

l Note of a Plan for the Emigration of German Jewry, January 2,1936, IIcDonald Papers file No. 356.

2

A report of 1934,

3 Report

McDonald Papers file No. 356.

by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald,
28 9 1934, McDonald P~per.s f~+e No. 35~-

March

4 Informationsbl1tter im Autra 5 e des Zentralausschusses
der Deu~schen Juden filr iiilfe und Aufbau, lo 6, August
27, 1934, The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zioni.st· Archives,·Jerusalem, Document No 87/24.
·

· 'l'hore was financial solida.ri ty within the com.mu..

nity ~swell, so that · in the words of Giora Lotan_ (Georg~
Lubi~sky) ~- ·"no Jew had to go with~ut the mininium'il.

German Jewry's attitude of lookin~ down on East European Jews lessened afte~_l933~ as they .began to realiz~
,

that they_ shared. a common fate

2

• Interest in Palestine

and participation in Zionist activities increased mar-kedly after .the National Socialist takeover. T~e for-

mer is revealed by a survey of the activities of the Fa'lestine Department (office) in Berlin during th~ period
April to December 1933, Within a half year period the

Berlin Advisory Boar d of the Palestine· Department ·had
been consulted by 25,000 persons

In the survey it

estimated that ·t his information must have reached at

· least 75,000 •*.or . approximately half the Jewish popu~
lation of Berlin. Coriditions throughout _the Reich
resembled those . in Berlin.3.
*Zionist activist in Germany and former Director or
the Israel National Insurance Institute.
1 Taped interview of Giera Lot an by Avraham Marg aliot,, ; , Oral History Division of the Institute of ·
Con-temporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of . Jerusalem No 7.
··
2 Taped interview of Reuven Eytan by Avraham Margalio~,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contempo-rary Jewry, ._ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 2.
3 Report from the Berlin Palestine Department of the
•. Jewish Agency for Palestine to the American Palestine
Campaign, December l, · 1933, Survey of the activities
of· the Palestine Department since April 1, of this
Year(l933),Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.
**The assumption was that each individual reached at least
two relatives.

The £ollowi r.t6 dericription of tha inc::-eased pace of

activity at the Pal~stine Office ·in Berlin is revealing:
urn. recent years the Palestine Department of the

Berlin Office of the Jewish Agency consisted ot - a small voltunteer staff whose sole task was
the distribution of the small number of the
Category C certifacates which coLstituted Germany's share. At the same time this staff answered inquiries from the few people who were
interested in emigration to Palestine.
_ This situation changed immediate1y when,
as a result of the nationalist · revolution the
l~gal position of Jewry in Germany underwent a
fundamental change. The Palestine Department
was suddenly stormed by a large number of Jews~
independent merchants, clerks and industrial
employees, physicians,attorneys and members -of
other professions- who feared that the econo•
mic basis of their lives would be jeopardized
or entirely destroyed, and who therefore became interested in building up a new life in
Palestine" l.

An increasing number of Jewish youths in Germany chose vocations in agriculture, the various trades, and,
in the case of women, domestic training. This was done with
the intent of obtaining immigration certificates to Palestine
"""
based on their new skill~.

German Jews helped in the training or young would-be

em_igrants by providing their agricultural holding~ for Hac~shara. According to Giora Lotan some sought by this means ·

to save their agricultural property on the basis that it
furthered emigration :3• •
l Ibid.
2 Ibid.

3 Taped interview of Giora Lotan

by Avraham Margald.ot, Oral
History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No?.
• Also see chapter titled Nazi Policy concerning Jewish Emigration from Germany to Palestine, (National Socialist
·
policy was to support activities that promoted emigration) ·

Membership in gsc~a.l,~~z jumped from 500 members

at the beginning of 1933 to 13,000. by the end; of the
year· 1 • Subscriptions to the Zionist organ JUdische
Runds~hau

2

.

ugrew enormously,. • Of 118. who replied in

my questionnaire to the question nwhat Jewish newspeper

did you read in Germany" 59 said the "Jildische Rundschau~

7 stated the "Zentralvereinze:'Ltung tt 28 said "none
the remainder read a variety

or

0

,

and

other Jewish newspapers,

many of them local ones.
The Kameraden, a non-Zionist youth organization,became Zionist, although a part of the group re-·
mained com~unists 3 •· In Munich ·1n the 1935-1936 pariod
alone membership in the . Zionist Party rose from 80 to
600 and continued to rise afterwards by another 100

to 200<)

.:.

ContributiorJ.S to Keren_Ka;vemet increased gr·eat•
ly,

According to Reuven Eytan

East European__ J ews in

Germany joined Zionist activiti sin reaction to Na=

tional Socialism more readily than did German Jewsd 4 ,
1 Based on report in The New Palestine, December 29,
· -1933, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine,, T~e Central Zionist Ar.chives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/b9.
·
.
.
2 Taped interview of Giora Lotan -by Avraham Margaliot,
.Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 7.
3 Taped interview of Eliezer Livneh by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of tbe Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 6.
4 Taped interview of Reuven Eytan$ by Avraham Margaliot
· Oral History Division of the Institute for Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 2.

This is confirmed to some extent by _Giora Lotu~~According to whom they were particularly strongly represented . in .the Hechalutz -m ovement 1 .0n the other hand,

- -- - - -

at least _in the early years~there were categories

·or

people who were .· c=isinclined to join the Zionist mov.ament

or consider emigration to Palestine, as the following
rep·o rt of December, 1933, . from the Artisans Aliyah_ Di-

vision of the .Palestine Office in Berlin indicates;

"This division has discovered that . Germany
has many experienced Jewish artisans such as masons, carpenters, ~echanics,
plumbers, joiners, locksmiths etc.~ wh~
know their trades so thoroughly and have
practiced them for so · many years that
.
they would indubitably prove most valuable
in Palestineo Though it must be conceded
that hitherto these people have shown
very little interest in Jewish and Zionist
affairs. ,t

~

Then there were cases ·11ke that of Leo Baeck* who had
offers of good positions outside of Germany but whQ• saw
their function as that

or

cont~nuing to serve the remain~

ing Germen Jews}:.

1 Taped· interview of Giera Lotan by· Avraham Margaliot ·,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary ·
·Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 7.
2 Renort from the Berlin Palestine Department of the Jewish
Agency for Palestine to the American Palestine Campaign,
December 1, 1933, Survey of the Activities of the
Palestine Department since Aprill (1933), Central Bureau
for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist
Archives, New York.
.
3 Taped interview of Giora Lotan by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary .
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No. 7.
• For more details see Friedlander, Albert H., Leo Baeck
Leben und Lehre 1 London: East and West Library, 1973.

The Jewish im~igration from Germany to Palestine
was less erratic than the general emigration of German
Jewry

••

The peak in Jewish emigration from Germany rea-

ched in 1933 saw a sharp decline in 1934 and continued
to decline ~n 1935

and then rose abruptly in 1936 ••. •

This was not paralled by the emigration ·of Jews

from

Germany to Palestine. Graph A shows that t _h is migration . reached nearly 8,000 in 1933 and rose slightly in 1934
and maintained this general · 1evel thrbugh 1935 and 1936.
The majority of Jews who left -Germany in 1933 went to the
neighboring European countries on a temporary basis ~nly •••.•
Those Jews who went to Palestine in most cases went there
to settle ·. This would indicate that the migration to Palestine was a more planned one, requiring more elabo~~te
preparation and arrangement. This view is supported by
the answers to my questionnaire where I asked both
"when did you decide to leave Germanytt and "when did
you leave Germanyn. Forty seven said that they decided
to leave Germany in 1933., but only 31 actually did. · For
the years 1933 and 1934 combined 59 decided to leave and

49 actually did so, and if we add the year 1935 we hav~a total of 73 wno decided to leave and only 61 w~o actually. left 1 • Another indicator or· long range planning
was the fact that parents sent their children to Palestine
in advance of their o~n migration. Out of 117 who answered
•
••
•••
1

.· - -~ -, .
·.
See graph A-. ·. r , · ·
See graph A
See- chapter titled .alt'e rnate ;Places of - Refuge.
See table II
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my question "if you had children, did they precede you .
to Palestine? , 20 said "yes", 3 said that some of their
.

.

children did and some did not, 34 said "no•tt or that their
children were born in Israel and for the remainder this
question did not apply.
The im~igration of German Jews into Palestine
amounted ·to a population transf~r representing a crosssection of the social structure of German Jewry, which
was predominantly middle class. This is undoubtedly due
t ·o the fact that we are actually dealing with a -r efugee
population. With few exceptions, these people

ould not

have left Germany, had it not been for their persecution
by the National ·socialists. Only 9 out or·113 who ans-

wered the question in my questionnaire: ttWhat triggered
your decision to leave · Germanytt• said "Zionism", the rest
indicated in one form or another that persecution by
the National Socialists was the decisive factor.
Of those who came to Pale~tin·e, many had .
no other alternative. Of 113 who ans ered the question
in my questionnaire: Did you have any alternative to

Palestine", _47 replied in the negative and 14 others ·
said that they did not consider any other alternative.

Before 1933 less then 5 pe~ cent of the Jews
in Ger~uny belonged to Zionist organizations. 1 Even·
a:nong th~se who came to Pales.tine, the majority were
never aembers of a . Zionist organization. Fifty nine
out of 116 who l:'esponced to my question: "Did.you
belong to a Zionist organization in Germany" said "no",
and of the remainder 12 joined in 1933 or after.
This group of immigrants who, unlike their
predecessors, were highly assimilated and had a very
limited knowledge of Jewish culture, found the
readjustment problem particularly difficult. Some did
not remain in Palestine. Of those who did remain many
found it very difficult to learn Hebrew. ;
1

Not only

their deficient background but also their reluctance to
speak the language poorly, due to their perfectionist
at~itude contributed to this difficulty. Almost ali continued to speak German in Israel •. Only one out 117 who
responded to my questionnaire: "Do you speak German in
Israel?" said "no. The majority do speak some Ifebrew, .
some speak the language- well, but others still do not
speak it at all.

1 }1erner Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michaelis, and Ludwig Pinner,

Haayara-Transfer nach Pal~stina und Einwanderung Deut··· scher Juden 1933-1939 (TUbingen,: . J .c .B. Mohr, 1972), p. 109.

Their children on the other hand, have done
better. Those who went to school in Israel all speak
Hebrew but even more significant in terms of integration
into Israeli society is their marriage patt~rn. In the
case of 63 out qf 111 children whose pa~ents answered
my

question in the questionnaire: "If your children

have married in Israel did they marry ~ersons of German
origin" the response was negative •
. The older generation has maintained a marked
degree of unity, particularly in social matters.

·

Friendship circles ar e still marked .by a common German
background and even old age homes are set up along
these lines.

II. GERMAN-JEWISH IM;.1 IGRATION TO PALESTINE

BEFORE 1933
Up to 1933 the German-Jewish immigration to Palestine was of relatively little ~mportance. It tota- led only 2,048

for the years 1920 - 1932. As a percen-

tage of the total immigration to Palestine for those

years it represented a low of only

0.7

per cent

for

the years 1925 - 1928, and a high of only 3.0 per cent
for the year 1929. By contrast in 1933, the year of Hitler's rise to power, their total number increased to

6,803
for that year alone,representing 24.8 per cent
of that years total im!lligration to Palestine. The avai- .
lable figures as to categories of immigrants indicate
that between 1925 and 1932 only 241 persons were described as being of independent means or the Capitalist Category, while 408 entered on

the Labour Schedule.

Dependents of Palestine Residents accounted for a total
1
.
or ·750
immigrants. This contrasts sharply with the
post 1932 immigration of German Jews where the Capitalist A-I category of immigrant represanted· 37.1 par
for the years 193 3 . - i\larch 1939, and Labour Category C was only 35.6 per cent 2 of the total German-

cent

Jewi$h -im~igration for those yea~s. These figures indi-

h See Table I.
2 The Jewish Agency f o:' Fales tine Central Bureau for
the Settlenant of Ger~~n Jews Rcoort to the XXIst
Zionist Cor: '.:-ress ariu to th-~ Cot.:ncLl. of the tT•= \·1ish
Agency for ~alesti~e i~ Geneva JcrusaieCT: Central
Bureau fnr the oet,:J.e!:tent of Ger:::qn Jews · in Palestine,
August
1939), p. T5, table IV. (.From now on to b~~
.
cited as oentral Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist
Congress, August, 1939.)

1../ t/
Table

r1

Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany
1920-1933
Year

Citizenshi:2
German Other Total

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
Total
!920-24

FJ25*

175
185
38
71
180

?
?
?
?

175
185
38
71
180

649
262
71
9
6

?

649

?

1926
917
569
1927
1928
Total
1925-28 348
569
917
109
152
1929
43
103
1930
47
56
42
30
72
1931
2
1932
155
153
1933 5,750 1,053 6;803
Total
Ig2Y-33
6,035 1,250 7,285

Catee5or-ies
Persons Depend- Labor Not Total ,
of In- ents of Sched- Stadepend- Pales- ule
ted
ent
tine
Means
Residents
175
1?5
185
185
38
38
71
71
180
180
649

649

127

703

87

91?

127
5
13
16
80
3,150

703
13
9
17
524

87
139
77
58
3,129

-

917
152
103
72
155
6,803

3,264

571

3,450

-

7,285

8

47

Percentage of Immigrants from Germany in Relation to 2
the Total Number of Jewish Immigrants from 0-cher Countries
1920-1924
1925-1928
1929
1930
1931 1932
1933

1.4
0.7
3.0
2.1
1.8
1.7
24.8

Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
Fer
Per

Cent
Cent
Cent
Cent
Cent
Cent
Cent

1 Based on Jewish Agency Figures.

Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in
Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/69.
2 Ibid.
* Particulars regarding the classificatio!l of immigrants
according to citizenship are available only as of May

1925.

cate the pioneer makeup of the ~re-1933 GermanJewish immigration, whe!e there were 70 per cent

more labour than capitalist immigrants, as opposed to ·
the middle class composition of the post 1933 immigration,

where the capitalist immigration actually outnumbered
the labour category im.~igration.

Although, as ind i cated, the i mm i gr a tion of
German J ew s to Falestine before

1933 was small in

numbers, their i mp ac t on the early Yis h uv outstripped
their numeric a l p ro po rtion. Am on~ these immi g r a nts
were so me very i mp ort a nt p ersonnalities, both Zionists
and non-Zionist~ a nd their organiz a tions which left their
mark in Palestine.
On Septe mber 21,

1898, Paul Nathan wrote to the.

Germ8n Forei gn Office p ro p osin g the est 0 blis~ment of a
German

school system for the Jews in the Middle East.
/

Such a project requir~d the consent. of· the German
government. In the same year Max Bodenheimer accompanied
Eerzl on his trip to Jerusa-lem to meet vi.Tith the German
Kaiser. The Kaiser himself expressed interest in the ·
role that German Jewry could play in f.alestine. According
to ·B odenheimer, when the Kaiser traveled from Moza to
I

Jerusalem, he noticed a building or the Alliance Israelite
Universelle. This French-Jewish . organization sought to
spread French culture in the Niddle East. The Kaiser
thou ght this to be a very good idea and asked -: "Why don't
our Jews do the same thing?"
In 1901 the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden was
founded. Ostensibly its purpose was to improve the social

1 Max Bodenheimer und Henrietta Hannah Bodenheimer, Die
ZionisteL und das Kaiserliche Deutschland (Bersberg:
SchMuble Verlag, 1072), p. 110.

and political conditions of the J ews in Eastern Europe
and the Orient. It established i n Palestine
a school system that ex~ended from kindergarten to
teachers' training college. In 1904 it began to found
schools there , but did not stress the German language
and culture to the extent that the Alliance schools did
with Frenc h . The Hilfsverein devoted much attention to
Hebrew along with German . Hebrew was selected as the
language of instruction on the basis that subjects
tau ght in Hebrew be those in whi ch the teachers had
experience and for which there existed an adequate
terminology and a sufficient number of text books.
Its intent was to extend the use of He b rew to as many
subj~cts as possible, wh ile German wa s to become the
chief foreign language. Hebrew was the only language
used in its 11 kindergartens, and in its dozen or so
schools and teachers' training colle ges it was the
primary l angua ge of instruction. 1
The German Zionists and non-Zi9nists (Hilfsverein)
and the German government could find common grounds in the.
pursuit of their interests in Palestine. Bodenheimer wrote
to the German Foreign Office in 1902 that development of the
Zionist movement can be inseparably bound with the advance
of the German civilization and culture in the Orient. From

l Alex Bein, The Return to the Soil A Histor of Jewish
Settlement in Isra.el Translated from the Hebrew by Israel
. Schen) (Jerusalem: The Youth and Hechalutz Department of
the Zionist Organization, 1952),pp. 132-133

L;

the start of its activities in Palestine, the
_ ilfsverein worked to gethe~ with the Zionists~ In

1907 Dr. Paul Iathan, the business manager of the
Hilfsv2rein , came to Palestine . He recognized Haifa's
key position and decided to purchase there a piece of
land for a technical school • . The Hilfsverein believed
that Haifa would turn into a center of comme rce and
industry _for the Middle East. 2

In 1910 Richard Lichtheim met Dr. :Paul Nathan in
Palestine and the latter tried to convince him of the impossibility of realizing his Zionist dream. In his arguments he pointed to th~ disinierest shown for it by the ~: ...
influential Jews of Western Europe, the diffic~lty invol- .
ved in mobilizing the capital required for mass colonization,
and the existing political obstacles. For how would it be
possible to establish a Jewish community or state in a land
inhabited by Arabs, and against the will of the Turkish
authorities?; In 1911 a divergence of interests began
to develop. According to Elias Auerbach in that year
the pressure of the German government to increase

the use of German grew stronger. 4 Thus in 1912 the trend to

1 ffiax Bodenheimer und Henrietta Hannah Bodenheimer,.
££· cit., p~ 111.
2 Be in , £E • c it • , p • 134 •
.
3 Richard Lichtheim, Rtlckkehr; Lebenserinnerungen aus
der Frtlhzeit des Deutschen Zionismus (Stuttgart: Deut
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1970), p. 171.
_
4 Elias Auerbach, Pioneer der Verwirklichung (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1969), p. 325.

f

increase the use of Hebrew ·1n the Hilf sverein schools was
reversed, and some subjects that were heretofore taught in
Hebrew were now handled in German. This policy was opposed
by most of the Yishuv. The conflict came to a head
when the question arose as to which lanBua~e of instruction
should be used in the new Technical Institute to oe opened _
in Haifa. The project of opening a technical institute had

1

its origin in a gift of L 10,000 by a Russian Jewish philanthropist and member of Chovcvei Zion, Leon Visotzky. Hisgift was en~rusted to the Hilfsverein. The Zionist Organization
was represented on the Board of Governors of the Technion
by Achad Ha'am, Yechiel Tschleno~ and Schmaryahu Levin.
Additional funds were raised through the Jewish National
Fund.
The school was to be opened in the spring of
1914. With the Technion an affiliated secondary school (Reali)
was to be built which was to provide a g~neral

educa-

tion and prepare students for later studies in the Technion.
At a meeting of the governing body in October, 1913, it was ?ecided, at the suggestion of the management of the Hilfsverein,that German was to be the language of instruction.
Schmaryahu Levin

proposed a compromise whereby Hebrew

would be the language of instruction in the Reali School,
while German would serve- as the major ;foreign language··. In theTechnion instruction was provisionally to be in German, with
some scientific subjects to be taught in Hebrew. The board

rejected this compromise, promptin3 the Zionist represen~
tatives to withdraw in protest. The Sprach enkampf,

as the

so-called language dispute came to be known, initially concentrated on

the Reali Scho9l since it was to be opened

before the Technion. It soon spread to schools or ·the
Hilfsverein th~oughout the country, encompassing riot only
the teachers, students and parents concerned with ~he
Reali School, but the whole Yishuv. It became a question of
Zionist policy being confronted by . a major challenge. The
argument put forward by those favoring German was that since
Germany, at that time, was the leader in all technical fields,
the students would have to learn German or be · unable to read
the most up-to-date technical literature. Hebrew, on the
other hand, according to them, lacked the technical vocabulary, and this could not be developed fast enough. In re-

.

action to this challenge the Zionist Organization estab'

lished and financed the operation of numerous H~brew
qchools throughout the country. Both students and teachers
declared a strike on the Hilfsverein schools. There were
protest meetings throughout Palestine. The opposition to
t he Hilfsver ein was led by the Teac hers' Association,
formed in 1903 by Ussishkin, with the active support
of the pupils of the upper classes. ~ichard Lichtheim
described Ephrai~ Cohn~Reiss, the director of the
Hilfsverein schools, as a competent administrator, but as
an opponent of Zionism who showed himself to be an

intriguer and a dangerous enemy during the Sprachenkampf. 1
1 Lichtheim, ££· cit., p. 170.

,;
In November, 1913, Paul Nnthan came to Palestine.
His attitude was uncompromising, and he refus _e d to d~scuss
the issues, unless the teachers first gave in unconditionally1. Elias Auerbach, a mAmber of the - buildihg com~ission of
the Technion, met Dr.· Paul Nathan in Port Said as he was on
his way to Palestine.

He

found him angry, and the ensuing

discus2ion gives a cl'ear picture of his views ·o n the subject. He asked if they really believed there that a fe~ fanatics, by arousing the masses, could build~ technical
school in Palestine. He also _questioned whether a technical
school could be established \,ithout the introduction of a
European language • .Elias Aue.rbach who supported the Zionist
side, informed him that it was not -a mat~er of a few fanatics, but was the will of the whole Yishuv to defend the
use of Hebrew. He added that at the moment it was a question
of the Reali School and that he would be unable to find tea1

chers for it. Dr. Nathan replied that he will put a quick
end to this nationalistic outburst

and that he will obtain

as many teachers ' as he wished. He then accused Auerbach of
taking part in the rebellion, to which Auerbach replied that
he helped lead it and was now going to Berlin to warn the
-2
members of the Hilfsverein of their policy.
In Berlin Auerbach met James Simon, head of the
Hilfsverein and a very wealthy and respected industrialist.

1 B~in, op. cit., p. _}:_3~~
2 Auerbach, E.:g• .£.?:.!., pp. 328-329.

Auerbach described him as being impressed by his (Auerbach's)
views and informed him that the Hilfsverein's

policy was
influenced by pressures from the German Government 1 • Accor-

ding to Elias Auerbach the institutions of the Hilfsverein
in Palestine were placed under German protection. Even the
agreement of the Sultan to the establishmetit of the Technion

in Haifa was possible only through the political support of
.

2

the German representation in Constantinople.
~

The Reali School was to be opene~ in 1913, and

Dr. Arthur Biram was selected by the Hilfsverein as the
first director. The conflict delayed the opening of tha
school, as well as Dr. Biram's departure from Germany.

In February, 1914, the· governing bod:Y· of the
Technion accepted a compromise solution by which Hebrew
was to become the language of instruction within four years,
while some subjects were to be . taught in Hebrew immediate'

ly.Only at the beginning of 1920, after World War I, was
t~e Reali School opened under the directorship of Dr. Biram.
The school became a landmark in the Hebrew school system.
It gained much esteem for its pedagogic ideas which, besides

providing a high quality education, stressed the development
of its students' character towards industriousness, _precision in work, and honesty.
Of all . the German Jews who settled in Palestine
during the early pioneering days Arthur Ruppin made the
greatest contribution to the development of the Yishuv.

1 Ibid., pp. 331-332
2 Ibid., p. 325.

To \liscover what led this man to Zionism, and finally to
Fal~stine, it is necessary to study his writings, particulnrly his memoirs, letters, and diaries. Ruppin, who
gr w up in poverty, was forced to leave school at the age
of

15. He worked for nine years in the grain trade where

he earned sufficient money to bring his family out of its .
fin ancial difficulties. He then decided to continue with
bi~~ studies. He passed the examination for a high school

diploma as an external student, then enroled in the Unive sity of Berlin, and later in the University of Halle.
Thc.,re he studied law and economics.

Ruppin

was

introduced to Jewish national aspirations for the first
t j

,n e in Fabruary, 18 92, when he heard a young business

a r t'rentice, named Boschwi tz, give an account of these
id~as to the Graetz Society. He himself remained
undecided. In his diary he stated -: n~here may well
b

something in this fanciful idea of a Jewish State. In

ft H~ t, I am extremely interested in it, but I am doing
my

utmost to banish the thought, as I feel completely German. nl

1 Alex Bein editor, Arthur Ru pin: Memoirs Diaries
l.. 1 etters 2 (New York: Herzl Press, 1971 , p. 63.

./ ./

In other entries he repeatedly expressed the notion that
anti-Semitism would one day make it impossible for him to
remain in Germany, and also recorded

anti-Semitic in-

sults which he had experienced personally. In 1897 he wrote:
"It is quite likely that anti-Semitism vhll one day oblige
me to

emigrate to a country where it does not exist, e.g.
England" 1 • At the time when he wrote ·his book The Jews of ·

Today his attitude to Zionism was still "ambivalent". Herzl's
"diplomatic Zionism" seemed hopeless and unrealistic to ·
him. He drew closer to Zionism after he came to Berlin in

1904 and was introduced to the circle of "practical Zionists",
such as Berthold Feiwal, Martin ~uber, David Trietsch, and
Hans Gideon Heimann 2 • In March 1905, Ruppin joined the Zionist Organization. In 1907 he traveled to Palestine on behalf of the Zionist Organization in order to study the
situation there and investigate the possibilities of Zio1

nist work in the country. Dr. Jacob Thon, whom Ruppin _
came to know at the Bureau for Jewish Statistics and . Demography, was instrumental in arrang~ng this trip. According

to Richard Lichtheim he persuaded Prof'essor Otto Warburg•
to recruit Ruppin for the Zionist Organization's work in
Palestine 3 • Ruppin himself acknowledged Thon's role in in1 Ibid. , p. 62.
2 Ibid., p.

75,

• Otto Warburg was elected Chairman
Organization in 1911.
3 Lichtheim, .£.E· cit., p. · 156.

of the World Zionist

fluencing him to make his first trip there. "Thon himself,
with his enthusiasm for a Jewish National Home in Palestine
was largely responsible for my decision in 1907 to make a
journey to Palestine 111 • Jacob Thon himself settled there
at the end of 1907, while Ruppin's visit resulted in his
'

decision to do the same:"The possibilities of the country
attracted me. True, there were excellent prospects for ·me
in Germany as an economist, or lawyer, or university lecturer. But I had a feeling that no matter how much I would
achieve, I would continue to encounter-hostility -and be regarded as an outsider.I was hoping tha~ in Paiestine I
would be able to work without friction as __ a member -of the communi ty" 2 • There were othe·r factors as well that drove him to
Palestine. These proved less practical and more idealistic
and are revealed in his following entry: uFrom the age of
14, at least, I had cherished great ambitions, which grew

'

.

during the next ten years. It · seemed a waste of time to
lead the life of a Philistine and be content with satisfying material needs alone. I wanted to accomplish higher
things and be remembered by posterity 113 • Palestine could
offer him a chance to accomplish these higher things. After visiting Palestine for the first time he imagined la~gescale settlement there and became "so enthusiastic about
the possibilities that I accepted without hesitation the
1 l3ein editor,.££· cit., p. -~ 4_. __
2 Ibid., p. 86.
3 Ibid., P• 44.

s ug~esti on of the Zion i st Ac t i on Comra itte e to emi gr a te
to Pal est i ne as the representativ e of t he Zionist
Or ga niz a tion . u1 Ruppin , a practical man, saw
Falestine as the pl ace in which t o make his cont r ibution
to the Zionist cause . As he ad of ~he Falest i ne of f ice which
he established in J a f f a in 1908, Ruppin was responsible f~r

Zionist settlement in Palestine. In

this new fi_eld, for

which there was no model to follow, Ruppin was aided by
his knowled ge of economics and sociology. His character was
not that of an adventurer or· gambler. He was hardened by
experiences of poverty during his youth wh ich taught him
self-dis cipline,as is evident from his diary in which he
made entries concerning his future plans. Upon becoming .. ·
fiftee~ he drew up a complete pro gr a ~ for his life up to
the age of thirty. He included in it the years he would
work as an apprentice, the clubs he would join, the languages he would study, his service in the army, his income
over the years, and especially ·the sums he would earn, spend,
2

give to his parents, and save. Although his life did not
proceed according to this plan, the fact that he formulated
one is revealing of his cha racter, attesting to the practical nature of the man · and his suitability to the most difficult task undertaken by him. For it was left to him among

i Ibid., p. 76
2 For more details Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Zionist leaders to make a reality of their dreams. Between

1908 and the outbreak of World War I Ruppin laid the foundations for Zionist settlement in Palestine. He began his
work with very few means at his disposal, but worked relentlessly to raise funds for the purchase of land and the
I

maintenance of new institutions in Palestine .• Ruppin initiated
the purchase of what later became known as Hadar Hacarmel,
Haifa.

When work began on the Technion building in 1909,

the slop~s of Mount Carmel were still uninhabited. Realizing that the area would become a new commercial center and
wishing to avoid a situation where a Jewish institute would
be surrounded by Arab land, Ruppin endeavored to acquire
it as soon as possible. He suggested to professor Otto Warburg that a Palestine Real Estate Company be established for
the purpose of purchasing land in Haifa and Tel-Aviv. War- ·_
burg and his advisor Abraham Avadiovitz agreed to this proposal and raised the necessary capital for the purchase of
the land around the Technion.
Ruppin was also instrumental in the purchase of
large tracts of land in the Jesreel Valley: in the establishment of Tel-Aviv and in the acquisition of land in Jerusalem on which a significant part of the New City was built,
e.g. the Rehaviya quarter. He also helped raise money for
the maintenance of the Bezalel School, founded_by professor
Boris Schatz 1 in Jerusalem. -

• This included the purchase in 1910 of the · grounds on which
Llerhaviva was e2tablis4ed and t~e acquisitions after World
War I or the land for bahala~, ~inegar, Kfar Yehezkel, Geva,
Ein Harod, ~el Yosef, and Beit Alfa.

In 1905, Dalaika (Kinneret) and Um·Juni (Degania)
were acquired for the Jewish National Fund. It was Ruppin's
task to put these lands to use, for under Turkish law they
could have been expropriateQ if left idle for a period
of three years. In 1908 he established the first

Zionist

farm, Kinneret. Repeatedly Ruppin was called upon to mediate
the quarrels between Kinneret's manager and its wor~ers.
In 1909, on the occasion of the first workers' strike in
Kinneret, Ruppin had a long conversation with them. They
complained about the manager's high standard of living in
comparison with theirs' and about his domineering personality. The workers expressed the desire to replace him · ·.;

by a committee selected from their midst. Ruppin refused
to hand the whole Kinneret farm over .to the workers, for
it seemed to him too much of a risk. He agreed to let six
select workers manage a farm independently in the area of
Um Juni (Degania) and drew up a contract in German which
he and the six workers signed}Thus was founded the first
Kvutzah. Ruppin followed the development of Degania with
particular interest and became convinced that in many instances the conditions of the country made the kvutzah the
most suitable means of cultivating the soil.
While the Jewish workers in Palestine supported the establishment of the ~utzot, the middle class Zionists who constituted a majority on Zionist boards and at
Zionist congresses, regarded them as expensive experiments
of a socialist and even communist character. Ruppin was

1 ~ - , pp. 98-1°03.

neither a socialist nor a communist. He established this
type of settlement out of purely practical considerations.
He believed that the kvutzah offered the best and cheapest
way of making young Jews familiar with Palestinian agriculture.1 He and other supporters of the kvutzah had a hard
struggle with its opponents. They successfully resisted
the dissolution of the kvutzot founded in 1927. These developed into the prosperous settlements of Ramat David,
Sarid 1 Gevat, and Mishmar ha'Emek.
On 2,000 dunam bought for the Yishuv in Huldah
Ruppin decided to plant the Herzl Forest, for the lack

or ·

water made thi.s . area unsuitable for cultivation. Ruppin
employed Jewish laborers for this task. He also decid~d
to hire Jews 'to guard the forest, at a time when it was
still the practice to hire Arab watchmen to guard Jewish
property. 2
Ruppin's attempt to extend settlement activities
was hampered by a lack of funds. As part of an effort to
raise private capital for agricultural and urban settle-·
ments Ruppin wrote two pamphlets: "Land Purchase in Palestine1' and "Establishing Plantations in Palestine". Inthese pamphlets he recommended the purchase -of land to
be planted with almonds, olives or oranges and suggested
the formation of companies of planters for which _the name
Ahuzah was adopted. As a result

1 Toi d • , p • 106 •
2 Ibid • , p • 99 ..

of

this proposal and two

6 (}

visits by Ruppin to Russia, one in 1913, and the other in
the following year, several such companies were founded
by weal thy Jews. The companies established plantations· in

Kfar Saba, Kerkur, Bir Adas, Kfar Uriah, Poriah, and
Ruhamah1 Although most failed,in _ some cases, such as Kerkur and Kfar Saba, new settlement~ came into existence
out of the plantations. 1
While the farms Ruppin helped establish could
employ hundreds of workers, the Second Aliyah brought
thousands who were eager to find work. These workers sought
employment on the plantations established by members of the
First Aliyah -which employed cheaper and more experienced
Arab labour. A confli6t arose between the young socialists
of the Second Aliyah who wanted to take the place of. the
Arab workers, and the members of the First Aliyah who resisted such a move. Ruppin sought to solve this problem
by providing inexpensive housing for the Jewish workers
and thus make it easier for them to compete with Arab labour. He -also proposed the formation of workers' groups

to undertake jobs on a contractual basis. Finally he
sought to attract Yemenite Jews who were used to a hot

By 1913 the number

climate and a low standard of living.

of Jewish farm workers had risen from a few hundred to
.
-2
1,000, and by 1938 to 10,000.
.

-~

., . .
. ·.. ~

1 Ibid., p. 108.

2 Ibid~, p. 110.
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Arthur Ruppin made good use of the fact that he
was a German nation~l. Already before World War I he had
established very good relations with the German Consuls
in Jerusalem and Jaffa. These relations continued aft~r
war broke out. Through the unofficial intervention of the
German consulates with their Turkish allies Ruppinwas ·
successful in •mitigating some of Jamal Pasha's excesses
ag8:inst the Jews of . Pa~es;ine ·. 1 On occasions

he· -..· ·

also managed to solicit the assistance of_ high ranking
German officers who came to _P alestine in the service of the
German or Turkish armies. In Jerusalem he met them in the
German Consulate or the Hotel Fast. General Kress, then
Jamal Pasha's chief o~ staff, was particularly helpful
by modifying some of Jamal Pasha's harsh measures in favor
of the Yishuv.Ruppin added that Jamal hesitated to take ·
~

any direct measures against him, for he was a German citizen and Jamal knew of his good relations with

the German

authorities 2 • .After his expulsion from Palestine in 1916,
he continued to obtain help from the German embassy in Constantinople in his efforts to thwart Jamal Pasha's antiJewish measures 3 • While still in Palestine· he was assisted by
the German embassy in his . efforts to · maitain contact with
Richard Lichtheira, then operating, on behalf of the Zionist
Organization, out of Constant_inople. 4

1 Bein editor 1 .2.E· cit., p. 158 •.
p.159.
3 Ibid., p; 165.
4 Ibid., p. 155.
2 Ibid .. ,

' In Constantinople

Ruppin served

as

in Palestine

and

a contact
the

between the

Zionist

Jews

Executive

i n 3e rli n . Whe n Hu pp in a nd Lichthe im went to see the -U.S

0

a mbas s ador in Cons tantinople, the latter was accused by
Ge r man count e r e s p io na ge se ctio n IIIb*of consorting with
the ene my a nd was called to Be~lin. There he remained
during the war y ears 1-althou gh exo n er a ted from any guilt.
Ruppin t hus took over Lichtheim's position as representa~ive
of the Zionist Or ~a niz a tion in Constantinople and
continued to s erve the Zionist cause for the rest of
his days. But his greatest contribution was in the period
before World ~ar I, during which time he worked in
co operation with the pioneers of the Second Aliyah who
st 8 rt ed a rriving in the country in

1905, and laid the

foundation for Jewish settlement in Palestine.
Another le a din g individual to settle in Palestine
in the early days of the Yishuv was · nr . . Elias
who came to Haifa with his young wife in

Auerbach

1909. Unlike

Ruppin who went there on a specific mission with an assured
income, Auerbach went to _P alestine completely on his own.
His interest in Zionism was awakened by another German Jew,
Heinrisch Loewe, who had studied Jewish history, Hebrew,
and Arabic. This

Zionist's stories about Palestine

had their desired impact on Auerbach.

In his

youth

Auerbach had joined the Turnverein (sports club) Bar Kochba,

* According to Lichtheim.who learned of this much later, the
instigator of this was a Dr. Paul Weitz, the unofficial
director of the German Information Bureau in Constantinople.
Lichtheim, ££• cit., p. 369.

but Zionism alone wbuld not have been sufficient motivation
for him to settle in Fales·tine, for this was not the case
with most German Zionists. Auerbach was imbued vrith .a spirit of
romanticism. In a bazar in Tangier, while touring the Mediterranean, he came across . a gentleman in a white suite who
turned out to be a Jewish physician f~om Germany practicing
in this Moroccan city. Auerbach entered in his autobiogra- ·
phy: "I thought that I will loo]{ similarly some day" 1 • When
he first visited Palestine in 1909, in

preparation for sett~

iement there, he was attracted to Haifa, partially, he

ad-

mitted, by the romantic notion he had acquired about the
city from reading Herzl's Altneuland 2 • Dr. Auerbach became
the first practicing Jewish physician in Haifa*. In 1911, he
opened the first Jewish hospital in the city**.For his small
hospital Auerbach received a yearly subvention 1,000 francs
from the Frauenbund filr ~~dische Kulturarbeit in Pal~stina.
/

Jacob Reich, a wealthy Zionist from !~unich, sent him a large
crate with the linen required for the hospital.~
His nurse he recruited from the Ernst H_e rrmann family which
had come from Germany in 1910, and whose eldest daughter
2 Auerbach, op. cit., p. 197.
2 Ibid., p. 203,* Actually Dr. Ester Ginsberg, a sister of Achad Ha'am settled there before him, but she worked very little, specializing in internal meddcine.
_
**The writer himself was born in this hospital.
3 Ibid. , p. 261.

had been trained as a nurse in Germany 1 • Ernst was a friend

.

from Berlin whom he knew from his days in the Bar Kochba
group. An additional source of income since 1909 was a
yearly · grant of 400 francs from the Hilfsverein, to assure
hygenic conditions in the Ha1fa kindergartens 2 •
Various other German -Jewis~ personalities were
to .be encountered in these early days of the Yishuv. Ruppin .
reported that in 1916 there were ~-5 families from Germany,

1

numbering 166 in1ividuals, in J~rusalem~ and 35 persons in
Jaffa 4 • In the early 1920s a group ·from Germany, called·
Kwutzat Markenhoff, aft·er receiving agricultural training

in Germany, spent two years cultivating an area it had rented near Ein Gar:nim. In 1927 it moved to the Jordan Valley
where it established the collective settlement of Bet Zera.*
German Zionists visiting -Palestine could always find old
comrades and fe~low members of students' societies. In 1910
l

Dr. Wilhelm BrU . . n, a German Jewish physician, also came to
I:alestine. Init~ally he settleain

Hadera where

he planted

an orange grove. In 1911 Nathan Strauss, partner in the

R.H. Macy and CJmpany, visited Palestihe. He became ill

1 Ibid., p. 263.
2 Ibid., p. 235.
.
3 Arthur Ruppit, Der Aufbau des Landes Israel (Berlin: JHdischer Verlag, 1919), pp. 20-21.
4 Ibid., pp. 3C-31.
* In 1922, anot~er group of pioneers, from Czechoslovakia
and Germany, established themselves in the· Je·zreel Valley
calling their settlement Cheftziba.

and asked Dr. ;Nilhelm Brtlnn, then stj_J.l practicing in Hadera, t-o accompany him to Europe.Brtinn discussed with him
his plan to combat malaria and trachoma, then prevalent in
the country. Strauss proclaimed his readiness to establish
an institute in Jerusalem for this purpose and to have Brilnn
· take charge of it. This was the origin of the Nathan and Linda

Strauss

Health Center in Jerusalem. Siegfried Hoofien ar-

rived in Pa:J_estine in the same year as BTtinn.There he became
Assistant Director, and later Director, of the Anglo-Palestine

*

.

Bank. In the 1930s he played a prominent role in the transfer

negotiations with ~ermany.
Another German J~w, Joseph Treidel, came to Pale-

stine as early as 1904. IJ:lhi_s agricultural expert was sent
there by the Jewish Colonization Association to work as a
surveyor. R~

was not a Zionist, but for his work in Palestine

he may be counted among the early pioneers. Later he was
joined by his mother and two younger brothers, Alfred and
Oskar. Alfred Treidel settled in Kinneret as a farmer, and
Oskar worked as a chemist with Aaron Aaronsohn first in
Zichron Yaacov and later in the first ~xperimental agricultural st~tion in At•lit.
The Verband jUdischer Frauen ftir Kultur- ·
arbeit in Pal~stina
for the
in

in Berlin provided

the funds

establishment and maintenance of a school

Kinneret.

In Jerusalem

Dr.

Moritz Wallach,

• Now known as Bank Leumi Le Israel.

who had come to Palestine in 1889;established and administered the
most modern Jewish hospital in the city. This hospital,
Shaare Zedek, was subsidized through the financial assistance
of German and Dutch Jews.

Vhen Ruppin was ready to purchase

land in the Jezreel Valley, a young agronor1ist, Elias Blu~enfeld, came to his assistance by offering cash sufficient to
purchase 1,000 dunam 1 • In one instance Elias Auerbach relates how a non-Zionist friend of his from Germany ·was at~racted
to Palestine. Alex Baeruald,

an architect, was hired by the

Hilfsverein to build the Technion in Haifa. When offered
the job he accepted im:nediately, since this gave him a chance
to visit his friend Auerbach. Baerwald later became a Zionist
and · in 1924 settled in Haifa, becoming a teacher of architecture at the Technion 2 • In 1909., on _his way to Rechovot,

'

Auerbach came across a young German Jewish farmer by the ·
name of Weiner, the brother of his Hebrew teacher in Berlin3. ·
'

.

In Haifa, another Weiner, Rivkah W~iner, ran a kindergarten
founded by the Hilfsverein. She had received her training
in Berlin.
In 1911 work began in Mercha~ia on a cooperative
settlement

according to the plans of Professor Franz Oppen-

heimer.* the work was administered by another

Jew from Ger-

l Bein editor, £.12• cit., p. 115. _
2 Auerbach, op. cit., pp. 236-237.
3 Ibid • , p • ~ 9.
* Franz Oppenheimer was a well known Jewish economist and
sociologist. His work on producers' cooperatives influenced
the colonization forms in Palestine. This applied particularly to the middle class settlements established after

1933.

G7
many, Solomon Dyk.
The relations between · the German Zionists in
Palestine and the German colonists (Templars)\ as well as
with the German representatives in the Middle East is of
interest. The early settlers established

good relations

with the Templars. Elias Auerbach formed intellectual
0

companionships with some of these colonists in Haifa. Their
common interest in the · Bible was instrumental here, but ·
the fact that they shared a common German culture also
played a role. Richard Lichtheim, in describing his visit to
Haifa in 1910, points out that the nicest part of the city
1
was the German Colony • He described the Templar colony of
Sarona «s a model settlement with pretty houses and blooming ·
gardens. A comparison of Sarona with Petach Tikva would
put a Jewish traveler in a melancholic mood, he wrote. But
he added

that all beginnings · are hard and that one could

not expect the same · achievement from Jews who had just come
out of the Ghettos of Eastern Europe, as of people who have
2
a thousand years of peasant tradition behind them.

Ruppin was also impressed by the German colonies in Palestine. At times he looked at them as models of
what could be done there. He pointed out that these colo~ nists were successful because both the man and woman of the
household helped run the farms. This, he believed, would

1 Lichtheim, .£E·
2 Ibid., p. 163.

.£!.!.,

p. 174.

tf
have to be emulated by the Jewish pioneers. German Jewish
Zionists visiting Palestine would very often select hotels
run by Templars as most appealing and suitable to their
taste. Products such as fresh milk or cheese were bought
from the German colonists. for these were not handled in
a sufficiently sanitary manner, for them, by the Arabs.
Auerbach found these Germans to be competent, ho_n est, and
forthright. On the whole, the generation he met in Palestine
when he came there in 1909, was not anti-Semitic. He added
that in Haifa he knew all of them very well. There were
only four in the whole colony which he suspected of harbo~
ring anti-Semitic feelings, and he informs the reader that
all four were well educated people. Those who later
suppo.r ted thethat

Nazis_· were . descendents

of

generation~ This close affinity with the Germans, or

at least their culture, is understandable, for Palestine
I

and its population were strange to the German Zionists who
often remained German citizens and retained an attachment
to their former homeland. To Ruppin even the immigrants of
tbe second Aliyah seemed strange. He wrote of them: "They _
were predominantly motivated by emotion, tended to hold endless discussions, were unreliable, unpunctual, and inaccu- .
rate in their work". On the other hand he gave recognition
to their enthusiasm and to their "invaluable contribution"
to the agricultural colonization of Palestine. He indicated

1 Auerbach, op.

ill·,

pp. 285-286 •.

that he had developed friendly relations with many of these
East European immigrants and noted with satisfaction that
after living in poverty for .many years a number of them came
to hold leading positions in the Yishuv 1 . The cultural gap
between the Ger·man and East European Jews is exhibited most
pointedly when we compare the farmer's favorable impressions
of the·Templar villages and Ruppin's description of the East
European agricultural settlement·s . He was critical of tlie
way they maintained their-equipment and dwellings, which he
found dirty and disorderly, and added: "It is also questio~

..

nable if we will be able to infuse a greater sense of beauty
into the present generation". He criticized these settlers
as lacking a sense of beauty and ttinner relations with mate~
rial things", stating. that, if they owned a house for example,
they regarded it merely as an object of wealth and income and
did not appreciate its beauty and charm. Ruppin attributed
this to the continual instabi~i~y and .fear in the life of
2 German Jews who saw things as Ruppin
East European Jewry.
did must have be·en disturbed, for having been raised under a
more rigid German system·, they found it difficult to adjust
to conditions and outlooks alien to them. For the willingness to live and work under the most primitive conditions,

1 Bein editor, .9_E cit., p. 94.
2 Arthur Ruppin, The A~ricultural Colonization of the .Zionist Or~anization in ?alestine (London: ~artin Hopkinson
and Company Ltd., 1926) pp. 122-126.

!

as was required of the Chalutzim, wa s much more apparent .
among the youth of Eastern Europe than that of Germany.
The German culture in men like Ruppin was a legacy they would carry for life. In a February, 1925, diary
entry he stated that since the use of German had come to
be viewed as in bad taste, he had become dumb. He added
that this would always remain the case because even if.
he could still learn Hebrew, "it will never become the delicate instrument that the German l nnguag.e has been for me" 1 •
When it came to choosing a name for his daughter, Ruppin
had Agnon read him names from the Bible Concordance. He
finally chose the name Aya, which he liked, adding "was
this not the name of Goethe's moth~r? n 2 • .Rupp in did not ·find
easy the decision to give up his German citizenship. In
November . 1926, after h~nding in his application for naturalization, he wrote: "I must admit that I find it rather
{

difficult to give up my Ger~an nationality. After all, I
was · born in Germany, educated .in German schools •••• "{ In
March, 1927, he became a Palestini nn citizen and his diary

.

entry of that day shmvs that he wan st-ill unsure of his decision. "The future will show whether I have done the right
thihg in giving up my German passport, but I believe that
I had to take this step as a Zionist and in the interest
of my children who will_ not be half at home here and half
in ~ermany" 4 •

l Bein editor,~2 Ibid., p. 224.
3 Ibid., p. 227.
4 Ibid., p. 229.

ill·,

p. 217.
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Elias Auerbach relates that every January 27, he and
Treidel would ride to the German Consul in a frock and
high hat to celebrate Kaiser Wilhelm II's birthday. When
World War I broke out a contingent of 36 German citizens
left Haifa for service in the German army. Most were from
the Templar colony, but there were three Jews among them,
Elias Auerbach, Oskar Treidel, and David Tachauer (a mathematics teacher). These underwent great hard3hips on their
way to Germany via Syria, Turkey, and numerous Europea~
countries. Elias Auerbach even earned the Iron Cross I for
his part in the war on the German side. In explaining his
decision to fight for Germany, Auerbach pointed out that
he still had strong feelin~s of attachment to the country
to which he owed the basis of his education, and which at
the time did not persecute its Jews. But the decisive reasons were the fact that he was obligated to serve and would
have had to report to the German authorities sooner or later. Finally he felt that it was his duty 1 •
German

Zionists played a

~redominant role in the management of the affairs of the
-

Yishuv du~ing World War I for as long as it remained under
Turkish control. This was attributed to the ,contacts these
had with the German governmental authorities, and in turn
the latter's influence in Constantinople. Warburg and Hantke

o-p erated

from Berlin, Richard Lichtheim from Constanti-

1 Auerbach,~- cit., pp. 353-355, 375.

11nopl . , :=.-::.1 Ruppin from Jaffa. When Ruppin was exiled from
Pale~t:=~, he was replaced by the Austrian Dr. Jacob Thon.
Negotiations that began in Constantinople with ·
the Ger=-~ authorities were resumed in . Berlin and led to
a pro ~~=~ by the German Government to protect the Jews in
Palesti::~ during the war years. 'This it did by intervening
with

t~~

Turkish authorities on their behalf, and more spe-

cifical~7 by persuading them to let the Russian Jews remain
in Pale ~-ine.
On November, 1915, the German Consulate in Palestine =eceived written orders to protect Jewish interests.
Accordi~~ to Richard -Lichtheim the survival of the Yishuv
would l!..a7e been doubtful hqd it not been for the German ·
interve~~ion on its behalf. And although Germany acted thus
in orde~ to win favor with world Jewry, Lichtheim believed
this pr0~ection -could not have been obtained had not the
center~~ the world Zionist movement remained in Berlin, with
German Z~onists still holding key positions in the movement.
Accardi-~ to him a non-German Jewish leadership would have
been w:.=-.-2-le to obtain the same d.e gree of help from the German aut~orities 1 •
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In the early years of the Zionist movement there
was only a handful of German Jews in Palestine. Most of
the early Zionists knew Palestine from books, pictures) and
the description of others. Under Herzl's and later Wolffsohn's leader~hip the doctrine of political Zionism predominated. Herzl opposed settlement prior t0 the attainment
of a charter, believing in the possibility 0f a massive _
and well organized immigTation. Such an immigration could
be realized, according to Herzl", only through an agree-nent
with both the country in whose territory the Jews would
settle, and the country from which they would emigrate. On
the other hand he saw an unorganized and unplanned immigration of small groups as a potential obstacle to his larger
plan. Wolffsohn, who succeeded Herzl in 1904, remained
faithful

to this doctrine.
Otto Warburg, a member of a wealthy assimilated

German Jewish family, became active in the Zionist
Organization

as early as 1903, when he was elected

Chairman of the Falestine Commission at the sixth Zionist
Congress at Basle. The commission replaced the Colonization
Committee which had been elected

annually from the time

of the second congress, but which in fact was ineffective.
The new commission, headed by Warburg (botanist), included
also Dr. Soskin (agronomist), and Dr. Franz Oppenheimer
(economist). Its task was to carry out a scientific study
It became the organ most responsible for Zionist settlement
work in Palestine.* With the tide rising in favor of the
* ~he Palestine Commission replaced the Colonization Committee
~t the instsnce o! th~ German Zionists anq was headed by
.
~erman Je~s.,Dr. boskin, although born in Russia, was
educated in ~ermany and was a GermaL citizen.

11/
.

practical Zionists,• Otto ' arburg was elected in 1911,
to the

Chairmanship

of

the

World

Zionist

Organization.
Initially Warburg favored large-scale Jewish settlement not only in Palestine, but in the surrounding countries as well. This, he believed, would prbvide Palestine
with a reservoir of political and · economic strength.Alth ough Warburg . himself never sett-l ed in Palestine he
promoted practical settlement work there up to the outbreak
of World War I, after which . this became impossible. During
the war years his activities were concentrated on the political front, where he used his influence with the German
Foreign Ministry to check Turkish persecution of the Jews
in Palestine. After World War I Warburg dedicated himself
to .scientific work in Palestine directing the agricultural
research station in Rechovot, and later heading the botany
departmemt of the Hebrew University. ·D uring· these years he
.

.

w?s a frequent visitor to Palestine, but according to Richard Lichtheim, his strong desire to settle there remained
unfulfilled because of his wife's illness~ He died in Germany
in 1938.
Warburg made a marked contribution to ~he Jewish settlement of Palestine. Numerous institutions connected
with practical work in Palestine came into being under his
influence or with his financial assistance. These included
• These favored immediate settlement in Palestine in
contrast to the political Zionists who opposed settlement
prior to the attainment of a charter.
1 Ibid., p. 132.
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in 1904 the Olive Tree Fund of the Jewish National Fund,
in 1905 the Bezalel School . in Jerusalem, in 1906 the Palestine Plantation Association, in 1907 the Palestine Industrial Syndicate, in 1908 the Palestine Land Development
Company, in 1909 the Tiberias Plantation Company, and in
1911 the Experimental Agricultural Station ~n Atlit. He

helped promote land p~rchases by the Jewish Col~nization
Association and the Jewish National Fund .and encouraged
private investment in Palestinian industry and commerc~,
as well as in agriculture. In 1910, a group of leading German Zionists made
a tour of Palestine. These included Dr. Franz Oppenheimer,
Dr. Theodor Zlocisti, Richard Lichtheim, Ludwig Pinner, and
Dr. Brtlnn. Of this group only. Dr • . Brilnn remained there,
settling in

Hadera. More organized visits followed, but

German Zionists did not feel a .p ressing need to move to Palestine. Anti-Semitism did exist in Germany, but seemed
to present no immediate danger~ an4 from an economic stand~
po;nt German .Jewry was relatively well off. The view was
commonly held among Zionists in Eastern as well as Western Europe that the Jewish National Home had to be established in the first place as a refuge for Eastern European Jewry which was impoverished -and faced persecution. A
number of leading German Zionists, among them Adolf Friedemann1Franz Oppenheimer, Max Bodenheimer and Herman Struck
viewed Zionism not only as a political movement, but also
as a philantropic enterprise. They saw .it as the duty of

the better off Jews of Western Europe to help their
poorer East European .Brothers. 1 Oppenheimer expressed
his view to Kurt Blumenfeld that Zionism is a movement
in which the German Jews must be the leaders and the

Jews of Eastern Europe must be the actors. 2 Adolph
Friedemann similarly believed that the German Zionists,
and all together the West European Zionists, should be
the officers of the movement and that the Polish and

,

Russian Zionists should be led by them. 3 On the other
hand there were German Zionists who held the view
expressed by Kurt Blumenfeld in 1912 at the 13th
meeting of ~he delegates of the German Zionist
Organization,where he proposed th~t every Zionist
should include within his life's program moving to
Palestine and strive to establish economic interests
there. This proposal received the enthusiatic support
of most of the delegates and was adopted. 4
In those early years neither the Zionist
leaders. of Germany nor those of Eastern Europe saw
an immediate need for them to settle in Palestine.
There was more to be done among the masses in Europe
and on the political front there and in Constantinople.
Zionism made few converts in Germany. For here the
Jews had been emancipated and believed themselves to be
at home. Most of the German Zionists came from the

1 Ibid • , p • 108 •
2 Kurt Blumenfeld, Erlebte Judenfra e ein ViertelJahrhundert deutscher Zionismus Stuttgart: peutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), p. 52.

3 Ibid., p. 59.

4 Auerbach,£,£• cit., p. 317.

middle class, and a few from the upper class.
Included among them was a large representation of
university men who, accord•ing to Arthur Ruppin,
formed the "very heart of the movement"~ It is
clear that Palestine could have absorbed only ·a
small number of such immigrants if they had intended
to continue in their professions there.
After the publication of the Balfour Declaration
the center of Zionist activity began shifting from
Berlin to London. But an increasing number of leading
German Jews had become more sympathetic to Zionist
aspirations., some even becoming Zionists. Among them
were Alfred Tietz (owner of a large Cologne department
store) Oskar Wassermann (director of the Deutsche Bank),.
Dr. Leo Baeck, and Albert Einstein. Wassermann accepted
the chairmanship of the Karen Hayesod in Germany, and
Tietz served as chairman of the branch organization in .
the Rhineland. Einstein became a Zio~ist, and when Ruppin
inquired as to why he did so, Einstein replied that he
saw it as an idea which provided the Jews with the only
possibility of remaining a dignified community. He
explained that in this nationalistic world nationalism
alone remained a binding force for the ·Jews. 2 Many of ~he
members of the Centralverein came to accept the idea of a
Jewish National Home, some even becoming contributors and
active supporters of Keren Hayesod, all this without

1 Arthur Ruppin, The Jews of Today (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1913), p. 279.
2 Bein editor, 2.£• ill•, p. 253.
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becoming Zionists themselves.

According to

Rosenblilth . some of

the younger member of

Centralverein

formed

even

hachashara

Martin

the

groups

and underwent training in preparation for settlement in
Palestine 1 • In 1929 Max and Felix Warburg _v isited Palestine.
Ruppin, reporting about the former, stated that although
so far he had only seen little of Palestine, he was "extremely enthusiastic" with what he saw, adding that until then
he had bee~ considered a "pronounced anti-Zionist" 2 •
German Zionists still did not come to Palestine
in large numbers. Some turned down positions offered them
there. In May, 22_, 1923, Arthur Ruppin wrote that although
he wished to resign he has found no one to fill his post.
. Schocken\*

who was considered as a replacement, refused to

come to Palestine 3 • At another instance Ruppin wrote about
Dr. Elias Strauss whom he wanted in Palestine as manager of
the Palestine Land Development Company. Ruppin complained
that after having been in Palestine for six weeks, he was
about to return to Germany without having decided whether
to accept the offer. He added: "Our people are too cautious;
they do not want to give up anything in Europe in exchange
for sumething new in Palestine. This is frequently a mis~
4
take, for one must take the risk" •
l ___Rosenbluth, op. ~ - , p. 235.
2 Bein editor, ou. cit., p. 224.
* Schlomo ZalmonSchocken (1877
1959), German ~usinessman .
and publisher. He settled in Jerusalem in 1933.
3 Ibid. 1 p. 208.
4 Ibid., p. 221.

German Jewish Zionists played a major role in the
Brith Schalom movement which came into being in the 1920s.
It sought_to promote Arab-Jewish friendship and favored
the creation of a bi-national state with Jews and Ar~bs

having an equal share in the administration . Among the
prominent German Zionists associated with this organization
were Robert '~ el tch, Felix Rosenbltlth, Radler Feldmann,*

Arthur Ruppin , Professor Joseph Horowitz (Frankfurt),
Zalman Schocken, Jacob Thon (Austria), Dr. Franz Oppenheimer,
and Dr. Georg Landauer. Ruppin wanted tt to be a research
group for the Zionist leadership. Others urged that it
formulate and attempt to implement its own political program.
The German influence in the party was so overwhelming that
when Ussishkin attacked the Brith Schalom, he also attacked
"the Germans, whose special mentality expressed itself in the

Brith Schalom"** and went on to call them "criminals". 1
The Brith Schalom was opposed by most of the Zionist

parties and ceased to exist in the 1930s.
Some of the G~rman Zionists who came to Palestine in 1933 and after may have eventually done so even
without the pressure · of the National Socialists. Others did
not leave Germany for Palestine, but continued to serve the
Zionist cause from other countries.

• Rabbi Benjamin Joshua Radler-Feldmann worked in the Palestine Office for a number of years. Later he became
known as a writer under the name Rabbi Benjamin.
** The Brit Schalom had great ideological similarities with
the Aliyah Chadasha, formed in 1942 by Ger~nn Jews in Palestine.
1 Bein editor, .2.E· ill~, p. 250.

Martin Rose nbltlth and his brother Felix were born·
to an orthodox Jewish family that was also thouroughly imbued with the German culture. His parents saw to it that every new-born member of the family was given both a Jewish name
and a cognate German one. Martjn reiates that the awakening
of Messingwerk, (where ~e and his family lived) to Zionism
was a gradual process. He stated that "like other German
Jews we considered ourselves Gerffians of Jewish faith.
We thought of ourselves as citizens who enjoyed equal rights
with all other citizens, in nearly

1
all cases" • \Then Zio-

nism reached the Rosenbluth family, his brother Felix (Pinchas Rosen) was the first to be won over, next were his parents, but Martin himself was not convinced. What finally
persuaded him was his contact with East European Jews fleeing pogroms and passing in 1906 through Germany on their way
to the United States. In his work aiding East European Jews
II

he said: I began to feel for the first time the truth .of
the Zionist doctrine of the unity of the Jewish people" 2 •

What finally prompted him to join the Zionist Organization
was a lecture by Professor Eugen Taeubler who spoke of the
relationship between Zionism and German c~lture, em~hasi- •
zing that the German Zionists need not regret the influen·c e
cf their education and upbringing. He suggested that they
build their new ideas on the "solid basis" of their bAck.

ground. Many

-

of ·the Rosenbluth family had moved
to Pale,

stine before _1933. By the time his parents visited the country in 1924, three of their children had already settled
1 Rosenbltlth, 2..,2. cit., p. 116.
2 roid., p. 134.

there. His sister Mali who, with. her husband Dr. Felix Danziger had come to Palestine in 1923, founded a hospital in
.
*
Jerusalem together with Dr. Albert Sachs • Another brotµer,
Leo, was a physician in Rishon le Zion, and Felix had preceded his parents to Palestine, having gone there for a year
to learn Hebrew and prepare for settlement. Martin served
as Executive Vice-President of the German Zionist Federation until April 1, 1929. He then became Executive Di~ec~
tor of Keren Hayesod in Germany under the joint chairmanship
of Blumenfeld and Oskar Wassermann, an office which he retained until he left Germany in April, 1933. The German
Zionist Federation sent him to London as an accredited representative where he worked with the 0ewish Agency on matters
relative to the emigration of Jews from Germany. His particul?r task was to see to it that funds raised for the relief
of German Jewish refugees be.directed towards their settlement in Palestine.

Among his family ~embers Felix Ro?enblilth

attained the greatest prominence in the Zionist movement
and in Israel. He played a major role in the Zionist students
movement . and in 1911 was a co-founder of the youth movement
Blau-Weiss. From 1920 to 1923,he served as chairman of the
Zionist Organization of Germany. Between 1926 and 19311 he
served as a member of the Zionist Executive in London and
returned to Palestine in 1931. In the same year his wi-

• Albert Sachs, who moved to Palestine in 1923 was responsible, with a few friends, for the initiation and foundation in 1933 of the Jfidischer Wanderbund Blau-Weiss (Jewish
Blue--fuit Hiking Club). At its height this organization
had a membership of over three thousand Jewish youths who
combined Sunday hikes with Zionist education.

dowed mother had moved to Tel-Aviv. By 1933 all the Rosenbluths, with the exception of Martin and his family, had
settled in Palestine. There were German Zionists like Max
Bodenheimer who did not move to Palestine until 1935, but
whose son Frederick was there already in 1922 as an entomologist in the new agriculturai experimental station in
Tel-Aviv.
Kurt Blumenfeld was born to an assimilated Ger-

l

man Jewish family. His father was a judge in Insterberg .
and most of his parents' friends were non-Jews. In school
he had non-Jewish colleagues and never experienced any antiSemitic incidents. In his youth he remained unaware of the
existence of a special Jewish question. As a small boy he
was taken aback by the words of a Catholic maid who told
him that she went to confess to her priest about her sins.
Upon inquiring as to what these were she informed him that
she was employed by Jews. Upon further inquiry as to why
this was a sin, she answered that the Jews after all had
crucified Christ. 1 ·
In 1904, Kurt Blumenfeld went to Berlin for his
studies and the same year he joined the Zionist movement. ·
He came to the conclusion that in addition to a religious
there was also a national cohesion to the Jewish people.
According to him Zionism was necessary not only for Jews
2

without a homeland, but even for those born on Germany. Through
1 Blumenfeld, 21?.•cit., p. 2?.
2 ni£., p. 36. -

Felix RoseDblUth, who w~s raised in an orthodox Jewish
family, he wa s introduced t o another aspect of Judaism.
Through c9nversations with Felix it became cl ear to him
that he could on ly be a Jew as Zionist.
known for his

11

1 Blumenfeld oecame

Po st - Assimilati onist Zionism" which be

evolved to appeal to a lready assimilated Jews. \ ·hen called
• upon to serve as an offici a l in the Zionist party he gave
a positive response, although just then he was preparing
for the bar exam. He decided to give up law, stating that
be did not want to become a lawyer in a · nsmall East Prussian

Nest" and to remain in a wo rld in wh ich he felt h _e could
2
.
·n ot breathe. From 1 9 10 to 1914, he served as director of
the Department of Information of the World Zionist Executive. ·
Nahum Sokolow proposed to Blumenfeld that he become the
editor of the Welt, then the central organ of the Zionist
Or gani z a tion. This post Blumenfeld accepted and held from

'

1 913 to 1914~ In April of the latter year he undertook his
first journ ey to Palestine, going there as part of a Zionist
commission. · He wa s impressed by the natural beauty of the
land and was parlicularly struck by the old city of Jerusalem
and the siti of the .Temple. The latter determined for all
times his conviction that t ·1e Jewish question and Zionism

were inseprably· bound to Israel and Zion. 3
From 1923 to 193~ he was president of the German Zionist
Federation. Among the founders of Keren Haysod in 1920, he
became~ member of its directorate in
settled il) ,Palestine.
1 Ibid • , . . p • 3 9 •
2 Ibid • .,.. p. 49.
3 Ibid., p;.; 107.

1933,

the year he

Richard Lichtheim was born in Berlin to an assimilated
family, which a ccording to him believed assimilation to
the Ge r man Volk to be a necessity or even an. obligation. 1

In 1904, at the a ge of 19, he became aware of the Zionist
movement and soon thereafter, as a student, joined the
Zionist frat ernity Hasmon~a. Lichtheim oecame convinced
of the fact that anti-Semitism was a much stronger and more deeply rooted force than his parents' generation
had understood it to be. He was particularly aroused by
the attitude of such respected Germans as the philosopher
Eduard Hartmann and the historian Heinrich vori Treitschke
who took the Jews to task for not assimilating into German
society quickly enough. 2 ·Lichtheim was also influenced by
Julius Longbehn's, Rembrand als Erzieher, von einem
Deut~chen (Rembrant as Educator, by a German), which stated
that

a Jew could never become · a German. A few month later

'

he was introduced to Houston Stewart Chamberlain's,

Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, which was written
in a similar vain. 3 While all spoke in the name of German
nationalism Treitschke and Hartmann insisted that the Jews
be nothing but Germ~ns while Langbehn proclaimed that they
could never become Germans.
Although he personally did not suffer from anti-Semitism
Lichtheim's observations convinced him that German Jewry was
daluding itself about its situation. 4 At first he assisted
1 Lichtheim, Ruckkehr, .2£.! cit.,
2 Ibid. pp. 38-39.
3 Ibid. p. 42.
4 Ibid. p. 43.

p. 17.:

'
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the Zionist Organization's Palestine Department which
was established in 1907. In 1911, he became the editor
of the Welt, a post he held until 1913. In that year
he was sent to Constantinople as representative of
the Zionist Executive where he remained until his
aforementioned recall in 1917. From Constantinople
Lichtheim was able to render invaluable service to
the Yishuv by using his contacts with both the German
and American representatives there. The German Foreign
Office in Berlin was instrumental in arranging for the
transfer of money from Germany to Palestine, and it
also made possible Lichtheim's trip to Constantinople. 1 ·
Through his connection with the United States Embassador
Henry Morgenthau (h_imself a Jew born in Germany) he was
able to curb the physical persection of the Jews in
Palestine and provide economic assistance to the Yishuv.
{

W-nen the Turkish authorities decided to terminate the
activities of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Lichtheim abtained
Embassador Morgethau's promise to intercede on behalf of
the Yishuv. The latter persuaded the Turkish government

to permit the reopening of the bank. 2
In the spring of 1914, Morgenthau visted
Palestine and upon Lichtheim's recommendation he sought
out Ruppin as soon as he landed. This enabled Ruppin ·

to show Morgenthau some of the Jewish ·settlements,
1 Ibid., p. 271.
2 Ibid., p. 268.

and thus make a favorable impression on him. 1 In
September 1914, Morgenthau informed Ruppin that an
American warship would arrive with much needed aid
for the Yishuv. On the 6th of_ October 1914, ; the North
Carolina arrived with 250,000 Francs (L 10,000) in
gold. Aid continued to arrive, an~ once an entire
ship, ,the S.S. Vulcan, was sent with provisions for
the famine stricken Yishuv. 2
On

December 18, 1914, Lichtheim received

a telegram from Ruppin stating ·that Jamal Pasha was ·
about to deport all the Russian Jews in Palestine. 3
For Jamal Pasha had issued an order that enemy aliens
in Palestine, who were mostly Russian Jews, would _
either have to become Ottoman subjects or leave the
country. Many feared to renounce their nationality
for according to the laws of their country, they
would be committing high treason. 4 Lichtheim went to
the German Embassador (Wangenheim) who promised to
intercede with the Turkish authorities on behalf of
the Yishuv. The German Embassador kept his word and
the order was rescinded. 5 But Jamal Pasha had already
deported 500 Jews who were rounded up on December l?th. 6
1 :Bein ·editor, .2.E• cit., - p. 150.
2 Ibid • , p • 151.
.
3 Lichtheim, 2.12• ill_., p. 268.
4 Bein editor, 2E· cit., p. 152.
5 Lichtheim, .2.E• cit., p. 278.
6 Bein editor, 2£· cit., p. 153.

7

Jamal Pasha placed abstacles in the way of
Palestinian · Jews who wished to become Turkish citizens
and d~d not abide by the rule exempting naturalized
,,..

citizens from the· draft for one year. Morgenthau
intervened with Talaat Bey* prompting him to make a
favorable declaration. It stated that the Jews were no
f

l ,o nger required to reside in Turkey for five years
before becoming Ottoman citizens; that the fee for
naturalization should no longer be 37Frs. per person
but per family; ·that those without means should be
able to abtain citizenship without payment; that those
who were newly naturalized would be free from military
service for one year ·; and finally that women .and
children were to remain undisturbed. 1

In the beginnig of 1915, Jamal Pasha sent a
demand to the German embassy in Constantinople to have
I

Ruppin recalled. Richard Lichtheim heard of this measure
and managed to thwart it. 2 In lians Wangenheim, the
German Embas-sador in Constantinople, Lichtheim found a
sympathatic attitude towards the Zionists. Besides
helping mitigate Jamal Pasha's anti-Jewish activities

• The Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister
of Finance.
1 Lichtheim, 2.E.• cit., p. 282.
2 Bein editor, £12· £11•, p. 159. ,

the German authorities placed at Lichtheims desposal •
their . telegraphic code and their deplomatic courrier
service. During the war years only the German embassy
was permitted to send coded telegrams to its consulates
in Turkey. The American embassy could send such telegrams
to Washington, but not to its consulates in Palestine.~
Abraham Elkus, who replaced Morgethau in 1916, continued
the cooperation established between his predecessor and
Lichtheim.
From 1921 to 1923, Lichtheim was a member . of
the Zionist Executive and head of its Organizati~n
Department. He left the Zionist Executive in protest
against Weizmann's policy and joined t~e Revi~ionist
movement in 1925 and in 1933 the Jewish State ·Party.
In 1934 he settled in Palesttne.
Georg Landauer, Director of the Palestine
Office and of the Zionist F~deration in Germany

(1929-1933), settled in Palestine during the same
year; after · two earlier visits there. George Herlitz
archivist of the Zionist Organization, moved to
Jerusalem in 1933, managing the rescue of the archival
material from the Nazis* and its transfer to Palestine.
Robert Weltsch, born in Praque· in 1891, joined
.

. .. J ..

. .

. ..

~, .

.

.

1 Lichtheim, .2.£· ill·, p. 283 •. ·... · ·~ ··
· ,· 1
•Fora vivid account of how Herlitz managed to bring
the 154 crates in which the material from the archives :·
was packed, see his autobiaography George Herlitz, Mein
We nach Jerusalem· Errinerun en eines zionistischen:--Beamten Jerusalem: Verlag Rubin Mass,
•

?Y
the Zionist Bar Kochba society as a student. In 1921
he was elected · by the 12th Zionist Congress at Carlsbad
as alternate member of the Zionist Executive representing
Hitahadut. He became editor of the Jildische' Rundschau
in 1920 and continued in th~s post until 1938, when he
left Germany to settle in Palestine. He thus remained
to serve the German Zionist cause until. it was no lo~ger
possible, for in that year his paper was forced to cease ·
publication. His articles in the Jildische Rundschau
after Hitler's rise to power, raised the morale of German
Jewry at a time when this was sorely needed.

•
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I II.

MIGRATION FROM GERt,iANY TO PALESTII~E AFTER

1933

In response to the crisis faced by German Jewry after Hitler's rise to power the leadership of the Yishuv
began work on plans which they hoped would provide a
practical solution to the problem. As early as the spring
of 1933, Chaim Arlosoroff, then political head of the
Jerusalem Department of the J~wish Agency, went to Germany to study the situation first hand. His conclusions
were that the only solution to the plight of German Jewry
lay in a mass emigration extended over a number of-years

in which Palesti:qe would p:l!ay a central role. ·

He empha- •

sized that Palestine would not be a tempora.1"y solution
and thought in terms of a three or four year plan for the
evacuation of German Jewry~

Arlosoroff

also made a dis-

tinction between an organized and planned migration to
Palestine as opposed to an unplanr:ed emigration of individuals to other countries •

. He also came to the con-

clusion that the liquidation and transfer of German Jewry's property would rzq_uire an agree@ent with the German

Government .. 1

Dr. Hantke of Keren

Hayesod

drafted a propo-

sal for the settlement of German Jews in Palestine as early as
June of 1933. He prefaced . this proposal with a warning _.

.
1 Werner Feilchenfeld, D~lf Michaelis, a~d Ludwig ?inner,
Haavara Tr?-~s fer I~ach .Fti.lasti no. ~J.nd ~i!w-: -=inder~.uw DeutRvher Juden 1.::;55-l--h'j CI-ilbin,:;en: J .GoB. lilOnr, Paul

Siebeck 1972), p. 22.

J.

that his proposal will be subject to modification
since there was no reliable information as to
the number and categories of immigrants or as to
the means they will bring out of Germany.
In the proposal itself Hantke estimated that 20,000

Jews will emigrate from Germany to Palestine dur'ing 1933
and 1934, approximately 1,000 persons a montho

His im-

pression, based on conversations with recent arrivals from
Germany, was tha~ 1,000 per month would probably represent
a minimum estimate

Dr. Hantke added that if more than

20,000 German Jews would desire to come to Palestine, the
Mandatory Government would have to grant more Labour Certificates, for he estimated that even out of 20,000 would
be immigrants 60 per cent would have to come on a basis
other than Labour Certificates.

He added, that while

in agriculture and industry large numbers of immigrants
could be accommodated, this would not be the case with
the . accademic.

prof essionff

assumed that 20,ooo·German

and business •
Jews,

a

Hantke

group

which heretofore provided few immigrants· to Palestine,
will be bound to attract further Jewish immigration frow.
Germany.. 1

1 Draft Proposal of Dr. Hantke for the Settlement of Ger-

man Je~s in Palestine sen~ on June 12, 1933 to The
Jewish Agency for Palestine, London Office, Central Bureau for the Settlement of Germa~ Jews in Palestine,
Zionist Arc~i ves, Ne,: York.

In August, 1933, at the 18th Zionist Congress
which was held in Prague, Arthur Ruppin expresse~
the hope that Palestine would be able to absorb
10,000 Jewish immigrants yearly from Germany.

1

Chaim· eizmann recalled that after the Jewish
catastrophe i ·n Germany he expressed his openion
that the Jewish National Home _in Palestine would
have to play a major role in dealing with this
problem. 2 In May of 1934, he expressed an even
stronger conviction as to the role of Palestine
in this matter by stating that it alone

was in

a position to make a substantial contribution
to the constructive solution of the .German-Jewish
problem. 3
On December 5, 1933, at the opening session
of the Governing Board of the High Commission in
Lausanne, James G. McDonald, High Commissioner
for Refugees, gave recognition to the role that
Palestine would have to play in solving the problem
of German Jewry. He stated that it must have a role
in the solution

ot that problem and that funds be

1 Introduction written by Arthur Ruppin July 7,

1935, in Jewish Agency for Palestine Central

Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews,
Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress and to the
IVth Council of the Jewish A;renc in Lucerne
London: Central Bureau for the Settlement of
German Jews in Palestine, July, 1935), p. 7.
(From now on to be cited as Central Bureau
Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress, July, 1935.)
2 Preface written in same by Chaim Weizmann July 17,
1935, in Central Bureau Report to the XIXth
Zionist Congress, July, 1935, p. 5.
3 Weizmann in letter to Messrs. Louis Lipsky and Morris
Rothenberg, October 4, 1934, Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives 1
New York.

appropriated to the extent that Palestine is able
to. absorb Jews f rom Germany.

1_

As early as sum.mer of 1933, a letter was sent
out by the newly formed Vaad Meuchad le Yishuv Yehude
Germania ~'Erez Israel* (United Committee for the Settle-

ment of German Jews in Israel) -addressed to all Committees for the relief of German ·Jews. Its object was to
"link up the Yishuv with every individual com:nittee,
so as to avoid the drawing up of conflicting schemesi 1
It asked them to inform the Vaad Meuchad of their intentions and plans for asffisting German Jews in Pales~
I

~ine.

This circular also state~ that four commissions

were set up to aid in the settlement of Jews from :Germany,
e.g. one each for Agricultural Set~lement headed by Dre

A. Ruppin,for Urban Settlement presided over by Mr. S.

B'.oofien,for Educational Purposes with Dr. Joseph Lurie
as chairman, and an immigrant Committee, headed by Dr.

E. Levy to help immigrants on arrival~ 2
· 1 Statemerit by James G$ McDonald at the opening session
of the Governing Board of the High Co~mission in Lausanne, December 5, 1933, McDonald Papers file No •

. 356.
.
._
• -It was formed in 193~ in r~sporise to events in Germany.

All the large organizations in the Yishuv took part
in it. The v~ad Le u~i took charge of directi~g its
work. The work of the Vaad Meuchad was taken over by
the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jew;
in Palestine.
2 Letter sen~ out oy Ha Vaad ha Meuchad le Yishuv Yehude Germania b' Erez Israel to all Coa':'littces !'or the
relief of German J·ews, June 26,1933, signed by M. Ussishkin, Henrietta Szold, and A. Hantke. Central Bureau
for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.
·
·

Table II l
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany during
1933 - March 1939

Year

1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
January - March 1939

Immigration from
German;r
6,803

8,497
7,447
7,896
3,280
4,101

Total

3,371
41,395

Travelers authorized to
settle in Palestine

1933 - 1938
Estimate of immigrants entering
through other places
Granq Total

3,077
_).,800
4-6,2'72

1 · Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 68.
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Graph of Jewish Immigration from Germany to Palestine
1933-1938 (figures based on table II)
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Graph of Jewish Immigration .from Germany to Palestine
1933-1938 by Four Maj or Categories
(figures in .100s)
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Table II and graph A show that the immigration

of Je~s fro m Ger many reached its peak year in 1934 and
remained relatively high for ·the whole time period 19331936. A sharp decline occurred for the year 1937, and only
a slight rise is shown for 19~8.Graph B indicates. a drop
in ·immigra~ion for 1937 in all four major categories. In

1938 all four categories show a rise,· but only category
B-III, students, reaches and surpasses its former level * •

By mid 1935 the distribution of German Jews in . Palestine
between town and country was as follow~: 1

Tel Aviv
Haifa
·Jerusale m
Rural Settlements

. 10,000

5,COO
2,000
?.,000

By 1939 the distributio~ of Germa n Jews in

Palestine was as followsf
approxina tely 16,000
Tel-Aviv
If
11,000
Haifa
It
6,000
Jerusalem
rt
1,000
Other Towns
If
' 16,000
Colonies and Settlements .
·.,

The .above figures indicate th a t between 1935 cind

t939 the German Jewish population of Tel-Aviv increased
from 10,000 to 16,000, but less than doubl ed.; tha·t of Haifa

• The reasons for these chan~es are discussed in .
ch3pters IV and

VI.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress ·,
July, 19j5, p. 29.
2 Karen Hayesod, "Palestine and Jewish Immi gration
from Germany" (Jerusalem: Karen Hayesod, 1939), p$ 19.

more than doubled by increasing from 5,000 to 11,000, and
that ·or Jerusalem tripled, increasing from 2,000 to 6,000
during the same time period. The figures for Haifa, although
indicating a somewhat more than 100 per cent increase,
amounting to 6,000 persons, equalled in total the increase
fol' the city with the largest population from Germany, ~1ame-.

ly Tel-Aviv. Jerusalem saw an increase of only 4,000, but
this wan a greater increase in relation to the prior

size

of its German Je~ish population. In comparing Haifa and
Jerusalem in this regard it must be noted that, as a port
of entry, Haifa would tend to have a larger concentration
of new immigrants than a city like Jerusalem which is located _in the interior of the country .~his would also help explain the relatively sharp rise in the German Jewish population of Jerusalem duriLg the latter half of the 1930s~ as
G~rman immigrants moved away from their ports of entry to
other areas of the countryc

Germa~ Jewish im~igrants c~eated -new settlements
in Palet3tine, among them: RaI!lot Hashc..vim, Gan Herzl
Kf ar Shcn:aryahu 1 , ~Jar burg, Shavei Zion *"' , L'!oledet, Shs.a-

rah, Kwutzat Ein Gev, Kvutzat Tirat 1iwi, Kvutzat rt'.assad,
Kvut zat A1\ieh, Ge uli'm, Kv1.1.t za t Bamifnc=;h, Kvutza t Aloniru,

1 rbe Jewish A;,-ency foj7 Palestine, Centi--al Bures::1 for
the Settle]1e~t o·f Germa·n J C\VS, Henort to th-3 XXth
Zionist Con l;:::-css nnd -co th~ Council of the Jev-1ish .\fency in Zurich (Jcrusale~: Central ~Greau for the Se~tlement of Ger,~an c..iews in Palestine, .::.. u~ust, 1Sl3?), P• 25.
(From now on to be cited as Central Bureau Report to
the XXth iionist Congress, August, 1937.)
••rt \'/D.8 co~,1posod. 2ntircly of .Jewish 1:·2rJJ.t;rs from a village ir. ~11'..i:!..·terober~ (~2x:ingen) .. In Germany i:hey bccaffie
a co opera ti.ve group. ...~ascd on a report '1 he Gerr.1an
S~ttlcmen~ in Falest~ne, 1938, Council for German Jewry , Zionist A.r ~ h.:. v es , l. s \U Yo :c le l p 1 •
1

1

1

' '1
Kvutzat Maayan, Ramat Hadar, and Hasorim.
Numerous German-Jewish immigrants were absorbed in - Kvut z ot. By March 31, 1939, 88 Kvutzot had absorbed 3,525 such newcomers.

These -included the fol-

lowing which received relatively large numbers of settlers from Germany: 1
Name of
Number of Settlers
Kvutzah
from Germany
Givat Brenner
200
Kvutzat Rod ges - Tirat Zwi
117
Shaar Han e gev
116
Kvutzat Hasorea
116
Kvutzat Ya gur
113
Kvutzat Hug im, Shatta
109
. Ein Harod
108
Kvutzat Ge sher
104
Kvutzat Nnana
97
Givat Haim
93
Kvutzat Hugim , Ma os - Ra ananah
84
Kvutzat Bachrut
83
Ramat Hakovesh
78
Kvutzat 11as s ad
77
Kvutzat Batelem, Ein Gev
71
By March 1939, 1,200 German Jewish immigrants
had settled in Moshavim.

These included the settlements

of: Moledet, Shaarah, ·Geulim, Hasorim, Ein Vered, Ein
Iron, and Rishpon. 2

Two other areas in which a heavy concentration
of German Jews settled were Kiryat Bialik and Naharia.

The former is in the Haifa Bay area and the settlers for
the most part worked in the different industries and offices in Haifa. Naharia was almost entirely se~tlcd by German smallholders who came to Pales~ine on a capitalist

lCentral Bureau Renort to the XXIst zi·on1·~t
Con~ress
~
-u
'
August, 1939, p. ~l.
2 Ibid • 1 p. 32 •
I-'

visa. In February 1937, 150 families had settled there
as farmers. In Germany mo~t of the settlers had been engaged in the professions or in commerce . 1 •

HAAVARA

TRANSFERS

AND PALESTINE

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, · acting as a
_ quasi-gove1·nment, endeavored

to. convince·

governments and public bodies that in Palestine lay
the solution to the refugee problem. It was also responsible for the Haavara agreement with the German Government. But even before the Jewish Agency undertook this
task, a Palestinian Jewish businessman by the name of
Sam Cohen was already negotiating with the German autho-

rities. He represented the Hanotea Company which dealt
with the planting and operation of orange groves. Cohen
expressed his interest in importing to Palestine German
goods which were to be paid for with .blocked marks.
Meanwhile in June 1933 Arlosoroff was assassinated and on the Jewish side the initiative in transfer
matters remained in the hands of private businessmen.
As early as May 1933, an agreement was reached between
the Reich Ministry of Economics and Hanotea on e,n accoun~ of up to one million marks 2 •

1 Report by Norman Bentwich on the German Schools and
Settl~ments of Haifa, February 25, 1937 Central Bureau
for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. The
· central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, docu~ent No S7/386.
2 Shaul Ash, Studies in the Holocaust and Conte • porc1ry
Jewry ~erusalem:Institute of Con~emporary Jewry The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1973) p. 60.
1
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After the arrangement between Hanotea and
German authorities became a fact the Zionist leadership
in Germany decided to include itself in these dealings.
They were reluctant to leave such important matters
as the transfer of German Jewish capital to Palestine
i~ the hands of a private company. Aft~r some difficult
negotiations the German authorities increased the transferable capital to three million marks 1 •
As the Zionist leadership took charge of ·the
transfer question, more far reaching arrangements were
made. On August 7, 1933, a meeting took place at the
Reich Ministry of Economics. There th~ Jewish representation consisted of Dr. Siegfried Moses and Dr.
Georg Landauer, representing the Zionistischen Vereinigungen fUr Deutschland, S. Hoofien, the An~loPalestine Bank, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the executive of
the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Sam Cohen and Machnes, Hanotea.The purpose of the meeting was to work
out a more comp~ehensive transfer agreement between
Germany and Palestine. It was agreed upon that the
Anglo_- Palestine Bank, M.M. Warburg and Company, Ham-

.burg, and A.E. Wassermanni Berlin, will form a company
that will act in an advisory capacity only

and will

1 The .Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S?/84, p.l.

not partake in the transfer and export transactions.
This company was named PaHistina Treuhandstel.le zur Beratung deutscher Juden G.m.b.H. or Paltreu. This company
was based in Berlin with the purpose of advising German
Jews about capital transfers to Palestine. It was further
agre~d that emigrants who received permis~ion from the
Auswanderungsberatungsstelle to t~ansfer savings over
and above the LI 1,000 required to obtain a capitalist
visa, had to deposit them in a special account.Two special accounts were opened _ by Paltreu with the Reichsbank
~1
1n the name of the Bank der Tempelgesellschaft
.Spe~
cial Account I was used in connection with the transfer
of capital belonging to German Jews, including to im~igrants to Palestine in the immediate future~ Special Account II for the use of German Jews who, for the time being, remained in Germany, but who w~shed to transfer the
whole or part of their capital to. Palestine in ordeI· to
ensure the possibility of immigration at a more distant
future.

In November,1933, the Trust and Transfer
Office Haavara

Ltd. was established. German Jews wishing

to.transfer their capital to Palestine through this agency deposited their money in one of the two accounts in the
1 In a letter of August 25, 1933, from the Reich Minister
of Economics to S. Hofien, director of the AngloPalestine Bank Ltd. The Central Bureau for ~he Settlement of German Je .xrs in Palestine, The Central Zionist
Archives, Jerusalem Document S7/159, p. 1.
• ·rhe Rt:;ich Econo::nic Ministry succeded in this vmy to
include in the a~ree~cnt the !empler Ba~k of the German
colonists in Palestin~.
1

name of the Haavara. This -money was then utilized by
the Haavara agency in pa~ent for goods ordered in Germany by Palestinian importers and traders. The equivalent
of the sums thus expended, which the Haavara received
from the Palestinian merchants in Palestine Pounds was
then· credited in Palestine to its German depositorsl
The Haavara Ltd., Tel Aviv, became the official trust company for the transfer of capital by German Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The shares of Haavara
belonged to the Anglo-Palestine Bank until 1935, and afterwards to the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Dr. Theodor
Zlocisti, president of the Hitachdut Olej Germania headed
its Board of Directors and Heinrich Margulies represented
the directorate of the Anglo-Palestine Bank on the Board.
The management of the Haavara was up to 1935 in cha:r.·ge
of Leo David and Dr. Robert Weiss-Liwni~ Dr. Werner Senator,
who headed the Immigration Department as a member of the
Executive of the Jewish Agency, served as Chairman of the
Board

of Directors from 1935 on, and up to the outbreak

of World War II.
The 19th Zionist Congress that met in the
summer of 1935, decided that, in order to stimulate the
emigration of German Jews to Palestine, the :Executive

1 The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/84, p. 2.

of the Jewish Agency should take over supervisory controi
over the operation of the Haavara~ The Board of Haavara was
reconstituted as follows: Two represen~etives of the Jewish Agency and one represe?tative each of the Va.ad Leu!!!i,
the German Zionist Feder~tion, the German Inmigrants Association and the Anglo- Palestine Bank. Besides Dr. Werner
Senator, the Chairman, other members of the Board of Directors were: Dr. Georg Landauer,head of the German division of the Jewish Agency~ Dr. $iegfried Saalheimer, representing the directorate of the Anglo-Palestine . Bank,

J. Brudney, head of the Workers' Bank as representative
of the Vaad Leumi, Dr. Ludwig Pinner as representative
of the Hitachdut Ol e ~ Germani ~ and his stand-by Drv Max
Kreuzberger, and Dr. Sally Hirsch. Dr

Siegfried Moses,who

was part of the Generaldirektorat, became a nember of the
Board of Directors in 1938.

TABLE . III l
The distribution of the total sums transferred up
to June_ 30, 1939, was as follows:*
A in cash direct to clients

LP 4,960.000

B Regular cash payments to recipients of pensions and dividends,
and to pupils

360.000

1 Central Bureau Report to the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 45.
* The total · amount includes sums paid directly in cash to
the transfe:r;- clierrts, sums tra:isfer:rt:?d for the national
funds, sums invested by -cransfer clients in public and
private, agricultural and industrial under~akings.

C National funds and institutions
(transfer of contribut ions etc

590.000

D Investment in the form of debentures and shares in coloni•zing companies (JNF, PASA, NIR,
Mekorot etc.)

890.000

E Loans to middle-class settlement
companies (Ras co, Naharia, Ramat
Hacbavim, etc.)

290.000

F Investments in industrial and commercial undertakings and in
second mortgages
Sum Total

910.000
8,000.000

The sum of LP 8,000.000 does not. present a
true picture of the value of the t r ansfers. From the
total sum transferred up to the te rmination of the a greement (8.1 million), Werner Feilchenfeld calculated that

the true value of the transfer was only LP 5.5 million.
The difference was accounted for by the transfer disagio 1 ~

·The bulk of this discrepancy was due to the over-price
charged for German exports bought through the transfer
system*.

In table III categories D and E applied to a
form of transfer which was - very closely connected . to · the
upbuilding of Palestine. The companies would acquire Reichmark assets through Haavara for building and irrigation
projects and would issue shares or debentures for this capital.
·1 Werner Feilchenf·e 1a·, Dolf Michaelis, Ludwig Pinner, Haavara-Transfer nach PaUistina und Einw-inderun Deutscher
uden l
~-1 7;
T bingen: J .C .B. fiiohr, .Paul Siebeck,
1972 pp. 74-?5.
• For more details about the cost of transfer see chapter
titled lfazi Policy Cone erning Jewish Enigra·tion f:rom
Germany to Palestine · ~

IOb

These shares would then go to the individual transferors,
RASSCO (Rural and Suburban Settlement Company Ltd.), Mekorot (Water Supply Ltd.) ,HANOTEA (Colonizers and_ Orange
Grove Planters), PASA ( Palestine Agricultural Settlement
Association Ltd.) and NIR (The Jewi~h Agricultural Cooperative Labour Association Ltd.), are among the well known
companies that were beneficiairies of this type of arrangement . with Haavara.
Other forms of transfer involved the use by
individual immigrants of their transfer assets for the
purchase of machines and other goods in Germany for busi. . ·*-

ne s s es to be established in Palestine .Other forms of
transfer transactions involved a merchant who took over
the Reichmark assets of German immigrants to purchase
goods in Germany and paid the immigrant in Palestine with
local currency. This was done within the range of goods
purchaseable through the Haavara.
A wide range of Palest1nian firms acquired Reichmark assets in return for

shares

or

debentures

for transferors. These include such undertakings as
Lodzia Textiles L~d., Ahrayut Ltd., Printing on Tin Lewin-Epstein, Nehustan Palestine Copper Industries Ltd.,
Palestine Levant Quarries Ltd., Atid- Navigation Company
Ltd., Paldag Ltd., Kallia Seaside and Health Resort Ltd.,
* For more details on contribution: of German Jews in this

regard see chapter titled "Socio-Economic and Demographic
Description of the German-Jewish immigration 11 •

I1
and INVA ('I'he Investment Corporation of P9.lestine Ltd. ) 1
T.Able IV 2
Areas of Transfer
A Goods transfer to P9-le_stine (through Haavara)

RM

92,887.084

B Exploitation of part of German
exports to neighbouring •~ountries
(through Haavara's sister com-

5,150~392

pany N.EMICO)
C Transfer of Support Marks (through

the sinter company INTRIA

4,057c;419

Th Sundry transfer activities

1,822.222

Sum Total RM 103,917.117
As table IV shows the most important element in the
He.avara activities wa.s the transfer of goods to Palestine, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of
the total. Category B in table IV, dealing with Nfil'IICO .,
(Near and Middle East Commercial Corporation1 Ltd.) was
a way of supplementing the turnover of Haavara. This
was done by encouraging the import of German goods to
Middle East countries through th~ transfer system. These could be purchased, in part, through the Reichmark

1 Ibid., .pp. 9-10.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist c ·o ngress,
August, 1939, P. 45.

I ff
assets of German Jews who immigrated or intended to
immigrate to Palestine. The Middle Eastern purchasers
would pay the Haavara Agency which in turn transmitted
the payments (minus transfer costs) to the immigrants.
Category C in table IV,dealing with Support
Work,was a way of clearing foreign relief contributions
for the Jews in Germany by such organizations as Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee and Council for German Jewry.
This was carried out through the· INTRIA (International
Trade and Investment Agency Ltd.). Individual remittances
to German Jews were handled in a similar way .
According to Werner Feilchenfeld* goods
purchased through Haavara did not produce an increase in Palestine's

balance of trade and payment
1
deficit, but on the contrary it improved it .He also
contended that in order to protect Palestinian industries Haavara refrained from importing products which
could be manufactured locally

2

•

*Dr.Werner Feilcheni'eld was General Manager of the
Trust and Transfer Office Haavara Ltd.
1 Werner Feilchenfeld, Five Years of Jewish Immigration
from Germany and the Haavara-Transfer 1933-1938,
(Tel~Aviv: Haaretz Press, 1938), p. 25.
. .
2 Ib l.u
•

'
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THE HA.A.VARA COYTROV~RSY
As early as August 23, 1933, .news of a trinsfer
agreement between Palestine and Germany appear_ed in "The
Palestine Post 111 • This news led to controversy in Prague
where the 18th Zionist Congress was in session" Mr . Meer
Grossmann, leader of the Revisionists, protested that this
'
agreement would underQine the Jewish boycott of German goods
and demanded to know whether the Zionist Executive knew of
the negotiations which had preceded the agreement and
whether this agreement was concluded with its knowledge.
On behalf of the Revisionists he stated:

11

·.Ve consider this

~greement as harmful, and contrary to the moral and economic interest of the Jewish nation. 112 • Replying on be' alf of
the Zionist .Executive Berl Locker said that it had nothing
7-:

to do with the agreement?. JabO~insky denounced this agreement as an rtundignified and humili.ating compromise 11 and added
that the Jews of Palestine would not support it and would.
boycott German goods imported on the basis. of this agreement7.
Arthur Ruppin revealed at the Congre ss that Sam Cohen was
responsible for concluding this agreement 5 • This still left
open the question of what, if any, role the Jewish Agency
1 "German Capit al for Falestine. lazi Government Agrees to
Transfer of Je·\7ish Froperty 11 The Pales1;ine Fost
August 23, 1933, p. 1.
2 "The General Debate Opens, Revisionists Oppose :Bimigrati on
Agreement" Je'::ish ....1!1ronic le September 1, 1933, p. 21.
3 The Palestine _t-Jost,.:1.u 6 ust c~8 , 1933, p. 1.
4 "Mr. Jabotins::y' s 3tatementi' ,Jev1ish Chronicle,Sept.1,1933,p.25.
5 The Palestine Post, September 1, 19j3, p. 1.

1

I D
had in the matter. Mr • . Hoofien, the manager of the AngloPalestine Bank,ex~lained that all his bank did

in connection

with the T~ansfer Agreement was to collect money for the
goods sent to Pa1e~tine from Germany. This money was then
held until the German Jews to whom it was due arrived·in

.

1

Palestine •. Professor Herbert Speyer, presiding in the absence of the chairman d'A.vigdor Goldsmid, vacated the chair
at the Jewish Agency Council meeting in Prague to enable
him to spe~k in the debate. He demande d that the · d~tails of
the agreeme nt be submitted to the Executive. Mr. Berl Locker
re peated his for~er assurances that the Executive had neither negotiated nor concluded the a~reement, but insisted
that the details could not be made public. A committee of
five · was then appointed by the Council of the Jewish Agen2
cy to wh om the details were to be revealed •
At the Congress Me er Grossmann put. forward a
resolution stating that no body affiliated with the Zionist
Organization be permitted to negotiate with Germany, or have
anything to do •,rith her until the German Government permits German Jews to leave unconditiona lly ind with out restricti.ons on the export of their capital and belongin~s .
The chair overruled this resolution by stating that. the primary concern of the Zionist Organization wast~ save German
Jews ~nd settle them in Palestine. A resolution was agreed
upon with regard to the Transfer Pact instructing the Action
Committee at its next session to reinvestigate the question
1 "The Three Million 1Iark .Agreerrnnt 11 ,Jewish Chronicle,
September 1, 1933, P.26.
2 "Jewish A~ency Council Meeting Continuance of the Status
Quo", Jewish Chronicle, September 8, 1933, p. 22.

ti!
"with the understanding that nothing is to be permitted
which is in contradiction with the attitude adopted by
Congress in its resolution dealing with the situation in
1
Germany.
The controversy over this Transfer Agreement did
not die down ~ith the conclusion of the 18th Zionist Congress, and more details about the agr:eement were revealed.
On September 20, 1933, the commerc ial correspondent of "The
Palestine Postu reported that the Anglo-Palestine B.s..nk, in
consultation with the Zionist Organization of Germany, took
the place of Hanotea in the negotiations. The reason given
for this action was that an

i

1

arrangement of this nature

should not be left in the hands of a cor:1pany of the necessarily ~imited scope of Hanotea. T~e corres p ondent viewed
the agreement with syC1pathy for according to him it

sav ed

wh3.t remained of these German Jews' fortune and enabled them
to start productive lives in I;alestine, this in spite of th·e
fact that it was done at the cost of purchasing the equi2

valent in G·-=: rmn.n goods •
Rothenberg and Lipsky, after returning from the
Congress in Prague, spoke out in defense of the agreement.
They clai med t½at it wa s not a breach of the boycott of
German goods. "The products released would never return to
Germany either in the form of value or in exchange goods.
1 ucon gr ess Concluding Sessions and Resolutions", Jewish
Chronicle, Septe~oer 8 , 1933, 9. 22.
2 " 1.rhe German-l'alestine Trade Agreement, an Unholy Alliance" The FA.les·tine Fost, September 20, 1933, p. 15.

I J 1It would in effect provide a diminution of the total economic . wealth of Germany 11

•

They claimed that, although it

might appear as a favorable balance for German trade, the
1
transactions really mean a depletion of German resources •
In the l 1 overnber

9, 193 1+ issue· of ''The New Pale-

stine'' the:re appeared a more critical article about the
Transfer Agreement. It ~tated that it was generally accepted as an una voidable procedure to enable German Jews to
come to Pale st ine with some means of their own. -On - the
other hand it was stated that these transfers were a
breach of the boycott 2 . r~leanwh ile a clear picture of a
Jewish Agency's role in the agreement had yet to emerge.

An editorial in the October l?, 1933 issue of the ttJe wish
Chronicle 11 co r.1p lained that the Jewish Agency stated in
"so mewha t cryptic la:pguar;e that j_t does not part icipate 11 ,.
in the carriyng out of this pact.·Tbis answer, according
to the "Chr~:>nicle 11

,

le.:.'t the question begging. But it ad-

ded that Sam Cohen who conducted the negotiatioLs for the
agreement left no doubt as to Zioni st cooperation in this
matter. He stated that Hano tea c.onducted it s negotiations
in "full accord with the respons ible bodies in Palestine 11
and added tna t both the Zionist Feder~tion in Germany and
the Palestine Office in Berlin had be gun similar_ negotiations with the Germans Uinistry of 3cono11ic Affairs. The
1aRothenberg and Lipsky back from Prague Tell of Zionist
Congress and German Bitue:tion 11 , The l~ev✓ Palestine,
September 20, 1933, p. 1.
2 "Explain Palestine Trade with Reich; Letter from An0;loPalestine Company fails to clarify Issue" The New l 1 a lestine,Y:ovember 9, 1934, p. 1.
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"Jewish Chronicle" added: "We leave it to ot hers to square
Mr. Cohen's words with the categorical denials of Zionist
partipation .r ecently heard in Prague''. It then came out
strongly against the agreement, regardless of wh o conducted the negotiations, finding no justification in.the-plea
that it promoted the building of the National Home.

11

Jews

do not wish their National Home to be made in Germany''· It
ended with the argument "lazidom has chosen to declare a
war of ex.t ermination on German Jewry.The situati·on ·must not
be handled weakly. Half a boycott won't save the German
Jewsri ! In an editorial of its Novemoer 16, 1934 issue ''The
New Palestine" came ou~ in support of the agreement for otherwise, it claimed, the German Jews would come penniless to
Palestine and become a burden upon the national fund 1 •
The l,9th Zionist Congress which met during .Au gustSept embe~

1935 in Lucerne was again witness t~ the Ha~vara

controversy •. Il'lr. Kaplansky (Labour) attacked it,· claiming
that it would damage the Yishuv economically and politically.
He asserted that German imports were exp orted t o to Palestine under condi tions of duaping and were · thus endan 0 ering
the inf ant industri es of the Yishuv and expressed the -fear
that Germany may overtake Britain as the number one imp orter to Palestine. He complained that the agre~ment was
breaking the solidarity of world Jewry. Kaplansky found the

1 The New Palestine,November 16, 1934, p.4.

I I'-{
Transfer Account No. 2 arrangement particularly objectionable~ for it provided for the transfer of capital to Palestipe that belonged to Jews who still remained in Germany1. Meer Grossmann, leader of the Jewish State party*,
2

also attacked the agreement • On the other band Berl Katznelson wh o -was the editor of Davar and a member of the Palestine Labour Delegation,. defended the agreement for enabling "tens of thousands of Jev,/8 to take their property from
Germany and invest their capital in the development ·Qf Palestine~
Inspite of opposi~ion the following resolution
on the subject 'o f the Transfsr Agreement was adopted: ''In
order to encourage the continued imr~igration of Jews into
Palestine from Germany, the Executive is instructed to take
under its contro:all-the work of the Haavara~ This resolution.received the overwhelming supi ort of the _Congress with
a vote of 169 to 12, but only after the dele ga t~s of the
Jewish State party had left it in protest 5 • Speaking out
for the resolution, Dr. Hillel Silver asserted that the
fact that the Executive of the JevJish Agency took control
over the agreement, ·would ensure against abuses. Wrs (/ -Golda
I.feyer son (r~~eir) also spoke out in its favor, stating "that
1 Jewish Chronicle, August 30, 1935, p. 14.
* Dissident rJvisionist Group.
2 The Chicago Je\ish Chronicle, August 30, 1935, p. 2.
3 "Pale stine - German Brirter Pact Def ended tt The Jevrish
Exponent, August 30, 1935", p.l.
4 "The Transfer Agreement 11 , Jev,ish Chronicle, September 6,

1935, p.25.

5 "The Transfer Agreement '1 , The Chicago Je\'rish Chronicle,
September 6, 1935, p. 2.

//5
in no circumstances could they stop usi~g every means at
their .disposal to take out as many German Jewish men, women and children from the Gehinnom in which they found themselves 11. Meer Grossmann, in opposition, proposed an amendmend to the resolution ;;hich called on all Zionist· insti tu-

t ions to ab.s tain from any dealings with Germany and withdraw
from the Tra nsfer Agreem~nt. This amendment was defeated
·l
with only 35 voting in its favor and 177 against •
In .its · September 6th edition the "Jewish Chronicle11 came out with an editorial condemni ng the resolution
adopt ed by the 19th Zionist Congress. It described 1t as an
exchange of Jewish hostages in return for the purchase of
German goods. It added that the agreement depicted the Jews
as presenting two faces to the world, one condemning the
Germqns for their atrocities, and the otner content at promoting trnrJ e 1.d th G2rmany 2 •
In the Septer:1ber 13, 1935 issue

11

The Tew R:tles-

tine 11 presc r.rt-2d 1,-"oshe Shertock' s vie1:rn in support 9f the
Haavara, stating tha~ i ts opponents could not expect extensive coloni zs.tion 1 a large ir:E'1igr.ation, and the rescue of
Jewish c api tal ~hile op posing the agreement. He also expressed his doubts about ~he boycott,-clai • ing that it was an
expression of force possessed by otner people,·a force Tihich
~

A

the Zionist movement still had to cre ate foT itself?e
1

The Transfer Agreement",. _Jewish Chr onicle ,September 6,
1936, p. 25.
2 Je\·Jish Chronicle, Sept.1ember 6, 1935, p. 9.
3 11 XIlCth Zionist Congress Transfer A~reement
The Ne"\'.r Pale-.
stine, 0eptembcr 13, 1935, p. 14.
11

11

,
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After the close of the 19th Zionist Congress
other serious charges were leveled at the Haavara Agency.

s. Y.

J~cobi -, _a member of the executive of the l\Jew Zionist

Organization, claimed that it gave back the Jews from Germany only 39 per cent of all the 80ods imported througp its
offices. He.pointed to the Jewish National Fund, the Labour
Cooperative .r-Jir, and the _.Hanotea corporation as its beneficiaries and claimed that there was little differen6e between
the privilege·s provided the German immigrants under the agree1
Q.c
.
ment and conditions before it c a~e into being. The hronicle~
also attacked the Yishuv for trading with G8rmany. It claimed that a lar ~e· number of Jewish merchants had concluded
transactions with ~erman concerns whi ch increased German
r)

exports to a level exceding p~e-tazi days~.
In an editorial of its October

25, 1935 issue the

"Chronicle '' carr1e out with its sharpest attack an the Haavara
to date, lab ~ling it as.blacknail arrangement 3 • A letter by

Lt. Colonel F.H.Ki_sch, and published in the same edition, outlined the major objections to th6 Haavar~: It aided the German econooy, reduced unemployment. and thus helped prolong
the Nazi regime; it was detrimental to a united Jewish front;
it hurt youn s industries in Palestine which had to conpete
with subsidized German exports;it created a bad impression
with the British who saw tazi perscution r ewarded with in1 ''The 'I'ransfe.r Agreement ;$cri o ...1.s Char?es Against Haavara 11
Jewish Cbron ic l e_ bep-c;er:1ber ,~C ~ 19) 5, I). 20.
2"The 'i'r.'.J.nstor Agreement I>rooi.JD; Attituoe of the Yisbuv
to the 1,oycott ~'J :Jwish Chr_smic le.. Oc.;toocr J.c3, l 9j 5, p. 31
3 "Scrap i:;he ,-~-ransf er AgI eewent J 21vv ish Cl,ronic le, Oc to1

11

ber 25, 1~35., p_.9.

·

·

JI 1
creased tr ade ; it undermined those seeking En~ land 1 s and
other countries' intervention against the Nazis; it was
debas~ng the life of the Yishuv by forci ng J ewish businessmen to either deal in German goods, or face financial ruin!
The vaad Leumi and the board cif Deputie~ in -London outlined the following poi nts in support of the Haavara:
Graet Britain re ma ined ~he largest exporter to Palestine;
import ers from Germany throu gh the Haavara needed special
certificates; Ha3vara payments were made in German marks
instead of sterling payments; Haavara protected Palestine
from Germa n du~ping by coope rating with the Jewish ~anufacturers Association in protectiI'-g local industries
from imports of the type of ~ oods manufactured locally;
2
the - transferred capital ~as used to build up the country .

1 Lt. Colonel .B' . H. Kisch to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle, 11 1he Transfer Agreement',. Jewish Chronicle, October 25, 1935, p. 27.
2 "Truth about the Haavara 11 The A.merican Hebrew, January 3,
1936, p. 228.

,.
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIOHS IN THE 1933-1938 MIGRATION
. THE CENTRAL BUREAU FOR THE SETTLEMENT -OF GERMAN JEWS
IN PALESTINE
The organization tha~ played the most impor-

, tant role in the settlement of German Jews in Palestine
was the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine. This organization, an organ· of the Jewish

Agency for Palestine, was established at the XVIII~h
Zionist Congress held at Prague from August 21, to September 4, 1933.

The relevant resolution reads:

"The Congress resolves to create a Central
Bureau for the purpose of organizing the
erni~ration of Jews from Germany to Palestine\ which shall be in control, in agreement with the Executive, of all matters
appertaining to this question" 1.
Dr. Chaim Weizmann was elected Chairman of the
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, with headquarters in London. The Palestine sec-

_tion of the Bureau, with headquarters in Jerusalem, was
put under the leadership of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, with Dr.

Werner Senator as his deputy. The management of the
London Bureau was entrusted to Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth,
an~ of the Jerusalem Bureau to Dr. Georg Landauer. Henrietta Szold was entrusted with the direction of youthimmigration and social work among the German immigrants.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Con0;ress,
July, 1935, p. 13.

The Central Bureau established an Advisory Council consisting of five members: Dr. Erj_1st Lewi, Dr~ Pinner,
Kurt Ruppin, Dr. Preuss, and two -deputy members: Dr.
LBwenstein and D~. Zl~cisti.
The Jewish Agency, as a division of whose Executive it h~s been operating, placed at the .disposal
of the Bureau certain of its departments, · particularly
the colonization and technical departments 1 • The Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau worked closely with
the Hitachdu~. Olej Germania* 2 • Both departments of the
Central Bureau worked in cooperation with the German
Zionist Federation and the Pal~stina-Amt ** in Berlin,
as well as with the Arb~its gerneinschafji~

Kinder- und

Jugendalijah in Berlin.* "'* 3·
In a letter of October 4, 1934, to Louis Lipsky
und Morris Rothenberg,' representing the American Palestine
Campaign for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Chaim Weizmann outlined the functions of the Central Bureau as
-f ollows:
tt

a) Acceptance and training of ~gricultural and
urban workers,
b) Settlement of· agricultural laborers' groups,

·1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine-, Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews, Palestine Office, Report from
October 1, 1933, to June 30, 1934, Zionist Archives,
New York, p. 1.
• The or~anization of German j~migrants in Palestine. In
1938 it became the Hitachdut Olej Germania v'Austria.
2 Ibid. p.2.
•• Palestina Office

3 Ibid. , p.l.

***For additional information about the Arbeits~emeinschaft see chapter on "Youth Aliyah".
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c) Colonization of middle class settlers,
d) Granting of loans to manufacturers, artisans, and small tradespeqple,
e) Giving information and advice in all branches of economic adjustment,
f) Transportation of children from Germany, and
their settlement in Palestine (Children's
Aliyah),
g) Support of scient~~fic institutions in Palestine for the appointment of Jewish scientists from Germany,
h) First aid and social care for the immigrants*,
i) Obtaining and distribution of Palestine Immigration certificates for refugees from Germany0 1.
The London Bureau began its work in October,

1933,

and the Jerusalem Department a few weeks later. Dr. Senator went to Berlin as early as December 1933, in order
to coordinate the activities of the German Jewish organi2

zations with those of the Central Bureau. The principal
functions of the London Bureau were fund raising to finance the work of the Central Bureau, to provide advice
and assistance to German Jewish refugees outside of Pa-

lestine, and to distribute iIIL'1ligration certificates to
the refugees. In addition the London office also represented the Jewish Agency in a number of committees that
handled relief work for the Jews in Germany and for those
• With the exception of (i) which was a function of the
London Department of the Central Bureau, all were functions of the Jerusalem Department of the Bureau. An additional task of the Jerusalem Bureau was the constructi)~
of dwellings for German Jewish immigrants.
1 :Letter by Chaim Weizmann, October 4, 1934, Central I
Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine,
Zionist. Archives, New York.

2 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews, Palestine Office, R~port from
October 1, 1933, to June 30, 1934, Zionist ~x-.::hives, rew
York, p. 1.
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who had become refugees.
The activities of the Londo·n Bureau did not
'

involve the organization in its own fund r~ising drives, but
rather the attainment of funds raised through various
relief committe~s • 1

Funds thus obtained .by 'the Central

Bureau were often earmarked in advance for certain projects favored by the committees. 2 . The &c€cutive of the
Jewish Agency would determine the number 0f immigration

certficates out of the total received by it from the Mandatory Government that \ ould be alloted to the Central
1

Bureau for the distribution to German Jewish immigrants.
The applicants for such certificates had to address their
requests to the Palestine Office in the countries in
which they happened to reside. All applications accepted
by these offices were then forwarded to the Palestine

Office in Berlin. The Central Bureau would finally decide how the Palestine certificates were to be distribu·ted
among the various countries for German Jews who had taken
refuge there. This decision was based on the endorsement
of the Palestine Office in Berlin on the one hand, and

1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July, 1935, p. 14.
2 Ibid • , p •

15 ..

I ,-

on the number cf certificates* provided by the Executive
of the Jewish Agency on the other. ·
Up to July 1934, .one third of all the certificates granted by the Government to the · Jewish Agency were
allocated to German Jews l. During the time period April 1, 1935 to March 31, 1937, the Palestine Government

granted the Jewish Agency 39,250 certificates, out of
which 10,457 or 26 per cent were allocated by the Agency

to German Jews 2 •
The granting of certificates to individual
applicants· involved a series of procedures and a variety of considerations. All applications of German Jews
accepted by the various Palestine offices r e quired the
approval of the Palestine Office in Berlin , which could
reject an application .on either pol i tical or moral
grounds •

The Berlin office was also authorized totem-

porarely refuse the endorsement of an application if
there was doubt about the national qualification of the
applicant.

In case of a dispute the Immigration Depart-

* The certificates referred to above were· Category C
(labour Schedule) certificates alloted by the Manda-

tory Government to the . Jewish Agency for distribution.
These included also the so-called Refugee Certificates
which were provided for Ger~un Jews who had left Germany, but had no certificates with which to enter
· Palestine.
1 Note of A conference of the English Zionist Federation on the Immigration Policy ir:. Palestine, July 10_,
_ 1934, McDonald Pa pers file I 0e 356.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress,
August, 1937, p. 11.
1

ment of the Executive of the Jewish Agency would have
the final word -

At the outset decisions on applications

were made by the Palestine Office Commission, often with
the assistance of representatives of local relief committees, 1

By 1935, the specifica.tions concerning the granting of immigration certificates as set forth by the Jew~
ish Agency, and carried out by the Palestine Office in
Berlin became very strict~ The general instructions
were that the distribution of certificates based on sentimental considerations had to be phased out. Only in
exceptional cases should expulsion from Germany and less
of employment be co.n sidered j_n the granting of certificates, the primary consideration being wether the individual can be integraJ:; ed productively into the Palestine
economy,

The most desirable categories of immigrants

were specified as trained agriculturists ar skilled arti.
. .
h
*
sans, with preference given t o t e former&

Special

L Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress, ·
July, 1935, p. 21.
* General Zionist policy was also to encourage the immigration of well-to-do people who could provide for their
own absorption through use of their capital. This according to David Yisraeli, "The Third Reich and the Transfer
Agreement" Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 6,
Number 2, 1971. (London: Wiedenfield and Nicholson, 1971),
p.

129.
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consideration was to be given Chalutzim 9 for whom bet-

ween 60 and 70 per cent of the certificates would be reSuch who were granted a certificate were required to obligate themselves to work for one year in
.
d 1 oca t·ion. 1
an assigne

Special consideration was given to the timing
at which certificates were granted where ~hildren were

concerned. Consequently families with young children were
not to be provided with certificates enabling them to emigrate to Palestine during the summer months. The policy
was instituted in response to the high occurrence of
summer diseases among such children. 2

In cases of mixed marriages documents had to be
produced to prove that the wife had converted to Judaism.

As for age . specifications, the policy was to
reject applications by males who were 46 or older,
barring exceptional cases, and by women 36 or over.
In cases where the applicant was known to have
had an 2.nti-Zionist or Communi.st affiliation, an investiLgation was called for to determine whether tbe individual's
newly acclaimed Zionism was due to conviction or was an
act of opportunism.3

Certificates were granted without

1 Informations-Rundschreiben des PalMstina Amtes

Berlin
February 12, 1935, Gentral Bureau for the Settfement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives
'
Jerusalem, document S7/150.
2 Informations-Rundschrei ben des Fali!stina Amt es,. Berlinl
June 20, 1935, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives
Jerusalem, document lo S7/150.
'
3 Jhfo:c1nations -Rundschrei ben des 1--aHlstina Arnt es, Berlin,
February 12, 1935, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, document No S7/150.

11<
regard to the applicants past Zionist affiliation 1 .The
stricter regulations as -. a:pplied by the PaHistina-Amt
Berlin were in response to complaints by the Jewish
Agency that the quality of immigrants fell short of the
specified requirements. The three major complaints were:
a) That immigrants often did not meet the established

physical fitness requirements, and that physicians had
prepared false reports about their health. b) That immigrants were sent to Palestine, who lacked sufficient ·.p reparation in Zionist ideology, and who rejected any sacrifice demanded by Zion. c) A significant number of immigrants did not live up to the obliGations they had
2
· assumed to work on the land •
The policy outlined was applied in practice in
the following manner: Out of a block of 500 certificates
granted by the Jewish Agency in the fall of 1935 for distribution to German Jews, 450 went to Chalutzimj and 50
,

·t o artisans.

Out of these 500 certificates 490 were

granted to individuals under 35 years of age, and 10 to
applicants who were between the agess of 35 and 4;.3

1 Central Bureau Renort to the XIXth Zionist Congr·ess,
July , 193 5 , p • 21~.
2 Letter of the Jewish Agency to the Pal~sti~a-Amt~Fli.2,
Nover·1ber 16~ 1934, Ce!!t!'3l r \treau for the Settl~r:i2r1t-)f
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S7/149.
3 Informations-Rundsch!:eiben des Fa.Histina Amt~)~erlin,
December 27, 1935, Cen~ral Bureau for tbe Set~lenent
of German Jews in Falestine, ~he Central Zionis~ Archi-

ves, Jerusalem, Documen-c l~o S7 /150.

The policies described above were generally adhered
to up to and into 1938,

with the ,exception that Zio-

nists of singular merit recieved special corisideration.1
Criticism did arise on the part of or5anizations dealing
with German Jewish immigration as to the selection of
candidates who were . to receive immigration certificates
and the number alloted to German Jews in general. One
particular incident involved Mr. Davidson, a member of
the German Refugee Committee in London, and also a member of the Anglo-Hicem Immigration Commi ttee. On the
' .occasion of a trip to Palestine, Mr. Davidson tried to
arrive at the truth about complaints that the distribution· of certificates by the Jewish A~ency had not been
handled fairly and that, in order to obtain a certificate, one had to be a member of the Zionist Party in Germany~2

He. was of the opinion that the Jewish Agency

made unjustifiable demands by requiring a knowledge of

1 Letter of Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth of October 13~ 1938~
circulated to the various Palestine offices, Central ·
Bureau for the ·settlement of German Jews in Palestine,
The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document

No S7/784.
· 2 Letter' of Otto M. Schiff * to Professor S, Brodetsky **
May 3, 1934,Central Bureau for the Settlement of Ger~an Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document No S7/72.
• Otto Schiff was a Member of the Allocation Comraittee
of the Central British Fund.
** Professor Selig Brodetsky was a Member of the Executire of the Jewish Agency and of the ~orld Zionist
Organization and a Member of the Allocation Comrai ttee
of the Central British Fund.
(Abov·e information from McDonald Papers file No. 356.
List of Jewish personalities p. 2.)

Hebrew of the would-be im~igrants 1 .Mr. Davidson also
took it upon himself to.meet with'Mr. Hyamson, the Director of the Immigration Department of the Palestine

Government, and then address a communication to him

2

•

In it he requested that 100 immigration certificates
be given to the German refugee committee.

1-ir. David-

son pointed out that he did not wish to t'apply to the
Jewish Agency, as from his experience of the previous
year he assumed that within three months he may perhaps
receive three permits from the Agency,.,

This matter was

of great concern to" the Jewish Agency which wanted the
letter withdrawn~ as it did constitute a communiqu/
with the Palestine Government and which Mr ~ Eyamson treated as an official communicatione

The Jewish Agency

defended the "desirabilitytt of an applicant having at
least a minimum knowledge of the Hebrew _language and
its cul ture,3

but denied that applicants had to be

Zionists and pointing out the fact that through an
1 Letter of S. Brodetsky to Otto M. Schiff May 6, 1934,
(in reply to May 3, 1934 letter), Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews
Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document No S7/72.
2 Letter of Otto
Schiff to Professor S. Brodetsky
May 3, 1934, Cen~ral Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Cent~al Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Docu~ent to S7/72.
3 Letter of s. Brodetsky to Otto Schiff May 6~ 1934,
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in
Palestine, The Central Zic~ist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document No S?/72.
·

in

arrangement with the !gµdah,

an anti-Zionist organi-

zation, certificates were made available to its members
l

by the Jewish Agency

•

The policy · line laid down by the Jewish Agency with regard to the distribution of certificates was
I

related to mandatory specifications in this matter. In

1935 the Palestine Government laid down detailed regu~
lations governing the distribution of certificates. A
certain number of these certificates were alloted specifically for married individuals, and a particularly
small number for unmarried applicants. ·

1-:

large number

of certificates was assigned for relatives of Palestine
residents

and another portion was reserved for arti.-

sans with a minimum of four years experience who wer~
required to be married as wellv

·2

The crisis that has overtaken Austrian Jewry
after that country's occupation by · Germany in 1938 led

to a fundamental change of policy. Younger, able bodied
immigrants no longer received preference over others as
in earlier years.

Many came to Palesti:qe destitute

and without the benefit of vocational preparation, 3
1 Ibid.
2 lnio:rr~ations-Run.dschreiben des Pa1listi112 .A1:.rtes, Berli.n,
June 20, 1'3.?5, Cent.ral Bureau for the ~ ~lt::~t~
of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zioni~t Archives,

Document No

s7/150.

3 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for
the Settlement of Ger.man Jews, Report to the XXIst
Zionist Congress and the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Geneva (Jerusalem: Central Bureau
for the Settlement of German Jews i.n Palestine, August 1939), p. 15.

The activities of the Jerusalem Bureau included,
among others the establish:nent of RASSCO ( The Rural
and Suburban Settlement Company) whose task was promotion of the Settlement of members of the Jewish middleclass 1 • RASSCO, established in the summer of 1934, was
designed for German Jewish families who were not prepared to develop new land from its initial stages, but
had sufficient means to acquire holdings which had already been prepared for them.It was geared specifically
for agricultural and suburban ·colonizationo

~ne

·1 and

parcelled out to the settlers was acquired either by
Keren Kayemet

~

or by RASSCO itself. The company took on

the responsibility of organizing the settlement and providing instructors in agriculture for their members.

By 1939 RASSCO was responsible . for the establishment
of ~he agricultural aettlements of Kfar Shmaryahu, ~'deb
~arburg, and Shavei Zion. It also established an auxiliairy

farming settl~ment in Kiryat Bialik and a sub-

· urban settlement in Kiryat Bialik B. In addition, RASSCO
set up a residential quarter on Mount Carmel.

This in-

1 Lette~ of Chaim Weizmann to Messrs.- Louis Lipsky and

Morris Rothenberg October 4, 1934, Central Bureau fo~
the settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist
Archives, 1ew York.
* The Jewish National Fund

volved the settlement of 600

people and a combined

investment by the settlers and RASSGO of

LP

180.000, 1

The Central Bureau also created the Palestine
Water Suppl7

Company * for irrigation -work and for the

expansion of land areas suitable for intensive cultivation.2

This company which was registered in the spring

~f 1935, later bought shares in the newly founded Mekorot
Water Company. 3 Besides the establishment of middle-class
settlements and providing aid to individua

settlers of·

this category, the Central Bureau also assisted in the
absorption of Chalutzim in ·labour settlementse It went
into an agreement with NIR (the Jewish Agricultural Cooperative Labour Association Ltd.) whereby i-t would

buy

shares in the company and in return the company would ·
invest in Kvutzot and Kibbutzim in which German ,Jewish
immigrants were absorbed 4
Occupational training in industry and trades
·was another aspect of the Central Bureau's work~ It helped

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Consress,
Augus t , l (Y"9
-;;) ~
• Cheviah Lehaspakat ~ayim
2 Letter of Chaim Neizma~n to Messrs. Louis Lipsky and
Morris Rothenberg 0cto~er 4, 1934s Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionj_st
Archives, ~ew York.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress,
August, 1937, p. 25.
4 Agreement between NIR and Central Bureau (undated
document), . Central Bureau for the Settlement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives
Jerusalem, document S7/329.
'
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in cooperation with the Labour Savings Banks, •

to set

up funds in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa for the training of apprentices.

The Central Bureau also orga-

nized vocational training courses with the help of the
Hitachdu.th Olej Q~rmania, 1 By

1939 it helped in the trs.i-

ning of individuals in the .following institution~2
Wizo
Moazath Hapoalotb ·
Batei Halutsoth
Conservatoire, Jerusalem
Technicum, Haifa
Childreen•s.Home "Ahavah 11
Trade School "Ludwig Tj_etz",Yagur
Ag~icultural Research Station of the
·
Keren Kayemeth, Kiryath Anavim
Girl's Farm of Hapoel Hamisrachi
· Gan Mee;ed
Art School Jacob Steinhard, Jerusalem
11
Aviron 1' Palestine Aviation Company~Haifa
Palestine FishinG Company, Haifa
New Bezalel, School of Arts and Crafts,
Jerusalem
Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Yeshivoth of Misrahi
Yeshivoth of Agudath Yirael
School. for Kurses, Shaare Zedek Hospital

Several thousand German Jewish im8igrants received
agricultural training in the various settlements. Here
the Central Bureau provided the financial means
for the purchase .of equipment and erection · of ~che bui.). * Kupat Milve V'Chisachon Shel Haovdim.
1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,;

July, 1935, p. 29.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 25.

ding ne~ded to house and school the immigrants 1 •
The central Bureau provided loans for undertakings in industry and in manual trades. This it did
through existing banks and other credit agencies, involving such institutions as the Bank L'Ataassiah and the
Bank of the Credit Cooperatives Zerubabel~

In 1934, .

through the initiative of the tiitachduth Olej Germania,
· a Loan Fund of Immigrants from Germany was f our1ded * •

Funds intended for urban credits were distributed .by the
Central 9ureau through this institution. 2
During the period April 1935 to March 1937,
the joint activities of the Central Bureau and the Labour
Cooperativ~ Credit Societies, the Zerubabel Bank and the
Industrial Bankiceased.Instead there was cooperation with
cooperative credit societies of German

immigrants and the

direct granting of credit by the Cent ral Bureau. 3 By 1939

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 27.
* Kupat Milve shel Ole~ Germania.
2 Central Bureau Hepor to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July s 19 3 5 , pp. 40--41 •
3 Central Bureau Report to the XX:th Zionist Congress,
August, 1937, p. 30.

the Kupat Milve had 2 9 500
formation of LP 9,000,

members with a capital
Kupat E~ was founded to

provide small loans for im~iBrants who lacked sufficient credit to receive loans from a bank,

1

The Central Bureau helped finance Hebrew
language courses organized by the Hitachduth Ole~
Germania and the Culture Department of the Vaad .
Leumi

••

Another task undertaken by the Central Bu-

reau was the. provision of fellowships to accademic
immigrants from Germany~ Grants were also given to
certain institutions on behalf of such scholars. These

institutions included the Agricultural Experimental
Station at Rechovot, the Hebrew . University i.n Jerusalem, the Haifa Technical Institute, and the Daniel
Sieff Institute, 2
The accommodations constructed by the Jewis~ Agency for pioneer immigrants were not particular-

ly· suited for the German Jewish immigration, which
included a comparatively large number of families with

1 Central Bureau Report to the X:X:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939. p. 43.
~ National Council.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XX:th Zionist Congress,
August, 1937, p. 53.

children.

The Central Bureau provided for the erec-

tion of a modern immigration hostei in Haifa. In cooperation with the Vaad Leu~i it organized a Social Service
in the immigration hostels~

The Bur~au also provided

aid for provisional housi?g in camps, barracks and ren-

ted flats.~ ~be. Social nepartment · of the Vaad Leurai, under the direction of Henrietta Szold,received monthly
subventions from the Central Bureau and operated in cooperation with the Hitachdut Olej Germania,

Besides

the aforementioned . difficulties in the housing situation
the German Jewish im~igrants often suffered maladies due
to the change of climate, 2
Seventy eight per cent of all expenditures incurred up to April 1, 1939, were related to absorption
of German Jews in agriculture, 3 This vms : in line with
1 Report on Jewish Immigration from Germany to Palestine
for the Year 1933-1934, Central Bureuu for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist
Archives, Jerusalem, Document No S7/109, pG3.

2Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July 1935,

3 Memorandum from Dr. Llartin Rosenbl1th to Mr. Henry Montor,
Subject: Central Bureau f~r the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, October 9, 1941, Central Bur~.au for tl:e
Sottlcment of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives,
New York, p. 2.

Table V 1 •
Funds alloted by the Central Bureau from 1933 to April 1,
1939 for the German Jewish Immigration into Palestine.
Number
LP
of
Persons
1) Buildings erected in agricultural
settlements for housing accommodation
245,000 10,650
2) Absorption in agricultural settlements where it was not necessary
to provide for additional housing
241,000
facilities
5,100
226,000
Li-, 700
3) Youth Aliyah
4) Training in agriculture and handi106·, 500
3,400
craft
5) Credi ts
53,000
3,880
60,000 15,500
6) Social care
7) Assistance for members of free professions and cultural purposes
28,300
3,110
8 ·) Instruction, administration
26,000

--------

Total

994,890

46,340

the principle laid down by the Jewish Agency, that as many
German Jews as possible be settled on the land. It is
clear from the figures in table V that the Centr~l Bureau
concentrated on a constructive -absorption process, allocating only LP 60,000, or approximately 6 per cent of
its total outlay for social welfare, the ·remainder being used for their integration : into the economy of the

1 Ibid.

Yishuv.
--

The bulk of the funds available to the Central

Bureau was supplied by the Jewish Agency, the British
Council for German Jewry, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, -and the Jewish Colonization Asso "'.'"
ciation.
The figures in table V show that the Central
Bureau administered nearly LP 1 million (.about LP 21.5
per cent per capita)" for the immigrants from Germany.
This is a small sum and attests to the fact that the
German Jewish immigrants relied on their own means

*•

The answers to my questionnaire tend to confirm this.
Out of . 115

who answered the question: "By whose help

did you emigrate, privately or through an organization~,

89 answered privately and only 26 stated that they had
received help from an organization. Further, to the
question "did you settle privately at first or in a camp'',
out of 116 who answered,

95 said privately, 10 said

in

a camp or Beit Olim, and 11 settled in kibbutzim. Fi**
nally out of 110 who answered the question in my quest-

ionnaire, "did you have any private mean$ or relatives
in Israel who helped yo~'', 73 stated that they had private
means or relatives or friends who helped them. 37 had
neither private means nor help from relatives or friends.
* The financial assets of the German Jewish immigration

are discussed in connection with the Eaavara agreement
and in the chapter titled Socio-Econonic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration.
~~ Some did not apply, e.g. those who c&me with Youth
Aliya.

HITACHDUTH OLEJ GERMAN IA
The Hitachduth Olej Ge~mania ·was formed in February

1932

by Zionists from Germany who had settled · in Palestine

before the Hitler era. Among its founders it counted Dr.
, Ernst Lewy and Dr. Theodor Zlocisti. It was a self-help
organization whi ch recruited volunteer workers, and whose
task it was to inte grate an Aliyah of a non-Chaluz character into the Yishuv . Already bef ore the establishment of
the Central Bureau it provided a.reception and informa tion
service for new immigrants from Germany. Initially it receivad financial assistance fron the Vaad MAuchad (United

Commd.ittee) and frorn the Central Bureau. :I!he various 1:5ranches of the [~_tachdutb .Olej Germn't1ia advised the new irnm migrar-ts on obts.ining er.1ployrrent, settlement on the land,
le gal matters, housing, choice of occupation, invesvmenv
•

....

.J...

a nd transfer of money through the Haavara acency, questions
on securing loans, schooling , and social matters . It had
established a special sJrvic e at the ~orts of Jaffa and
Haifa for the receptioL of i~CTigrants

f10~

1933 - 1934, the Hi tac hd uth 01;.; j Gr-;rr.:ania

Germany . In
E,f; ~

up t ent camps

for i mm i gra nt s with ou~ means vho could not be put up in

1

Batei Olim of the Jewish Agency . Later special i mmi gr ant

1

Die 'l'f-f,t i ri:1rei t der Hi t3.chduth Ole.-j Gerrn.ania, ~~e rke. s und
f' 1i1el-~ •v~_v l '1~? - J_ 934, Central imreau for the Settlement of ~erman Jews in ~alestine, ~he Central Zionist
Archives, Jerusalem, Docume nt i:3 7/26

Srd

houses for refugees from Germany were established in Haifa,
Tel-Aviv, and-Jerusalem. The Hitachd 1th Olej Germania
also set up special labour exchanges which CO? perated
with the General Federation of Labour.

Of particular importance were its efforts to faci~
litate the cultural absorption of the immigrants. The
Central Cultural Com~ittee of the Hitachduth Olej Germania,
with headquarters in fel-Aviv, curried out the organizational and planning work for the whole country, ·w hile its
branches in Haifa, Jerusalem and the larger settlements
retained a liriited deg ee of independent action. Hebrew
langua ge and culture courses · ere provided for the GerQan

directed, up to 1939, by Nahum Le;in and Jacob Sanobank

who ~hemselve~ 0ere not German Jews.
In 1936 tho Cultural Department of the Vaad Leumi
took over primary respons~bility for Hebrew instruction,
but the Hitachduth Olej Germania continued its work in

that field, so that in 1937
Hebrew courses in

900 students attended its

15 settlements, and an additional

1,200

were doin~ so in the cities 1 • Its adult oducation · courses
were geared not only towards the dissemination of the Hebrew language, but also towards familiari2ing the immigrants

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 24.

with the com1try, . its people ( both Je ..rs and Arabs), Jewish
religion and history. The Hitachduth Olej ~qrmani~, as part
of this eff~rt, organized lectures _throughout the country
in which these subjects were dealt with. Its Cultural Committee

also provided students and their parents with advise

on the continuation of education and the choice of schools.
As a consequence of the increased immigration of
Aust~ian Jews after the Anschluss the already existing
Hitachduth Ole.j Austria united \?ith the Hitachduth Olej
Germania to form the Hitnchduth Olej Germania we Austria.

By 1939 this corabined organizat ion had 6,000
paying members in 26 local groups 1 •

FOR GERf'.1AH JE,'JRY

The Ccn-tral Bri tir~h ::;1und for _Ge rman Jewry was for
med in the sunmer of 1933 after an a~reement ha~ been·reachcd between the English Zionist Federation and the non-

-

Zionist leaders of British Jewry to for • a joint c~mpniGn
for the benefit of German Jewso In 1933 it raised
L 202s000

, in 1934 L 175i000

L 92,000 2 • . The distributicn

, and by the middle of 1935
of tpe sums raised was

decided upon by an Allocations Com~ittee compr~sed of
Zionists and non-Zionists in equal numbers, and Sir Osmond d '_Avigdor Goldsmid ser·ved as neutral Chairman. Of

1 Ibid.

2 Central Bureau ?.eport to the XIX~h Zionist Congress,
July, 1935, p. 16.

,~1 o·
the total raised during the time period described :=tbove
L 71,000

went to Keren Hayasod antl over L 42,000

to

Keren Kayamet.The latter was earmarked for the purchase of
land for the settlement of Jews from G~rmany. This was
done with the agreement of the Jerusalem DeparGment of
the Central Bureau. A further L 82,500

were allocated

for construction of houses, training in agricultural and
manual occupations and for the settlement of immigrants
without means of their own. The Central Bureau was entrusted to carry out these proBrams, receiving for that
purpose L 58,000

up to mid 1935.• The Central British

Fund also allocated L 27,000

to the Hebrew University,

the Haifa Technical Institute, and for Wizo for the
benefit of German Jewish immigrants. Under its auspices the · women's Appeal Committee was formed which, _by
May 1935, had provided L 9,000 for th~ tranofer of youth
from Germany to Palestine. 1
The Council for German Jewry was established in

1936~ This was_in response to the grave situation of
of German Jewry after the passage of .the _Nuremberg . Laws -of

1935. In January 1936, Sir Herbert Sa~uel, Lord Bearsted
and Mr. Siraon Marks (all leaders of British Jewry) went
to the United States to establish personal contact with

the leaders of the ~ewish Joint Distribution Committee
and · the United Palestine Appeal. \\hen the delegation
returned from the United States, the Council for German
Jewry commenced operations, repJ.acing the Central :S:ci ti.sh
1 Ibid..

Fund for German Jewry. The Councils -' . aim. was · to organize
a more comprehensive and more coordinated effort on the
part of the Jewish organizations in Great Britain, the
United States, and continental ~UTope, in

order to help

German Jewry, with emphasis on emigration and training
for emigration.

The Council' drew up a program for the

emig~ation of 100,000 Jews from Germany over a period
of four years

~

It estimated that L 3~000.000

be required for that endeavour,

would

of which one million

should be contributed by British Jev·ry.

.' During its
1
first two years it raised L 750,090 in England.
This
was to be used over a seven year period, but by the end

of 1937 its funds were almost exhausted. In 1938 the
Council also provided aid for Austrian Jewry, raising
L 170,000

for that purpose~ After the November 1938

pogrom, a new appeal was issued in which over a half
million pounds were raised, 2
The Council worked through Jewish organizations
in Germany and Austria, and a.s regards settlement of the rei'ugeesr it operat~d through the Jewish Colonization Association
(ICA) and the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. In England· it operated through
1 1he Council for German Jewry and the Baldwin Appeal, 1939,
Council for .German Jewry, Zionist Archives, 1ew York,p.l.
2 Ibid~

p. 2.

-

13/ 1the German Jewish Aid Committee which dealt with the
needs of the refugees in that country. The Council did
not set up its own machinery for the work of emigration
training and relief.

Originally the council's main objectives were: 1
a) To assist in an orderly and planned emigration
b)

c)
d)

e)
f)

from Germany.
To assist in settlement on the land, both in
Palestine and in overseas countries.
To organize and expand training facilities . for
agriculture and manual occupations.
To provide funds for the relief, training , and
emigration of Jewish refugees in En gland
To assist national refugee committees in huropean states.
To assist in any emergency for refugees from
Germany.
After the severe deterioration in the situation

of German and Austrian Jewry in 1938, the Council was
forced to change its objectives and set up the following
. ·t·ies 2 :
priori
a) To arrange a rapid emigration from Germany.
·b) To transfer the training activities to centers outside of Germany.
c) to prepare temporary refuge for a large number
of refugees in England and on the European
continent.
Although envisaged to represent both US. and
British Jewry, the Council for German Jewry was of importance only in Great Britain. The major organization

in

the United States , as regards matters of assistance and
fund raising was the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee.

1 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
2

!61d. p. 4.

Out of the first collection of the Council for
German Jewry L 243,000

were alloted to the Central

Bureau, about L 95,000

to l{creI1. Kaye~, and L 112,000

to Keren Havesod. Out of the proceeds ~f the second and

third fund raising campaign the Council for German Jewry allocated only L

134,000

and only L 43,000

to Keren Kayemetft The reason for

i;o

the Central Bureau,

this was that the funds raised by the Council. had to be
used in England for the· increasing number of refugees
from Germany and _Austria who had. _arrived :there _in 1938
and after. The expenditures of the German Jewish Aid

Committee * in England had correspondigly jumped ·from
L

40,000

in 1937 to L 100,000

in 1938~ The sums rai-

sed in England by the Central British Fund (1933-1935)
and the Council for German Jewry (193~-1939) amounted

to approximately ·.L 2,000.000

out of which a total

of L 700,000 1 had been alloted for the settlement

1 Central Bureau Report to the

August, 1939, p. 11.

XXIst Zionist Congress.,

* The Ge.r man Jewish Aid Committee was formed by the Central

British Fund for German Jewry, predecessor to the Council for German Jewry.

IL/ L./

of German Jews in Palestine.
Between 1933 and 1939 the Women's Appeal Committee in England alloted L 52,000

1 to You0h Ali~~•

AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COifJ\" ITTEE

Its most important work Has for Jewish refugees
in countries other than Palestine-<) In

1934-1935 it par-

ticipated in a joint drive with the American Palestine
Campaign. Out of the net proceeds each received half a
million dollars 2 , and out of the remaining 800,000
dollars 250,000 dollars

ere. allocated to projects p:co-

posed by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestineo

Out of the 500~000 dollars

alloted to American Palestine Campaie;n half went to the
Central Bureau- 3
~

joint campaign was again conducted in 1935 and

the Central Bureau wa~ alloted by the Jewish Agency
LP 24,000 out of the share of United 'Palestine Appeal, 4.
1 Ibid.

2 Central Bur~au ~er)cirt to the XIXth z·i·onist
Congrea
. .....s'·
July, 193 5, p. 16.

3 Ibids ,p. 17.
4 Central Bureau Report to the X:Xth Liionist Congress,

August, 1937, P-c 3 •

In 1936 and 1937, the Joint Distribution Committee and United Palestine Appeal held separate campaigns. The proceeds of the latter were divided equally
between Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemet.The Jewish Agency alloted LP 50,000 in 1936, and the same amount again
in 1937 to the Central Bureau, to which both funds made
equal contributions . 1 •

REICHSVERTRETUNG DER JUDEN IN DEUTSCHLAND
German

Jewry has been organized under this

group since 1933. Its main tasks were social help,training

and emigr~tion. The

Reichsvertretung included a

Committee for Relief and Reconstruction (Zentralausschuss
ftlr Hilfe und Aufbau)which was responsible for educaticn,
vocational training, and retraining for prospective emigrants. It set up centers for the training of youths
between the ages of 14 and 17, and for the retraining of
individuals between the ages of 17 and 30.
Vocational training was both in agriculture
and in the manual trades8 In Garmany approximately 5,000 persons a y_ear were rec.eiving training and retraining under the auspices of the Reichsvertretung 2 •
The Reichsvertretung comprised three emigration agencies: a) the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutsch~ , which assisted in amigration to all countries

1 Ibid., p. 4.
2 Council for German. Jew-:ry, Annual .B.eport for the.. year...
1937, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
· Jews in Tolestine, The Cent::al Zioni3t Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S7/516, p. 6.

over•neas with the exception of Palestine • . b) The Pal~stiri:1 -Amt which, as part of the Jewish Agency dealt exclurd. vely with emigration to Palestine. c) the emigration
office of the committe which dealt with the repatriation
of J~ws who were not German nationals

••

The annual

bud g(,t of the Reichsvertretung was approximately RM

4,00( .000 a year, of which

about half was raised inside Germany,and the remainder outside 1**
The Palestine Office, Berlin (Pal~stina-Amt
BerJtn) was responsible for directing the flow of refu-

gees from Germany to Palestine. It ~ot only distributed Lhe Labour Cert ifi.cates and procured the Capitalist category entry permits, but also arranged for
tranoportation to Palestine and helped finance the
tripn of the needy. The Palestine Office also supervis e d the training of prospective emi grants to Palestin , including the Hachshara

work of the Hecha lutze

In January 1939, the question about the posit~on of the staff of the Reichsvertretung was raised.
The question was whether they should u~e the opportunity
avail ble to them to leave Germany or whether they
shou)d continue with their important work. Norman
Bentwlch urged that they be given a promise of permits
so that their emigration shculd be assured in the future.
He al. o proposed that a sum be put at their disposal
* · Hauptstelle fllr jildische WanderfUrsorge.

1- ~
• .,
.l.Dl l.

**Th0American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and
tht, Council for German Jewry were the Largest external
Contributors.

outside of Germany to assist them when they finally
do emigrate. He suggest.ed asumof L 10 a month for each
1
month served in Germany during 1939 • Tha decision
of the Council for Germany was that

0

no special grant

could be made for that purpose, but it was stated that
arrangements had been made for the granting of visas to
England for the principal members of this country
(Germany)

J

they would receive special treatment ·v.;ith

regard to maintenance and ultimate emigration 112 •
HIGH COkt/iISSIONS FOR GERrlAN RBF_UGEES

The High Commission for the refugees from Ger-

many was created by a resolutioJ.1 of the Assembly of
the League of Nations on October 11,1933. The states
supportinB the Com~ission intended .that it should be
/

an integral part of the League, or at least an autonomous organization attached to it, whose administration costs the _League would underwrite 3 e German*oppo·sition at the assembly resulted ih a compromise,whereby the League appointed the High Commissioner and

named the Governing Body, but the commission was to
be detached from the League, not responsible to the
Council, and would not receive financial support from
1 Officials of the Reichsvertretung, Note of the offi-

cers, by rorman Beni;wicn, Janua.ry 4, 1939, Council for
the German Jewry, Zionist Archives, New York.
2 Minutes of the f,:! eeting of the 1Dxecutive held January 5,
1939t Council for Garman Jewry, Zionist Archives,
New York, p. 2.
3 Report by 1;orman Bentwj_ch on High Commissions for
G~rman refugees, lfovemb2r 8, 19:;7, 1\tcTJonald Papers
file No. 356Q p. 1.
• Germany was then still a member of the League of Nations.

•

the League 1 • The resolution adopted by the issembly of
the League of Nations· on October 11, 1933, read as follows:
requests the Council of the League
of Nations to invite States and, if it thinks,
advisable, private organizations best able
to assist these refugees to b e represented
on a Governing Body of vhich the duty will
be to aid the HiP;h Commi ss ione:c in his work,
the High Commossioner having to submit periodical reports on the development and fulfilment of his task to the saie Governing
Body , \?hich would forward the!:'l to the States likely to be able to assist in the action
contemplated, Suggests further that the expenses of this collaboration and of the
High Commissioner's office should be defrayed by funds contributed voluntarily from
private or other sources; The council is
requested to invite states and, if it thinks
it advisable, private or ganizations be st
able to assist the refugees in que stion, to
be representd on a Governing Body of which
the duty will be to aid the High Commissioner in his work 1' 2

11 • • · • • • • • •

On October 12, 1933~ James G. McDonald was invited
to accept the position of High Commissioner for refugees
(Jewish and other) coming from Germany *
The f ollow~ng countries ·w ere invited to be
represented on the Governing Body: The Netherlands, France.,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgiu~, Switzerland, Denmark,
Italy, United States United Kingdom, Sweden; Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 3 • Of these

all but Argentina,

1 Ibid.
2 League of Nations, Organization on an Internation2l
Basis of Assistance for Refu~ees (Je ~ish and Other)
Coming f:ron Ger;:nany, October l2,193j, McDonald Fapers
file No • 3 56 , pp • 1-2 •
* Former US 1-'res:i.dent Herbert Hoover w~s also considered
for this post. This accordin~ to a letter of Mildred s.
Wertheimer, Au~ust 11, 1933, McDonald Papers fi.le
}10. 356.
3 League of ;ations, Organization on an International Ba-

sis of A~sistance for ~efu~ees (Jewish n~d Oth0r) Coming
from Gerfi1arc.y 1 Octor>er 12, 1933, Jfic.Donald faperr-, .file No.
356, p. 2.

Brazil, and Spain accepted. These twelve countries,with
the addition of Yougoslavia as the thirteens membe~ be1
came the Governing Body of the High Commission •
The first meeting of the Governing Body, held
in December 1933, decided th~t the Body be composed exclusively of representatives of statesG The representa~
tives of the organizations were to form, an advisory

Council which could make recommandations to the Governing Body but whose members could be included in organs
2
that made recommendations to the State • Jam~s McDonald
did face pressure from some private organizations to be
recognized as more of an integral part of the Hi'gh Commission 3 • His attitude

on this subject is revealed in

his following correspondence with Miss Esther G~ Ogden

of the Foreign Policy Associat'ion:
"In my talks with Dr~ Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann, which were very friendly_tbroughout, ·
I have been quite definite in my stutement
that the private organizations can only have
an advisory relationship to the Governing
Body. Both Dr. Jeizmann and Dr. Goldmann
assented to this and even agreed that I
would be stronger as · the, representative of
1 Progress of the work of the High Commissioner for re- ·
fugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, September 1934t McDonald Papers file Noc 356, P~ 2.
2 Report by Pormah Be~tv/ich on ~Iigh Commissions for -German
'Refugees, :Fovernber 8, 1937} McDonald : lapers file No. _356,
p. 2.
3 Letter of Jaces G4 ~cDonald to hliss Esther G. Ogden,
November 15, 1933, McDonal¢l Papers fi.le No. 356~

1'1 0
fifteen* .governments than as representative of a private organization." 1
The Advisory Council consisted of representatives of private organizations both Jewish and nonJewish. Among the Jewish organizations repre~ented on
the Council were: the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee (Paris), the Council for German Jewry (London),
HISS-ICA Emigration Association (HICEN1 ) (Paris); tb.e Jewish Agency for Palestine ( Lond on), the Jewish Colonization Association (Paris), the Jewish Refugee Committee
(London), the World Jewish Congress (Paris), Agudat
Israel World Organization (London). 2
In the first meeting of the Governing Body

in December 1933, Ja~es _G. McDonald pointed out that it
was undesirable that his office should undertake direct
work of relief

To do so, according to him, would neces~

sitate the building up of a large staff and would result in overlapping with private organization already
occupied with this task, 3 The functions of -the Governing Body were outlined as . follows:
* Actually it turned out to be thirteen governments.
1 Ibid.

2 League of Nations, Refugees Coming from Germany, Report Submitted to the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of
the Assembly of the League of Nations by the High Com~iscionsr, Sir Niell ~alcolro~ Geneva, September 1,

~937, McD9nald Fape_rs fil __ No. 356, p. 4~
3 Pr.o gress of the Work

_

01· tne High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany. Sep~ember, 19:54, McDonald Papers file No. 356 7 p. 2 ....

ly/

a) To conduct ne gotiations with Governments * •
b) To coordi nate the work of the private relief
and ·emigration organizations.
c For the High Commissioner to personally participate in the efforts of the 1 larger private
organizations to secure funds •
James G. McDonald was suc~essful ~n assisting
Jewish organizations raise funds, particularly in the

United States (of which he was a citizen).

He was also

.

able to bring about the coordination · of the voluntary efforts

of the various bodies in Europe and the United States. ·
The High Commissioner was not successful as regards the
settlement of refugees in overseas countries,

Accor-

ding to Norman Be~twich he ''supplemented with some little
effect the approaches of the British Government, and the
Palestine Administration for settlement i~ Palestine:• · 2
On Dec·ember 27, 1935, James G. IfoDonald resigned from his post, two years after he had assumed office.
In his letter of resignation he expressed his dissatisf~ction with the results of commissions activities. He
thought it insufficient to continue work only on behalf

or

those who fled Germany, but stat~d that

to be undertaken to "mitigate the causes

efforts had
which created

• Negotiations with the Government were .to involve technical ma tters such a s passports, ident ification papers,
residence and work permits, and admission of refugees
to various countries. Ibid., pp. 3-8.
1 Ibid • , p • 3 •
2 Report by Norraan Bentwich on Hi gh Commissions for German
refugees, Nove Ji Jer 8 , ~~937, McDona ld Pape~s file Ho. 356,
.P. 5.
-- - - .--- ___-__ --- -~--- ---- --

German refugees!'

He concluded that the matter was a

political function which had to be nandled by the League
itself and that this could not have been part of the work
of the High Commissioner's Office, which was weakened
from its start by its separation fro~ the League. 1
In February 1936, Major-General Sir Neill
Malcolm was appointed the New High Commissione

for Ger-

man refugees. His tasks were conf'ned to dealing with the
question of legal status for the refugees and to negotiate with governments of countries of refuge, while the
provision of material assistance to the refuge es was
relegated to the private organizationso 2

In

the winte~ of 1938, the Office of the

High Commissioner for German refugees and tho Na nsen
International Office for refugees

merged to form the

Office of High Com:rrissioner of t4e League of Nations
for RefugeBs.The activities of this new office applied

to all refugees, .not just those coming from Germany., Sir
Herbert Samuel was appointed its first High Commissionere
1 Letter of resignation of James G.tilcDonald, High Corn.missioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from
Germany, · necemb_e r 2?, 1_9 35, kDonald Papers file No. 356,
pp. V-VI.
2 Refugees Corning from Germany, Report submitted to the
Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
League of Nations b~l the High Comwissi.oner, Sir Neill
Malcolm, ~epte~ber _l, 1937, Mcponald Fap~rs file Noe 356,
*P.T~h?-•
.
.
.,-~21 uncer
l
th
1s organization
was f oun d ect. in
_j
_e name
The Nansen Organization fer Help to Refugees and was
called after 1930 The ~ansen International Office for
Refugees. It dealt with Jewish and non-Jewish refugees
from Russia,and with Armenian and Turkish refugeese
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YOUTH

PRECURSOR TO YCU 1rH

ALIYAH

ALIYAH

In the latter part of the 19th century
Carl Netter, founder of Mikveh Israel Agricultural
College, brought youngsters from Galicia to Palestine.
Next to come on the scene was Israel Belki.n whose
work contributed greatly towards the foundation in
1892, of the children's village of Meir Shefeya.
In 1923, the Jewish com~unity of Durban in South
Africa sponsored the immigration of orphans from
the Ukraine to the village of Giv'at Hamoreh.
After World War I, Dr. Siegfried
Lehmann (a children's doctor ) , was invited by
Kovno's Jewish communal leaders to take over
direction of the Department of Child Welfare of
the Jewish National Counci l.
an

institute

f or

the

care

This i ncluded
of

orphan

r' "(

children and youth (Kinderheim). In his work he
had the bGcking of tlie Berlin Jewish com;:mni ty
and the Joint. Distribution Comrni ttee of Americ·a.
The Kinderheim of Kovno was run on the principl~
that the youths should have self governmerit.
They _were trained for manual labor in agriculture,carpentry, and other trades. Politically they were
free to adhere to the group of their choice, .
whether it be Hash ome r Ha t za ir, The Zionist Socialist
Ur.ion, the Earxist Yiddishist Bund, or the Bechalutz.
The 200 members of the home were divided
into groups of fro m 30 to 40 each on the basis of
religious, socia_l , and political views . 1 This
situation applied for the years 1921-1925. In

·1925 it was realized

by ~ost participants that

Jews who fitted theoselves for physicnl work would
have little opportunity there, and that emigration
was neccessarj. The Marxists in the home Were not

1 Norman Bentwich, Ben-Shemen A Children's Village
in Israel (Jerusalem: ITinted unJ2r the su 1Jervision
of the Publishin[; Department of the Jewish Agency
at the Jerusalem Post Press,· 1958), p. 23.

of this opinion, but others saw Palestine as their
destination.
The situation -of the Jewish youths in
Kovno in

1925 was in many ways similar to that

of their counterparts in Germa ny of the 1930's.
Seeing no future in their native country many were
eag er to build a future some where else.
Leh~ann sought a future for these children
in Ben-Shemen. The land and buildings were provided
by the Jewish National Fund. Other aid came from
the JilJische Waisenhilfe (Orphan's Fund), of Berlin .
which helped maintain the Kovno Kinderheim until
1930, and the Children's Village Ben-Shemen in
Palestine. The children who began coming to the

1926 were mainly . from Eastern Europe,

village in

but this situation chan~ed in th~ 193O's~
During the years

1932-1933 Reeba Freier,
.

.

a dedicated social ~orker and wife of a Berlin
Rabbi, laid the foundations of Youth Aliyah. She
gave birth to the idea of sending Jewish youngsters
to the Land of Israel, where they would be educated
in agricultural settle • ents. This is recorded in
one of her leiters to Henrietta Szold which read~
as follows:

"One February morning in 1932, a few
sixteen yenr old boys cawe to me for .
advice. Pale . and shaken, une mployed
and hun s ry, they had no prospects
for the futuie. Should they leave
Berlin? Go to the Rhineland? What
was my opinion?
After restless days and
sleepless ni ghts I hit upon an idea;
these young people should be sent to
Eretz Israel to live and to work.
Jewish you t h could not be permitted
to go to se ed living purposelessly;
the Land of Isr0el exists for them,
to be upbuilt by them."l

In this matter she found little support a mong
Zionists in· Germany who thought the educational
facilities in Palestine to be inediquate.
Lehmann, who happened to be visiting
Berlin at the ti~e, agreed to take them to BenSbemen, thus inaugurating a process by which many
thousands of children would find their way to
Palestine. Before Youth Aliyah was launcb ed another
group was sent to the Technicum in -Haifa. Other
parents had sent their children to _attend the Reali
school in Haifa. Under Henrietta Szold, who founded
Hadassah in 1912, this movement grew into an
organized education and rescue operation.

1 Marian G. Greenberg,"Joyful Mother of Children"
Youth Aliyah Under Henrietta Szold (:New York:
Hadassah, The ~omen's Zionist Organization of
America, Inc., August 1960), p. 1.

YOUTH ALIYAH AT ITS INCEPfION

After Hitler's rise to power the situation
of German Jewish youth became critical. In a letter
of August

21, 1933, to the president of the XVIIIth

Zionist Congress Georg Landaue~• stated that every
year between 6,000 and 7,000 Jewish youth left
schools in Germany and soug ht occupations. They
had no opportunities in either business or academic
fields, and their opportunities in agriculture,
in industry, and in craftsmanship were limited,
as was the number of those who could be sent abroad
for Hachsharah. Palestine was seen by him as the
best alter~ative for dealing with the problem and
esti~ated that already in

he

1933, 3,000 _youn~ people

could be absorbed as trainees in -Palestinian
industries, in kibbutzim, and in other settlements. 1
In this letter Landauer also proposed
the creation of an office in Germany whose function

it would be to select and prepare prospective
youthful e~igrants. He pointed out that a special
division for IIachsharah-Aliyah, which should serve
that purpose,liad been etablished within the Pala~tina-

• Georg .Landauer was entrusted with the management
of the Jerusalem Department of the newly created
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine,
1 The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The General Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Docu~ent S7/65.

Amt Berlin. He added that also in Palestine an
office had to be established, whose task it
would be to provide for the material necessities,
work and professional training for the youths.
Already in the summer of

1933, a meeting

of the repr~sentatives of the ag~i~ultural ·
collectives took place in Ein Harod. These spoke
for kwutzot, kibbutzim, and moshavim 9f · various
- political and religious standings. The question
before them was how to organize the immigration
of boys and - girls from Germany to Palestine,
and what role the agricultural collectives would
play in this enterprise. This meeting dealt with
the need to raise funds for the undertaking and
concluded that for the first year LP 3.00 per
child monthly would be needed, and only LP 2.50
during the second year. 1
In Palestine matters of organizing
youth immigration were dealt with by a subcommittee of the United Co mmittee (Vaad Hameuchad)
fo·r

the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.
In Germany itself action wis also taken

on this matter. The Joint Com • ittee for the Settle~ent

1 Five Years of Youth Im.• igration into Palestine,
1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
Ge roan Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, l~ew York.

of G~rman Jews in Pa lestine was or 6 anized and
had its Sub-Comrnittee on Education and Culture
examine the educational needs of the emigrants
and the possibilities for their fulfillment
in Palestine.
This investigation was prompted by the
representatives of various Jewish institutions in
Ger • any. These included the aforementioned Jtldische
Waisenhilfe (Orphan Fund); the organization which
founded Ahava* in Berlin in the early 1920's, and
th~ Jtldiscihe Jugendhilfe. The last was a federation ·
of the Jewish youth organizations of Germany. It
iricluded all the various -groups with a Zionist
and pioneer ideology. By 1ovember 1933, the Jtldische
Jur-;endhilfe had made . arrangements with Ein Ha.rod,
Rodges, and with the Girls' Farm _in Talpiot.
Racha Freier was_ la.rGely responsible for
this arrangement.
Late in 1933 the Arbei ts .; -r;emeinschaft ftlr
\

Kinder und Jugendalijah (Association for Child and
Youth Immigration) was organized. It was ciompos·e d
of three a6enc1es: The Jtidische Ju~endhilfe, the
Children's Village of Ben-Shemen, and Ahava whi ch
was ready to be transferred to Palestine.

* Ahava was - a home for the protection and care

of neglected and abandoned children of refugees
from Eastern Eu~ope.

I ,/.

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft ftlr Kinder und Jugendalijah
raised funds in Germany and other countries and
conducted propaganda. It coordinated its activities
with the Jewish Agency in Palestine and in this
way Youth Aliyah became part of Zionist activities.
Tbe Arbeits g emeinschaft cooperated with
the Zentralausschuss der deutschen Juden ftlr Hilfe
und Aufbau (Central Committee of German Jews for
aid and Development) which was recognized by the
German Government.
-The Central Bureau for the Settlement
I

of German Jews in Palestine, created in the
summer of

1933 at the Zionist Congress in Prague,

took over the task of the Joint Committee for the
Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. Henrietta
Szold was put in charge of Youth Immigration and
Social Welfare within the Jerusalem Department of
the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
J~ws in Palestine.

YOUTH ALIYAH BEGINS

The Central Bureau for the Settlement
of German Jews in Falestine, with the Youth
Immigration Department under its wings, riegotiated
with the mandatory government to secure immigration
certificates for boys and girls between the ages

of fifteen and seventeen. In matters concerning
youth immigrati~n~ the Central Bureau coordinateq
its activities with the Arbeits g emeinschaft filr
Kinder und Jugend-Alijah in Berlin, which provided
funds for the maintenance and transfer of the youths.
It also brought the plans before German parents,
educators, and . leaders of the Jewish community. ·
A group of propogandists. was assigned
to carry the project to the United States, England ,
Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and South
Africa. The collection of funds was carried out
mostly by women's committees. In the United States·,
the United Jewish Appeal relegated funds for Youth
Aliyah from its contribution to the Department of
the Jewish Agency for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine.
The distribution of the refugee certificates
placed at the disposal of the Central Bureau was
the task of the Palestine offices of the respective
countries in cooperation with the London office

of

the Central Bureau. 1
In October 1933, the Palestine government

1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central ~ureau
for the Settlement of German Jews, Palestine
Office. Report from Octoberl,1933 to June 30,
1934, Zionist Archives, 1ew York, pp. 1,2.

placed at the disposal of the Jewish Agency 350
certificates for youths from Germany of the ages

15

to

17.

The Jewish Agency

guaranteed to the

government the maintenance of these youths to
the age of of 18,

1

so that they would not become

a public burden.
In a _January 14,

1934, press conference

called by the Central Office for the Settlement
of German Jews of the Jewish Agency in Palestine,
Miss Szold gave the following report on the
subject of _child and youth immigration:

"At the moment we are expecting an
immigration of 350 young folk (and
not two thousand, which would have
been the case had we a million
pounds at our disposal). With the
number of permits given us by the
government, and the 100-150 certific~tes received ·by ·Kfar Hanoar BenShemen, there will be an immigration ·
of 450 to 500 children from 15-17
years of age until October."2

She added that · the first gr.oup was expected to
arrive at Ein Herod at the end of January~ The
second, comprisinl youths from orthodox fa milies,
was intended to go to Kibbutz Rodges, whose members

1 Ibid., p. 13.
2 The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The Gentral Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S7/7. p. 4.

were·also orthodox. ~he third

0

roup consisted of

pupils fro m the _Ah a va home in Berlin, which at
the time was conte mpl a ting the transfer of its 100
1
pupils to Palestin e in stages. The fourth group,
of g irls bet een the a g es of 14 and

17, was expected

to arrive at the Girl's Faro near Talpioth which
was conducted ~y Mrs. Ben-Zvi. A fifth group,
comprised of orthodox g irls, was to go the Household
and Tr a de . School est a blished by the Mizrachi v omen's
Or g anization of America,and located in Jerusalem.
·The last two institutions had by then
already taken in a number of g irls who had come
rrom Germa ny with their parents.
At this time other centers and other
means of absorbing i mmigran t y ouths we re sought,
among them private homes in which children could
be accommodated.
These youths were to be placed in
agricultural settlements and in various youth
institutions. A special co mmission determined
the places to which these youngsters would be . sent.
The first group arrived in

1934. Henrietta

Szold described the event as follows:

"On Monday . February

1 Ibid.

19, 1934, on .the

I 6'1

steamship Martha 1ashington the first
group of boys and girls organized for
settlement in Palestine by the Juedische
Jugendhilfe arrived at the recently
opened port of Haifa ••••• ~he group was
destined for Ein Harod . . . . . .
'rhe luggage · heaped upon the do_c k
was a formidable pile. Among the
suitcases of every conceiv~ble shape,
size, and material, there stuck up
flagpoles, cellos and ma~dolins, and
first and. foremost, bicycles. Some
of the boys and 8irls had chunky
rucksacks strapped to their backs. On
their arrival at Ein Harod the traveters
were hurried into the dining room
where they sang out lus~ily one Hebrew
song after another, t h eir hosts joinihg
in with a will. After the meal came
the inevitable Borah, which at once
integrated tne new arrivals into the
company of the old residents. 11 1

Ih th~ first half of 1934 diffei~nt youth
groups from Germany had settled on the land. Fifty
nine were placed in Ein Harodi

25 on Girls' Farm

-J~rusalem, 30 at Youth-Home Ahava* in Haifa, and

1 : Greenberg, .2.12· cite , pp. 2, 3 ~

* After its transfer fr0:n Berlin, Aha.va. established
itself in ren~ed buildings at Heve Shaanan, near
Haifat until its ouilding on a plot in the·
·
Mifratz Haifa area was to ~e completed.

15 at kibbutz Rode;es at F'etach :ritwah .. 1
1

These groups were accompanied by thei~.
own leaders, and were under the supervision of
the Central Bureau.
After _graniing the first batch of 350
certificates for Youth Aliyah the government
permitted the inclusion of y6unger and older
children than heretofore agreed upon. Ahava was
permitted to bring in very young children~and in
special cases the Jewish Agency was allowed to
use Labour-Sertificates for young people betwe en
the ages of 17 and 18. 2
These pro~isio~s raised the number of
youthful immigrants for 1934 to 363, with additional
arrivals co~ing as ben0ficiaries _of the Ju gendhilfe,
and others on certificates received directly by

institutions . such,

as

Ben-Shemen. The latter two

categories raised the total of Youth Aliyah immigrants
in that year to

396. 3

After the exhaustion of the first series

1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau
for the Settle~ent of German Jews, Palestine
Office, Report from October 1, 1933 to June 30,
1934, Zionist Archives, hew York, p. 13.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July 1935, p. 45.
3 Ibid.

of certificates the mandatory government provided
a second batch of 350 .

1

By July 1, 1935, 612 young people had
settled in Falestine with the help of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft . Of thes e 588 were placed in institutipns
and kvutzot and were distributed thus:

2
Table r
Ben- Sbemen •.•••••••.•..•••.••••••.••.••.••• 120
Ahava • • • .. • • • • • • • • .. • • • .. . • • • • .. • • • • .. .. • • • • .. • • • .. 41
Beth Zeirot Mizrachi , Jerusalem ............... ~ ... 21
Girls' Training Farm Talpiot .......................... 5
Kvutzot :
~in Harod ............................................. 61
mel Joseph ....................................... 39
Gi vat Brenn-e r .............................. ., ...... 58
Mishmar Haemek ....................................... 20
Dagania A .................................................. 14
Dagania B ....................................... .. ..... 15
Kvutzot Kinneret .................................. 15
Hashomer Hatzair Kinneret .. ! .................. 24
Gvat .............................................................. 26
Yagur ...................................................... 3 5
Tel Hai ..... ~ ................ ·................-..... 30
Trade School of the Haifa Technica l
Institute .......................................... 18
Apprentices of the Kremener Iron
Foundry, Haifa ................................. 18
Rodges ................................................ 52

1 Ibid ..
2 Ibid ..

,1,1

Table II l
Youth Aliyah from its Inception in 1934
to April 1, 1939
Now in Trairiing •••.•.• ~ .••••..•••.•••••••••••• 3,119
Left Youth Aliyah ••••..••••.••.•••••••••••••• 1 1 516
Grnnt, 1933-1934 ...............•.•••.• 363
If
l 9 3L~- l 93 5 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • · 3 50
It
1935 ................... , ......... 200
"
1936 (100 Labour Schedule) ••~•• 250
1+97
All Categories until· August 1937
Stud. Cert. August l 937-1·Jarch 1938 • • • • 504Dep. Cert. August 1937·-ffarch 1938 . • • • •
21
Stud. Cert. April-October 1938 ...•.... 884
Dep. Cert. April-October 1938 ••oo•••••
28
Studo Cert. October 1938-March 1939 •.• 1,503
Dep. Cert. October 1938-March 1939 ••.
·35

4,635

o.....

4,635

Table III 2
Youth Aliyah from its Inception in 1934
to April 1, 1939 According to Country . of Origin
Germany ••••••••••••• 3,229 ·
Austria •.••..•.•••..
935
Poland •••••••••••.•• · 139
C.S.R •••••••••••••••
270
Rumania •••••••.•••••
29
Refugees (Italy, England, Holland, Denmark etc.) ••••••••
33

-4-,6-3,....,.,5

·Girls ••••• 40 per cent
Boys •••••• 60 per cent

1 Central Bureau Report to the X:XIst Zionist Co11 0,- rrecc
August, 1939, J?• 60. ____
.. _
...
•..),..) '

2 Five vears of Youth Immigration int6 Palestine,
1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
Ger'.nan Jews in Palestine, 1939, Zionist Archives,
1' e w York , p • 41+ •

· Table II reveals that 1935 and 1936

saw a decline in the number of certificates for
youths granted by the mandatory government. In

1936 a batch of 100 certificates was granted for
Youth ~liyah out of the Labour Schedule allotment.*
While the government refused to grant additional
certificates in that yea~ direct alloc~tions to
closed instftutions, such as Ahava-, Ben-Shemen,
and the Ludwig Teitz School in Yagur, continuede
\~/hen students completed their two yea.rs'
training program,vacancies were created for additional
groups of youths. T6 circumvent the restrictions
i~posed on immigration certificates,some of the
settlements applied for recognition of their
schools. as being of secondary rank. Degania A,
after obtaining such recognition from the governoent,
applied to the Migration Pepartment for 100
certificates. These were ~ranted. 1 This procedure
was subsequently follo~ed by other settlements.
Table III shows that the overwhelming
majority of Youth Aliyah immigrants up to ·1939
came from Germany (approximately 70-per cent). The
only other sector with a large representation for
that time period was Austria, with 935;* or about

* See table II.
1 Central Bureau Report to the LXth Zionist Congress,
August, 1937, p. 45.
** See table III.

16
20 per cent. The latter became a facfor only after
the 1938 Anschluss. The mandatory government granted
certificates not on the basis of nationality but
place of domicile. Thus certificates were not
~ranted for Austrian children until Germany occupied
the country. 1
Although total German Jewish immigration
into Palestine in each of t he years 1937, 1938, and

1939, was _smaller in each instance than in pr~ceding
yearst this situation did not apply to Youth Aliyah
which saw ·a marked increase during these ye a rs.* *
The mandatory governNent, in response to
the Arab riots of 1936-1937 in opposition to Jewish
immigration and land sales, delayed and reduced
immigration scheduless This policy did not have
as marked an effect on Youth Aliyah. The aforementioned student-school a~rangements permitted an
increased flow of young immigrants.
The situation may be . gauged from the
following account in a letter written by Henrietta
Szold:

non March 16, (1938) the daily press
carried the immigration regulations
• See table I ! abapter titled "Migration from
Germany to Palestine."
* • See -cable IL.
1 Taped interview of Mrs. Eva L':ichaelis by Rivka
Banitt, Oral History Division of the Institute
of Conte~porary Jewry, ~he lle8rew University of
Jerusalem, April 28, 1965, No. 361.

for the period April 1 to September
30, 1938. You know how disappointing
they were on the whole. Nothing for
the Labour Schedule at present, with
a maximum of . a thousand at the discretion
of the High Commissioner if the economic
situation improved to such an extent
as to warrant it bef~re September 30.
On the other hand -we could hardly
believe our own senses when we read
the generous provis~on in category BIII, *
the students' category, our Youth Aliyah
category. ·unrestricted! On second thought
restricted, not by government, but by
our limitations. Vhat were our limitations:
available places and available funds!"l

Table I I shows how predominant a role
Student Certificates played compared with Dependent
Certificates for Youth Aliyah. Out of 2,975 certifi~
cates granted for this immigration between August

1937 and March 1939, 2,891 were Student Certificates,
while only 84 were Dependent Certificates.
The years 1937 to 1939 were years_ in

which

the situation of German Jewry deteriorated considerably. In these years persecution was intensified
and the te~ritories, from which Jewish youth .flocked _
to Palestine, increased. To Germany proper were
added Czechoslovakia, Austria, Danzig, Memel, and
the No Ivian' s-Lands between Germany · and Poland.
The last was crammed with Polish Jews who had been

I in chapter
titled Socio~Economic and Demographic Description of·
the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
1 Letter of Henrietta Szold to Mrs. Greenberg. The
Jev-iish AGency for Palestine, Central Bureau .for the
~et~lement of G~fman Jews, Zionist Archives, tew
YorK, April 2, 1938.
* For figures on this category see table

/1I
expelled from Germany.
The mandatory government of Falestine
ruled that certificates granted to the various
agricultural settlements were to be used only for
the youth of Greater Germany, the Altreich the
Ostmark-, Czechia and Slovakiae Later Italy was
also added to this list.
German Jewish Youths were also entering
Palestine from the various transit countries which
harbored them on a temporary basis, and which
after the November 10, 1938, events were flooded
by them

The November events also forced the Arbeits-

gemeinschaft fflr Kinder und Ju gendalijah to transfer
its office from Berlin to London.
',' .,.,

/1EJ-

PREPARETORY -~ ORK IN hUHOPE

The first candidates for Aliyah were
for the most part members of youth organizations.
They were put through a lengthy process of eliminnation which included a number of ~eeks' training
under the observation of teachers and youth leaders.
The latter two would help evaluate th~ candidates
· as to their suitability for emigration, for
physical labour, for· independence from parents,
for collective living, and for their knowledge
of Hebrew. During this time perio~ the candidates
underwent a thorough medical examination as required.
by the Jerusalem office. In the camp the youths
spent half their day working, and the other half
studying. Finally a selection was made of the most
suitable applicants, which was more numerous than
tbe available places in Palestine.
When the camp period was ove~ an
agreement was drawn up with the parents in which
they entrust~d · their children to Youth Aliyah for
a period of two years~ Financial arringements were
also included in the contract. Sufficient clothing
was provided for the time period in question, and
tbe names of the future im~igrants were m3i led to
Palestine. There certificates were prepared and •

111
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forwarded to the British Consul in Berlin, who,
upon approval, $ent them to the PaHlstina-Amt.
Only at that point could the candidates proceed
to Palestine.

HACHSHARAH

The Jlidishe Jugendhilfe was in charge
of preparation for immigration to Palestine
(Hachsbarah). The Reichsvertretung was responsible
for the financial and administrative aspect of the
Hachsharah as long as the trainees stayed in Germany.
As it became increasingly more difficult
for Jewish youth to enter higher schools in Germany,
the concept of "Mittlere Hachsharah" developed. The
idea was to keep students instead of the usual
eight years for nine years _ in the regular school.
The additional year was to prepare them for manual
work. For those children who were destined to
emigrate to Palestine this stage became known as
the "Mi ttlere Hachsharah" ( intermidiary Ha.chsharah)
These younBstefs were approximately.14 years of ag~
and thus too young for regular Hachsharah.
Besides training in Germany there was also
an "Auslands-Hachsharah" (Hachsharah outsid_e of
Germany) which had its origins in the Hechalutz.

Here·were included youths at times as young as

15

and as old as 28.
The transfer of boys and girls to European

countries neighborin~ on Germany was dictated by
the limited possibilities of training them in that
country, and later by considerations of safety.
This is confirmed in the following words of Mrs ·.
Eva Michaelis who was head of the _Arbei tsgemeinschaft ftlr Kinder und Jugendalijah.

nwith the -acceleration of Nazi persecution
the number of applications by far
exceeded the number of certificates
which were at our desposal. We had
therefore, to look for ways and
means how we could bring youngsters to
safety during their waiting time for
certificates, and that was the main
reason for dividing the work in a way
that all those eligable for Youth
Aliyah Certificates either went straight
to Palestine, as soon as certificates·
were available, or for those who had to
wait we tried to find places in neigboring
countries, like Holland, Luxemburg,
Denmark, and Belgium."l

The term rtAuslands-Hachsharah" was born
in

1933, but already in the 1920's boys from Germany

were sent by Hechal~tz to train in Holland. Holland

l Taped interview of Eva Michaelis by Rivka Banitt
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contem~
porary Jewry, The liebrew"University of Jerusalem,
April 28, 1965, 1o. 361.

became very important in this respect. One of

the largest .Auslands-Hac~shar a h itstitutions was
established in \ erkdorp at the Vieringen Folder.
Holland was considered as a new site for the Berlin
based Arbeitsge~einschaft before London was finally
chosen. 1
Youths were selected for Auslads-Hachsharah
only after having gone through one year . of training
_in Germany. This was to minimize the chances of
failure, for they could not be sent back to Germany.
O~e of the conditions of the host countries
was that the person must emigrate immediately· after
completion of Hachsharah. The usual time permitted
for such stays was eighteen months. A problem soon
arose whereby the number of youths who completed
Hachsarah in certain countries was larger than the
pumber of certificates available. For such cases
~. Adler-Rudel* devised a system wheriby a jouth
who, for example, completed his Hachsharah in
Denmark but did not have a certificate,was sent
·to Sweden, and . one in a similar situation •i n Sweden
was sent to Denmark.

1

hus both would -actually have

·an eighteen month extension. 2 Of course this limited

1 Ibid.
* In 1933 he was the director of the Department of
Productive Welfare of the Jewj_sb Community ~n
Berlin. In 1934 he became the Secretary General of
the Reichsvertretung, succeeding Dr. Yl2'eutzber8er.
2 Taped interview of hr. !\.dler:-Rudel by l'Jlrs. Rivka
Banitt, Oral History Division of the Institute of
Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University ·of
Jerusalem, June 24, 1965, No. 341.

the riumber of children who could be taken out of
Germany.
Hachsha rah centers were established in
the various countries with the aid of leading Jews,
Zionists and non-Zionists. These established small
committees who helped finance the projects in
cooperation with the Central Jewish Organizations .
(the A~eric~n Joint Distribution Committee, the

Central British Fund, and the Jewish Colonization
Association). The agreement as to how much each
group was ' to pay was "more or less in the way of
a gentleman's agreement. 1
Besides to Holland ., refugee children
were sent to various other European countries

includ~ng, England, France, r1 orway, Sweden, Denmark,
Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Nrr
Man's-Land between Poland _and Germany.
In Denmark there were no training centers,
but the youths could be placed with individual
Danish farmers.
In Belgium and France Hachsharah ac-tivities ·
were of limited success. Adler-Rudel attributed

this to a lack of organizational ability on the
part of their Jewish communities. In the case · of

1 Ibid.

/11
the former the conflict between orthodox and
non-orthodox played a role, and in the case of
the latter there was opposition on the part · of
French Jewry to the influx of German Jewish
refugees. 1
After the

1938 pogrom England became

a very important Hacbsharah center.
Although in the earlier years, and up
to

1937, applicants were accepted on the basis

of performance in preparation camps, later, when
the pressure increased, other considerations had
to be taken into account. These included the
situation of the family, its social background,
and the nationality (since Polish Jews residing
in Germany were the first to be expelled).
The age of the youngster was also a
factor. The·mandatory government would grant Youth
Aliyah certificates oniy £or boys and ~irls unde~
t~e age of

17. There was always an urgent need

in such cases to obtain certificates for youths
who were about to turn

17 •
..

The distribution bf certificates was
more complicated than this. The various settlements
wanted only groups affiliated with their movements.

1 Ibid .

/
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Thus; if a Ha-Shomer Hatzair kibbutz just absorbed
a group, then ~~pai would demand thut the next
batch come from among its adherents. The or~anizations
in Germany were instructed to send at certain times
groups belonging to particular movements which did
not always mean that they represented the most
urgent cases. This created friction among certain .
ideological groups, as is evident from letters
by the presidency of the few Zionist -Organization
(Revisionists) on the one hand 1 and Arthur Lourie
on ·behalf ·of the Jewish Agency on the other.
The former · had the following complaints:

"Despite the fact that -Herzlia is
intensely Zionist, it t as suffered
immiti gated discri~ination in the
mitter of Palestice i ~m i gration
certificates and in the allocation
of Relief Funds· raised abroad. The
Brit Tru:npeldor (no·w known as "Herzlia n)
has not received a sin g le one of
the immi3ration certificates or a
sing le penny fro m the Helief Fund.
This is due to the fact that the
Old Zionist Organization is dominated
by the Socialist wing wh ich imposes
a political test . in the CTatter of
funds and certificates.
After the or ganization of the
Youth ~migration from Germany in
accordance with the Samuel System,
the Brit Trumpeldor, both in Berliri
and in Palestine made offici a l demands
for allocations to the needs of the
Brit 'l1rurnpeldor. In Fales tine ne·g otiations have proceeded fo~ about 2 jears,

7
and althou~h ~iss H. Szold has
frequently prooised to satisfy
the B.ri t r_rru::1;·:eldor'' s der;:i nnds,
nothin5 has been done in the
matter. 11 1

Arthur Lurie's reply was that each
organization was alloted certificates based on
its rel~tive strengtho This formerly also applied
to Betar. Allocation was based upon recognition
as a Machsharah body. When the . Revisionists and
Betar withdrew froo the Zionist Organization and

the Jewish Agency, they lost their status as a ·
Halutz organization, and also the right to an
allotment of certificates. This did not affect
the right of individual members of Betar to
receive immigration ~ertificateso 2

1 Council for German Jewry, Memorandum on discrimination against the youth organizations of t~e
Nev;.1 Zionist Organization in the 1:1:-1.tter of the
German and Austrian relief, sub~it~ed by the prcsidenc;y of t:he J\ew Ziionist O.rganization. April 1938,
Zionist Archives, 1cw York.
2 Council f o::- :;e::-::wn Jewry, Letter· from Arthur Lourie,
represent .ins the Jewish Agency for Pal~stine, to
Mr. L. Bakst3nsky of the ~~glish Ziofiist F0deration, l'fay 4 ~ 19?3, Zionist Arcbi ves, tew York.
1
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ABSORP'rION AND TRAINING. OF YOUTH IN FALESTIN.E

The primary objective of the Youth Aliyah
move ment was to attach the young people to the soil

-and to agricultural occupations. But technical
education was not ignored either. In the Meshakim
themselves there were some o~portunities for training
in carpentry and metal work. This was expanded by
providing training for young immigrants with
inclinations to technical pursuits in such places
as The Trade S6hool of the Haifa Technical Institute,

I I
and the Kremener Iron Foundry in the lh.frntz EaiL1
area. In 1937; the Ludwi3 Teitz Trade School for
Boys, attached to kibbutz Yagur, was opened. It
provided a three year course in carpentry, forge,
lock and tin smithing. In '.rel-Aviv young immi gran ts
were sent to the Max Pine School for courses in
iron work

For girls, the Mizrachi Wo men 's institu-

tions, the Bet Zeirot in Jerusalem, the . Bet Halutzot
_in Tel-Aviv, and the Wiz a Hostel at Nahalat Yizhak,
provided the training in the household arts,
and also introduction in poultry-raising and in.

gardening.
The general program for the education
and training of Youth Aliyah was twofold, work
and study. Four hours in the field or workshop
were succeeded by four hours of study. Their
curriculum included Hebrew, Bible, history, and
science.
The twelve collective settlements
accommodating youth in July

1935 were expanded to

·29 by 1937. 1
When it became evident that the kibbutzim
· could not take in the growing number of yo~ng
arrivals, negotiations were started with the

1 Centro.l

U.L"cau

August, 1937,

ReDort to the XXth Zionist Cona-·1.,ecc.•
o· .:::i.-..;,,
~

p. 38.

I Jsmalll10lders

I

settlements (Mosh av Ovdim). In April

1936, the first sroup, nuTiberir-g 50 fro:n Germany
and from arnon~ German refugees in .France, were
assigned to Nahalal6 1 In that year out of 672
youths placed in all settlements, 180 went to four
moshavim. 2
The difference in structure presented
by moshav life as opposed to kibbutz life required
_a change in the education supervision of the new

charBes. While in the kibbutzim the youths remained
in groups, tn the moshav they lived each in the .
home of a

farmer.
The policY was to place youths within

groups similar in ideology to those that they
were associated with in Ger• any. Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair,
Kibbutz Ha-f/ euchad, and Bever Ha-KwuJ~ were able

to

accomodate their followers. This was not always

the case with disciples of other gfoups·, such as
the Revisionists and General Zionists. After the
Anschluss of Austria and the conse1uent increased
·pressure for emigration, sorae groups were ·c onstituted
of youths with diverse ideological tackcrounds. rhis
· 1ed to reduced discipline due to the interference

1 Ibid., p. 39.
2
."!'

•

.

-

•.

-

C. -- - - - --- - - -

Greenberg, £12.· cit., p. /•
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of political groups.
Of particular difficulty was the placement
of orthodox youths, a proble m which ·troubled
Henrietta Szold as is revealed in her writing of
the time.

"The Youth Aliyah became possible
in its present form only because
the kvutzot ~ave us the opportunity
of maintaining, educating, and
adjusting young people to a gricultural
pursuits at a mini mum expenditure of
funds. Our airn must be to parallel
· for the orthodox the 30 or more
cooperative settle ments which
Labor Palestine has created in the
course of time without dreaming that
they would enable us to meet the
emergency. Unfortunately, it was not
possible to cha rm, as with an
Aladdin's Lamp, into existence a series
of institutions which · the religious
community failed to erect all these
years. r,1

In 1934, the only suitable place for
the orthodox youth was kiobutz Rodges. The institutions of .Ahava and C_h ildren' s Village · Meir
Shefeya conformed to religious requirements, but
did not put stress on education in the Law, as
demanded by orthodox Jews.
Expedients. were employed at the ~xpense
of the Youth Aliyah principle of putting agricaltural
education ahead of all else. Two techinical groups,

1 Ibid., pp.

4,5.

7

Rambam and Iehemia, were constituted in the Haifa
area . to provide facilities for orthodox youths.
At the same time religibus girls were enrolled in
the Household School of I·1lizrachi Women.
The lack of places for religious boys
and 6 irls prompted some ·parents and .their children
to conceal their desire for a religious way of life,
for fe&r thej might loose the chance of coming to
Palestine.
These did not prove to be viable solutions,
and new institutions had to be developed in addition
the expansi·on of the old ones. By 1939 the number
of places suitable for religious youths had multiplied
ten fold. 1 Besides Rodges, places were available at
S'deh Jacob, Kfar Saba, Ramat Ha-Sharon, the household schools of Mizrachi women in Jerusaie~ and
Tel-Aviv, fi!ikweh Israel, and Kfar Noar Dati. A
group of youth from the Frankfurt Boys' Orphanage
was transferred to the latter.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Co11gress,
August, 1939, p. 51.
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.ra ble I V l
Youth Aliyah Groups in Pa les t ine
Apr il 1 , 1939
1

Tota l
Institutions
1\hava Ho rne
. •. . •. . . . •. . •. . . . ••. ••
• •••••.• 14 5
Bcn-Shemen
................................ . 292
Be t Zeir ot Mizrachi , Jerus al em • . . • . . • • •••• 77
Be t Hachaluzot, Tel-Aviv . . . . . . . . . . . .
o•
55
Girl ' s Ag ricultur al Farm, Jerusa l em I
32
Kfar 1oa r Dati I .. . .....
. •..
~ •.
60
Kfar f oar Dati II • • •••••
60
Kfar to a r Dati Orpahanag e I
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Now i n Training •••
Left You t h Aliya h ••••••••

3,119
1,516

4 , 635

\

I.

GRADUATES

The purpose of training these youths
was their .introduction to agricultural pursuits.
The first group to come to Palestine completed
its training in Ein Harod. After grad~ation it
decided to remain as a unit, and together with
young Palest·inians founded the set.t lernent of Alonim·.
This group then became host to other young immigrants.
Other groups, upon completion of their training,
joined · labour groups (Plugot Avodah). These, while
preferring agricultural pursuits, at times of need
t ·u rned to other occupations, such as road building,
construction, quarrying, and work as stevedores .•
By mid 1939, 76 per cent of the graduates
continued in _Agriculture,

8.0 per cent became

artisans, while 14.0 per ~en~ entered a variety of
other fields or . joined relatives in Palestine.* A
significant number did go to th~ cities, and this
was contrary to the original plan. But co 5nizance
had to be taken of this fact, and a process of ·
rethinking had to take place. This may .be .deduced
from Henrietta Szold's words which read a$ follow:

"Formerly we took the po~ition that

• See table V.

f

such individuals must shift for
themselv es ; today we are not
prepared to run th risk of having ·
our boys and girls lose their hold
upon a well ordered life. 11 1

And later she came out with the following statement:

"The fi gure confirms the opinion that I
have held almost from the beginning of
our undert aking that we are not
justified in pu~t ing all our c and idates
into a gricultural life. A number had .
acquired skills abroad which we have
no ri ght to disregard in continuing
their education."2

Table V 3 .
Occupation of Former Membe rs of Youth Aliyah Groups
April 1, 1939
In Agricultural . Settlements · .- •• ~ ••••••• 955=ca. 76%.
In Towns as Artisans and Workers ~ •••• ;. 109~ca. 8%
Care of Children •••••••••••••••• ••&••e 47=ca.
3~5%
Studying • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e • • • • • • 27=ca. -2%
Household Occupations ••••••••••••••••• 48=ca. 3%
Sailors ............... e•••••••••wco••o•••
4=ca. 005~1;
Attending Police School · · • • · ••••••a•e>•••
5=ca. 0.5%
· Joined Relatives in Palestine • • • • • • • • • • ·6l=ca. 4. 5%
22--ca. 1·,¼
"' t1n try ••••••••••• ,. •••••••••••• ·• • •
Le ..1-~t· Co
1o
Undecided •••••-••••••••••••.•••.•••••••· • 19==ca. · 1 c0
Total • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • .. • . • . • . • • • • • • • • 1,
100¼
· Left Ben-Shemen ••••••••••••••••••••••
Passed Aw3.y • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
7
V

~f~=Ca.

~

~

1,516

1 Greenberg, -.21.?.· cit., p. 8.
2 lb id. , p. 9.

3 Central biJ_reau Heport to the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August , 193 9 , p • 60 •

! '

Problems did arise. Many of the ;youngsters
bad a very limited knowledge

oi

Hebrew and of Jewish

life. These were adolescents with the usual - problems
of that age group, compounded by ~he separation
from their parents.
The Youth Aliyah tfadrichim had to play
the role of leaders, counselors, pedagogues, and
friends. They were aided by youth leaders and house .
mothers, the organizers of work, and representatives
from the agricultural settlements. Although the
fi~st gro~p cam~ with their own madrichim from
Germany, this became l e ss the case as the years
p~ogressed.
Some problems arose from the insufficient
schooling that some of the settlements could offer.
Other cases involved students who had ambitions
-- beyond what·Youth Aliyah could offer.
There were instances where parents aburied
the system by registering their children in Youth
Aliyah out of financial need\b~t with the intention
of withdrawing them at the earliest convenience.

1

During 1938 and 1939, more parents ca.me ·to Fales tine,
a . factor which did threaten discipline among the
youths in cases where visiting privileges were
demanded. Also, the worsenin~ situation in Germany
served to create anxiety among those boys and girls
whose · families were still there.
1 Five Years of Youth Immigration into Pal,stine,
1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
~erman Jews in Palestine, 1939, L'iionist Archi res,
l ew York, p. 32.

FINANCING OF YOU~rH ALIYAH

When the Youth Aliyah program started
parents were abl

and willing to pay for a fair

portion of the expenses involved. By May 31, 1935,
the . fees payed by parents of children of the
Jildisch~ Ju~e~dhilfe helped cover th~ costs of
trainj_ng and F~duc a tion in Fales_tine amountj_ng to
LP

5,627.

This accounted for close to 10 per cent

of the amount (LP 48,32l) allocated for running
expenses by various institutions. 1
The provisions of the contract between
the Ju ~e~dbilfe and the kwutzot required a monthly
payment of LP 3.00 per child during the first year,
and LP 2. 50 during the second. The closed ins ti tut ions,

such as Beit Zeirot Mizrachi

received a larger

sum~and Ben-Shemen and Ahava were alloted a lump
r
2
su.n.

This con~ract pro~ided the youths with
trainine;, housing, furnishing, board, repair of
clothing and linen, educational material, medical
care, and medical insurance.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July., 193 5, p. 47.
2 Ibid~, PP, 46, 47.

I
Table VI l

General Youth -A liyah Account for the Period
17th Octob~r 1933-3lst harch 1939
LP.

U.S.A.
Hadassah, The Women's Zionist
Organization of America •.••••••••
Eddie Cantor Fund for Grad~ates •• _.~
Sundry Donn.tions .................. -•• ·
Enp;land • • . • • • • • • • • • •.••••••••.••••
Eddie Cantor Fund~ •••••••••••• ; ••••
German;y_ ••••••••.••.• ~ .............. .
Neth e 1, lands • • . • • •••••••
Sou t h 11.. fr i c a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
o •

•

.......... .

S\vj_·czerland . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sv1 e d en • • • ••••••••• -•••••••••• ~ •••••
Canada
a
e
a •
e
0

•

O

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Czc8l10s lovakia ••••••••• o........ . .
]Jc nm ,3.r l·: •••• a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Be J. ~ i um
•• •• ,, ••••• c • ., • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

E~y1-"')t
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Austria ................... ., •••••••••

Buli:-:!;aria • • • • ••••••• ~ ••••• ·••• ~ ••• ~.
:B'rar:ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-I--Iur1 sary ••••••••••••• •••••4:'•••o••••
l<in ln.nd •

e ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

India. • • • •••••.•••••••••••• ., ••••••

l\J or ·:a·:t

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••

Joint Distribution Committee •••••••
pundry Donations •••••••••••••••••••
ln t ere s t • • • • •
a • • • • • ~ •
c • • • •
Total Income
o .. •

•

•

It

•

•

•

192,707.118
9,926.215*
816.501
'+6, 818 .142
10,986.250
18,570.125
·16,273 040
25,544.596
9,697.894

7,676.806
1 7 , 2 L~4 • 511 *
5, 3'+3 .850
6,117.La2
2,791.864 .
1,632.096.

832.730

1,013.739
680.320
278.000

147.945

210.833
213.083
798.500

43.477

-56_.633

• This sum does not include LP 2,514.197 paid to
the Jewish 1ational Fund Ltd. for the purchase
of land.
** Includes LP 11,711&575 through Keren Hayesod.

1 Central Bureau Re1)ort to the XXIst Zionist Congress~
August, 1939, p . ..91.

~-.. ·..

Table VII l
General Youth ·Aliyah Account for the Period
17th October 1933-3lst March 1939
LP~

Expenditure

Union for the Immigration of
Jewish Youth (Agudah l'Aliyat Hanoar) •• 194,494.000

Ben-Shemen (including LP 1~300 received
from Hadassah for building for Polish
Youth ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

42,142.625

Ahava Home, Haifa ••••••••••••••••••••••

34,915~000

Settlements of Graduates .••.•••••••••••

7,375.983

Subsidies •••••••••• ·••••••••••••••••••••

1,109.105

Social Work.•••·••··~••··•··•·•··•·····•

1,910.194

Group leaders (Madrichim) (including
Seminary) • ~ ••••••••••••••••••••• ._ ••.•••

814.399

Propaganda in various ·countries(From
1938-39 including expenses of London
Office) ••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••

11,347.913

Administrative expenses ...•..••...••...
7,898.372
Total
302,007.591
Less: Expenses on a/c of the Central
~ureau for the Settlement of German
~ews •••••• , •••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••• 21,989~310
Amount allocated to the Union of
for the Immigration of Jewish
Youth •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 194,494.000
Amount allocated for the Settlement
bf Graduates ••.•••••.•••••••• · ••••••.
Total Expenditure·

1 Ibid. , p. 92.

7,375.983
223,859~293
7.8,148.298

As may be seen from table VI Hadassah
was by far the largest contributor to Youth
Aliyah during the time period in question. In

1935,

Rose Jacobs, then president of Hadassah, signed
an agreement with Youth Aliyah which made the
organization its princip~l agent in the United
States. This development came about as a result
of the application of a not inconsiderable amount
of · pressure by the president of Hadassah, as is ·
evident from her following correspondence ·with

Dr. Georg Landauer:*

"·••• In seeking a project Hadassah
is only interested in an undertaki_ng
which can be considered a Hadassah
project. On that basis our organization
has grown and flourished and has
developed its methods and technique.
Experience has taught us that only ·
along these lines can Hadassah serve
as as effective instrument for the
upbuilding of Palestine. There is
therefore no reason for abandoning
its procedure now, all the more so
because the other organizations have
not proven as effective.ul

* Georg Landauer was manager of the Central Bureau

for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine
(Jerusalem Office).
1 The Georg·Landauer Collection, Leo Baeck Institute,
1-- ew York.

I
This development came about to the
chagrin of other organi~ations as is evident
from the following remarks in a

letter from

Robert Silverman to Dr. Martin ~osenbleuth:*

"

We were all very much astonished
when we were informed very circuitously
that the Central Bureau had entered
into an exclusive arrangement with
Hadassah •.••• an agreement was being
entered into between the Arbeitsgemeinscbaft and Hadassah whereby
the latter would undertake to raise
funds for the Arbeitsgemeinschaft,
it being understood that Hadassah
-i s to have exclusive right and that
all communication between the
Arbeitsgemeinschaft and the American
Palestine Campaign would be discontinued~
.••• we offered Hadassah an opportunity
of proceeding with the children and
Youth Aliyah work as part of its
program, but asked them not to insist
on the exclusive right in the · matter,
so that we too could use the childr~n•s
work in our campaign publicity, etc.
They would hear of no arrangement other
tha n the one which they think they
have concluded with Dr. Landauer."l

* Ma rtin Rosenbleuth was manager of the Central
Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in

Palestine (London Office).
1 Ibid.

't

II
CHILDREN'S ALIYAH

After the 1ovember

19381 pogroms the

Yishuv began preparations for a mass immigration
of Jewish children. The Children's Aliyah was put
under the control of a central office in the
D partment of Social Service of the Vaad Leumi • .
An arrangement was concluded with Youth Aliyah
whereby i~ undertook to handle all dealings with
organizations and families abroad, and also
accepted responsibility for the care of children
who were put in the .settlements or were otherwise
kept in groups. The Department of Social Service
of the Vaad Leumi was responsible for handling
the negotiations with the mandatory authorities,
investigating the families which offered to
adopt children, and managing their distribution.
The Bureau registered the names of the · families
in Palestine that were ready to adopt children,
and the children in Germany whom they proposed to
ado~t. The list grew to include thousands . of
families, a preponderant number being relatives
of the children they offered to care for.
The British authorities permitted a broad interpretation of the institution~l principle

I

for the admission of children, who were between
13 and 14 years old. Urban as well as rural
institutions qualified under this arranBement.

In April 1939, the first batch of 50
Children's Aliyah certificates were granted and
were supple~ented in June of that year by an
addi tiona·1 500 • 1
By 1941, about 900 children within that

-category had arrived in Palestineo2

1 Centra l Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 62.
2 Greenberg, £E.· cit., p. 9.

V.

BRIT I.SH IMAUGHATIOY POLICY

In 1933 a new Immigration Ordinance
was introduc d. Although it r .tained the main
features of the preceding Ordinance, its
interpretation was somewhat stricter. Its
categori s were as follows:

A

Persons of independent means,
which term includes:
(i) Persons in bona fide

possession and freely
disposing of a capital of
not less than L 1,000;

I I
(ii) Members of liberal professions in poss-

ession of a _capital of not less than
L 500, provided that the Director,
Department of Migration, is satisfied
that the capital of such persons is
sufficient to secure them reasonable .
prospects of success in the pursuit they
intend to enter, that they are qualified
and physically fit to follow their proposed pursuits,and that their settlement in Palestine will not lead to the
creation of undue competition in the
propcsed pursuit;
B.(i) Orphans whose maintenance in or by public institut·ions in Palestine is assured

until such time as they are- able to support
themselves;
(ii) Persons of religious occupations
whose maintenance is assured;
(iii) Students whose -admission to an educational institution in Pa.lestine and
maintenance are assured until such time
as they are able to support themselves;

. C. Persons who have a definite pr6spect · of
employment in Palestine;
D. Dependents of permanent residents or of

,,_

immigrants belonging to category A, B. and

c. 1

Generally, individuals meeting the requirements of
categories A, B, and C were readily admitted. The economic
absorptive capacity principle was most important i~ determining the number of immigrants admitted under category C.
Most certificates of this category continued to be consigned
· to the Jewish Agency for distribution through its offices
in various countries.

Thus were established the foundations of British
immigration policy as they stood on the eve of the mass
influx of Jews from Germany during the -1930s.

1930 was another period of economic depression
for Palestine, and in 1931 Jewish immigration declined
to 4,075,

from a figure of 5,249

in 1929, and 4,944 '

in i930. 2
In 1931 the Mandatory Government attempted to
regularize unauthorized immigration.An amnesty was issued
and several thousand Jewish immigrants were granted normal
. residence status, 3
As more travelers remained in Palestine, the
Government stipulated that such who$e qualification for
1 Arieh .Tartakovier and Kurt R. Grossmann, The Jewish.
Refugee ( Nev York, Institute of Jewish Affairs of
the American Jewish Congress, · 1944), pp. 57 - 58~
2 Oscar I. Janowsky, Foundation of Israel Emergence of
a Welfare State. ( New Jersey: D. van Norstrand
·- company, Inc., 1959). p. 145.

3 Albert M. Hyamson, Palestine under the Mandate 1 20 -

1948 (London: Methuen

Co. Ltd., 1950? p.64.

immigration certificates were in doubt had to
deposit of L

25

make

a

for a visa. This figure proved in-

effective and was raised to L 60. In 1934 the practice
was introduced of c·ounting against the Labour Schedule
cases of those who remained in the country even though
they made the L 60 deposit. 1

Immigration in 1932 rose to 9,55~, 2 and in 1933
jumped to 27,289. 3

THE PERIOD

1933

1936

During thes~ years Palestine experienced unpr_e cedented economic development. The capital and know-

how which German Jewish immigrants brought to Palestine
contributed significantly to this development.The immigration figures for 1934 were 36,619 1 and for 1935 (the
Immigrants ~rom Germany
peak year) they were 55,407.
accounted for approximately 20 per cent of the total for
the years 1933 through 1935. 4 The aforementioned immi-

.gration figures were supplemented by illegal immigration.

1

Ibid,, p. 65.
2 Janowsky, ~ · ~ - , p. 145.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 68.
4 Ibid. (calculations based on figures in table)

}Of

The new arrivals in the time period in question not only
contributed to the general prosperity, but actually
increased the economic absorptive capacity of the country.
This was particularly the case ~ince many of these immigrants did not go into agricultural pursuits, but went
rather to urban industries. This served to restrain
the pressure on the limited land available~
~he Arab population actually shared in the prosperity, but agitation against Jewish immigration increased. As early as 1933, in response to the s11dden
sharp rise in Jewish immigration,the Arab leadership
announced a policy of non-cooperation and a boycott of
British and Zionist goods~
Until 1936 the principle of economic absorptive
capacity was generally adhered to, and this in spite of
the fact that the request of the Jewish Agency for imraigration certificates were never met. The granting of
immigration certificates under the Labour Schedule was
based on this principle.
From October 1934 to March 1935 the Jewish
Agency request~d 18,600,
7,500,

and the Government granted

for the period April - September 1935 it

requested 19,160~

and received 8,000

1 The distribution

of the Labour Certificates between German Jews and others
was largely in the hands of the Jewish Agency, but consi~
deration had to be taken that the reci~ient fit the re-

quirements of the category.•

THE

PERIOD

1936 - 1939

Although during this period economic conditions
remained good and economic absorptive capacity of Palestine increased, the Government, in response to the
Arab riots of 1936 and 1937, curtailed im~igration.
No ~ the economic absorptive capacity principle was superseded by political cons i~erations.
Qommission,

The Royal

sent to Palestine in 1936, published its

report in July 1937

Besides recom;nending the Partition

of Palestine it proposed the abandonment of the economic

absorptive capacity principle and its replacement by the
principle of uPolitical High Level''• 2 It proposed that
this high level be fixed at 12,000 immigrants annually_
for the next five years, including all categories, and
provided for a reduction in this number if economic conditions so required.3
l Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs
19"36 (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey
,
Milford, 1937), p. 703.
·2 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine A Study
of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, Vol. II (New
Haven: Yale University Fress,1947), p. 826.
3 l};)isL_ p. 829.

On April 27~ 1938 a commission beaded by Sir
John Woodhead arrived in Palestine. Its task was to de-

vise a plan for the partition of Palestine, as was recommended by the Royal Commossion.- It found the idea
impractical. The Palestine Gazette published an _immigration ordinance on April 12, 1939 which authorized the
High Commissioner to impose at his own discretion a
limit for the number of each category of immigrant
1
· certific ate to be granted •
On May 17, 1939

the British Government iss-

ued a White Paper which came to be known as the McDonald
White Paper of 1939.

It stipulated that J ewish

immi gration i.nto Palestine be fixed at a maximum
of 75,000 in th

following five ye a r period. There-

after the number of J ewish immigrants was to
d~pend on Arab consent! Immigration would be subject
to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity. A
Yearly quota of · 10,000 imm~grants was to be allowed~
In addition 25,000 refugees were to be admitted as
soon as adequate provision for their maintenance
was ensured, with special consideration to be given
refugee children and dependents. 2
The period between 1936 and 1939 saw great
restrictions placed on immigrationo For 1936 the figure
declined to 26,974 3 from the 1935 peak year; in 1937 it
1 Arieh Tarta.kower and Kurt Grossmann., The J ewish Refu~ (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the
American Jewish Congress and World J ewish Congress ,
191+4)' p. 61.
2 Palestine, Statement of Policy, presented to Parliament
by command of His Majesty May, 1939~ (London: His
Majesty•s Stationary Offic ,, 1939) Cmd. 6019, pp. 10-11.
3 C ntral Bureau Report to the X){Ist Zion:i.st Cone;reB~1 ,
August, 1939, p. 68.

declined to 9,441

and in 1938 it was only 11,222,

Immigration from Germany accounted for _approximately

30 per cent of the total for these years. *For 1938 and 1939
alone th·s figure rose even higherJ That the decline in immigration was due to
deliberate British policy is evident from the reduction
in the number of labour certificates grant~d. For the period October 1935 to March 1936 the Jewish Agency requested
10.900

category C certificates and received only 3,250,

For April _to September 1936 the Jewish Agency requested

11,000

and rece ved only 4,500;

March 1937, it requested 10,695
and from April to September 1937
11 250

and just 775

to·

for October 1936

and.received only _l,800 1
the request

as for

cert~ficates were granted. 2

From 1934 to 1936 32,516
on the Labour Schedule, and 15,695

individuals came in
as person of "Indepen-

dent L1eans", indicating that the heads of workers' families outnumbered the heads of middle class families by
two to one.Between 1937 and 1939 16,642

family mem-

1 Central Bureau Report to ·t -h e XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p 68.
* Up to Iiarch 1939 (calculation based on figures in table).
2 Arnold Je Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs

1936 (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey
Milford 1937), p. 703.

'

bers entered under category c,- and ll,968i

under

category A. This drastic change in proportion was due
to curtailment of the Labour ScheduleG
In 1938 the Colonial Office ordered the re.
1 On ·the other
striction of category A immigration.
hand for -the pe-riod Aprill to September 30 . of that same
year, as described in chapter on Youth Aliyah, category
.
. 2 1n
B III, students category, was unrestricted.
this
category German Jews accounted for . 66 per cent 3 ·of the
total immigration in 1938, and 86 per cent 4 of the

total immigration for the period January to March 1939.
This contrasts sharply with the figures for the periqd

1933 to 193? 1 when a peak of only 43 per cen was reached
in 1933~ but the average percentage was in the low 20s. 5
.

In absolute figures this amounted to 1,659

6

in 1938, and

1 9 202 7 for the period January to March 1939. ·

1 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine, A
Stud of Jewish Arab and
ritish Policies Vol .. .
II New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 677.
2 Letter of Henrietta Szold to Mrsc Greenberg April 2,
1938, Zionist Archives, New York.
3 See table II in ch a pter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Jewish
Immigration to Palestine.
4 Central Bureau Report to the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 74.
5 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
·Demographic Description of the German-Jewish
Immigration to Palestine.
6 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Je.wish Immigration .to Palestine.
7 Central Bureau-Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 73.

This also contrasts sharply with the absolute figures
for the period 1933 to 1937, where the low figure was

89

for 1933 and the high figure was 662

for 1936,

the other two years being both below 40~.
As a percentage of the total yearly .German-

Jewish immigration, category BIII accounted for 27.1

1

per cent in 1938, ·and for 27.0 2 per cent for January
to March 1939. This contrasts sharply with the figures

for the years 1933 to 1937 where the.y represented only

1.3

per cent in 1933, and a high of only 804 3 per

cent in 1936. For the years 1938. to

1939

March

the aforementioned figureo would indicate that

._ Grea.,c Britain gave specially favorable consideration

to immigration of Jews from Germany falling under category BIII,both as-compared to other categories for these
immigrants and as compared to immigrants from other
areas in previous years. The British authorities gave

1 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
2 Central Bureau Report to the X:X:Ist Zionist Congress_,
August, 1939, p. 73.
3 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Des6ription of the German-Jewish
Immigration to Palestine.

1- 1
special consideration to Jewish youths from Germany bet-

ween the ages of 15 and 16, but in 1936 no special certificates were granted for this group, a situation
which caused the Jewish Agency ~to complain 1
In category AI German Jews accounted for

78 per cent 2 of the total immigration in 1938, and for
72 per cent 3 of the total for the period January to
March 1939. This represents an increase over the figures for the period 1933 to 1937, where the peak was
68 per cent

for 1937, and the low point 29 per cent

for 1935, the remaining years averaging a percentage
in the lor 50s

,,

· In absolute figures this amounted to
2,036 5 for 1938 and 1,558 6 for the period January to
1 Liesel Strauss, Die Einwanderung nach Pallistina Seit
Dem Weltlricge (Gen~ve, Imprimerie Genevoise, 1938),
p$ 740
.
2 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immi-·
gration.
3 Central Dul'eau REmo):'t to the X:XIst Zionj st Congress,

August, 1939,

Po~74

4 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and De-

mographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration.

5_ ee table I in chapter titled titled Socio-Economic
and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish
Immigration.
6 Centrnl Bureau Heport to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939,p. 73.

arc . 1939. Although the last figure is high for the
three months involved, on the whole this period does
not contrast sharply ~·th earlier years, in which the
years _•1933 to 1936 each witnessed a higher immig::'ation
in category AI among German Jews than ~ither the years

1937 or 1938

As a percentage of the total German-

Jewish immigration category AI did not show a significant change during all the years in question 1
For the
years 1938 to March 1939 these figures would indicate

tpat Great Britain gave Jews from the Greater Reich un-

der category AI more favorable consideration than in .previous years, as compared to Jews coming from other
countri_e s, but did n.ot give category AI a more favored
status among immigrants from Germany as compared to

other years
From August 1937 and on, each member of the
family was required to hold an immigrant certificate
hich was counted against the tota

ficates • 2 This

quota of AI certi-

as unlike the previ~us arrangement,

1 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
* ~or

the period ·January to March 1939 the figure was

34.9 per cent.
Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 73.
2 Eva Bellig, Die · Gesellschaftlischc Einf2;eliederung der
Deutschen Auswanderer in IsraJl (Frankfurt a/M:
Europtiische Verlagsanstalt, 1967), p. 28.

hereby only the heaA of the family needed such acertificate. The granting of certificates in categories AII
and AIII was discontinued altogether, the former in 1936
and the latter in 1938 1 •
In category D,dependents· of l?alestine residents,
German Jews accounted for 47 per cent 2 of the total immigration in 1938, and for 64 per cent 3 of'the total for
the period January to March 1939. This represents an increase over the figures for 1933 to 1937, with a low of

9 per cent

for 1935, and a high

ot

20 per cent

1933, the remaining years being 13 per cent
and

1
2

3
4

19 per cent

for

in 1931+

for both 1936 and 1937. In absolute

Central Bureau neport to the XX:Ith Zionist Congress ,
August, 1939, p. 74~
See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of th e German Jewish Immigration
to Palestine.
C ntral Bureau Report to the XX:Ist Zionist CongreRs,
August, 1939, p. 74.
See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Jewish
Immigration to falestine.

. /)

2
figures this aciounted to 1,038 1 for 1938t and 771
for the period January to March 1939. Although the last
figure is high for 3 months, on the whole it does not
contrast sharply with the -figures for the previous
years with a high of li643

524

•for

for 1936 and a low · of

1933. As a ~ercentage of the total German-Je-

wish immigration category D did not show a marked dif<...
.

*

feren~e for the jears in qu~stion, 3 · with the exception of the r·rst two years for the aforementionedreasons@ For the years 1938 to March 1939 the$e figures would indicate that Jews from Greater Germany under
See table I in chapt er titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigra- ·
tion to Palestineo
2 Central Bureau Report to the :X:XIst Zionist; Congress,
- August, 1939,p. 73e

1

3 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and

Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Pale~tineo

The low figures for 1933 and 1934 (758) must be .
viewed in light of the ·ract that the German-Jewish ·
immigration had only started in these years and
therefore there could not be as many dependents of
Palestine residents as in later yearse (Figure is
based on table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic
and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish
immigration to Palestine.
For tbe period January to March 1939 the figure
was 17.3 per cent.
Central Bureau Heport to the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, Pe 73.

Il

category D receiv8d more favorable consideration

when

compared to the previous years, than Jews from other
countries, but not more favorable · when compared·_to· Jews
coming from Germany in earlier years. On the whole,
close relatives of Germ~n Jews received special consideration from the British authorities 1 •
· In category C, Labour Schedule, German Jews a.c.... counted for 34 per cent 2 of the total immigration from
all countries in 1937, 36 per cent

for 1938, and 55

per c·ent 3 of the total for the period January

to

March

1939e This represents a sharp increase over the figures
for th~ period 1933 to 1936,with a low of 11 per· cent

1 Strauss, .2.£· cit_", p. 74.
2 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German Jewish
Immigration in Palestine.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 74.

in 1935 and a hi.gh of only 24 per cent
remainder being 17 per cent

in 1936, the

and 20 per cent

for the

years 1933 and l 93Lt. In absolute figures this amounted to

980

in 1937, 1,389

1

in 1938 -,_ · a,nd 829

2

for · ·the -

period January to March 1939. Excluding the figures for
the three months in 1939,· this represents a severe reduction from the figures of 1933 to 1936, where the low was

2,605 'in 1936, and the high 4,o82

in 1934-c

As a percentage of the total German-Jewish
immigration those in_category C accounted for 29 9 per
cent

of the total ·in 1937

total in 1938

2206 per sent

and 18.6 per cent- 4

of the

for the period Janu-

ary to March 1939. This contrasts with the figures for

lSee table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
, 2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
, August, 1939, p. 730

3 See table I in chapter. titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
4 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 73.

the period 1933 to 1936 where the high las 4850 per
cent
in 1934, and the low 33.0 .per cent 1 for 19366
The absolute decline in the figures for category C
German-Jewish immigration was due to the new and more
severe restrictions imposed by the Mandatory Government
on all immigration iri that category. On the other hana;
in the distribution of these category q c~rtificates,
a task of the Jevish· Agency

and not of the British

authorities, German Jews consistently received a ~maller percent a ge of certificates than their representation
in the total immigration warranted. This despite the
fact that the British authorities, before surrendering
the category C certificates took out a portion specifically for German Jewr y . 2 In 1933 the difference
was 8 per cent when C category immigrants from Ger-·
many accounted for · 17 per cent

of the total immigra-

tion of that category, while the total German-Jewish
immigration represented 25 per cent

of the total

from all countries. The discrepan6y continued in .the

same direction for the .year 1934 (3 per cent),

. 1 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and
Demographic Description of the German Jewish
Immigration to Palestine.
2 Strauss, QE~ cit., p. 74.

1935 (2 pe~ cent~

1936 (5 per cent)

1937

(1 per

cent)t
and rose to 19 per cen 1 for 1938 and 15 per
cent 2 for the period Janua.r-y to March 1939. This would

indicate that the Jews coming from Greater ·Germany were
favored

more by the British authorities when compared

to immigrants from other areas, than by the Jewish
Agency.
Jews coming from Greater Germany, as opposed to
Germany proper, accounted for 55 per cent3 Of the total
immigration in 1938, and for 70 per cent 4 of the total
immigration for the period January to March 1939.
The Mandatory Goverment was favorably

disposed

to the transfer of Jewish children from Europe, and this
in consideration of the situation created by the Nazis
and in view of the fact that Arab objections were less

l See table II in chapter titled Socio-~conomic and
Demographic Descri.ption of the German Jewish
Immigration to Palestine.
2 Central Bureau Report to th XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 74.
3 See table II in chapter titled Socio-~conomic and
Demographic Description of the German Jewish
Immigration to Palestine~
4 Centra.l Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August , 1939, p . 74.

severe in this case,

an~ also in consideration of the

pressing situation in

hich German Jevrry found itself short-

ly after the Nazi •takeover in Germany, conditions under
which dependents were admitted to Palestine were amended.
While originally only relatives were expected to take
responsibility for such immigrants~ later kibbutzim were
also given that right when relatives of members were
concerned. 1
After the November 1938 pogroms in Germany the
VaRd Leumi demanded that the Yishuv be permitted to

accept 10,000

Je ish children from Germany. The Govern-

ment made only s mall concessions, granting 20
certificates for this purpose once and. 500 2 on another occa1

sion.
In March i938 Austria was annexed by Germany, in
September the Sudetenland was incorporated to the Reich,
and in the s·pring of that same year Chechoslovakia was

partially occupiedt Memel was annexed and the Jews were
expelled from Danzig~ The number of Jews under German
rule or as refugees in Eur·opean countries reached
Albe~t M. Hyamson, Palestine under the Mandate 1920l948_ (London: Methuen & Co .. Ltd.~ 19.50} p. b8.
2 Central Bureau Report to the X:Xlsv iionis"t Congress,
'Augu.s t, 1939, Pe 17.
1

,

650,000.-~

In recognition of the drastic needs of these
Jews the White Paper of 1939 provided for the admission
of 25,900 refugees. On the whole British autb0 rities
were inclined to favor

immigrants from Germany and

Western Europe in general 1 to those from other areas. This
is evident from the following remarks of A'ibert M. Hyamson

head of the Mandatory Government Depa~tment of Immigration· until 1931+:
n

One was tempted to strain the law in favor
of prospective immigrants from German
lands, not only on account of the danger
in which they stood, but also because, if
one is permitted to generalize, they constituted the best element among the immigrantso The history of Palestine under the
Mandate would have been different and probably far happier if V1estern JevTs ~ especially those of a German~ Dutch and British
upbringing, had from the beginning had an
adequate share in it",2.

In the ~ower House of Parliament Colonel Wedgewood described the immigrants from Germany as
b est imn;iigration that country has ever had" 3

1 Ibid. -, p. 14
2 Hyamson, .2.12 · cit., p.
3 Strauss, 2.£· cit., p
e

59.
74.

"the

The Mandatory authorities gaye special consideration

to the plight of German Jewry as early as

March 1933

when they authorized an advance of 1,000

Labour Schedule certifica·tes on account of tl':1.e sche1
dule for the coming half year • They alsb sent 200
~certificates for capitalist immigrants directly to
the British Passport Office for distribution to German Jews 2
6

General Sir Arthur Wauchope 1 High Commissioner for the period 1932 - 1938, was described as having
a personally favorable-attitude towards the matter of a
Jewish National Home in Palestine. He saw Palestine as
a principle refuge for German Jewry when the National
Socialist persecution· started 3 .

1 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress,
July, 1935, p. 19.
2.Norman Bentwich, The Refugees from Germany (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936), p. 147c
3 This according to Norman Bentwich who knew him
personally.
Norman and Helen, . Mandate Memories 1918-1948
( London: The Hogan Press, 1965), p. 149.

1Captain F. Foley, head of the passport division
of the British Consulate i~ Berlin, was responsible
fo_r the issuing of all certificates for Palestine~ a
functj on which he administered ttmost sympathetically!' 1

Dr. Franz Meyer - * described him as very helpful~ "he
(Foley) often shut his eyes and let pass cases where
people requested capitalist certificates,but could not
show sufficient meansrr 2 • In a letter to Dr. Werner
Senator

Ill

he reveals himself in the following manner:
n

I am glad we have 450 Labour Schedule
certificates and hope that you will
have a very large and generous heart
for Germany and send us many more.
You' will . e pleased to know I am
working in close cooperation with
your friends in the Palestine-Amt.
I value their assistance very much
indeed. I wish I could do more for
the inLumerable victims of ~azi
persecutionn. 3

1 Report on the Visit to Berlin November 22 and 23,1933.
McDona.ld Papers file No. 3 56 ~

Franz Meyer is member of the Leo Beck Insitute Council and one of the leaders of the Central European
Immigrants Association.
2 Taped interview of Franz Meyer by Avraham Margoliot
·Oral History Division The Hebrew Unuversity of
*
Senator w~s Deputy to the Director of· the
Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews in Palestirie.
, 3 Letter dated 1935~
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in
Palestine, fhe Central Zionist Archives, Jeru~alem,
Document S7/781.

nr:uwitfl~r

The White Paper provisions concerning immigration
wree applied by the British in a very strict manner.
Even

when

the .· situation

of European Jewry was in

some of its most critical stages the British refused to
grant certificates, claiming that illegel immigration
had filled the time period in question.
With the outbreak of World War II the British
decreed that immigration of residents from enemy country
..

was prohibited. Only after a year of protestations were
these regulation lifted sufficiently to permit the immigration of wives and children of Palestinian residents,
of children up to the age of

15 and of immigrants whom

the Jewish Agency desig?ated as old Zioni~t.Also famous
authors and rabbis were allowed to come to Palestine.
These restrictions were reimposed ~hen Italy Joined
the war.

ROUTES

TAKEN

On February 12, 1935 James G. McDonald stated that
the bulk of German-Jewish refugees who went from Germa1
ny to Palestine, did so di:r es:tly • According to my ques·tionnaire which covered people who left Germany between _193~
and 1940 and who came to Palestin<~, 76 out of 118 who answered the question "did you go directly from Germany to Palestine" said nyes"

Of the remainder 3 went to France fj_rst,

1 to Lithuania, 2 to Ru.mania, 2 to Lebanon, 3 to Switzerland, 1 to Holland and ~elgium, 1 to Meran,Tirol, l to Argentina, 2 to Shanghai 9 1 to France and Tunisia, 1 to England and Australia, 1 to Sw~den, l to Holland, Switzerland
and Italy, 1 to Latvia, 1 to Cz.echoslovakia, l to Switzer-

land and Italy

1 to Bulgaria-; 1 to France and Luxemburg,

1 to Poland, 3 to England, 1 to Persia, 2 to Belgium, 4 to

Italy, l to Thailand~ 2 to Cuba, Belgium and France, 2 to
Holland, and 1 to Lithuania, Poland 1 Austria and Italy.
A comparison between the years the immigrants left
Germany and the question whether they went directly to
Palestine is revealing

Year

W3nt directly to
Palestine

1933
1934
19}5
1935

15

22

9
3

5

7 .
5

1937

2
2

6
8

1938

7

11

12

·1939
1940

Did not go directly
to Palestine

2

Total ·

77

1

~

---zro--

1 Statement of James Ge McDonald made at the se2sion of the
Permanent Committee of the Governing Body at London ,Feoruary 12,1935° McDonald Papers file l~o 3560
* 1 went dj_r · ctly to Palestine in
thrOl.Ph other countr:L.,s ..

1932. ** 2

just; parrned

These figures indicate that the percentage of
German Jews wbo went directly to Palestine was higher

in the earlier than in the later years, p: ~rticularly in
1938 and 1939. This may have been d~e to the severer
restrictions imposed by . the Mandatory Authorities or
..

to the fact that the German Jews Nho left late were of
a group that was less inclined to settle in Palestine.

In the closing years of the 1930, Jews were
organized into groups and put on trains or Danubian
steamers. When they traveled by train

they would 1su-

ally go to Athens, and from there continue in small
vessels to Palestine, 1

Those who went by way of the

Danube headed for the ~lack Sea, whereupon they would
embark from such ports as Constanza and Sulina in
On the route hotels
were set up to lodge and feed these refugees, 2 These

Rumania,

and Verna in Bulgaria

were generally illegal immigrants who were often aided,
and in some cases organized 1 by the Nati6nal Socialist
authoretie.s .3

·1 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 66.
2 Ibid.~ pp. 66-67.
3 See chapter titled National Socialist Policy concerning The Jewish Immigration To Palestine.
* Fo a list of the various vessels which attempted to
land illegal immigrants in Palestine during 1939 19Lt0 s . Tartakover, .21?.· ~it., pp. 70-71.

VI.

ALTERNATE

PLACES

OF

REFUGE

The beginning of National Socialist persecution
in April 1933 resulted in an unorganized Jewish emigrationc This emigration was largely voluntary, and many
of those who left Germany did not know where they .
should finally s e ttle. These emigrants were able to

biing some of their capital with them" Dr. Ruppin proposed that the High Com~issioner
for refugees (Jewish and other) Coming from Germany
plan for a regularized yearly emigration of 20,000
young Jews from Germany over a te_n year period,
He thought that . half of this number could go to Palestine, and that the other half should be directed
towards the United States and South America,

Re was

strongly opposed to large group settlements in the
less developed countries, 1 By November 1934 German Jews
who had left their country were distributed as follows; 2
France
Palestine
Poland

c-ze ch o s 1 ov ak i a

21,250
6,500

6,000
3,750
4,000 _
2,500
2,000
2,125

Holland
England
Belgium
-Switzerland
Scandinavia
1,125
Austria
640
Saar and Luxemburg
275
USA (1933-1934)3
1,786
Other countries
800

1 James G. McDonald writing of September 28, 1934.
UcDonald Papers file No. 356 .
2 McDonald Papers file l~o. 356.
3 Tartakower, .£12.· cit., p. 321.

As the figures indicate the stream of' emigrants initi-

ally flowed to the countries bordering on Germany ,with
France receiving the la:rges t number. These countries were

still suffering

from the effects of economic depression

and were not prepared to absorb the majority of refugeeso
In the early years there were even cases of people ·retur-

ning to Germany from these countries.
In February 1935 the distribution of the GermanJewish Refugees was as follows 1 ;
Settled Overseas *
Palestine

USA

South American Countries
South Africa
Elsewhere

20,000
5,000
2,500
200
500

28,000
Absorb ed :i.n European Countr ies
6,000
Repa~ria~ed to Countries of
·
Central· or 5astern Countries
18,000
Unabsorbed in European Countries:
France
13,500
Great Britain
2,500
Czechoslovakia
1,500
Holland
1,500
Saar Territory
1,300
Italy
1,100
Spain
1,000
Austria
900
Belgium
,400
300 ·
Scandinavian Countries
Elsewhere in Europe
1,000
25,000
1 McDonald Pape_rr~ file No. 356.

* A substan~ial number of those who settled overseas
went directly from Germany to the overseas countries·.
They never became part of the refugee problem·in
Europe.

These figures show that by 19j5 more refugees
h ad been settled overseas than remained in the R'uropean
countries around Germanyo -By June 15, 1935 J~ames McDonald
e stimated t hat France alone had been host to 30, 000

fugees, 20, 0 00

re-

of whom had been sent to other ·count-

ries . Also by that date 36,800 1 refugees had gone over-

seas , especially to Palestine, the Unit.ed States , South
America and South Africao After tbe Ntirem.berg Laws of
September 1935 it became .clear that organized mass emigrat i on of Jews would be necessary. Jewish organizations
in Germany in cooperation, especially 9 with Jewish or-

ganiz·ations of Palestine, Great Bri taj_n and ·the United
States undertook to evacuate German Jewry in an organized manner. This situation prevailed until the No em- ber 1938 pogrom, after which organized emigration became
. impossible

Besides i n Palestine German Jews took r e fuge
i n the fo ll owing countries and are a s of the worl d:

THE

UNI TED

STATES

Unti l 1921 the r e were few re stricti on·s govern i ng
the entrance of Europe an immigrant s i nt o t he ·United
States. The Quota ·Act of 1921 pla c ed the fi r st numerical
restric t ions on such immigrantse It provided f or an
annual immigration limited to? per cent of each Eur o-

pean nationality r~s iding in the United Sta tes in 191·0 . 2
1 James G~ McDonald, letter of resi gnation Of J ames G.
McDona ld, Hi gh Commiss i oner for Ref uge es (Je wi sh and
other) Co min g fro ~ Germany, addre s sed to t he Secre t a ry
ueneral of t he Le a gue of 1 ations, London, Dec em be r 27,
1936. p. 34.
2

Arthur D. Morse, ~ hile Six Million Di e d,; ~ Ghr on iclE~.
of American Apath ~ (New York: Random llouse ,1 ~6 7),p. 134 .

Also a maximum quota of 355,000 immigrants was established. The quota for Germany turned out to be 26,000
immigrants annually 1 •
The 1929 crash prompted President Hoover to

•issue a White House Statement on September 8, 1930. It
provided that consular officers "will, before issuing a
visa, have to pass judgement with partitular care on
whether the applicant may become a public charge, and
if the applicant cannot convince the officer that it
;is not probable, the visa will be refusedn 2 o
Cecilia Rosansky, Field Counselor of the National Council of Jewish Women gave the following description of the effects of this legislation:
"•••·••under our restrictive immigration
law Germany has an annual quota of , over
25,000 persons who are permitted to enter this country. 'rhis number was of
course greatly reduced by the executive
order of President Hoover, so that in
1932 only about 1,500 German immigrants
came to join relatives in the United
States. Estimating that the same numbar
of regular immigrants were admitted during the past year, we find that there were
in addition about 2,000 Germans here
who are actually refugees, ••••••
Everyone knows how rigid the tests are
of the American Consuls abroad, so that
these 2,000 refugees were admitted only
after they had established to the complete satisfaction of the American Consuls, either that the resources of their
American relatives, their own financial resources, or their special eminence· in the
professions or in the arts were sufficient

l Morse, .£12• cit., p. 135.
2 Ibid.

to guarantee against their becoming public

cha.rges".J.
These regulations were in effect in 1933 when
Jews began to emigrate from Germany in large numbers~
and applied to refugees as well as to other categories

of immigrants.
Section 7(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924
presented a particular problem for German Jews" · -rt- provided that applicants furnish police certificates of
good character for the previous five years, a record
of military service, two certified ·copies of his birth
certificate and two copies of all other available recordso
The law stated that these must be pre sented only nif
availablen, but the consuls were often stricter than
this provision called for 2 •
The American Consul in Holland was particularly
strict, as the following report of December 20,1933
ind_icates:

"It is pra~tically:.impossible for any r~tugea
to receive here in Holland a visum for
- emigration to the States, whereas we hear
that the consuls in Germany are at· prsent
-much more obliging in this respectu3.
1 Broadcast over WEAF, Monday July 9, 1934- ,3:30 P.M. by
. Cecilia Rosansky. LicDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Morse, op. cit., P• 137.
3 Report to James G. McDonald December 20, 1933.
McDonald Papers file Iw. 356.

A report of July 2, 1934 indicates that this situation has not changed:

"The Dutch Committee have again been complaining very bitterly of the anti-Jewish
attitude of the U.S.A. consul in Rotterdam" 1.
The strict regulations of September 1930 were
applied until the issuanc~ of new visa instructions

on January 12, 1937. These called for a _more generous
interpretation of the public charge provi$ion, so that
probability be sustituted for possibility in determining whether an applicant should be denied a visa
.

.

2

on the grounds that he may become a public charge •
Jewish Refugees from Germany admitted to
the. United States 1933 to 1940 3.
1,786
1933-1934
1934-1935
1"683

1935-1936

3,284

1936-1937

193?-19:58
1938-1939
1939.-1940

6,750

11,91'7
30,096
·191880

75,39~

Total

In 1938 President Rosevelt ordered that 12,000
to J5,000 German refugees ·who had come to the United
States on visitors

visas. should not be forced to ' leave

at their expiration. Their visas were to be extended
for as long as necessary 3 •

On

the other hand, a pro-

posal to admit 20,000 German Jewish .children above the
, 1 R~port to James G. McDonald, July 2, 1934.
McDonald rapers file No. 356.
2 Morse, 2J2· cit., p. 19?.

3 Ibid., p. 2347

limits of the existing quota did not come to fruition, 1 .

Only in 1938 were the full German and Austrian quotas
utilized.

µ-REAT

BRJ;TA;I;r

Already before World War I England had a restrictive immigration policy. After the war, faced with
serious problems of unemployment, Bngland clamp~d down_
on immigration more tightly. This policy continued past

1933. The requirements for refugees and other aliens
continued to be the same

Up to 1938 the only immigrants

admitted to England were those who could prove that they
either had sufficient means

or an invitation from a
prominent Briton or a domestic service permit~ 2
The numoer of refugees admitted was so limited that _ in 1935 Norman Bentwich qould write that the
sums collected by the Central British Fund of the Jewish Organizations for_. the years 1933 through 1935 r.•1argely exceededu the needs of the refugees in the countryt
Most of the funds collected were allocated for the
settlement in Palestine and other countries and for
training in Germany, France and Denmark, 3

On December 19,

l.Ibid. p. 268
2 Tartakower, 2£· cite, pp. 217, 218.

3 Norman Bentwich, The Refugee from German_;y: (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., -1936),p. 121.

1933 Mr. d'Avigdor Goldsmid, the president of the Central Migration Comillittee,appointed by the London Confe-

rence, reported that the refugees were arriving in England
at the rate of about 350 a month, and that they were
being settled in other countries from England at the
rate of about 80 to 100 a month., 1

Up to 1938 the number of refugees who remained in England was relatively small. According to Norman Bent~ich they reached 15,000 at the most.
those

Many of

~o stayed in England on a temporary basis emigra-

ted overseas to the United States, Palestine, and other
countries

2 A report of March 7, ·1934 about the refu-

gee situation in England presents the following picture:
"The figures about the refugees in England are int eres ting~and indicate that
the prob lem is being appreciably reduced, anyhow in this country Roughly
they are as follows: 3,500 refugees
have been r~gistered with the Refugee ·
Committee, Of these no less than 750
have been placed in England, either ·in
• employment or as students. The number
of students or professional persons retraining is over 300 •••• Over 900 have
moved on to other countries, about half
back to Germany, and the other half to
all parts of the world. There is a float·ng population of 1,000 whose addresses
are not known, and it is believed that
half must have gone back or found their
way to other countries. About 100 are
1 Report of December 19

1933

McDonald Papers file No . .

356

2 Rep.ort by Norman Bentwich "Aliens in England Interned

and Uninterned" August 19,1941. McDonald Papers file
No •

3 56 ~ , p •

4•

}·o
receiving relief regularly from ~he Committee.
1
.rhat leaves a residue of 900 tc l,000 who
are not placed or accounted for .a" 1

In 1934 the British Government decided to issue
a special Home Office document of identity and travel to
refugees from Germany who could not obtain a national
passport. 2

· · A more liberal admission policy was'adopted by
Great Britain in 1938. This policy was based on humanitarian c~nsiderations which _recognized the special problems

of the refuge es. For others immigration into England remained very difficult. Between November 1938 and September 1939 England permitted the immigr ation of more than
9,000 German children, of whom 90 per cent were Jewish ~3
Accor ding to Adler-Rud e l •· non- Jewish people re s ponded "quicker and more numerously" than Jews in answ- rir1,
the call for homes to Vlace these youngsters.

He also

_added that poor Jews responded in greater numbers than
rich J e {' s •4

1 Report of March 7,193~McDonald ?a~~rs file No. 356.
2 Letter of James Go McDonald to Under Secretary of State

of Great Britain of November 14, 1934 and in reference
to a letter of March 26, 1934 ~o C. 1748/23/18, received by James G. McDonald from His Majesty's Government.
McDonald Papers file lo. 356.
- ·-·

3 Morse-·,

QEot

cit., p. 166e

• ln 1933 he was the Director of the Department of ProducWelfare of the Jewish Community in Berlin. In 1934 he be'came the Secretary General of the Reichsvertretung, succeeding Dr. Kreutzberger.
4 Taped interview of Mr. Adler-Rudel by Mrs. Rivka Be.nitt,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,June 24,1965,
No_

3~1 . .

The Movement for the Care of Children took responsibility for 10,000 youngsters under sixteen and pla~ed
1
them in private homes and in hostels. These youths were
permi-tted to continue their education in English schools.
According to Adler-Rudel some public schools offered freeplaces for these children, but after a year a number
asked that they be taken away, not because they did not
behave well or did poorly in their work, but rather because they did so well tbat they became a source of en-•
vy · to the other children which created ·._ friction distur-

-

.

bing the harmony of the school

·2

Tho' sands of young people betwee·n the ages of

thirteen and thirty five were admitted to England for
training in industry and agriculture,

and thousands

of men and women entered England under guarantee of
local citizens. Some were allowed into the country i~
transit, others vere 'old and had guarantees of maintenance for life 8 3 _ Three thousand five hundred men
1 Report by Norman Bentwich nAliens in England, Interned
and Uninterned u August 19, 191-+-l . , McDona ld Pape rs
file No. 356, Po 4.
'
2 Taped interview of Adler::Ru-deT- by Mx·s. Rivka Bc.ani tt,
Oral History Divis.ion of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
· ~une 24, 1965~ No 341~
3 Report by Norman Bentwich nAliens in England Interned
·.and Unint~rned 11 August 19, 1941. I~cDonald Papers
file No. 356 9 p. 4.
\.

.

between the ages of eighteen and forty five were housed

,

at : the Kitchner Camp at Richboro g~, Kent~ 4

It was to

.

.

serve as a transit and training center for those who had
prospects of emigrating overseas and ~ho had been taken
out of Germany

in

order t~at they not continue to be incarcerated in concentration camps~ 2
After the outbreak of war Norman Bentwich estimated that only a few were likely to be in transit for
the United States , Palestine or South America~

These

men were engaged in manual work within the camp or -on
4
the land around which ;as leased for horticulture~
hile the census of 1931 sho~ed about 18,000

German and

Austrian residents in England at the outbreak ·of war,
they numbe red nearly 90,000~

?1~000 German and Aust-

rian refugees were brought before Alien Tribunals"5
Approximately ten per cent of them : er& non~iews. 6

At the outbreak qf war ·of the 15,000

wo-

men who had· by then entered England as domestic servants
1 Letter by Norman Bentwich to .James GQ McDonald Sep-

tember 21, 1939 •. McDonald Papers file No. 356.

2 Report by Norman Bentwich nAliens in England Interned ·
~nd Uninterned" August 19, 194-L; McDonald Papers
cf i 1 e N-o 3 56 , p • 4 •
.
by Nor!llan Bentwich to James G. McDonald, Sep_tember 21 ,_ 1939 .. __ McDonald Papers fil~ Noo 356 ..

3 Letter

4 Let t er by Norman Beniwich to J ames·G. McDonald October
1 2 , 1939. McD~nald ~ap~rs fi,l e No .. 356.

,5 Rep ort

'

Norman Bentwi ch 0 Aliens in England ·Interned
· a nd Uninterned" Augus_~ 19 ,;_l 941. McDonald Papers
file Noo 356, p. 2.
· 6 Ib i d ., p. 3 • .
by

appro~imately half lost their employment.

Men who had

worked as trade agents also lost the~r poste.

Those who

had come to England in transit were held indefinitelyeThe
plans of the Intergovernmenta_l Committee

•

to settle

many:· of these refugees in Australia , Rhodesia, British

Guinea and other countries ·had to be suspended 1 1 After the
outbreak of war the refugees as well as other aliens were
required to obtain a special permit before they could qualify for civil employment.

Such permits were granted in •

cases where the work could not be done by any British subjects or because there was a demand for the ·type of work
for which the refugee ·qualified.

1939 and

May

While between November

1940 the government was mor·e liberal in its

granting of work permits this situation changed after the
invasion of Belgium, Holland and France. The reports about
the role played by Nazi agents in these countries caused
a change of policy

tow~rds the refugees. Reports circu-

lated that some persons posing as refugees had actually
2
.
helped the Nazis in their invasion of Holland~ A policy
of ~nternment was initiated by the authorities. It encompassed all male refugees between the ages

of

sixteen ·and

seventy and included some women refugees as wellcAfter a.
short - time many were released, but 20,000 remained in-

terned. 3
l 'Report by Norman Bentwich nAliens in England Interned
and Uninterned" August 19, 1941. McDonald Papers file

No. 356.

2 Ibid.!., p. 8.

* Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was established
as a byproduct of the 193 3 Evian Conference to help
deal with the refugee problem.
1

3

Ibid., p.

9.

)

FRANCE
Although France faced both economic and political
difficulties it welcomed more refuges from Nazi Germany du.ring the

the 50,000

1930s than any other European country .. Of
officially admitted from Germany and 4,000

from the Saar the vast majority were Jews.1 on December

23, 1933 James G. McDonald described France as the temporary home of by far the largest number of refugees,.
He added the following:
"The French Government, priding itself
on its tradition of hospitality to the
oppressed, put no obstacles in the way
to ·the stream of refugees that crossed
the Belgian frontier or passed through
the Saar into France~
In 1933 French ditizens, acting chiefly through
Le Comite National de Secours aux Re.fugies Allemands
have raised and expended ·ten million French francs for

the care of the refugeesp 2 As long as funds were available it housed thousands of refugee_s in hotels and re-

staurants in Paris,

It also provided advice on employ-

ment and on procedures for obtaining identity and working
)?apers, 3

When the committee ran out of funds the French

1-Tartakower, op. cit., p$ 1330
2 Statement toThe~w York Times by James G. McDonald
December 23, 1933e l\lcDonald Papers file No. 356.
3 Bentwich, .2.E• cit.,_ p .. 39.

Govirnment provided barracks and military buildings on
the outskirts of Pariso At one time close to 2,000 persons were ac·commodated in them 1 cThere was some opposition to the influx of
Jewish refugees to France even among French Jews 1 as the
following report shows:
"Monsieur L. Dreyfus wrote, stating his
point of view, that .he was strongly opposed to encouraging refugees to come to
¥ranee, both because it tended to arouse
anti-Semitism in France and because it
reflected on the patriotism of those Jews
ho remained in Germany. But he and his
friends, he said, were prepared to contribute to a fund for assisting the Jews
in Germany"2
Due to the worsening economic situation in. France
refugees entering the country after November 1933 were
required to possess regular documents of admission from
the French Governnent.. Without such documents an indivi-

dual could be refused entry, and if he entered illegally

he would be liable to evictibn 3 . ·. rt was very difficult
to obtain a residence permit 1 and even more difficult to
obtain working papers.
For approximately two years refugees were free
to take up handicrafts as an ~occupation • . Norman ·Bentwich
could report in May 1934 that the · Federation of Jewish
Societies was "most helpful in finding work for artisans .

1 Ibid., p. 40.
2 Report to James G. McDonald February 22, 1934~
McDonald Papers file ~o. 356.
3 Ibid.

l)

.

.

an d sma 11 ousinessmen

tll

•

The Laval law-decree of ~pril 8, 1935 2 was
designed to protect French artisans fro~ alien competition and put an end to that venue of ~mployment for the
refugees. Refugees who could set up their own businesses
could be actively engaged

4n

commerce and industry. De-

crees of June 17, 1938• .and or,.e of November 12, 1938
put an end to this possibility of employment as well. 3
The Decree of May 2? ]938 made an alien who entered tie co ntry illegally liable to a fine of 100 to
1,000 francs and to imprisonment of one · month to one
ear. This applied as well to aliens wh9 were found in
France after having been denied identity cards, or to
those 1ho without a valid excuse failed to apply for such
a card. Failure to adhere to an expulsion order issued by
the Ministe

of Interior carried with it a penalty of from

six months to three years imprisonment. The latter regulation was mitigated by the provision for a plea of ·nimpos-

sibilityrt of leaving France. In such cases, if it could
be sho ·n that the alien could not +eave France, he would

l Report by Norman Bentwich, · ti~led "Notes on the Present
Position of the Refugees in France'', to James G. McDonald,
M-y 11, 1934· • McDonald Papers file Io. 3 56.
·
2 ·Tartakower, on. cit., p~ 136.
..,
3~ 3 Ib lQ
• ' p • .i. t •

---

i

)
not be subject to the proscribed penalty, but would be
alloted a place of residence from where he had to report to the police regularly, 1
The aforementioned provisions indicate that
France was ready to accept refugees on a provisional
basis only.
After the outbreak of war all ~ale aliens from
enemy countries were internedo This included the refugees.·
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland received many refuge-es in transit,. 2
Approximately 5,000 Jews found a refuge in Switzerland
between 1933 and 1939,

That most were in transit ·1s

evident from the fact that in the short period between
April and September 1933

10,000 Jewish refugees passed

one Swiss frontierpost . aione,3 When she feared that the
refugees might remain in the country, she did refuse
them entry in some ·casesc This is evident from the following report to James ·G. McDonald:

"Tickets -to the Swiss frontier were not
sufficient, as the Swiss authorities
had . in several cases refused admission
to Polish ' citizE'ns, refugees from Germany
wh6 were not able to show .tickets to the
Swiss frontier station at the other end
of Switzerland'! 4

1 Ibid., pp.139-140.
2 Bentwich, 2.12· cit. p. 49.
'3 Tartakower, .<2.E· cit., p. 291.
4 Report of visit to Saarbrilcken January 25, 1935.

McDonald Papers file No. 356.

1

After the annexation of the Sudetenland by
the Reich the Swiss Government actually introduced visas

for non-Aryan German citizens who were now entering the
country illegally, 1

OTHER EUROPEAN COUKTRIES OF REFUGE
In the ·early years of Nazi rule Belgium, Holland,
Chechoslovakia, · like Switzerland and France, opened their
frontiers to the refugees.

2

During the years 1933 - 1939

Belgium admitted 40,000, of whom 25,000 remained at the

outbreak of the war, 3

Holland was sheltering 30,000 re-

fugees when the war broke,

In both Hol and and Belgium

refugees were sheltered in camps, with the expectation _
· that they would soon leave,

In these countries efforts

were made to restrict imCTigration only when it became
clear that the stream of .arrivals continued~ while the
departure of refugees w·as slower than expected, 4 By 1938
there

ere 5,0oo5German and Austrian refugees in Cze choslovakia and an ·eq~al number in Italy. 6 Smaller groups
of German-Je·wish refu_gees found their way to Norway,
Sweden, Denmark and a number of other European cou~tries.

1 Tartakower, .££· cit., p. 288.
2 Report James G. vlcDonald Barch 18, 1935.
McDonald Papers file No . 356.
3 Tartakower, ~· cit., p. 308.
4 Ibid., p. 300.
5 Ibid., p. 304.
6 Ibid., p. 311.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
The South and Central American countries varied in
their ~ttitude towards the immigration of German Jews.
Brazil and Argentina bad large Jewish communities and
seemed to be relatively desirable places of refuge. Argentina, which in the aarly years of the refugee movement
'

took a liberal stand on the question of immigration, later discontinued this policy

National Socialist propa-

ganda had its effect there and anti-Semitic organizations
pressed upon the Government to restrict immigrationoThis
is apparent from the following letter of Rigoberto A. Merai

Commander in Chief of the

11

Argentine Ba nner"

to Vis-

count Cecil in connection with his work on behalf o·f the
refugees from Germany:
"Learn:ng that in the session of the 6th
December the Argentine Republique has been
mentioned as a refuge for Hebrews~ I have
the honor to let you know that you can discount my country as a propitious cou ntry
for Jewish colonization. We shall not tolerate that our country, where the Jew is an
oppressor, strangler and extortioner of our
society, be taken as refuge by the low~st
of all races, the refuse of humanity. If,
for reasons of diplomacy or weakness, our
honorable Government should offer our · country
as refuge, we should open an offensive based
on .terror until we have destroyed the dens ·
in which they find shelter~• 1
After a visit to sixteen different South and Cen-

• A nationalist group ih Argentine.
1 Letter of Rigoberto A. Merai to Viscount Cecil
ber 9, 1933, McDonald.Papers file No. 356.

Decem-

tral American countries Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, personal
assistant to James G. McDonald, reported that despite
excessive nationalism in those countries

Argentina was

the .only country where he found oppositton in intellectual
circles to immigration ~fa limited number of scholars. 1
The rising anti-Semitism resulted in increased
restrictions being placed on Jewish immigration to that
country. A de~ree issued in 1938 provided that applications

of immigrants visas to Argentina must be referred to an
intermini terial board in Buenos Aires,

The general po-

licy was that immigrants who left their country of origin
for political, racial or religious reasons were . conside~
red undesirable .2

The Brazilian constitution imposed rigorous
limit~tions o~ immigration, while emphasis was put on_
the . admission of only agricultural immigrants~ This is

evident from the following . statement of the Brazilian
Minister of Labor:
.nNone except agricultural immigrants can be
considered; the Constitution limiting the
immigratio n to definite quotas cannot be
exceeded; the German quota has tentatively
been fixed at 3,090 a year; of this proportion only 10 per cent could be Jews or
refugees - that is 309 a year; the constitutional limitation of 2 per cent of the
immigrants who have come to the country
during the past 50 years, is a mistake and
should not have been included in the funda~
mental law, but there it is and it cannot
be ignored or circumvented; if an attempt
1 Reported in the Journal do Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, December 31, 1935, McDonald Pa pers file No. 356.
2 Tartakowe_r , ·££• cit., P• 316.

I
t

were made to get around it I would at once
be attacked by the friends of Alberto de
Torres (the nationalistic society which had
most to do with writing the immigration restriction into the constitution~ because of
their intense opposition to the continuation ·
of Japanese imr:iigratiori on a large seal~) ' 1
1

He added that nothing beyond the 309 · agriculturists a

year was possible; that even Poles and stateless among
the refugees would have to be included in·the German quota, since they came from Germany. 2

By the end of 1937 there were approximately
8 000

German Jews in Brazil, indicating that the con-

stitutional restrictions were not enforced too strictly.
After 1937 immigration to Brazil became more difficult
and only capitalists and visitors were admitted under very
strict conditions~ 3

In Mexico i mnig~ation restrictions were strict"
In general the smaller Central and South Amer i can countries
could not absorb very large numbers of refugees. The Ecuad9rian Government endqrsed a scheme to bring in 50,000
Jews to the country for settlement· on · the :land.

This scheme

was impractical since most of the refugees were not suited
for the rough tropical c_ountry life. It was also feared
that such a ~arge group would arouse the local population# 4

1 Report concerning immigration to Brazil, March 15,
1935, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Ibid.
3 Tartakower, £E• cit., p. 316.
4 Suppliment to the General Report of the High Commissioner
on the work of the mission visiting South and Central
America, February-June 1935, McDonald Papers file No.
356. p. 9.

The Dominican Republic offered a similar plan for the ·
settlement of up to 100,000 Jews, 1
Latin America was prepared for the settlement
of farmers but not businessmen and members of· the liberal professions. Desp1te the various problems involved

Latin Americ? ranked with the United States and Palestine
as refuge for German Jews.

OTHER CENTERS OF REFUGE
Othe~ centers of ref ge for German Jews wer~ South
Africa which admitted 7,000, until anti-Jewish agitation
put a halt to it 2 Australia admitted only 8,500 Jewish
refugees, including non-Germans, up to the outbreak of

war. in the Pacific 3

while Canada admitted only 6,000

.

German Jewish refugees,

4

By 1939 10,000 German Jewish re-

fugees found their way_ to Shanghai,5
I

•

•

As early as December of 1933, consideration was
given to the settlement of Jewish refugees in the USSR,
and more specifically in Birobijan,*

Lord Morley, at the

House of Lords, thought that· 3 persons, one appointed by
ORT, one by .the American Agro-Joint Committee, . and one by
l · Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine,· A Stud;1·

of Jewish, Arab and British Policie~, Vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 191f-7)- p. 950.
2 Tartakower, -~· cit., p. 325.

3 Ibid., p. 32b.
4 Ibid., p. 328.

5 Central Bureau Report to the :XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 7 • .
* A Jewish rational Autonomous Region in the USSR.

the High Commissioner ought to investigate the possibilities of settlement there. 1
In the United States a new Committee was formed
calling itself th~ "American Committe for the Settlement
of .Jews in the USSR.

Lord M6rley said that they hoped

to raise ten million dollar

amongst some rich Jews for

the purpose of settling Jews in various part~ of the

USSR, and especially in Birobijan,

Wurfbain added that

the report of Dr. Rones who went to the USSR for the AgroJoint seemed to be very favorable for such settlement
possibilities, particularly in the industrial field~ 2
The consideration of this whole endeavour caused
an outcry in the Yiddish Pr ss in Europe which published
violent articles against the High Commissioner and Mr"
Warburg, because of a report that they were proposing to
put pressure on the refugees to go to Birobijan in Siberia~
Norman Bentwich told the press that the story was an °absolute invention.u,and-that there was no intention of pressing any refugee to go to Russia. 3

James G. McDonald -

1 Report to the High Commissioner for Refugees, December .
21, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Wurfbain (Assistant to the High Commissioner for
Refugees) to James G. McDonald December 3, 1934
McDonald Papers file No. 356.
·
'
3 Letter by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald, March
6, 1934., McDonald Papers file No. 356.

justified Bentwich's denial of the report and added that
he had always been skeptical about the whole project. 1

EVIAN CONFERENCE OF 1938
The Evian Conference was called at the initiative
of President Rosevelt. Thirty two Governments had accepted
the invitation to be represented at this refuge conference,
an invitation that specified that no country "would be

expected or asked to receive a greater number of emigrants
than is permitted by its existing legislation'\ 2 The conference attempted to organize a planned migration for tr1e
refugees in response to the chaotic situation that deve?
loped after Austrian Jewry fell under National Socialist
rule. Of all the countries only the Dominican Republic
offered to take in large numbers of Jews 3

According to

Arthur De Morse the origins of the ~rian Conference lay
in the increased demand for action by the State Department
on behalf of the refugees after the Austrian Anschluss.
To counteract this pressure Secretary Hull, Under Secre-

tary We lls and two other associates had decided

0

that it

was preferable for the department _to get out in front and
attempt to guide the pressure~ primarily with a view toward forestalling attempts to have the immigration laws
1 Letter by James G_. McDonald to Norman Bentwich March 16,
-1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
·
2 Morse, .2.E.· cit., P~ 202.
3' Esco Founda~ion for Palestine, Inc., Vol. II, .212.• cit.,
p.

950.

()

liberalized 111 • Summer W:.11s came up with 1..ihe idea of
"an international conference. It would be months in
planning, would silence the critics of apathy, and if
all worked well, would divert refugees from the United
States to other co-operating nations~ 2

1 Morse,

O~o

cit., P• 203~ .

• This he based on an internal State Department memo, randum prepared late in 1938 by an official of the Division of European Affairs (formerly known as the Division
of Western Buropean Affairs).
2 Ibid.\ pp. 203 - 204.

VII. NAZI POLICY COIWERNING j·E:NISH EJ.IIGRATION FRO.M

GERMANY TO PALESTINE

In 1933 the National Socialist conception
of the J e,isb problem, and hence it's solution,were
based on Hitler's polemics. In "Mein Kampfn he
d escribes them as a "race of parasites ,,l and a ~•state

within a state" 2 , set on subjugating the worldo 3
As for the Palest.ine question he state·s:

"~lhile the Zionists try to make the rest
of the world believe that the national
conciousn~ss of the Jew finds its
satisfaction in the creation of a
Palestinian state~ the Jews again
slyly dupe the dumb Goyim. It doesn't
even enter their heads to build up
a Jewish -state in Palestine for the
purpose of living there; all they
want is a central organization for
t heir international world swindle,
e ndowed with its own sovereign
ri ghts and removed from the interventi on
of other states : a haven for convi c ted
scoundrels and a 4 univers i ty f or
budd i ng c ro oks . 11
•

1 Adol ph Hitler, Mein Ka mpf (Boston: Houghton Llifflin
Company~ 1943), p. 232.

2 Ibid e, p. 150.
3
P. 1~52 ~

4

nrcr:-,

!bid., pp. 324-325.

~1
Even in his last will and testament Hitler
persisted in this attitude, blaming the Jews for
Germany's defeat. 1
Still in 1933 there was no long-range
Jewish policy. The anti-Jewish boycotts, the Aryanization of Jewish property, and the anti-Jewish
legislation were no ends in themselves. Jews did
leave Germany, but many more remained, and in the
early years some of the emigrants even returned.
A struggle

soon developed within the

German hierarchy over the handling of Jewish policy.
It involved mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
of Propaganda, the S.S. (Schutzstaffeln der N.S.D.A.P,),
the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichfflhrers S,S,)
and the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspoliz~i).
Prapagandists such as Goebbels, Frank,
and Rosenberg could not compete with the S.S. or other
organizations which had paramilitary forces at their
disposal.
In 1931, Himmler, who was chief of the
S.S. appointed Reinhard Heydrich to organize a
secret security branch (S.D.) within his organization.

1 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich (New York: Simon and Shuster 1960), p. 1124.

During the June, 1934, purges the S.S.
gained primacy over the larger but less disciplined

S.A •• In that year Himmler also became head of the
political police of all the states, except Prussia,
which was under Goering's j·urisdiction. The Gestapo,
created in 1933, was also put under Himmler's direction.
By a decree of the Filhrer in June 1936 he became the
chief of the Reich Police and of all its branches,
including the political and criminal police.
Heydrich headed the S.D. and the Gestapo.
In 1936 the S.D. accorded Jewish affairs
their own department, Section II. 112, under the
command of Leopold von Mildenstein. Adolph Eichmann
was placed second in command. Upon the replacement
of Mildenstein, Herbert Hagen became the new section
chief, while Eichmann was made specialist in matters
of Zionism. In 1937 the role of Section II 112, was
expanded to deal with all aspects of the Jewish
question.
In the early years of the Reich the S.S.
had little authority over emigration. The Reichsinnenministarium (Reich Ministry of the Interior),
and especially its Reichwanderungsamt (Reich Office
of ~igration), was the comp~tent authority for Jewith
emigration.

According to Arthur Prinz, member of the Jewish
Hilfsverein, * these responsible German organizations

were until 1939 staffed by officials who had
previously belonged to the Zentrum Party or other
non-Socialist parties. He added that its leading
officials were "extremely accomodating and did
everything they could to make 6~r work easier." 1
Under the jurisdiction of the Reichswanderungsamt
Jewish emigration proceeded on a strictly legal
bases. All the documents had to be in order and
conform to the legal requirements of the immigrant's
country of destination.

2

The fact that in the early years of
the Reich the S.S. had little authority over Jewish
emigration did prevent it from exerting its influence
in this matter.

While the early boycott activities and
excesses of the less disciplined S.A. took no

cognizance of any difference between Jews, the more
sophisticated S.S. recognized them and their value

• Hilfsverein des deutschen Juden - German Jewish
Relief Association was devoted to helping Jews
emigrate from Germany. It did not handle emigration
to Palestine, which was the task of the Palestine Office.
l Arthur Prinz, "The Role of the Gestapo in Obstructing
and Promoting Jewish Emigratlon," Yad Washem Studies 2
(Jerusalem: Pu,b.lished for the Yad Washem Remenbrance
Authority by ·t he Publishing I:epartment of the Jewish

Agency~ 1958), p. 205.

2 Ibid~, p. 207.

in furthering its goal of making Germany judenrein
(free of Jews). In recognition of this fact on March
20, 1934, the earlier ban on the activities of all
Jewish organizations was lifted. Those groups

which

strengthened the concept of Jewish identity -were
permitted to resume their activities. This included
the Zionist organizations which were accorded more
favored treatment in recognition of the fact that they
were promoting emigration. Although cautious at first

by the beginning of 1935,the S.S. and hence the
Gestapo were clearly encouraging Zionist activity.
According to Dr. Reuven Eytan, secretary of the Zionist
branch office in Munich, Zionist activity in Germany
was resumed in 1935. The Gestapo favored the Zionists
since they sought emigration. "Their attitude towards
the Zionists was correct. They sent their men to
Zionist meetings, who behaved very properly. 11 He
adds that in the same year a Palestine week was
organized in Munich which was attended by 1,500 Jews
out of about 5,000 left in the city. 1 When Zionist

1 Taped Interview of Reuven Eytan by Avraham Margaliot,

Oral History Division of the Institute of·Contemporary
Zewry, The Hebr~w Universlty of Jerusalem, No. 2.

policy paralleled that of the Gestapo it was
encouraged although their activities were kept
under constant surveillance.
The Zionists avoided all relations with
the Jewish communist youth movement for fear it may
harm them. 1
On May 15, 1935, the S.S. made its
position public in an article entitled "The Visible
Enemy" and published in "Das Schwarze Korps", its
official journal.

"The Jews in Germany fall into two
groups: the Zicnists, and those who
favor being assimilated. The Zionsts
adhere to a strict racial position,
and by emigrating to Palestine they ·
are helping to build their own Jewish
state. The assimilation-minded Jews
deny their race and insist on their
loyalty to Germany or claim to be
Christians, because they have been
baptized, in order to overthrow 2
National Socialist principles."

1 Taped interview of Eliezer Livneh (Livenstein)
by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of
the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, No. 6.
2 Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz
Nazi Polic to~ard Germru:·Jews 19 -1
(Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1970, p. 194.

The cooperation of the S.S. with the
Zionists went as far as a greeing to the admission
to Germany of Hechalutz teachers and instructors. 1
In 1937, with Eichmann in charge of
Jewish affairs for both the S.D. through Section
II 112 and the Gestapo, it was thought that Jewish
policy could be better coordinated.
Eichmann, the self-styled expert on
Jews and Zionism, and most of his cohorts in the
S.D. and S.S. were still interested in the Zionists
and emigration to Palestine. As a matter of fact
Eichmann planned a visit to Palestine that same year.
Conta_c t was made with a Haganah commander in Palestine
whose name was Feival Folkes, in Hebrew Feival Poles.
Folkes came to Berlin where he had several meetings
with Eichmann. Eichmann was informed of the Haganah's

l Revealed in a letter from F. Foley, head of the
passport division of the British consul~te ~in ~Berltn,
to Dr. Werner Senator, deputy to Dr. Ruppin who was
director of the Jerusalem department of the Central
Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, Th e Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/281.

-~
eagerness for Jewish immigration and was quite
impressed with this Palestinian. His impression of
him is

revealing

in terms of Eichmann's attitude

towards the Zionists and his concept of their strength,
ability, and potential usefulness. His report is as
follows:

"In spite of his race, he is a true
National Socialist in his so~1. · The
Haganah is the most efficient
intelligence service in the circles
of world Jewry, particularly of
Jewry in the Middle East. The
Haganah often cooperates with
French and British intelligence
services, but works against them .
when a conflict of interest arises. 111

Eichmann together with his section chief
Herbert Hagen did finally make his trip to Palestine.
But a meeting with Folkes was then arranged in Cairo.
The discussions were not very successful. ~~ile Eichmann
and Hagen wanted to learn about assasination plots
against Nazi official~ Folkes was interested in

1 Quentin Reynolds, Ephraim Katz, and Zwy Aldouby,
Minister of Death The Adol h Eichmann Stor
New York: The Viking Press, 1960, p. 74.

increased emigration to Palestine. He suggested that,
if currency restrictions were eased, the British
would permit a large number of capitalist immigrants.
Eicmnann made his view on that proposal
clear. He was not interested that Jewish capital be
taken abroad but was first of all anxious
of npenniless Jews

to be rid

i.

At this stage Eichmann also rejected
the proposal on grounds that the 50~000 immigrants
a year

nvisaged by

P

lkes would greatly strengthen

the Jewish position in Palestine, while the Reich
policy was to hinder the creationofa Jewish stateo 1
Germany' s foreign policy as regards
Palestine and the Jewish questlon was very reserved
until 1936e In that year, as a consequence of the
Arab riots against further Jewish immigration, the
British government sent to Palestine, late in 1936,
a royal comission to inrestigate the sltuation and
make reco:mmendations .- · Concern_ grew·__in : Germ.a n -circles
that creation of a Jewish state was contemplated.

On July 7, 1937, the Peel Commission Report (as it
was c~lled) recommended the partition of Palestine

1 Schleunes, .2.E· cit., p. 211.

I

~

, .1

)

into three parts, one Jewish, one Arab. and one under
permanent British mandate. This development stirred
great interest and apprehension in Germany's foreign
policy departments.
When Hitler rose to power the Palestine
Desk

in the Wilhelmstrasse was held by Legationsrat

(Counsellor) Schmidt-Roelke. The German

Consul-General

in Jerusalem was Dr. Wolff an ardent opponent of the
National Socialist Party1 who was replaced only at

the end of 1935. In 1936 Dr. Doehle took ·over that
pot

Wolff's cooperation was very important in the

promotion of German Jewish emigration to Palestine.
Hi ~ expert opinion reports and bureaucratic powe rs
were used to further rather then obstruct this

.
t·ion. 2
em1.gra

Legationsrat Sc·h midt - Roelke was succeeded
to the Palestine Desk by Geheimrat Pilger who played
a very reserved role. He ,as in turn replaced by
Minister Werner Otto von Renting who held the post
during the crucial years of 1938 and 1939. Dr. Ernst
Marcus•

described him as a known critic of the Hitler

• Also known as Political Division VII.
1 Ernst Marcus, "The German Foreign Office and the
Palestine Qu~stion," Yad t;ashem Studies 2 (1958), p. 183.
2 Ibid .. , p.

184.

•• Jewish Agent of Haavara and Peltreu transfer companies
and representative of the interest of the Palestine
Office.

.1r egime and a ve~y competent persone l
Up to 1937, there wa~ no publ ic stat ement
b y Hit l er which would indicate Germany's at t itude

towards the establishment of a Jewish state in Pal estine. ,
But in that year, Briti~h considerat ion and later
proposal of such a plan prompted Germany to t ake a
s tand on this matter. A telegram dis patched by Neurath ,
\

...

the German Foreign Minister, on June 1 , 1937~ to his
embassy in Grea~ Britain, the consulate General at
Jerusalem, and the legation in Iraq included the
following instructions as to the position to be
taken by the German representatives:

nThe fo.rmation of a Jewish state or
a Jewish-led political structure
under British mandate is not in
Germany's interest, since a Palestinian
state would not absorb world Jewry
but would create an additional posit ion
of power under int ernat~onal l aw for
i nternational Jewr y, somewhat l i ke th e
Vatican State f or plitic al Catholic ism
or Mos cow fo r the Comintern. "
A supplement fo r th e London embas sy added :

"Alt hough Germany h a s hithe r to aided the
emigration of Jews of German citizenship
to Palestine as much as possible, it is
incorrect to assume tha t Germany would
also welcome the for mation of a political
str~cture more or .less under Jewish
leadership in Palestine.tt 2

1 Ibid • , p • 188 •

2 Doc·wnents on German Fore i gn Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V O'la sbington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1 ')62), Document 1495/370141- 42 pp. 746•··7'+7.

.

This position is part and parcel of the
National Socialist view of world Jewry and the threat
it represented. Even with the elimination of all Jews
from German soil the Jewish question would not be
solved for Germany. "International Jewry" was seen
as a permanent ideological and political enemy of
National Socialist Germany. This position was
propounded in a June 22, 193~ circular of the German
Foreign Ministry. 1 It added that it was in Germany's
interest to keep the Jews dispersed and
Palestine which could not absorb all of world J~wry
anyway would only become a power base against Germany.
There were other factors underlying
Germany's opposition to the creation of a Jewish state
in Palestine. One was the question of the Templers.•
Most were settled in areas that would fall within
the Jewish state.
Dr. Doehle wrote on July 13, 1937, to
Berlin that the existence of German settlements in

a Jewish state would in the long run be impossible.
Even if in view of the large number of Jews remaining
in Germany the Jewish state would not adopt

discriminatory measures against the German settlers
in ?alestine, th£ Jewish pcpulation would force the.n

1 Ibid., Docwnent 7055/E524081-90 p. 752.
• I group of German religionists organized in 1854
and settled in Palestine in 1868 to await the end

of the world.

~

out by means of a boycott and other measures. 1
It was added by Renting that the existence of a
German minority in a Jewish state might hinder
Germany's freedom of action with respect to the
Jews. 2
Another factor was Germany's relations
with the Arabs which she sough~ to improve. An
August 7, 1937, memorandum of Political Division
VII from Berlin points out Iraqi Minister President
Hikmet Sulyman's violent opposition to the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 3
In a letter of July 15, 1937, to the
Foreign Ministry, Doehle describes a meeting with
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husyni who
asked him whether Germany was prepared to take a stand
against the Jews and the plan for the creation of a
Jewish state - either in the press or in some other
way. Doehle adds that he agreed to forward the request
and expressed the opdnion that it could be fulfilled. 4
On August 10, 1937, the Consulate-General
in Jerusalem wrote to the Foreign Ministry that the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem let it know of his "joy" and
"satisfaction" with the German press comments against

1 Ibid., Document
2 !bict., Document
3 Ibid., Document
4 Ibict., Document

1526/373516-19 p. 754.
1526/373535-38 p. 760.
1542/375514; 3496/E019907-10 p. 763.
1526/373532-33 p. 756.

·the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish
state. 1
.Political Division VII saw some advant a ges

to the establishment of a Jewish state , as _i s r evealed
in its memorandum of August 7, 1937. 2 It would reli eve
t he Reich of a large number of Jews~ It would make
it possible to deal with official representatives ,

when ttattacked by Jewry", in contrast t

"anonymous

and therefore irre sponsible elements".
When the Peel Commission plan became
public and the question of a Jewish state came to the
fore, a dark cloud set over the question of German
Jewisp. emigration to Pal estine. Transfer negotiations
ere held up as were d e cisions on emigration to Palestine~
In that year Jewish immigration from Germany dropped
to 3,280, less then half the figure of any year
since 1933. 3 * The Filhr~~ himself had taken an i nterest

1 I bido, Doc ument 1526/ 373550-54 p. 766.
2 Ibid. , Document 1542/37 5514 ; ?496/ E019907- 10 p . 764 .
3 Cent r a l Bureau Rep ort · to tha XXIst Zi.onist Congress,
Au gust ~

1g39, p. 68.

1937 also
affected the German Jews . 3ut, since the restrictions
wrre applied in the categcry C (Labour Echedule),
which accounted for only 37.5 per cent of the total
German J ewish i mmigration during 1933-1938 and still
accounted for 29.9 of their total in 1937, the German
policy change was respocsible for much of the rest of
the decline. (For figures see table I in chapter titled
Soci-E0onom ic and Demographic Description of the
German J ewish I illIJ.i;:5ra tion to Pal e stine).

* British restr i cti ons on i mmi gr a tion in

0
in the matter. Other officials became reluctant to
take positions on the question of Palestine until
Hitler made his position known. This situation
continued until 1938 and meanwhile Zionist work
inside Germany was obstructed by the Gestapo. A
case in point was that of Mrs. Eva Michaelis, head
of the Arbeits-Gemeinschaft* in Berlin, who described
her harrasment by that organization. She reported
that after her return from a Youth Aliyah conference
that had taken place in Holland, she was summoned by
the Gestapo and accused of making anti-German
propaganda. She was later instructed by Eichmann
not to go abroad again or maintain contact with any
youth Aliyah committee abroad, to cease all her work,
and hand in her passport the next day. She was able
to leave Germany in the beginning of 1938, and upon
arrival in Palestine reported that she "did not believe
that any organized work in Germany, even Aliyah work
or Hachshara work, •••• , could be much longer continued
from Berlin under the pressure of the Gestapo. 111

Consequently in that same year the office was transferred
to London.

• Full and proper name was Arbeits-Gemeinschaft ffir
Kinder und Jugendaliyah.
1 Taped interview of Eva Michaelis by Rivka Banitt,
Oral History Division of the Institute of
Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
April 28, 1965, No. 361.

On January 27, 1938, Karl Clodius ,Deputy
Director of the Economic Policy Department issued a
memorand.um1 which stated that the Policy :!Jepartment
of the Foreign Ministry as well as the Ministry of
Economics and the Foreign Trade Office of the
Auslandsorganisation are of the opinion that the
Ffthrer's general directive to facilitate Jewish
emigration from Germany by all means can.not be
fulfilled if Palestine is excluded. It adds that
according to the Auss ennolitische s Amt, the Filhrer
had recently decided again after another report
by Reichleiter Rosenberg, that Jewish emigration

from Germany shall continue to be promoted by all
available means. "Any question which might have
existed up to now as to whether in ·the Filhrer's
opQnion such emigration is to be directed primarily
to Palestine has thereby been answered in the
affirmative " Clodius indic.a ted that chances of the
creation of a Jewish state have diminished a.nd the
question of immigration can be separated from the
fight against the creation of such a state.

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, Document 1542/375533-37 p. 784.

The view was held, particularly by the
Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry,
t hat Jewish emigration outside of Palestine, especially
in centers of inter·n ati.o nal trade? can harm Germany
much more economically and through propaganda and
press , tha.n in Palestine • 1
The end of 1937, and the be ginning of 1938 ,
saw a marked change in the Third Reich. Neurath, Schacht,
Blomberg

and Fri tsh were r emoved and replaced by more

firm supporters of the National Socialistc· u s • .
When Joachim von Ribbentrop bec ame Foreign
Minister in 1938, the A~sl ~ndsorganisation, which was
competing with the for e ign of fice, was integrated with
it.
This change al s o had its impact on matters
·c oncerning Jewish emigration . In 1936_and ·1937 9 while
t he officials of the Reichwanderun gsamt still felt
t hemselv es in c ontrol of matters within their own-~
sph ere of . a ctivity , they i nsis t ed that if emigra t ion
had to be force d on t he Jews , it s h ould be c arried
out nin a manne r befitt i ng a civil iz e d na t i on". 2 ·

Up to the so - call ed "Juniakti on" (June
operation) of June 1938, it was possible to pursue a
productive and efficiently direc t ed Jewish emi gration
policyo 3 The situation changed radically thereafter
1 Ibid.
2 Prinz, 9.12. . cit., p. 207.

3 Ibid.

as matters were falling tnto.J tlie· hands of t.he 111or.e radical
elements.
According to Arthur Prinz when in December

1938, officers of the Hilfsverein and the Reichsvertretung• called at the Reichwanderungsamt. with . the
purpose o~ mitigating the terms for the release of _30;000
~ews who had been int~rned in concentration camps,
they discovered that the entire action had been staged
without their knowledge. The Gestapo set emigration
within a few weeks as a condition for their release. 1
In this year it became clear that the
Gestapo and other radicals has taken over authority
'

over Jewish matters. This development marked the
· end to an orderly and strictly legal Jewish emigration
policy.
The failure of the July 1938, Evian
Conference to find a solution for Germany's Jewish
problem contributed to this development~ This
intergovernmental conference was called by president
Rosevelt to consider efforts which might alleviate
the plight of the victims of National Socialism.
Thirty two countries sent delegates to the conference.
The Ger~an government allowed representatives of

• The Reichsvert~etun& was founded in 1933 by the
Zionist Federation and Central Union of German Jews
to represent the collective interests of all Jewish
organizations in Germany.
1 Ibid. , p. 208.
2 For ~o~e details on Evian Confere~ce see chapter titled
Alter~a.te Plac·es of Refuge.

,,. ¥!
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Austrian and German Jewry to attend the c onference
a nd present their plans f or fa c ilitating emigrati on .
The c onference was a fa i lure from t h e
National Socialists' point of view f or i t neit her
a nswered the question of how emigration was t o be
organized and financed nor where t he emigrati on was
to be directed. 1
The year 1938 saw an accel€ration and
intensification of anti-Je\\'ish activities. These
included boycotts, Aryanization of J ewish property,
anti-Jewish legislation, and deportations, and was
c ulminated in November by the Kristallnacht.
)

Still the goal of a judenrein Germany
was not attained, and the impulsive approach, as
represented by the Kristallnacht pogrom, was discredi t ed
in favor of a more realistic and methodical approach.
J ewish emigration from Germany was impeded
by a numbe r of fa c tors . Most co unt ries pl aced severe

re s tric t ion s on immigration. Th e s ocio-e conomic
structure of Ge r man Jewry was a n other barri er since
most countrie s did not se ek a large influx of middle
cla ss businessmen and profesionals. ~
The fact that the Jewish a gencies had to
spread their resources to meet the needs of even

• The anti-Semitic propaganda of the National Socialists
made their accept a nce even mo r e difficult.
1 DocuCTents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, Document 1520/373206-19 p. 928.

'1

poorer Jev;ish emigrants from Eastern Europe also

impeded this process. Additionally the large percentage
of older people in Germany's Jewish population made
emigration a particularly difficult prospect for
many. These even if welcomed in another country, were
hardly prepared to start a new life the~e.
The impoverishment -of German Jewry was
also recognized by the National Socialists as an
impedime nt to their emigratione A memorandum cf
December

7, 1937, sent

by the Reich Forej_gn Exchange

Control Office to the Foreign Ministry is revealing.
It states that as the well-to-do Jews leave Germany
the impoverishment of the Jewish community, which
had been proceeding rapidly, will reach a point
where it no longer will be able to assist the
unemployed and destitute Jews. Out of 360,000 Jews
remaining in Germany 90,000 were receiving assistanceo 1
More Jews were expected to fall into that category
within a short time, and for whom emigration
opportunities, with the exception of the young,
would be very limit ·ed~
Then there were many German Jews who still
hoped for better times. They considered-themselves Germans
and thought that the Hitler era would pass.

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, Document 1542/375521-29 p. 774.

Those Jews who entertained any hopes that
-

their situation in Germany would ,improv-e, were per- _
s,aded otherwise

by the events of

1938.

The March ~hluss of Austria only
sered to compound the problem, for now another
200,000 1 Jews fell under the rule of the National
Socialists, a greater numbe r then the 130,000 2
ho had emigrated from Germany between 1933 and the

end of 1937.
A January

25, 1939, circular of the

_For eign Ministry s pe a ks of the n e cessity of a radic a l
solution· to the Jewish question as a re s ult of the
augment a tion

of Aust~ ·an Jewry to that of the old

Reicn. 3 It continue s as follo ws:

"The ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish
policy in the emigra t ion of all Jews
liTing on German territorye It is to
be anticipated that the incisive
economic measures, which have obliged
the Jews to live from "savings
instead of profits," will in themselves
enhance their willigness to emigrateo

l Solomon Grayzel, A History of the Jews from~
Babylonian ~ile ·to the Present 57?,8-196~ (New York:
The New American Liorary Inc., 1968), p. 674.
2 Council for German Jewry Annual Report for Year 1937
The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, ~he Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/516 p. 2.
_
3 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, ·Document 1520/373206-19 Po 927.

6
In reviewing the past 5 years since
the seizure of power, however, it
must be admitted that neither the
law for the restoration for the
civil service, nor the Nuremberg
Jewish legislation with the
regulations for its application,
which halted any assimilatory
tendencies of the Jews, have
substantially contributed to the
emigration of the German Jews.
On the contrary, in every period
of domestic tranquillity such
a return stream of Jewish emigrants
set in that the Gestap'o found it
necessary first to place Jewish
returnees with German passports
in a training camp* for political
screening."l

The new situation called for the
application of more rigorous and less time consuming
methods in an attempt to speed up emigration. The
man to show the way was Adolph Eichmann. He suggested
to Heydrich, who was in charge of the Gestapo bureau
in Vienna, that the various bureaus concerned with
emigration be consolidated into a single Gestapo
department. Ifeydrich accepted the proposal and put
him in charge of the so-called Central Office for
Jewish Emigration, which was established in August

1938. WorkiLg from the former Rothchild mansion 1~

• Concentration camp is meant.
1 Ibid..:.., pp. 927-928.

Vienna, Eichmann put his "conveyor belt system"
into pra ctice. By that system the Jewish - emigrant
entered the office and within one day, after going
through various proceedures, he would leave with all
the papers needed for leaving Austria. If he had any
property, by the time he left the office he was
dispossessed of it. This was all within line of
Eichmann.'s principle tha t the rich , Jews must pay for
•

the emigration of the poor. By this method Eichmann
managed to effect the emigration of 100,000 Jews,
or about half of Austria's Jewish population by
February 1939. 1
The Foreign Office in Berlin as well as
the economic authorities of the Reich objected to
the extension of this system to the "Altreich"
(the for mer area of the German Reich), as desired
by the Gestapo.
After the Kristallnacht the handling
of Jewish emigration became chaotic. The Eichmann
operation in Vienna became the model for the Gestapo
also in the old Reich. No cogniz:ance was taken of the
feet that Jews needed some means b y which to exist
while waiting for visas and certificates. Jews were

1 Ibid., Document 7051/E 523699-704 p. 935.

4,

given impossible deadlines for emigration, forcing
them to flee across borders and leading thousands
to move to Shanghai or South American countries,
whereas otherwise they would have waited for their
visas for the U.S. or Palestine.
It still took until the end of 1938
before a Central Authority for ~ewish Emigration,
on the Vienna model was established in Berlin under
the leadership of the Gestapo.
The first working session of the
Committee of the Central Reich Office for _Jewish
Emigration took place on February 11, 1939, in the
office of the Secret State Police. The session was
conducted by the chief of the Security Police, S.S.
Gruppenfllhrer Heydrich, whom Fieldmarshal G8ring
had commissioned to direct the Central Reich Office
for Jewish Emigration. At this meeting Heydrich
laid down the following policy lines in regard to
Jewish emigration: The emigratiom of Jews of very
limited

financial means was to be encouraged by

providing the necGessary assistance • .In this
context Eeydrich mentioned that the special tax
'

imposed on rich Jews by the Police President

in Earlin should be used fo~ this purpose.
' be Jews, having been organized into a Reich association
of all racial Jews, through which they were
the~selves ~o prepare for emigration, and to which

10
all Jewish education and welfare work was to be
transferred, could themselves be utilized to solve
the emigration problem. Contact was to be established
with foreign Jewish organizations to further that
goal.
Heydrich also brought up the question -of
illegal emigration to Palestine_~ The policy line on
that issue was as follows:

"Illegal emigration should be opposed
on principle, to be sure. In the
case of Palestine, however, matters
were such that illegal transports
were already going there at the
present ti~e from many other
European countries, which were .
themselves only transit countries,
and in these circumstances this
opportunity could also be ·utilized
by Germany, though without any
official participation."

It was added that Senior Counselor Hinrichs and
Minister Eisenlohr from the Foreign Ministry had

no objection to this and expressed the viewpoint
that every possibility for getting a Jew out of
Germany ought to be taken advantage of. To this
Ministcrialdir~ctor Wohlthat added that he had
heard in ~ondon that Palestine could still absorb
about 800,000 to 1,000,000 Jews, and that this
quota would be filled from other· countries in

case no Jews from Germany went to Palestine. 1
A January

25, 1939, circular of the

German Foreign Ministry addressed to all German
Diplomatic missions and consulates stressed that
there was no reason for cooperation with countries
such as Poland, Hungary, and Rumania who were
themselves striving for the emigration of their
Jewish populations. This would only compete with
Germany's claim to the admission of her Jews to
other countries. Palestine was not seen as a solution
due to the restrictions on immigration placed by
the British Mandatory Government. The emigration
to Palestine of well-to-do Jews, which the British
permitted, would contribute to the develpment of
a Jewish state and was opposed on those grounds.
It added that Germany had a major interest in seeing
that the Jews continue to be dispersed. Thus
rejecting the theory that anti-German centers
and boycott hubs would be created in all parts of
the world, but rather concluding that the influx
of Jews aroused anti-Semitism and thus provided
the best propaganda for Germany's Jewish policy. 2

1 Ibid., Document 7051/E523699-704 pp. 935-936.
pp. 930-931.

2 Ibid., Document 1520/373206-19

11i
This policy statement points out a contradiction
in the National Socialist's Jewish policy. On
the one hand the stated goal was to make Germany
,iudenrein through forced emigration, and on the
other hand Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda and
Bohle's Overseas organization did wha~ they could
to · spread · anti-Semitism abroad and thus stiffen
'

foreign resistance to Jewish immigration, with the
possible exception of Palestine.
Another contradiction in this policy
is evident from the November 10,1938, arrest of
officers of the Hilfsverein, of the Reichsvertretung,
and of the Jewish communities. Many were kept under
arrest for a number of weeks thus obstructing the
emigration process.
Vhen Jewish emigration became haphazard,
based ·on false documents, and on tourist visas, other
countries reacted by further restricting Jewish
immigration. Eichmann's policy of forcing a mass
emigration of Jews, regardless of consequences, created
a refugee problem for the rest of the world.
He continued to take an interest in
Jewish emigration to Palestine. One case in point
inv0lved Moshe Auerbach, a :·outh instructor in a
Palestinaian kibbutz who arrived in Vienna in 1938
under the name of Bravman. •He informed Eichmann that
the Chalutz movement was interested

:n

p~eparing a

(

thousand Jewish youth in Austria for agricultural
work in order to bring them to Palestine. Eichmann
agreed and with Gestapo cooperation in issuing exit
vesas Bravman managed to bring many of his people

to Palestine. 1
An o ther case involved Uoshe Galili who ,
with the help of Eichmann, organized tne famous
nyouth train". Eichmann arranged for a train to
transport a thousand young men and women to Athens.
He even provided S.S

troops to protect the youth

on boarding the train. These were then brought
to Pale tine illegally~ 2
There were other cases where Eichmann
and the Gestapo cooperated in promoting illegal

emigration to Palestine. This policy was still
pursued as late as October 1939,

~en a transport

with Czechoslovakian Jews left f~r Palestine . 3
Meanwhile i n Germany proper t he Hamburg Ameri c an
Line openly adve rtis ed nil legal e Auswanderung"
·· (illegal e mi grati on), to Pale stine . 4

After the invasion of Poland in September
1, 1939, and the resultent addition of 3,000,000
Jews und er Nazi r ule e migration alone could no longer
be considered as a solution for the Jewish question~
1 Reynold s , on cit., PPe 84-85.
2 Ibid .. , pp 0 -8~
3 I bid ., p . 94 .
4 Tar t ak o'ver , 2-E· cit., Pe 67.
c

THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST POLICY

The exodus of Jews from Germany, which
the National Socialists encouraged from the time of
Hitler's advent to power, faced great difficulties
on account of the currency restriction laws in force
in Germany which prohibited the export of capital
in foreign currency.
In order to facilitate the emigration of
Jews and t h eir immigration to Palestine the German
authorities agreed to allow Jews to export their
capital to Palestine in the form of merchandise
As early as the spring of 1933 an
agreement was reached between · Hanotea• and the
German authorities for the transfer of funds to
Palestine. This a greement was strongly supported
by Wolff, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem. 1
Wolff's arguments in favor of such an agreement
pointed to the fact that increased German exports
to Palestine would help alleviate the German
unemployment problem, which was severe at the time.
Later Wclff also argued that a transfer agree~ent
could serve as a weapon against a world-wide Jewish

• Hanotea dealt with the planting and operation of
orange groves in Palestine •
. 1 Shaul Esh, Studies in che Holocaust and Contemporary
Jewry (JerJ.saleCT: Institute of Contemporary Jewry,
The Hebrew Uni,rersity of Jerusalem, 1973), pp. 46-47.

boycott against German goodso The latter view is
supported in a letter of August 10, 1933, from the
Mini 9 ter of Economics to the Foreign Office and

dealing with the Hanotea Ltd. agreement. It reads
as follows:

"It seems to me that this way
really affords the best guarant ee
of the strong est possible effect
on the Jewish boycott measures
and of payment of the money to
emigrants without loss. As I
hear this view is also confirmed
by a lett er tele gram of the
.
German consulate in Jerusalem.u 1

Wolff was

in

a position to expedite

or obstruct the workings of the tra~sfer agreement.
This was particularly the case with transfer money
of Special Account II,* as is evident from a letter

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, Document 36005/33 Po 733.
* Special Account II was for the use of those German
Jews who .for the ti:ne being remained in Germany, but
who wished to transfer the whole or part of their
capital to Palestine in order to e~sure the
pcssibility of immigratio~ at a more distant future.
RI/I 50,000 vva.s set as the highest individual paymant
possible into Special Account II.

of August 25, 1933, from the Reich Minister of
Ec onomics to S. Hoofien• in wh ich he sta te s that
permission to deposit capital on Special Account I I
could only be granted upon the approval of the project
for which it was intended by the German Consul-General
in Jerusalem.]!_
The use of the SpecJal Account I I was
restricted to German "citizens of Jewish nationality"
as is stipulated by the Reich Minister of Economics
in a letter to S. Hoofien of August 10, 1933. 2 This
restriction applied until July 1934, when it was
expanded to include ali Jews residing in Germany. In
the same letter the Reich Minister of Economics
mentions the extension of the transfer agreement with
Hanotea to RM 3 million and adds that he is willing
to make provisions ·for an additional sum after the

RM 3 million had been used up, but a small part of
any additional purchaces will have to be paid for
in foreign currency. 3
The Trust and Transfer Office "Haavaran
Ltd., registered with the Palestinian government
on Novembar 5, 1933, was entrusted with the transfer

• Representative of the Anglo-Palestine Bank.
l The Central Bure&u for tje Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Docu~ent S7/159 p. l.
2 Ibid.

3 Tb t d ,, , p.. 2 •

of capital from Germany to Palestine. On the German
side this agreement had been ne got iated by the Reich
Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Exchange
control office.
)

In the letter of acceptance of the Reich
Ministry of Economics the provision was made that
the three million Reichmark could be transferred
through a Palestinian trust company. 1
The major factors leading to Germany's
consent to the transfer agreement are stated in a
letter of August 28, 1933, from the German Minister
of Economics to the various branches of the Foreign
Exchange Control .Agencies. It reads as follows:

"This agreement has been reached
in order to further the emigration
of German Jews to Palestine without
overburdening the foreign currency
reserves of the Reichbank, and at
the same time to increase the export
of German goods to Palestine."2

The emigration of German Jews t ·o countries other
than Palestine often cost Germany more foreign
cur~ency tha~ emigration to Palestine which could
be fiLanced by the export of German products .through

1 The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, 2~e Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S7/89, pG 1~
2 The Centra .. Bure au for the Settlement: of German Jews
in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem

Documen~ 87/159

p. 2~

'

the Haavara transfer system. Evid~nce of an immigrant•s
ability to support himself was a requirement of almost
.alL countries, while Germany's foreign currency
probl ems made the transfer of such capital very
difficult. An individual leaving Germany in 1933 was
entitled to take with him only RM 200 ·in foreign
currency, a figure that by 1937 had been reduced to
RM 10 l
Other economic considerations were also
involved, including Germany's desire to expand her
xports~ This is evident from her special arrangements

with the Haavara Agency for the establishment of the

"Near and Middle East Commercial Corporationu ( NEt'.iICO )
whose function it was to facilitate the export of
German products to Egypt

Syria

and Iraq~ In this

connection, the fact that Jews played a major role in
the importat iori of German products to these countries
did not escape the German policy.makers~ 2
The boycott of German .goods in Palestine
a nd the Englo-SD.xon countries in reaction to the
National Socialists' early Jewish policies were taken
very seriously by the German authorities. It was their
hope that an arrange~ent, such as the Haavara agree~ent,

would counteract it~
1 Schleunes, .2.£· cit., p. 195C;

2 Werner Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michaelis, Ludwig Pinner,·
Baavara-Transfer N3ch Pal tlstjna und Einwanderung
Deu.tseher Jud~:1. J. 9 ~:: - 1q;z, r (TtJ.bingen: J.C.:S. tf.ohr,
·_aul Siebeck .. 1972 , p. 54.

To relieve Germany's unemployment p~oblem
which had reached 6 million

in 1~32, increased exports,

and hence increased production was sought. The situation
a

particularl

acute in the years i933-1934 but lost

its urgency after Germany's rearmament program went
into full swing in 1936 and unemployment was reduced
to less then one million. 1 The resultant increased
need for foreign currency and raw materials and the
consequent decline of these reserves prompted Germany
to reduce the selection of transferable items. Starting
in 1936, a list of items was introduced fo r which
foreign currency had to be paid by Palestinian
i purters in amounts sufficient to cover such outlays

by G·rmany. First the export of iron, then, in the
beginning of 193?

i.ron ware, tubes., ·a nd sheet metal,

and in mid 1937 a further serie~ of goods with an
appreciable portion of foreign raw materials, were
prohibited. IP February 1938, a furthe~:limitation
as introducBd whicht instead of expanding the list
of pro~ibitions, introduced a list of items importabJe
through the transfer system.2

The increased restrictions on importable
items through the Haavara Agency were partially
1 Shirer, .2.£· cit., p. 258.
2 Feilchenfeld,

:Iichaelis, Pinner, £12· cit., p.

51.

circrimvented with the aid of German industrialists.
These forwarned the agency of pending restrictions
on certain items so that contracts could be drawn
for large quantities of such items in time. The
industrialists recognized Haavara as a large and
good customer that would pay for a whole order
upon placing it. 1

Table I 2 1'1
The Transfer of Capital from Germany to Palestine
through the Haavara

Reichmarks

Year

~

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939 (first

1,254,955
895,038
17 103,153
19 , 9 58 , 64- 5
31,407,501
18,853,911
8

6

month)

1 Ibid·. , p.

6 iL~43, 912

Value · n LP

96,535
657,430
1~082,145

1,095,539
1,461,628

795,129
225s582

53.

2 Central ~ureau Report th the XX:Ist Zionist Congress,
-~ Aug;ust, 1939, p. 44.
• ·The great i~crease in the ~ark transfer figures during
1935, 1936, and 1937 did not produce any corresponding
increase in the total of iounds transfe~red, sinc0 in
the meantime the ·prices of German gbods had risen
perceptibly as compared with those of goods imported
from other countriesc Haavara had t~ return this
difference to the Palestinian i~porters in order to
make transfer activities possible.

The full effect of these restrictions on
the Haavara becam } a pparent since 1938, as the figures
in table I show.
Betwe n the years 1933 and 1938 Germany
was able to increaoe her expo~ts to Palestine
significantly abov

what they were; during the years

of the Weimar Republic. While the value of German
exports between 19~8 and 1932 averaged annually around
LP ?OO,OOO, their a nnual average between 1933 and 1938
was around LP 2,000,000. 1 The price of German imports
to Palestine was p: rticularly high, since the export
premium which the German government payed German
exporters was not rt pplied in this case and the increased
prices were in compensation to these exporters.
During the 1935/1936 and 1936/193? citrus
seasons Haavara t ook over the citrus barter, and an
agreement was reached between the Jewish, Arab, and
German colonist citrus exporters on the one hand and
the Haavara Agenc y and the German government on the
other. The German KOvernment refused to continue this
arrangement for th

1937/1938 season for political

reasons.
Almost all of Palestine's imports from
Germany went throui:;h the Haa7·ara Agency •. The remaiLeer

1 Werner Feilchenf( ld, Jewish Trade Policy on the,
Bases of . Transf r Asree:ments wit:i Central and
East European Co~~ntries (Tel A7iv: Ea 3.retz Press,
1938), p. 14. (fi gures based on table)

was accounted for by the purchases of Arab and German
colonist importers. In 1937, for example, these
accounted for only Oo3 per cent of all German imports. 1

Table II 2
Share of Capital that German Jews could take to
Palestine Compared with the Bhare they could take
to other La.nds.

Year

Average percentage

Average per-

of Reichmark holdings centage of
received by immigrants .blocked marks
to Palestine
(Snerr~2rk)
holdings
received by
emigrants

who went to
other couDtrie:=-

1934

85

1936
1937
1938 (1st half)
1938 (2nd half)
1939 (1st half)

73

1935

80

62(t5
62o5
48e5

33.3

37e-7

2698

20.3B
10e83

6.5

~erman Jewish emigrants to Palestine
received more for the same Reichmark holdings than
Jews who emigrated to other lands. This may be seen

1 Ibid t p. 15.
2 Cent~al Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August~ 1939, p. 46. (table based on figures)

from table II which shows that in 1935 Jews who
emigrated to Palestine ~eceived overt ice as much
for the same Reichmark capital as Jews emigrating
to other countries. This figure increased as the
years passed to over three times as much in 1937,
over five times as much in 1938 and even more than
that in 1939.

1

Administrative charges of the Peltreu
were 2 per cent, administrative charges of Haavara
were 2.5 per cent and the bank commission was 0.5
per cent, the remainder representing price bonuses
to importers. These bonuses consisted of payments
to the importers of German goods to compensate for
the difference between the over-price asked by the

German supplier and the competitive price. Higher
prices were charged for exports to Palestine
because German exporters did not receive export
bonuses in such cases where payment was made in
Reichmark rather than in foreign currency. These
bonus payments to importers accounteq for the
bulk of the discounts charged those who transferred
their capital to Palestine. Jews who emigrated to
countries other than Palestine could take their
capital only from blocked mnrks (Sperrmark) and

were at a disadvantage in terms of the percentage
of their capital that they could take out of Germany.

l See table II.

The

ncouragement of German exports

to Pa lest i ne became less meaningful from an economic
s t andpoint, as t he need to create j obs for unemployed
German workers d imini shed. This was particul arl y s o
in this instanc e since exports to Palestine through
t he Ha.avara Agency did not bring f oreign currencyo 1

Continued German co-operation ~i th t he

Haavara agency was due to t he fact that it furthere d
t he ca use of emigration, as is evident from the
v arious ac tivities and conditions for ,hich she .
permitted the transfer of money. ~he s e included:

a . The provision of tne

um of LP 500 as r e quired

f or emigrants of the liberal professions, and
LP 2 50 as required of immigrants classified a s
a rti sans ;
b . Th e provision of the sum of LP 1,000 required

to abtain a ·c apita l ist v isa ~ .f or i1wnigrants of
that cate gory;
c

Th e t ransfer of funds c ont r ibut ed to organi zati ons
promoting emigra tion, s uch as Youth Aliyah;

d

The transfer of pensions to forme r German civil
servants or officials who settled in Palestir.e;

e. The transfer or · school fees by parents in Germany
~o their children in Palestine.
The German authorities even permitted the transfer

of capital where emigration prospects were in the
more distant future. This is evident from their
1 Feilchenfeld, Michaelis,

inner, £12• cite, p

0

29.

agreement to the provjsion. of Special Account I I
whereby c apital was transferred by German Je~s
who ~ere not contemplating immediate emig~ati on.
The transfer of expense money for German-Jewish
tourists in Palestine, in order that they may
prepare themselves for future

migrati on, is al so

. indicative of this policy.
The continued operati on of the Haavara
gency was possible, to no small extent, due t o

the cooperative attitude shown by some German
officia sin key positio~s. Wolff, the German
Consul-General :n Jerusalem was already cited in

this connection. Schmidt-Roelke, head of the Palestine
Desk in Berlin,

as considered to have had a positive

influence on the attitude of the German Foreign
Office in the years 1933 and ~934 ; this according
to Ernst 4arcus wh o had pers onal dealings with him . 1
Ot to v on Renting , a s ticcess or t o Schmidt-Roelke

:as des cribe d by Ernst Marcus , who had extensive
contac ts wi t h him, as being most cooper at i v e , an
anti-Na zi, and a man with an nunderstanding for the
Zionist couse." 2

1 Ernst Marcus, "The German Foreign Office and the
Paleqtine Question in -+:; he Period 1933-1939,"
Yad Wa s h em ~St udie s 2 (Je r usalem: Publishea for
Yad Washeru Re weo orance A~t h ority by the Publishing
Department of the Jewish Agency, 1958), p. 183.
2 ill£~, pp. 188, 204.

Timotheus Wur t, director of the Bank
0

of the Temple Society, was ·largely responsible for the
fric~ionless manner in which the business of the
bank, concerning the transfer of Jewish money to
Palestine, was carried out. 1
Rans nartenstein, head of the Foreign
Exchange Control Office, played a major' role in
the development and operation of the transfer
agreement. This he did in the face of continued
opposition from various National Socialist circles.

As the official responsible for the Haavara Tranfer
Agency on the German side until the departure of
Hjalmar Schacht as Reich Minister of Econo~ics in
Septembe

1937, he worked relentlessly for an

orderly emigration of German

.

JeNSo

2

It must be added that there were other
German officials with attitudes quite the opposite
of those described above

These incluq~d Geheimrat

Pilger, who succeeded Schmidt-Roelke at the Palestine
Desk and served in that capacity until he was
replaced by Otto von Henting. Both Pilger and Doehle,
the new Consul-General at Jerusalem (replacing Wolff),
were considered to be allies on this matter by

1 Ibid~, pp. 184-185.
2 Feilchenfeld, Michaelis, Pinner, 2.E.· cit~, p.

30.

oppoLents of the Haavara agreement. l. In a letter
of J anuary 14, 1938, to the Forei~n Ministry,
Doeh l e makes h i s strong opposition to the transfer
agreeme.1t quite clear , adding that a delayed
d e c is i on or a renewed confirmation of this policy
would only serve to al i enate the Arabs. 2
The publication of the recommendations
of t he Peel Commission on July 7 , 1937, had its
repercussions in Ber in, whe~e cuddcnly transfer
negotiations in progress were held up in the Reich
Ministry of Economics. Fzven before the report was
made public, concern about the possible establ~sh • ent
of a Jewish state, and opposition to the Haav~ra
agreement, in this connection, was expressed 5-n
c ertain German circles.

I n a memorandum of the AuslaLdsorganisat~cr~
of J une 5, 1937 , the following objections were raised
a gainst the Haava ra a gr eement : First that it dra ined
of f economic g ood s fr om Germany wi thout a quid pro
quo in g oods or for e i gn exc hange ; s e c ond it co mpe lled
the non-Jewish elements in Palestin e to finance
Jewish i~nigra tion; *third it f a cilitat ed the
formation of a Jewish state with German c~pit a l.

1 Documents o~ German For&i gn Policy 1913-1945 Series D
Volume V, Document 1495/370143-44, p. 748.

2 Ibid.~ .D ocuwe nt 15L~2/375530-32, pp. 780-781.

Bince they were forced to buy through the Haavara
as well.

The same memorandum points out that the Foreign
Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation bas been
fighting for an amendment

of the Haavara agreement

for over two years.il The Chief of Protocol*
concurred with this v1ew, as is evident from a
memorandum of June 11, 1937 and added the following
suggestions as to how to deal with the Jewish
emigration question:

11

••••
a considerably increased
emigration of Jews out of Germany
is to be obtained not through any
administrative "promotion" on the
part of Germany~ possibly even
entailing s &crifices of foreign
exchange (Haavara) - -but by
encouraging the Jews' own urge to
emigrate. In my opinion this goal
could be reached through sharpening of
domestic legislation reg r rdi ng the
Jews (for example, special taxes on
Jewish income) to an extent which
would automatically result in the
emigration of the Jews on their own
initiative."2

The German Foreign Ministry also came

tu question the Haavara agreement as is evident
from its circular of June 22, 1937, to its various

1 Ibid., ~ocument 1495/370143-44, p. 748.

2 Ibid., Jocument 1495/370139-40, p. 749.

• ·The Chief of Protocol was at this time the director
of the Refera~ Deutschland which was concerned with
liaison between the Foreign Ministry and other
offices of the Sta::e ar..d Party.

diplomatic missions around the world. It stated
that this agreement promoted t he consolidation of
Jewry in Palestine and thereby accelerated the trend
towards establishment of a Jewish state -there. This
was contrary to Germany 1 s foreign policy. But her
attftude on this question had been largely dictated
by domestic considerations, ·namely the promotion

of Jewish emigration. 1
With the p~blication of the Peel
Commission report the likelyhood of a Jewish state
being established in Palestine increased, and the
need for Germany to take countermeasures became
more µrgent.

A memorandum of Political Division VII
-(Palestine Desk) of August

7, 193?,- points tG

measures that could be taken by Germany to help check
this development. In the diplomatic sphere, other
European countries who opposed such a state could
be brought into a common front with Ge~many. Support
could be provided to movements opposing the creation
of a Jewish state in Palestine (i.e. support of the
Arabs with arms and money). Domestic measures
as the bl ~}eking of emigration to Palestine; directi ng

emig~ation to other countries; and renunci4tion · of the
Haavara agreement were also contemplated. But the
memorandum adds that the last proposal was opposed

1

Ibid. , Dec J.nent 7055/E524081-90, pp. 751-'?52 _

in German quarters concerned with economic policy. 1

In a December 7, 1937, com·munique to
Renting of Political Division VII the Reich Foreign
Exchange Control Office of the Foreign Ministry,
strongly defended the continuation of the activities
of Haavara. It pointed out that since 1933 about
one third of all Jewish e migrants from Germany had
gone to Palestine, representing approximately one
half of all Jews who had emigrated overseas. This

emigration vas paid for by foreign exchange earned
through a supplementary German export of goods,
which would have been boycotted were it not for
the transfer agreement. Furthermore, those Jews
who emigrated to Palestine as capitalists brought
over more German Jews. Also, the allotment of
worker certificates was connected with the capitalist
.
.
t·ion. 2 ,
immigra

Evidence of a change in attitude on
the part of the Foreign Exchange Control Office
and the Yinistry of Economics is dicernable from
a January 27, 1937, memorandum by the Deputy Tiirector
of the Economic Policy Department. It stated that
both organizations now favored the

a~endment of

the Haavara agreement. The Ministry of Economics,

1 Ibij., Document 1542/375514; 3496/E019907-10,
pp. 764-765.
2 Ibid., Document 1542/375521-29, pp. 775-776.

I

after further conversations on the subject, took
a stand closer t o that of the Ausla nds organis a tion
by supporting not just an

amendment of the Haavara

agreement but its abolition and replacement by
another system. While the agencies were of one mind
on the matter of terminating the Haavara agreement, ·
the Ministry of Economics and representstives of
the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation
believed that another system had to take its place.
The two aforementioned ministries and the Economic
Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry were of
the opinion that the Ftlhrer's general directive to
"facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany by all
available means" could not be fulfilled if .?alestine

were to be excluded in this connection. It was added
that there was no chance to promote the emigration
of Jews to any other country on economic conditions
eq~ally favorable. 1
Continued discussions about this subject
had to be postponed since the Ministry of Economics
was being reorganized at that time.
A particularly sharp attack against

the Haavara was p~esented by a March 10, 1938)
memorar:dum of Referat Deutscbland. It points out

1 Ibi<l., Document 1542/375533-37, pp. ?83-784.

that the controversy over continuation of this
agreement is one between the political a nd economic
offices in and outside the Foreign Ministry. It,
the Auslandsorganisation, and other agencies,
espec~ally the Party agencies, with exception of
the Ministry of Economics and Foreign Exchange
Control Office, wanted to terminate the agreement.
The Referat Deutschland stated that
the Ministry of Interior intended to submit a
memorandum to the Ffihrer and Reich Chancellor pointing
out that: a. Emigration of rich Jews to Palestine
contributed to the building of a Jewish state and
that lt would be better to scatter the tTews, and
thus promote anti-Semitic sentiment in the world.*
b. The Referat Deutschland and the Auslandsorganisation

were of the opinion that German export· firms
were interested in the continuation of the agreement
because they realized considerable profits, even
thQugh they earned no foreign exchange for Germany.i
The controversy within National Socialist
circles continued on this issue until the outbreak
of World War II, at which time the Haavara 3ctivities
were terminated.

* An added notation states that "The Auslandsorga15sation
and Eeferat Deutschland consider the latter the right
solation."
1 Ibid,, . Document 2029/4-44544-46, pp. 785-787.

VIII,. SOCIO-ECONOMIC .om DEI.'i OGRAPHIC DESCRIP.i:ION OF
THE GERMAI~ J ENGSH D:1MIGRATION 110 PALESTINE

The four major categories of immigrants
were: AI (Capitali s t), B III (Stud nt), C
C (Labour)

D (Dependent). Thes

and

accounted

for 98 per cent**of all German Jewish immigrants to
Palestine, and for a similar percentage of the total
Jewish immigration of that per "od.
Total Jerish immigration into Palestine
fron~ Ja . .mary 19.33 to March 1939 was 194,055 of which

46~272

ame from Germany. 1

Table r 2
Jewish Immigration into Palestine fro m Germany

During 1933-1938
Yea1

Total ~.933
Pere ntage

Total 1934-

AI
2,982
43.-8

3,128

Percentage

36.9

Tot al 1qy,, ::>
Percentage

2,666

BIII
89
1_.3

Category
C

D

3,129
1+6. 0

7.7
758

386

4,082

4 ,.5

48.0

337

2,871

524

9 @0 .

1,269

35.9

4.,5

3~.6

Total 1936
P.rcentage

2,790
35.i~

662

2,605

8.4

33.,0

l,64~
20.8

Total 1937
Percentage.

1,368
41.8

980

8.0

29(;9

627
19.1

Total 1938
Percentage

2,036
23 . 2

1,659

1,389

1,038

Total 1933-

263
27.1

22.,5

17o0

16o9

..

19) 8
14,972
15,056
3,396
5,859
Percentage
8.5
14.7
37.3
37.5
* For more details on immigrant cate gories s e
chapt r titl ed British I mmigrat ion Policy ~
** See table I.
1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress ,
August, 1939, p. 68 .
2 Ibid., pp. 72-73.

~

1-

Table II 1
Percentage of German Immigration to the Total
Immigration into Palestine within ~ach Category
Category

Year
AI

BIII

C

D

Total

1933

55

25

17

20

1934

43

22

20

13

23

1935

29

18

11

9

13

1936

59

43

24

-. 19

29

1937

68

26

34

19

35

1938

78

66

36

47

55

Total

48

32

19

14

24

25

CAPITALIST IMMIGRATION

Of this category German Jews accounted
for 48 percent, twice their share of the total immigration.•
The relative decline shown for the years

19,4 and 1935 (table II) was the result of an increase
during that period in the total number of capitalist
immigrants from other areas of the world, making the
Germ8n share proportionally smaller. The subsequent
sharp increase, particularly in 1937, was due to the
relative decline of the number of immigrants of that
category from other countries, and not to any increase
in the number of AI category immigrants from m~rmany.
Their number actually reached a low point in _that year.
1 Th• Jewi~h ~gency fer Pal•~tine, Central Bureau fer the
Settlement •f German Jew~ in Pale~tine, The Central
Zieni~t. Archive~, Jeru~alem, Decument S7/787, p. 5.
* See ta.bl• IT.

The German Jewish L,migr3.nts incl uded a
c onsiderable number of capitalists. These brought
in t o Palestine through the Haavara agency, t ogether
with the sum placed at their disposal by the German
Reich.bank RM139,568,110 o LP8,1 01 , 49lo 1 I f ,e include
capital brought in outside the Haavara, we arrive at
a c ns3darably larger total. 2 *
Table III shows that over half the German
Je ish immigrants fell under

he category of indubtry,

trade, or commerce. Many of these 1ere self employed
and possessed a considerable amount of capital. Upon
arrival in Palestine they sought to reestablish
thems lves in their former occupaticns. Their fortunes
er

generally limited so that thy could not live off

them. Consequently numerous industrial plants were set
up by these newcommers

They a lso became partners in

exis t ing establishments , hel ping in their expansion
b y pr ovi ding capital , more modern e quipment, and

technical knowh ow.
A study of the facto r ie s est abli s h ed in

Pa.lestine in the time period Janu ary to August 1934
is revealing. Out of a total of 49 enterpri se s 32 were

1 Feilchenf eld, Michae lis, Pinner, .2.E· ill_., p. 75.
2 Ibid. , p, S,6 •
.st

Exac_t · figures are not. know:1.

established by German Jews. Out of 20 in the process
of establishment 12 were owned by German Jews.

1

LABOUR IMMIGRATION

This group of immigrants, designated category
C (Labour Schedule), was subject to a bi-annual quota
set by the mandatory government. These quotas were
worked out in negotiations with the Jewish Agency which
distributed the worker ·cert:iI.i ·cat:est ·thro~gh~itsJ_o-f:fie-es
1

in Europe. Immigrants of this category were young people,
without means, many of whom belonged to Hechalutz and
received special training before their arrival in
Palestine.
German Jews of this designation were
underrepresented in the immigration of that period,
accounting for only 19 per cent of the total.* Their
sharp increase in the years 1937 and 1938 to 43 .and 36
per cent of the total•• respectively, is misleading.
From 1937 on the mandatory government severely restricted
the number of immigrants of this category. In 1937
and 1938 German Jews comprised, respectively 35 and

55 per cent*** of the total immigrant population.

1 Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews
in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem,
Document S742.
• See table II
•• See table I I
*** See table II

1
Thus German immigrants on a labour schedule were still
underrepresented when compared to their share of the
total immigration. Table I ·shows that in 1937 only
980 German Jews arrived under category C, and only
1,389 did so in 1938. Both figures indicate a sharp drop
from the previous years. In these years they represented
only 29.9 and 22.6 per cent of the total German Jewish
immigration, both figures being significantly below
those of earlier years.

IMMIGRATION OF STUDENTS

Immigration of students came under category

BIII.
It was not uncommon for parents to have
their children precede them to Palestine. This was the
case with youngsters in the age group 12 to 18 who were
brought in organized groups.
The first group of Youth Aliyah children
landed in Haifa in February 1934. -This accounts for
the rise in this category of German immigrants after
that year.• Also as is shown in table II these German
Jewish immigrants had a larg~r share of the total
im~igration in this category (32 per cent) than thefr
representation in the total Jewish immigration (24 per
cent) would warrant.

• See table I.

8·
IMMIGRATION OF DEPENDENTS

This type of immigration came under category
D and comprised dependents of Palestine residents.
It represented only 14.7 per cent of the
total German Jewish immigration in the years in question,*
accounting for a smaller percentage of the total
immigration in this ·category (14 per cent) than they
did of the total Jewish immigration into Palestine.

THE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE

GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

A

most striking aspect of the German Jewish

immigrants' occupational structure is the fact that 17.4
per cent were registered as agriculturists.** In contrast,
the figures of a census of the Jewish population of
Germany taken in 1933 showed oniy 1 per cent to be in
that category. 1 This discrepancy is to be explained by
the fact that many young people who had no vocation,
received agricultural training through the Chalutz
movement and then registerd as farmers~

* See table I.
•* See table III.
1 Statistik des deutschen Reiches, vol. CCCCLV,
Volksz~hlung~ Die BevBlkerung des deutshen
Reiches nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszghlung 1933,
Heft 5: Die Glaubensjuden :m deutschen Reich, (Berlin:
Verlag ftir Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik

G.m.b.H., 1936), p. 25.

Table III also shows that the GermanJewish immigrants of this category were represented
almost twice as strongly as their share of the total
immigration would warrant.
When compared with the general Jewish
population in Germany, members of the liberal professions
were overrepresented among the German immigrants, their

number accounting for 20.9 per cent* of their immigrant
group, while in the aformentioned census they represented
only 10.7 per cent. The explanation for this disproportionately large number of professionals among the
immigrants is to be found in the fact that this group
comprised the first victims of the anti-Jewish
legislation and thus were forced to leava Germany
earlier and in greater proportions than others. This
trend is confirmed by the figures in table IV which
show that more than three times as many immigrants
in that category arrived in Palestine within the first
three years than in the three subsequent years.
This group of German Jews .was overrepresented
when we consider the German . Jews' share of the total

immigration (i.e.) 41 per cent of all immigrants in
that category.**
The figures for unskilled labor among tbe
German Jewish immigrants is strikingly low. Only

5.3 per cent were registered under that designation,

• See ~able III.
•• See table III.

Table III 1
Occupations Abroad of Jewish Immigrants from
Germany to Palestine During 1933-1938

Total

Agriculture

2,268

Industry and Trades
Textiles
79
Leatherworks
45
Woodwork
417
Metalworks
586
Building
899
121
Printing
Chemical
90
Clothing
493
Food
363
Various
187
Total
3,2'&5
Transport

Percentage
of Total
German
Immigration

90

Percentage
of Total
Immigration
from All
Countries

43
0.6

0.3

3.2

4.5

6.9
0.9

0.7

3.8

2.8

1.4

25:T
0.7

18
16

Liberal Professions
Medical
1,173
Education
456
Engineering
358
Arts
117
414
Legal
Various
126
Religious
Total

~

25:'9

41

Commerce

3,402

26.1

46

583

4.5

34

2.!2

13

Officials
Unskilled Labour
Total Active

695
13,037

9.0
3.5

2.7

0.9
3.2

1.0
0.6

100.0~~

28

1,848

26

Unspecified: Men
3,791
Women 12,125

21

8,945

24

Pupils (adul"t)

Children
Unknown
Total

~312

40,0hl

Travelers authorised
to settle in Pales~ine
and i::nmigrants entering
through other nlaces 5,028
Grand tot.al
~
45,089

19

24

I
Table rv2 ·
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from
Germany as Applied to the Liberal Professions

Liberal Professions 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Medical
324 210 361 125
43 110
Education
91
97 127
94 · 15
32
Engineering
119
91
57
40
15
36~
37 . 21
14
30
2
13
Arts
Legal
122
99
60
52
23
58
Various
50
22
24
13
4
13
Relfgious
4
18
21 -12 __.2
12
Total
7lf? ,5S - bb4 359 TI57 !74
Total 1933-1935

1,969

Total 1936-1938

650

- accounting for only 13 per cent of the total immigration.•
The figures discussed above showed a marked
increase in the number of farmers among German Jews
entering Palestine. This change in occupations became
even more pronounced when the immigrant~ soµght
gainful employment. In my questionnaire out of 111

who answered the question: "did you continue in your
field within the first two years after your arrival
-i n Palestine," only 38' answered in the affirmative

while ?3 answered in the negative. Large numbers of
refugees, besides becoming farmers ·, also ~oncentrated
on the building and metals industries: or found occupations
as drivers. In these fields there was a demand for workers.

1 Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S7/787, based on tables pp. 8
a.nd 9.
2 Ibid. ,P• 8.

• Seetable III.

THE GERMAN JK/."S V·v'HO SETTLED ON THE LAND

Of those who settled on the land the largest gr oup
went to kibbutzim, and the remainder to moshavim. Most
joined already existing settlements, but some established
new ones.

By 1939 German Jews who settled on the land or
found occupation in rural areas were distributed as follows:
Collective Settlements and Youth Aliyah Groups

7,000

11iddle-Class Settlements

3,500
1,000

Auxiliary Holdings
Agricultural Labourers in the Plantations
and

1

3,000

Colonies

Persons Engaged in Various Occupations

1,500

in Rural Districts
Total

16,000

German Jews, in some cases, formed settlements
that were quite unique in their- makeup . These consisted of
middle~aged settlers who had no previous experience in farming, but were rather professionals from metropolit an areas
in Germany who invested their whole fortune in farming. They
did not become gentlemen farmers living on plantations, but
were mostly smallholders practicing mixed farming based on
self-labor.
A report by a visitor to one such settlement is
instructive:

1 Keren Hayesod,
Germany

1
'

Palestine and Jewish Emigration from
(Jerusalem: Keren Hayesod, 1939) p. 19.
11

"On three hills near Kfar Hala l 3.8 German families settled and called the place Rammoth Hashavim
(Hills of the Returning). Among tha 38 settlers
are 1 1; doctors, one upi versi ty professor,. 2 pharmaeists, 2 l awyers, l economist, 1 _actor and 3 industri~lists who decided to give up their professions and start a new hippy life on the land.
With the exception of one docton and one dentist
all of them are working their own holding~ themselves with the help of their families. 11 1
A journa list's r~port on some new immigrants in
Ramoth Hashavim provides a characteristic account of one such
settler. Frau

Hilse, the wife of a former captain

bf

in-

dustry, was _behind a shop counter seated in a big leather
armchair she had brought from her home in Germany. The counter wa s divided into two sections, one serving the store,
while the other was a home. These were only temporary acc ommodations whi le they were building themselves a home. The
viife intended to continue in her new occupation, wfuile the
,,...,

husband w6 uld be occupied with egg ~reduction~ •.
futle citrus plantations were of major import ance
for these farms, other crops, characteristic of mixed farming, were introduced. In order to maximize production from
their li mited plots of land they introduced ~oultry raising
and vegetable growing. The latter·was aided through the - installation of irrigation systems. Dairy farmin g , based on

lReport on a visit to Ramoth Hashavim on July 11, 1934 by
Heinrich Cohn, Ceµtral Bureau £or the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine, The Cent_r al Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.,
Document S7/133
2 Eric Gottgetreu, "German Jews in Palestine 11 Llenorah Journal
(New York: The Uenorah Association Inc., January 1936) p. 55.

their own fodd3r production also became a ch aracteristic feature of these villa ges . The yields of these farms
were substantial, accounting for at least

25 per cent of the

total vegetable production of the Y-ishuv, and 46 per c ent
of the eggs 1- o Ramoth Hashavim, for example, specialized in
egg

production. Every settler had 600 hens whj_ch provided

him with approxi~ately 90,000 eggs a year~ The~e were marke-

ted c ooperatively in Tel-Aviv and yielded their 6wners bet~een
LP 15 and LF 20 a year. Each family also grew its- own vege-·•
tables 2
A number of factors drove this category cif settler s to th~ land~ One was the fact that the transfer conditions of the J-13.J.Varn a 5 ency were f av ora b1e for those '.'.rho
est2blished themselves in agricultural settlc~ents o Many
found it impos~,i bl2 to continue in thej_:r profession and

,

thoug~t that investing their liLlit~d capital on a farm would
be relati.voly safe . The spiritual motives of

retttrll

to the

soil and the religion of labour , as \7ell as zionist convic-

tion, played their role too.

Those wh o es t ablished themselves - in the middle
class s e ttle ments did not arr ive ·there as part of an orga* Th es e settle ments cdnsi sted of a collection
nized group.

1 Karen Hayesod, .912. cit., Pe 21.
2 Gottgetreu, 2£ .. cit-;-,-p. 55.
,
~ Sh 3 v e Zi on , as c it e d be f o ;_. . c , \'/as an ex c e pt 1 on , s inc e its
first settlers came from the villa~e ·of iiexi11gen.

of individuals who came here from various parts of Germany. These had di.fferent political views, including zionists
and non-~onists, socialists and capitalists. In the question
of reli gi on they varied just as much, counting among t hemselves traditionalists , liberals and atheists.
· rn a study Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner

1

.atte-¥1pted

to provide a picture of the age distribution of the settlers.
Out of 19 wh o est~blished themselves in 1934, 3 were less
than 30 years old, 6 over 50. Of 69 who settled in Beth Yizchak , only 4 were less than 30, but 23 wer e over 50. The same

study po inted out that the age of the married women was on
the average bet~een

5 and

6 years lower than that ·of their

husbands. This was typical of the Germa n Jewish middle class
where men would carry in their late 20s and early 30s, only
after they had established themselves in their occupations .
Most of these middle class set~lers ue~e married and some
had childreno The fact that they were founded on the basis
of personal labour, thou 6 h in principle not excluding it,
made necessary the employnent of both husband and wife in
farm work. Settlers in their 50s were largely dependent on
their children for heavy labor. As was characteristic of
the German Je~ ish middle class, these settlers had few
children, on the average approximately one per couple.
This is shown in a sm~ple s_tudy by Idargarete Turncwsky 2
Pinner • In 1938, out of 94 families in Naharia she counted
1 Margarete Turncwsky-FinnP-r, "Die Zwei te Generation t!i tteleuro ilischer Siedler in Israel.(Tilbingen:J.C.B . Uohr
Faul Siebeck) 1962) p.8.
2 Ibid. , p. 9.

94 children, o-ut of 60 families in Ramoth Hashavim 68,
and out of the 24 families in Sdeh Warburg 22. During the
· first_ difficult years the settlers refrained from having
children since all energy and all hands were required
for the task of establishing themselves.
Those immigrants who went to the mid d le class
settlem~nts, if they received any hachshara training at
all, it .: was in Pl1lcst ine itself. In most case s their trai-

ning was on the job as they settled and began building
their homes and was facilitated through the aid of hired
instructores. Some of these settlers faced the additional
handicap of having to stand guard against Arab attack. This
was the case, particularly, in such areas as Shave Zion
and Naharia which were surrounded by Arab villages. The
fact that these settlers relied on their own financial
resources reduced the influence of the Jewish.Agency_ in
matters such as preparation for settlement on the land and
its use afterwardso This led to difficulties as described
by a German Jewish journalist who visited Palestin~1 •
The land in Pardess Chana belonged to the
Palestine Colonization Association (Pica). The 250 fa-milies from Germany who settled on it, received 6 dunam
each. The plan was that out the individual allotments

5 dunam would be assigned to the cultivation of oranges
1 Alfred Kupferberg, Deutsche Juden im Jfidischen Land,
Pallistinaberichte eines Jildischen Journalisten(Hamburg :
(·. Lessma:nn Verlag, l 9j4) p. 95 .

and the remaining dunam was to be used for mixed farming,
such as poultry raising and vegetable growing. Bu~, in
this instance, the settlers decided to use all 6 dunam
for orange groves, in the expectation that the sale of
these extra oranges would provide them with a greater ·return than the mixed farming system would. As a result they
were forced to purchase their vegetables from Arab villa ge s.
They became totally reliant on one crop, oranges, which depended on export possibilities _and condequently involve~
greater risks. Because these settlers were financially
independent they could shun outsiue advise~
In the middle class settlenents German continued

* Tne first generation
to be the lanDuage of the co m~unity:
of settlers remained in rel ative isolation from the rest
of the Yishuv . Al thoug·h they did take up the study of Hebrew,
Jewish history and religion, they vante d to preserve.their
European heritage as well.
The.Cultural Comwi ssion of the Hito.chduth Olej
Germania sent speakers to these settl ements, and plans for
lectures and seminars wer~ arranied. These were usually conducted in German. In Ramoth Hashavim the settlers built a
* This may hJVG been another factor influencing German

Jevs to settle on the land. For here their inability to
speak Hebrew was of less er importance than would have been
the case with most urban pursuits.

cultural center to which they brought entertainers from
the outside as an addition to their own. Usually only they
and friends of their children attended these performances.
The children, where they went to school outside the villages, had greater opportunity to learn Hebrew and to assimilate in the Yishuv.
The German settlers found it diffd.cult to adjust to
new conditions. Men ·who had worn suits as lawyers·, businessmen or bank directors now had to discard their former forma l
attire in favor of simple khaki dress. Their·•-ivives had ·-t-o
mLke a·similar adjustment.~ Such changes took time. A description of conditions in Ramoth Hashavim is enlightening
on this subject * • The students from Ramoth Hashavim went to
school in Kfar llolal. They came\. dr essed in short pants with
.

suspenders, typical 3avarian style, and with book cases from
Germany. ~hey ~ust have been a curious sight for the other
students. On the whole ~hey got along wel l with the other
students and did b0tter than everage in school. This is not
surprising considerhJ.g the bacl,.ground of their parents nho,
as educated professionals, v~lued learning and encouraged
tbera in their studiese ·These children were economicially
advantaged in comparison to their schoolmates. hlany had bycicles which they rode to school, much to the envy of the
others_, for it was a - luxury that not many children in Palestine enjoyed. The adults in Ramoth Hashavim used to water
* Based on conversation with and interview of an individual
from Kfar ~alal who knows Ramoth Hashavim Well .

1
the unpaved paths so that they wouid not have to walk thrOllgh
dust the next morning . Such pecularities were viewed with
amusement by veterans of the Yishuv.
The earliest middle class settlers often built

their homes . v:i th a view to accoompdatine; their furni tu.re
brought with them from ~urope. These were often · too large
in relation to their small land holdings and. consumed too
much of their limited capital. In the later years RASSCO
introduced a more practical standard house for sue~ settle- ments

It included 2 rooms and a combi nati on kit chen-diLing

room and h&llway entrance The settlers invested on .the average
LP 1,700 per fa mily in l~aha.ria and G~m Hashomron ~ approxi:~1ate-

ly LP 1~500 in Kfar ~chmaryahu, LP 1 1~~0 in Romoth Hashavim,
LP 850 in Shav0 Zion, and 600 in Kfar Yedidiya~
A pay~ent of LP 1,200 to Fica and a r~scrve of an

additional LP 300 - LP 50J ~are required of those who wished
to settle in ~ardess Chanao Those who· planned to settle in
the Haifa Bay area needed LP 800, in qn Chai .LP 900, and
in Karkur LP 1,200 - LP 1650

2
e

Of the area under cultivation in these settlenents
48 per cent was privately o~ned, and

prope:cty of the Je·-,rish fo:itional Fund 3

52 per cent was the
e

1 Turnowsky-Pinner, op. cit.~ p. 13.
2 Bericht ci~r Landw.:i.rtschaftl i chcn t\btPilun:~ c1er HOG
Central nureau f o.r. the Set-r;le:-~!ent o.I.· G-2r~-'.ln Jews in l.)alestine, ~he Centra l Zionist Archives, J erusal em Docuraent
No. S'?/31.
3 Keren Hayesod, .212· ~·t- ' p. 21 .

Th e settlers bought and sold t heir g o ods thro ugh
co operatives . ·
Some of the settlements did hire outs i ~e worke rs.

I n t h e case of Ramotb Hashavi m these were r equired to pay
t axes to the community. No one was permitted t o employ
anyone without first submitting to this regulation. On the
other hand, they paid their workers well * .
Those who settled in the kibbutzim ·adher ed to a va r iety of ideologies and degrees of religious c onv ic tions, .
and consequently joined different kibbutz movemen~ s. These
included the Kibbutz iJieuchad , Ichud Hakvutzo t ve Hakibbutzirn,
the Kibbutz Arzi of Hashomer Hatzair, as well as those affiliated with the Agudath Yisrael (reli gi ous), µapoe l Hamis rachi and the Oved Zioni.

Of special interest in this report is the settlement of a particular gr oup from Germany in ~alest ine. The
·r1erkleute was founde d in 1932 when the KaCTeraden, Deutschjt1di scher ~3nderbund
* Based

011

s1i.

*

sp lit into three se parate organizations.

conve-rsation wit h previously cited informant .

** The Kaneraden, Dettsch~tictischer J~nder~urd was a Jevish

Youth or g-iniz:_1·c ion . .1 t ·.ms -co be a r:lovc-:rnent a ce ord ing
to the idec..ls o.f t.r:e Gere.an tTu ·---:er.:cl be·.T::1 '.--' un~. Its me;:nbers
were mostly assi~ilat~d Je~s ½ho ~ere ciroii~ht up as Ger mans and for ~h om ·re li gion played a ninor role . They
established a Jew ish youth n ovement for social reasons
(social a nti- s eoiti sm ) and not due to d ifferences of
ideolo gy . Its first group was or ganiz ed in Br es lau in
1916. For furtber details see Eliyahu La oz ( ~osba cher)
nThe ·.1, erkleute 11 Leo Bae ck Institute, Yearbook IV
( London : .cJast and ~Jest Library, 195<:J),pp. 165 - 182 .

One was the Schwarzes Ftihnlein (a right wing scout movement),
another the Freie DeutschjiM.ische Jugend (a left wing scout
movement), . and the rest founded the Werkleute. The Werkleute
believed in revolutionary socialism, but refused to join tl1e
com • unist party. They favo~ed·religion in the movement, but·
stressed its ethical humanitarian side while opposing orthodoxy. They saw the~selves as pirt of the Jewish nation but
did not join the Zi oni st move ment 1
The events of 1933 TTere a turning point for the
movement. They became Zior:ists, decided to settle in
join the kibbutz r::1oveinent

1✓a1estine,

and fowK1 their ornJ. kibbutz,. ~:hey

couid not identify totally with any of the existing movenents,

and so decided to establish~ 0crkl~ut e Kibbutzo In the sum~er
of 1933 the members ~ent on h~chshnr a and in the full of the
... ame year some I!ler;ibers ws1e sent to Io.lcstine. T:trnre they
traj_ned in two kiboutzim, _ one belonging to

the

Kibbutz ;\Tz:i.

movement, and the other to the Ki b~mt~ H8.'.'}eucY.ad

c

By April .

1934, each group had gr own to 20 menbers , and at this point
':)

Kibbutz Hazorea wos founded~ For thr ee years these pioneers
lived in

-liadera. u nt il in 1936 they sett'ied in the Jes ruel

Valley. This small group soon grew as the rest of the ~erk leute members left Germany after its establishment. In later
years they were joined by non-Germans, including tvJO Esroupsi
7.

one from Bulgaria - and one . from Tripolitania~. For years the
1 Eliya}1u I·1~aoz "The Werkleutc" Leo 13aeck Yearbook IV

London: 3ast and West Library l~::;:)), p. 1'/5.
2 Ibid .. , p. 173.
3 Turnowsky-Pinner, ££· cit., p. 125.

members could not decide which kibbutz movement to join.
The choice narrowed-down to one between Kibbutz Hameuchad
and Kibbutz Arzi 1 • In 1939 they finally opted for the latter.
Eliyahu Maoz (Wozbacher), a member of the Werkleute , explained the reasons for this choice. According to him the ~erkleute and Hashomer Hatznir had much in common. Both -originated in the youth movement. "The typical mer.ciber of its
kibbutzim was sinilar to the \"Jerkleute ,r. Th_e member s of the

Werkleuie were also attracted by the _ideological basis of
H3.shomer Hatzair v1here an adherence to com1r1on ideology on
matters pertaining to economics, politics~ educ~tion and
')

culture were required~. ~argarste Turno~sky-Pinner added

two oth er reasons~ no.ne ly: i~Phe kib butz's proxir:ii ty to L:i~_;h-

inclination to1."rards the s11all-kiboutz concept with a more
7,

rigid selection process for ne\': r.1embers?.

Another kiboutz with a si~nificant group of settlers from Germany was Gi va t ~ren~er. As early as 1928 a small
group of pioneers fro~ Lithuanius Italy, and Germany under
the leadership of ~nzo Sereni settled on the land. But the
kibbutz \Vas still in its begim:ings at the start of the

l Ibid ~ , p. 126.
2 Maoz, 2.E· cit., p. 181.

3 Turnowsky-Pinner, £12.• cit., p. 126.

mass exodus from Germany, so that in 1934 a reporter could
describe them as still living in tents. He ·recounts his
visit to _one tent belone;ing to the daughter of an acquaintance of his from Northern Germany. Upon entering the tent
he discovered a clean and neatly furnished area that had

even a touch of elegance to it, including a small tahle that
was also a vanity, a cabinet, and vases with flowers~.
In that same year the pop~lation of Givat Brenner
numbered 285 adults and 50 childr eno More than.half of the
adults and 60 per cent of the cl1ildren uere from Germany 2 •
FracticalJ.y all tbe settlers at Givat Brenner \Vere young
and belonged to Zion~ st youth ~ovcments. Those wh o came
frora Germei.ny belon 0 ed to the Jur:rt;-- Judisc hcir· ~
.!arnlerbund,
1

Brith lfaoli~1, H~c~1alutz ~ and Ii2.bo:ri-i. ri1 0 GivJt Brenner joined
the Kibbutz ~euchad raovoment. It grew into one of the lar-

gest kibbutzim in the country, a growth which necessitated the introduction of industry, as the land at its
dispo~;al was to limited" In 1942 Central Eur opean irm:.1 igr a nts
were still the ::u.aj ori ty, accounti.ng for 236 (alr'lost all from

Germany) out of a total of 527 members~ 3y 1958, only 200
out of its 800 members we~e of that aliyah, but being the

veterans iri the kibbutz, their influence ~as still great '+ •

1 Kupferberg, .2}2• cit., .P • 85 .
. 2 Ibid., p. 83.
3 Turnowsky-Pinner, .££• cit _., p. 120.
4 Ibid. , p. 121.

In 1952 a group of approximately 100 members of Givat
Brenner, the vast majority of them from Germany, left the
kibbutz to join a new collective settlement, Netzer Sereni,
The latter belonged to the Ichud Hakvutzot ve Hakibbutzim.
According to Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner this change was
due both to ideological reasons and to the ·ract that these
members wanted to have their children sleep in the same
home with them l* •
Other German Jewish imraigrunts worked on the land
as day laborers, mostly on citrus plantations. Their jobs
were temporary in nature and the pay was low.

1 Ibid., p. 128.
2 The practice in most kibbutzim was to have the children
and parents live separately.

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE GERM.All JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

· The figures in table V reveal a marked
contrast between the age distributi~n of the Jewish
population of Germany and that of the German Jewish
immigrants to Palestine.
Table v1
Je ish Imnigration into Palestine from Germany
During 1933-1938 According to Age Groups and
Population in Germany in 1933 According to Age Groups*

Age

Total

Percentage of
Total German
Je 7ish Immigration

Percentage
of Total
Jewish
Popule.tion
in German:y

10
21.4

2?.l

16.1
16 3
100.0

100.0

Travelers
·uthorized
t o s ett le
in Pa lest ine 3,228
Estimate of
immigrants
. entering
through other
places
1 ~800
Grand total 45,089

1 Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine , Central Bureau for t he Settleme nt of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerus~lem, Docu~ent S7/787, p. 9.
• Figures on Jews in Germany based on: Statistik des
~eutschen Reiches~ vol. CCCCLV Volkztlhlung
££· cit~, p. 17.
•

Most striking are the differences for the
age groups 21-30 and 61 and over. The former category
represented only 14.2 per cent of the Jewish population
in Germany, while among the immigrants its share was
almost twice as large. For the age group 61 and over
the contrast was even greater. This c~tegory accounted
for 16.3 per cent of the Jewish population in Germany,
almost three times the ratio among the immigrants, where
it represented only 5.6 per cent.
Even more revealing is a comparison of the
age groups 1-30 and 51 and over. The former represented
only 35.7 per cent of the German Jewish population as
a whol~ but

58.5 per cent of the immigrants. For the

older group the contrast is even more striking. Those
~- years or older accounted for 31.6 per cent of the
Jewish -population of Germany, in contrast to only 13.4
per cent of the immigrants.
These contrasts show that there was a
greater tendency for the young to immigrate to Palestine,
over half the German immigrants being of that category.
As for the older group, the tendency was
quite the opposite. Although representing a percentage
figure close to that of the younger group, in regard to
the Jewish population in Gel'many, it accounted for iess
than 15 per cent of the German immigrants.
This discrep:l·ncy can be explained by a
combination of factors. First, those of the young age
groups are more likely to up~oot themselves a.Ld start

anew, the reverse applying to the older age groups.
Also the policy of the British government and the
Jewish Agency favored the young who were viewed as
an economic asset by the former, and a national asset
by the latter.
The older groups in numerous cases depended
on pensions and their properties for income, a factor
which made them less likely to emigrate. These people
were affected in a less immediate way tha.n were other

Jews by the National Socialist persecution.
The age distribution of the immigrants
further reduced the percentage of young Jews among
those who remained in Germany, while increasing the
share of the older group. It must be noted that
already before the ascendance of Hitler the Jews of
Germany had a relatively larger population of old
people, due to a declining birth rate, than other
Jewish communities. Between the June, 1933, census
in Germany and December 1937 there was an excess· of
death over birth, within the Jew±sh population in
Germany, of no less than 25,000. 1

l Council for German Jewry, Annual Report for the
Year 1937, The Central Zi~nist ArchiveR, JerusalP.m,
Document S7/516.

SEX AND MARITAL STATUS

The figures in table VI show that more
males than females immigrated from German~ and that
there .were 62 per cent more bachelors than spinsters.
This majority of males is attributable to the Chalutz
movement, where the men greatly outnumbered the women.

Table vr 1
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany During
1933-1938, Sex and Family Status
Total

Male
&chelors
Married
Children under 17
Total

20,17

Female
Spinsters
Married
Children under 17
Total

4,044
10,740
4,176
18,960

Unspecified

6,624
9,424
4,~69

Percentaete
16.5
23.3
lL.. 9

51.9

10.1
26.8
10.5

47.4

284

Travelers authorised to
settle in Palestine
3,228
Estimate of immigrants
entering through other
places
1,800
Grand total
45,089

1 Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for
~alestine, Cen cral Bureaa for the Sett:ement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S7/787, p. 7.

According to the figures in table VII
the bachelors and spinsters in the German Jewish
immigration were overrepresented when viewed in terms
of · the total immigration of that category from all
countries. The Ge~man Jews were underrepresented in
terms of the number of married people, and accounted
for their exact share in the total immigration from

Table VII 1
Proportion of Immigration from Germany to Palestine
to the Total Jewish Immigration from all Countries
in Terms of Family Status
Family Status

Percentage Relation
of German Jewish
Immigration to Total
in Each Category

Percentage
Distribution of
German Jewish
Immigration

Bachelors and
Spinsters

28

26.6

Married

22

50.3

Children

24

22.4

Unspecified
Total

24

100.0%

0.7

all countries, in their number of children. This does

not mean that the German Jewish immigrants had the ·same

1 Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for

Palestine, Central Bureau for the Settlement of
German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, Document S7/787 p. 10.

fertility rate as other immigrants, but rather the
contrary, since we know that many children came without
parents.
The German Jews maintained a low fertility
rate in Israel. The 118 people asked in my questionnaire
had a sum total of 199 children. Since 19 were bachelors
or spinsters that means that ~17* persons produced only
119 offsprings; a figure insufficient to replace their

own number.

OCCUPATIONAL READJUSTMENT

The problem of training the youth and
preparing them for hard physical work and endurance,
was a relatively easy one to solve. This group was
absorbed into the working class of Palestine without
great difficulty. This was not the case with people
approaching 40. In terms of occupational readjustment,
immigrants of the middle class and of middle age
presented a grave problem. This group included numerous
people who derived their incomes in the more developed
German economy

as middlemen. These newcomers found

themselves in a very serious, and even tragic, situation.

• Figure derived at th~3: Number married
99x2=198+19 bachelors and spinsters= 217

A letter sent by Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth*
to Dr. Ruppin** is very instructive. It concerns the
following report from the Jewish Telegraphic Association:

"The Jewish press here reports an
epidemic of suicides among the
German immigrants in Haifa and
Tel-Aviv. Almost every day a case
of suicide among the German
immigrants is announced in the
press. Most of the suicides concern
people of the age of 40"

Dr. Rosenbleuth does not doubt the validity
of the report. His concern is with the effect it may
have on his negotiations with the Council for GermG.n
Jewry. He states that there are enough members there

who are waiting for the chance to prove that the
•Zionists exaggerate the importance of Palestine as a
solution to the problems of German Jewry.l

• Martin Rosenbleuth managed the London department
of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine.
•• Dr. Ruppin was director of the Jerusalem department
of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine.
1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The
Oentral Zionist Archives, Lettrer dated March 1937,
Document S7/386.

!he policy was to suppress such reports

1

•

Large numbers of professional people, particular-

ly lawyers and physicians, were forced to change their occupations. The law examinations requiring Hebrew and English preaented a great problem for German lawyers. Even
upon success·f ul completion of the examination there was little chance of establishing a practice. As for physicians, their
profession was overfilled.
The problem of retraining was a ·. particularly dif-

ficult one in the towns. Here there was a shortage of the
needed institutions and many had no means by which to maintain their families during the requisit training period 2 •

The .ta.c t that the vast majority of German Jewish
immigrants came from large urban centers compounded their
adjustment difficulties in Palestine. Here even the largest
cities did ~ot provide the opportunities that were available
to them in pre-Hitler Germany. On the other hand, between

1933 and 1938 they were able to bring a part of their capital with them, making their situation somewhat more tolerable.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS
Occupional readjustment means not only a lowering of the standard of living, but also a social setback,
particularly i~ the eyes of refugees. This applied especially to the German Jewish refugees, where social position
and tit:es played such an important role.
1 Ibid.
2 Central Bureau for the Settlement of German J·ews in Pale- -·-'---stine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document

S7/109.

The possibility of occupational readjustment
for national ideological reasons, and the fact that
one's colleagues were of the same social position, helped

ease the torment. Still, mentally these immigrants found
it difficult to accept their new realities. This is
pointedly revealed in a report- to the ·central Bureau
for the Settlement of German Jews in Falestine. 1 This
r port conveys the idea that the German Jews have not
learned from their experience. Almost the majority of
these immigrant families are still of the opi~1ion that
the pursuit of an academic career is still a worthwhile
goal and aie continuing to send their children to the
academies of higher learning, in numbers far greater
'

than Palestine can absorb. By 1940 German-Jewish
students accounted for approximately one third of the
total enrollment at the Hebrew University. 2

1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The
Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S7/100.
2 Tartakower, .2.:2• cit., p. 74.
·

The number of German Jews who settled in
Palestine before 1933 was insignificant; the overwhelming majority

came

. from Eastern Europe, mainly

Russia and Poland. The newcomers

from Germany had no

r~latives of fellow countrymen to help them through the
transitional stages. Thus the sudden influx of a large
number of immigrants with a p~rticular culture of their
own, the majority of whom were very far from Jewish
tradition, culture, and thought of Palestine, created
a serious readjustment problem. To start with they had
to overcome the language problem. In the majority of
cases the German Jews had no functional knowledge of
Hebrew. In my questionnaire, of 118 who answered the
question: nwhat languages did you speak upon arrival
in Palestine" only 40 included Hebrew among the
languages and of these 35 answered "some Hebrew" leaving
only five who presumably were fluent in the language.
This liguistic shortcomming acted as both
an economic and social barrier. The Jewish community
in Palestine concerned with the Hebraization of the
country, resented the fact that these immigrants
continued to speak and read in German. Also certain
positions required a knowledge of Hebrew.
The mentality of the German Jews created
difficulties for them. They were accustomed to an
exaggerated sense of exactitude, order, and discipline,
completely different from that of the rest of
Palestinian Jewry. This was interpreted as a lack of

m ntal flexibility on their part.• Their lack of
Jewish education also stood against them. For their
part the German Jews often considered the East European
Jews to be lacking in culture.

This attitude at times went to extremes.
A letter written by Jewish dentist from Germany to a
colleague abroad was . replete with ant·i-Semitic remarks
against the Jews of the Yishuv in general and the Polish
Jews in particular. He expressed a Nazi-like philosophy
which included the quoting of Goebbels. 1
Somehow this letter fell into the hands of
the Hitachduth Olej Germania office in Haifa, resulting
in a dispatch to that organization's office in Tel-Aviv,
giving it full authority to induce the man to leave
Palestine. This communiqu~ also expressed concern that
such a person might put the German-Jewish immigrants in
a bad light. 2

• "Jecke", a term used for the German Jewish immigrant,
is derived from the German word for jacket "Jacke",
which many of them wore. This contrasted sharply with
pioneer attire of most of the rest of the population.
But this term was also interpreted to stand for "Yehudi
Kashe Havana" meaning a Jew hard of understanding.
1 Hitachduth Olej Germania, The Central Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, letter dated March 20, 1934, Document S7/80.
2 Hitachduth Olej Germania, The Central Zionist !.='chives,
~erusalem, letter dated ~uly 30, 1934, Document 57/80.

A letter written in

1933 by a Dr.

Bodenheimer to Dr. Landauer• reveals some of the
feelings expressed against the German settlers in
Haifa.

"In Haifa there is a great animosity

against the German Jewish immigrants.
The argument is this: The Germans
are spoiling the prices, they are at
fault that everything is becoming more
expensive. They live too luxuriously.
Why shouldn't they live in tents as
we had done before them? Why can't
they walk instead of pay for a car?"L

He then adds that all the bad will shown
by German Jewry to Eastern European Jewry is now
being returned.

•Dr.George Landauer managed the Jerusalem department
of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German
Jews in Palestine.
l The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Centrel Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The
Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document s71.

Many of the German Jews were accustomed to look
don on the ~ws of Eastern Europe. They were ashamed of
their East European brothers and often tried to pass for
Germans

A large portion of them, having had no zionist

background or Jewish education , seemed more German than
Jewish . This resentment, affecting many secbions of the
Yisbuv, was corn.pounded by the fact that many Palestinian
Jews at that timc·identified everything German with Hitler~
This include-i the German language. Conflicts erupted c.,.nd acts
of terror were perpetrated aBainst German language meetincs
and ne 1.rnpapers. .So:ne kr:io'.7n \'.1rj_ters came to the defence of

the German J·ews
. anti-Semi tism

1
'

Asher Beil in called it a brand of
a 6 aj_nst

u Ji_,r.1ish

im:..Jisrants from Gerri1P.DY. Agnon arid

Shazar took similar positions 1 •

A

reporter who intervi e~od

Bialik at his home received the follo~ing response to the
question

11

Ho11 do you l i~--ce the German Jews ·who are preser:.tly

(1934-) comin 5 to Israel?": ''Well, r,e have no other J ews !

God gave us these; we must take them a s they D.re ri 2 •
berg makes it cle ar that Bialik was not spe aking of the e conomic difficulties involved in inte grating the German if iyah ::he n talking with such a reserved and ironic-cri tic o. l
1

~ashion, but was rather more concerned with intellectual

and cultural problems. In Bialik's view these immigrants
1 Curt D. Worr.iann,

'German Jevis in Israel: Their Cultural
Situation.since 1933 '' Leo .3aeck Ye a rbook A'V (London: East
and West Liorary 1070) P~ 83.
2 Ku~ferberg, .2.:2· cit., p. 60.
1

came with exaggei a ted expectations in matters of civility.
They left a country which had reached the highest level of
technology and were used to comfo~t and pampering in their
daily lives. This they now missed in Palestine. Bialik
pointed out that they were now in a land of pioneers and
that such expectations were unrealistic in a developing
country, while the- German Jews continued to overrate these
niceties.

filalik saw an even more serious problem . He

thought that the practices and mannerisms of the Germa n Jews
were of such i mp ort ance t o them that they could hardly
change ; that the German culture was so deeply ingrained in
them that even simple farmers and workers were totally inundated with them. These Jews were ' convinced that their German
cult~re hid reached a zenith and were consequently clo sed to
naw ideas. Bialik believed that German Jewry's move from the
ghetto into the German culture had resulted in-a tragic confusion so that the most talented German Jews had tragic
lives*. Here, ~e believed, lay the problem which hs feared they could not overco me, namely, their strong admiration for the Germa n cultu~e, while at the same ti me being
Jews. The problem, as Bialik perceived it, was whether·
the se German Jews would be able to assimilate into the
Jewsih culture and id2ntify the~selves with Is~ael 1 •
The following excerpt from a conversation between newly arrived German ~mo igrants and a veteran settler,
as captured by a reporter, is indiccttive of some of the
* He cited Heinrich Heine and Jacob ~assermann in this con-

nection.
1 Ibid., pp. 60-62.

formers' characteristics and the latter's attitude:

u .... She

was grieved by the ·plight of the Germµns and, of course,
when God punished, one ougnt to remain silent, but then -

wasn't it - after all, a just nemesis? If they had been
so willing to give everything for the privilege of assimilationc••·· Tell me, she laughe d into the room, and do
you think like the . other Germans? Do you expect to find a
Berlin in Jerusalem?

They looked at her blankly. Please

say again. I do not understand

Most Germans think that

Jerusalem is not good enough becciuse it is not like Berlin ..
They want this to be a little Germany 111
The Germa~ Je~s with their peculiarities at
ti wes became object of humor. ~he Llatateh

t~eater group

portrayed a German pioneer in one scene as standing in the
2
mj_cldle of the workshop brushing his knickerbockers •
A humerous anecdote poignantly points out the

German immigrant's irnbili ty or unwillini.;ness tc integrate
and assinilate into the Yishuve The story went that when
the question of partition arose the ma.Yor of Haharia, which
was settled by German Jews, ca me out with the declaration:
"I don't know whether Iiiaharia will become part of the Je-wish

or the Arab sector, but I know that Naharia will remain
German.''
1 Anne Bradley, "Ne·w Home, Gerr.ian Jews Enter Palestine 11
Menor~h Journal (New York: The Llenorah Association Inc.,
April 1Y34), ~· 14.
2 Kupferberg, £12· cit., p. 21.

. SOCIAL AL D CUI/el ~.AL Jt.1FAC11' OF •I•HE
GEm;~.\N JK.?ISH IM1HGRATION ON · THE YISHUV

The steamers bringing German immigr~nts to Palestine sailed the Mediterranean on their way to Haifa or

Jaffa where their passengers disembarked. hlany of these
newcome rs from GermEny were at~racted to Tel Aviv * e A re-

porter's impression of Tel-Aviv in 1933, after the first
wave of German immigrants bad arrived, provides a vivid
.

.

picture of the newly transformed city6 Shops were suddenly

displayi ng strings of red sausages of vari ous sizes and
I

shap8s., Schnj_t?,_el became a vc~ry popular dish. In the cafes

and resto..ura11ts

11

one is a.h. 2..yr.:i conscious of the solidarity
1

w1~ich goe[~ hend in hand vi th tweed caps and shorn hends;
anr1 of the cubsta:2tiali ty whi e:.h dj_sti su ishes the German

Frau fro=n 11er Dore frilly s ister.

11

I.~e rchai1ts started stock-.

ing their shelves with a variety of German bo oks ~ One
co 1lcl no longer ;\alk down tbe streets i:.ri thout running in-.

to new Gcr~an arrivals. Jaff a harbor vas filled with l arge
packing crates in \'1hich these imLJ ic;rants brou g}1t their belong ings, including furniture. In 1934 another reporter 1
described_ the cof.f.'ee shops ond restaurants est ab lished in ·

the .city by these im cr1 igrants ** as havir...g become the mee* See chapter II.
11
1 Dorothy Eor.n,
'=1he Gerr:i an s c or.ie to Tel-Aviv 11 , 'J:he l'-~ e-.·1
Palesti~e
Nuve~ber 14, 1933, p. 3.
**~n0y were reproach ed for having opened to Dany such shops.
2 Gottgetreu, £1?.• cit., p. 60.

ting places for th~se newcombrs. Since many had not yet
established themselves they frequented coffee shops to a
mucb gr·ea ter_ extent than the rest of the Yi.shuv. Thus, if
one went about the streets of Tel-Aviv during the spring
of 1934, he would get the impression that half the city's
population consisted of German Jews 1 • The impression that
Tel-Aviv was being swamped by Germans vms compounded by
the fact that the transplantation of things German went
co far as to i:r-:i0lu.de Berlin street names" A certain Tel-

Aviv traffic center was dubbed Fotsda2er Platz, another
Alexander FlHt~, and tho Bilu Street area ~teglitz 2 ~ Incide1)ts 'Nel e r·ecounted of people boarding buses and referz

ri ng to such areas by their nev.>ly given naL1es:>.

In Haifa the German influence ~as as apparent as
in Tel--Avi.v, A ctriking feE.:.ture of Jev,i h Haifa were doc~

tors and lE.t1.-.:yers from Gcr;1a.ny \Yhose shields, according to
a reporter, one could see practically on every street

corner 4 ......T n 4--h•
v is city, as in some of the others, German Jewish wo~l8n set up nu:ne rous kir..der8ard0ns, often in partnership with veteran residents who knew Hebrew. Numerous Ger-

1 Kupferberg , .£12 • cit • , p • Lt-8 •
2 Go~t getreu , .2..£· cit., p. 58.
3 Kupferberg,££· cit., p. 57.
4 Ibid. , p. 18.

man yougsters went to the Reali School Tihich operated
1
along German pedag~gic principles •
The enormous crates, known as "lifts", were as
numerous ip Haifa as in Jaffa. These were often left in
the streets for weeks or even months , while their owners
2

searched for living quarters •
The story of Jerusalem was similar to that of
Tel-Aviv and Haifa. Eighteen months after ·the fir.st large
v.iave of ·German Jewish immigration to Palestine, parts of·
Jerusalem were transformed. A reporter's account of the
changes in Jaffa Street are instructive. He described new
shop windows of a type not seen before in the city and
added the difference was not only in the wares but also
in th8 strj_kinc:,ly modern display. He was intrigued to find

an area with things only for men, and a perfumery section
with everything for women.
Physiciaps and dentists who had come to the city
also left their mark, as the reporter claimed "Going to a
dentist (they say) is today a pleasure; yesterday a torture". A radiologist from Germany \vho car,ie with a supply
of radium vvas treating patients in Jerusalemo Previously
such treatment required a trip to Europe.
This city was also inundated with German books
and magazines, and sausage shops 3 ~ The latter were often

1 Ibid. , p. 22.
2 Ibid., p. 24.
3 .David ~. Goitein, "The German Invasion" The Pew Palestine
May

15, 1934 p. 6.

3
started by persons who -were unable to continue in their
former professions, as is illustrated in the following

c ase of a doctor Berger . He was a famous childien's doctor in Berlin who, after being dismissed fro m his clinic,
left Germany and settled in J erusa le m. He was to be found
by . a reporter~ as she describ L~d it:

11

Ju s t off J a ffa Road ,

in Ben _Yehud a Street, I walked into a tiny shop - a mere

cubby-hol e

'I'b.ere , surr ounded by bis

11

all kinds . of salads

and ::::aus ages_" was Dr'" Berger labouriou.sly slicin8 Wm· st an d
apologizing to his customers for the unevenness of his sli ce s 111.
The n~w arrivals from Germaby, as long as they

could, brought with

th2r.u

everything, in the words of L1au-

rice fhurme 1 , "from the soft, sleep ind uc L.Jg pa.rlo:r.· roe kers
to the last :'t)olishi-n g ragii 2e '~Chis ·was quite unlike other
im mie;rants v.'ho cacrn to Palestine with few possess:Lons. r:i.1he
country was not really ready for the type of luxury and

co mf ort .that these im~iBrants a tt empted to i mport. This
luxury ~as also- apparent from the f ashiona ble clo thes
worn by their women, prompting one to comment in this connection that

11

the 8-ermans • bring I;aris and Berlin to Jeru·-

,
.
•
b l e nov+
sa 1 em an d _i_ai
1- . f' a·.' 2 • rn
.Lncs
e im~ngra11:cs
v1ere recogniza.
J

•

only .fro ~ the ~ay they dressed or spoke, but also from their

1 Bradley, 2.£• cit~, p. -.2 "Maurice S-:t::iuel Tells
Palestine" Pal estine
3 Goitein, £12· cit., p.

l?e
Viv.id Story of German Jews .in
News February 28, 1934 . ·p. 1.
6.

numerou s habits, .likes and dislikes they .had brought with
t hem f rom Germany. This went s o far as t o include t hei r
fac ia l .f eat ures which , at times , seemed to portray a c ul tiva t ed l a c k of expression t ypi c a l t o the lawyers a nd physici ans f rom some of the larger German c ities 1 •
ihe German Jewish immigrants introduced a new

l ifest yle t9 Palestine, especially in the citie s . Th ey
e stabl i sheo Western European style hotels and vacati on
resorts, r~staurants and coffee shopso Thei

stores 1e_e

more specialized and enhanced by the use of decorated

displaycascs4'
~ 100

Jews buj_lt their homes in .ccordance

with their accustomed tastes, but with regard to the
different climatic conditions and their more limited
· financial means

In this task they had the assistance

of architects Tiho also came from GermanyQ Their housegardens , whtch may still be seen on Mount Carme l in
Hai fa ~ attest t 6 t heir a ttempt at maintaining th is a spe c t
of the i r for mer li fest yle.
The i nt erior of thei r. homes r e se mbled their

former dwellings even more closely, the i r fu r niture,
librairJes, and other ·belon gings · having been brought
.

.

to Palestine with · them. In social services they _helped
upgrade the level of w~lfare work. Perhaps t he great
diversity of new industries introduced by these immigrants
represented their most important contribubution.
This group differed greatly fro m the pioneers

1 Kupferberg,££•

ill•,

p. 21.

who preceded it., with the other immigrants from
Central Europe eliminated the pioneer lifestyle

fro

th

major cities.
' h

antj-Jewish measures of th

National

Soc ialist regime were initially directed against
scientists, academicians, and artists. A though many
r ·o und refuge iri other countrie_f:J, a large number c ame:\

to Palestine. The numerous p ysicians among these
1

imm·grants helped make Palestine a first rate medical
center.*
s for the arts, here they left their
grea , t mark in the field of music. The Palestine
ore estra, j_nspired by Bron· slaw Huberman ') consisted

at its inc ption in 1936, almost ent·rely of immigrants
from Germany

It was of such high calibre that Arturo

Toscanini consented to conduct its opening concert.
The sector of the public attending these . conc erts and
helping sustain the orchestra had a high ratio of
German Jewish immigrants in it.
A considerable number

o! painters and

sculptors also came to Palestine in this immigratiano
Due to the laguage barrier the role of the German
speaking immigrants in the theater was more limitted,
but not inconsiderable. In sports they also made ·their
contribution, espec~ally in gymnastics and aquatics-

•Fora detailed list of such ·personalities see Tartakower, £12• c•it., p.

74.

ID ONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE YISHUV
The contribution of the German.Jewish immigration
t o the ec onomic development of the Yishuv could not be measured

only: in terms of the capital brought into the country by
them . The way this capital was invested is als o of c onsiderable importance. While the middle class immigrants
of the fourth Alijah invested 80 per cent of their capital i

real estate (landpurchaseB, housing construction,

and citrus groves), and only 5 per cent each foL industry

and commerce,

this was

ot the case with the immigrants

from Germany. These invested, according to a study by the
J

ish Age cy for the years 1933-1934, 26 per cent in

.

industry and handicraft, and

17 per cent in commerce.

Although investment in housing was a major factor for all
immigrants, it played a · relatively less imortant role for
those wh o came from Germanyc 1 The' German Jewish immigrants
helped raise the standards of industrial production. through

the ir fami li ari ty

ith modern western European techniques .

l F e ilchenf e ld, I.ric ha elis~ Pinne r, 2.£· cit., p . 98.

. :3
POST SCRIPT
The German Jewish im~igrants who came to. Palestine
in the

1930s brought with them a very large number of people

well educated in a large variety of fields. Palestine was
then unable to utilize them all, and many were resentful
that they could not play the role which they felt their
training and ability entitled them to.

Vith the_ growth of

modern Israel more found opportunities to engage in their
professions and beca~e im p ortant factors in the development
of the State. This has earned them increased recog~ition,
·...vhile at the same time they have learned to appreciate the
contributions of other groups in the Iishuv.They have been,
and are 7 leavinf their mark in Israel's institutes of bi s her
learning and research. Some have be~n appointed to hi g h g overnment a l posts, playing a p a rticul a rly important role
in the Israeli Depar~ment of Jubtice. Pinchas · Rosen ·(Felix
Rosenblfith).ser~ed as minister of justice while the membership of the supreme court includes or included former Chief
Justice Benja:::. in Halevi, Chaim Cohen, and Iloshe Landau.
Israel's first two State Dornptrollers,Siegfried wases and
Brnst l\ebenzahl were both German_irnDip;rants. Herbert :Foer1
der v1as a filember of the Knesset,_ and later Chairman of the
Bank Leumi. German Jews held or hold ministerial posts in
the Cabinet, bern?tein llinistcr of Commerce, Joseph Burg
Ilinister of ~elfare and later Llinister of the Interior,
Josephthal Housing
Agriculture.

Minister, and Naphtali Llinister of

.Members of this Aliyah also played a maj or role in
the f6rmation of historical and otner·archives in Isr ael 1 .
This app.lies _especially to the Central Zionist Archives
in Jerusalem wh ose first Director was Georg Berlitz, sueceded by Alexander Bein, and . in turn fol lowed by Mi.cha.el
Hayman . Some German J ews have attained great wealt h in the
busine ss world, particularly Xavi8r and Samu el Federman
who own the Dnn Hoteis in ~el-Aviv, Ceasarea and· on Mount
Uarmel in Haifa, the King David

Hotel in Jerusalem and

the Accad:i.a in Herzliah. On the other h a nd Ger11an Jews did
not penetrate the top l~ad 0rship circles of Isrtlel.
Germa n Jewioh ~riters whose me dium of expression

was the Grirman language foupd it most difficult to adjust
to Palestine

~or many ye a rs their l a n guag e of expression

was despis d and the big ~er publi hers in the country were
not prepared to publish works in German 2 .The lack of res0

ponse and their inability to live with their new situution
wer2 often tragic episodes in tho lives of _such men and
women* On the other hand there were those who succeeded in
surmou~ting gr eat difficulties and were even able to con-

tinue their creative work in both German and Hebrew, as
was the poet Lud wig Strauss. ~artin Buber, who knew Hebrew
well already before he settled · in Palestine, found opp ortunity to express himself in his new home. Others strugg-.
11
1 Curt D. Wormann,
Gerincm Jews in Israel: Their Cultural
Si tuatio.i1 since 1933 n Leo Bacck Institute Ye a rbook xv·
(London; ~as t and \'lest Library, 19'?0), P. BG.

2 Ibid • , p • 88 •

led with the Hebrew langua ge but continued their work in
German, as was the case with Max Brod. A sad story was that
of Arnold Zweig who, unable to adjust to his new homeland,
left in 1948 to settle in East Berlin*.
Up to October 1938, when it ceased publication,
the Jfldische Iiundschau was imported to Pale~tine. Thereafter
an attempt was made to distribute the Jildische Weltrundschau
which was published for a short time only in 1939 under the
editorship of Robert Weltsch and Gunter Krojonker. It failed
according to Curt Wassermann due to

11

unofficial but widely

backed opposition to German language publicntions ·11 ,1. 'l'wo
German language daylies Yedioth Hayom and Yedioth Chadashot
were able to maintain themselves, the latter and larger of
the two still appearing today. The

Hi tachduth Q}-_~ j Germania,

starting in 1935, published books in German on a variety of
subjects

•

•Fora more detailed account of various German Jewish
writers who settled." in Palestine see Wormann, 9.12.
cit., pp. 73-103.
· ·· ·
1 T5id., p 80.
**Fora listing of such books see Wormann, op.~-, p. 80.

In

1945,

largely at the initiative of prominent Ger-

man Jews in Israel the Council of Jews from Germany was formed as a roof organization of Jews from Central Europe inand outside of Israel. In

1955

it set up the Leo Baeck In-

stitute whose Jerusalem Center continues the Cultural work
of the Irgun Olej Merkas Europa *

* This organization succeeded both the Hitachduth Olej Germania and the . Hitachduth Olej Germania ve Austria.

ALIYAH CHADASHA
In 1942 the Alivah Chadasha * . was founded as an outgrowth of the Hitachduth Olej Germania we Olej Austria. It
encompassed a substantial proportion of the Germari Aliyah,
and a majority of its leadership consisted of Zionists
from Germany. These fac~ors prompted criticism and led to

the accusation that it was an association of people of a
particular regional background ( Landsmannschaft) .who
were mobilized into a political movement ·and party . It did
in fact adopt a political program. Georg Landauer replied

to such criticism in a 1944 political pamphlet of the
Aliyah Chadasha.· Here he pointed out that other Zioni st
parties were oriGinally also.based on groupings with common
·re~ion~ backgrounds .. He also drew attention t o the fact
that ~embers of the Hitac hduth Ol ~j Ge r ma ni a we Olej Alistria
who disappr~ved of its program did not join it, ·while Zionists of other backgrounds ;ho favored its political st and
evinced their support of the new group 1 •
The Aliya Chadasha presented itself as a political
group or movement, but not as a_party in the traditionai

* Felix Rosenbllith (Pinchas Rosen) was the he~d of the

Aliya Chadasha
11
Aliyah Chadasha 11 , Eine Neue Poli tische
Formation, Tel - Aviv: Bitaon Ltd., 1944,pp. 1-2.

1 Georg Landauer,

Zionist sense. While the former included members of various
economic, social, and cultural background, as well as religious views, the latter were divided between middle class,
labour,and religious parties. The Aliyah Chadasha strove
for a progressive, liberal society, the issues of Zionist
policy and reform of the Yishuv. The questions of education
and cul ture occupied a prominent position in its program.
JI:

It oppos ed the 1942 Biltmore Program oas being too uncompromising and incompatible with the reality of Jewish economic
and political existence in Palestine and in the world.Furthermore, the program was seen as isolationist and as an impediment to the promotion of cooperation and understanding. It
was argued that it was based on an overestimation of the
security and freedom that the establishment of a state would
provide. Such a state, according to the Aliyah Chadasha)
would guara.ntee neither military and political security, nor
economic development. Self-reliance v1as negated in favor of
collective security, for 1,,vhich the powers ruling Palestine

* The Bilt::ior Pro;ram was the product of an .Extraordinary
Zionist Conference held at the Hotel _Biltoor in New York,
and attended by ··1eizmann, Ben-Gurion, and other leading
Zionists. It ur~ed that the gates of Palestine be op ened,
th~t the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of
i mmigration ir:to Palestine and with +-he necessary authority
for upbuilding the country, that Palestine be established
as a Jevlish Commonweal th.

would be responsible. Under this arrangement the Yishuv
was expected to receive autonomy with -both the Arab and
Jewish nations having equal rights 1 •
In 1944 the Aliyah Chadasha enunciated its position on a number of key issues. On the question

of

Pale-

stine it proposed that Brita~ continue to rule it and so
fulfill the role of a strong international power which it
deemed necessary for the maintenance of order and · security.
At the same time it insisted on the abrogation of the 1939
W11ite ·Paper, 2 'I'he only restrictions on Jewish j_mmigrati on
it would countenanc e were to be based on the economic possibilities of the country and "considerations whj_ch had to be
~ho·,m the Arab people 11

•

It did .r2ot approve any proposnl

for the proclamation of a Jewish State and made no such demands
of Brite.in or Jche Arabs 3 ~ I'he Aliyah ChC1.dasha 11 aclvocat0d

cooperation with Britain s insisting th2.t

"'Ne

cannot dev ,:)l op

any po·1er of our own alongside her, and certainly not a3ainst
her 11 • It opp osed the resolution of the Zionist General Council which declared non-coaperation with the Government 4 . The
1 Essay by Georg Landauer titled "Aliyo.h Chadasha und Grundstltzc Zionist:i.t3eh8r Folitik 11 frorJ. volume of selected. :1ritings
~y Geor~ L~ndauer, , De~ Zion~smus _i9 ~a~de~ Dreier Jah~~e~nte,
1v1ax . Kreutzoer½er ea. ·l'el ..1\.-1,,"lV : B1taon Ier.la.f; lt_j:;7, p. J.lt-2.
1

2 Landauer,

"Aliyah Chadasha '' , .2..E. cit. , pp.

3 Ibid • , p • 11 •
4 Toldo, pp. 9-11. ,

7-8.

question of World War II played a major role in its plat-

form. ·It proposed that the Zionist positiori be one of total
war requiring the unconditional mobilization of all Jewish
forces with the single aim of fighting the National Socialists.
All considerations of Zionist policy were to be subordinated
to this goa.1 1 •
The .Aliyah Chc;1dasha opposed terrorism for uit
poisons the soul and makes men blind", and also because it
would lose for Zionism the sympathies of the enlightened world 2 •
This philosophy of refiance on moral rath~r than physical force
was to be introduced into the educational system which it
sought to reform 3 •

In 1947 Landauer submitted a proposal to the
Merkas of the Aliyah Chadasha.which included the following
policy pro·isions: The immediate immigration of Jewish refugees from Europe; recognition of th e Jews' ri g~t to continued
immigration thereafter; it proclaimed the-final ~oal to be
complete indepcnde11ce, but insisted that, in order to realj_ze
this program, there was need fer a transitional period, at
which time the country should be ·under United Nations'
supervision. This was then to le~d to a federated JewishArab state 4 • The Merkas opted for a program favor ing par-

1 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
2 Ibid. p. 24 by Felix Rosenblilth.
3 Ibid. pp 16-17.
4 Essay by Georg Landauer titled 11 Abschied von der Aliyah
Chad asha - ·-·elches ist der Richtige · ·-✓ eg? from volume of ___,.selected writings by Georg Landauer, Der Zionismus im
Wandel Dreier J hrzehnte, Max Kreuzberger ed. Tel Aviv:
Bitaon Verlag 1957, pp. 262-263
11

tition • . Not having forseen Britain's new readiness to
reduce her foreign commitments, and thus her rol~ in Palestine ·as well, they were caught by surprise. The adoption
of a new program by the Aliyah Chadasha which favored partition represented a move closer to the mainstream of

Eionist policy. The movement, cast in the role of the opposition, weakened in this· role, as a major part of its leadership abandoned their former position . This started the split
within the· Aliayh Cha dasha.
· Ina September, 1948, essay Georg Landauer described the events which led to the split with in the movement. To his dismay the majority of the leadership of the
. Aliyah Ch adasha submitted at its National Conf erence a progra

of unific at ion with the bved Zioni party and with a

splinter of ~he Geneial Zionist Party. Both , according to
Land ~uer, could not compare in strength with the Aliyah
Ch adasha , arid both had fou ght against its program in the _past.
Furthermore, this program of merger was presented as a
fait acco::1Dli, depriving the conference of any power of
decision. The key leadership positions were already agreed
upon, as ~as that of the chairman. This applied also to the
representation of the new party ~n the government. -Oppos:L t- ·on
to this union, and to the fact that even a majority could no
longer reverse it and its elements, prompted Landauer and many
others of the movement to r~fuse to attend its conference
which they deemed destructive to the political character of
the Aliyah Chadasha and leading to its liquidation~.

1 Ibid. pp.

273-274

The movement's end came in 1948 with the
establishment of the state. It h a d served its purpose
to the extent that it provided an outlet through which
Central Europe a n, and particularly German Jews could
express and lend weight to their political views.
The establishment of the State was so redical a
change in events that adjustment to them would have
re quired a co mp lete transfor ma tion of the movement.
Its retention would hav e meant the preservation of
a group of i n dividual s who onc e had shared a co mm on
ide a whose t ime h as passe d.

Margarete Tu.rnowsky-Pinner estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the Central European immigrants who
settled in kibbutzim remained there 1 • As for the middle
class settlements, 25 per cent left, some due to the physical strain which was to great for them, others during
times of economic crises.Generally, those who joined the
better organized settlements usually

weathered the crises and so the dropout rate from such was low 2 • It must

be noted that some who left their settlements may simply
have joined another or opted for a different form, but did
not actually give up agriculture.
The restitution pa yments and return of properties
had a marked effect on the German Jewish settlers. It has
raised the ctandard of living of many of these immigrants
substantially but also prompted some to return to Germany.
This vas the case with one individual at Ramoth Hashavim
who took bis whole family back to Germany after his factory was restored. In another instance a judge returned with
*

his wife, but their children remained in Israel • Of the
German Jevrn who im nigrated to Palestine before World \Var
1

II nearly 10,000 have returned to German~.

1 TurnovJSky-Pinner, .2.12~ cit., p .. 97.
2 Ibid • , p • 12 .
.
• Based on conversation and interview of informant from
Kfar Malat who is familiar with Rarnoth Hashavim.
3 Henry Zoller, 11 Niemals gehc5rten wir zurn inneren Kreis"
Der Spiegel, June 4, 1973, p. 108.

+

The passage of time, the arrival of new immigrants
from other parts of the world, and the growing up of a new
generatioruhas tended to reduce old antagonisms, although
some basic differences still remained for the first generation on the social level. This is evident from numerous
old age homes run by the Hitachduth Olej Merkas Europa
where many of these immigrants opt to spend their last days
with their fellow countrymen.

CONCLUSION

National Socialist persecution was the primary cause of t h e German Jewish mi gration to Palestine
in the 193Os. But this mi gration wa s influenced by a
number of ot he r fa ctors. These were British policy concerning i mm i gration to Palestine in g eneral, and more
specifically British atti t ude towards the the German
Jewish im:ni g ration, Germa n policy an ., attitude on the
same sub j ect, the alterna te pla ces of refu g e available
to German J ewr y , the a ctivities of the German Jewish
organiz a tions, and the attitude of the Ge r maJ1 Jews the mselves.
The German oli~ who be g an arriving in Palestine
in 1933 ~ ere fleeing pers ecut ion. These immigrants came
to realize that within t h eir existing society they could
no long er atta i n their economic and social g oals, nor
could they gratify their a s p ira tions to ttsolida rity",*
i.e. to complete mutual identification with the society in which they lived. F ear of a massive physical
assault on G,rman J ewry became a major spur to this
mi gration after the -ovemoer 1938 po groms, known as
~Krist a ll n acht 11 . The se were not the feeling s of the vast
majority of Ge rma n Jews prior to the Hitler era. Th ey
were hardly prepared for the events t n at h ad overtaken t h e m in t he 193Os • . lthou gh anti-S e mitism was not

* Conc ept

of sol id a r i +y fro~ Sh~uel il . ~i sens tadt,
Th e Absor ntion of I::rQi. ~,~ant s.. h Co:::i a r i ..... i ve Stud y
Bs_sect ...... ir..ly 0_1 -c::e e ·.nsn Coxn. 'lli ty ir,. ~a~e~"'Cir:e ,
anj -r.he 2-cJ.t8 of :srwl (Lonao- : rto '.ltle-.i g e t.c. ~egan
ra ul L'; u . , l :;1 ::,;4; , p . j .

new to them, German Jewry had established itself in both
the economic and cultural life of their country. The
German Jews were on the whole a well-to-do community

I

who saw themselves as an integral part of the German
nation. Only a small percenta ge of Germany's Jews were
Zionists. Of the German Jews who migrated to Palestine
before 1933 almost all were Zionists, but even among
German Zionists these olim were an exception. Before
the Hitler era very few German Jews settled in Palestine. Leading German Zionists such as Adolph Friedemann, Franz Oppenheimer, Max Bodenheirne~ and Herman
Struck saw Zionism as not only a political movement,
but also as a philantropic enterprise. They believed
it to be their duty _to help their poorer East European brothers settle in Palestine. On the other hand
there were other men like Kurt Blumenfeld who as early as 1912 expressed the belief that every Zionist
should include within his life's program

moving to

Palestine. This still left open the question of when
these Zionists would choose to settle there. Kurt Blumenfeld did ·not do so until 1933. Thus · some German Zinists who eventually would have migrated to Palestine,
were forced by the National Socialists to do so at an
earlier date. For such man as Ruppin and Elias Auerbach who did immigrate to Palestine during the early
years of _the Yishuv, Zionism was not the only motivating factor. As was shown in this work, the former
sought a challenge in life,and the latter was inspired

by romantic notions. On the whole, the Zionists in
pre-Hitler Germany were reluctant to abandon their
comfort and security for the rigor and insecurity of
frontier life in Palestine.
The German olim who began arriving in Palestine after 1933 were in search of economic readjustment and freedom from persecution. Their migration
was characterized by the large number of families, including older, married couples and children, and contrasted sharply with the preceding aliyot of youthful pioneers. The motivation of the pre-1930s aliyot
differed radically from the German Jewish ·immigration of the Hitler era. The pre-1930 aliyot were composed of young persons who were in most cases unmarried
and, if married, without children. These were separated from their families and had actually rebelled
against the communal life of the Jews in the diaspora.
Most of these pioneers came from traditionalist families that were in the process of assimilation. They
were the beneficiairies of both traditional and se-

cular education and had the advantage of relative economic security. They were not forced to emigrate to
oversea countries due to immediate economic need or
political persecution. These immigrants sought .to
satisfy certain social and cultural aspirations through
the transformation of Jewish society in a modern and
secular community. This i~plied a complete social and
cultural severance from their former environment. In-

dividual aspirations were subordinated to the goal
of restructuring the economic and social makeup ·
of the Jewish community in Palestine. This included
a return to agriculture and to other forms of manual
labor. In the cultural field it meant among other
things the revitalization of the Hebrew language. The
pioneers of the early aliyot organized themselves into groups associated with social movements and political parties and underwent Hachsharah before going
on aliyah. It must be noted that this description by no
means applied to all the im~igrants of the early aliyot.
Those Jews for whom the motive of economic
betterment was the predominant factor migrated to areas other than Palestine. In the 1930s immigration to
these areas (e.g. North- and South America) was severely restricted and the pattern of Jewish migration to
Palestine became more similar ·to that of the general
Jewish migration and could no longer be described as
an .aliyah of pioneers.
The East European Jews, in contrast to those of Germany, never assimilated. The rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe served to accentuate the Jews'
sense of isolation. Nationalism as well as religion
served as divisive fa<"'::0.r·s. Neither Pa nslavism nor the
self-assertior

\Jf

the various subject peoples in Eastern

Europe pr-ovided for Je wish participation within the
framework of their national aspirations. They could

become neither part of the dominant nations nor of
the subject groups that were striving for national recognition. In Germany the situation seemed to be quite
different. Numerous Jews came to see themselves as Germans of the Jewish or Mosaic faith. During World War I
they served in the German army and were as eager to
see it victorious as the rest of the Germans. This was

unlike East European Jewry which not only t-ried
(

to escape service in the hated Czarist army, but at
least in part looked forward to its defeat by the German forces. Thus those Jews who came to . Palestine during the first four aliyot, unlike the German olim,
did not experience an abrupt alienation from a nation
and culture to which they had formed very strong attachments.
The Zionists were psychologically better prepared to leave Germany and to go to Palestine, and the
percentage of Zionists ·among . those who went to Palestine
wa~ much larger than it was for the German Jews as a
whole. The intensification of persecution resulted in
more and more Jews identifying with their correligionists, and also with Zionism. The circulation of Zionist publications, such as the Jildische Rundschau, increased sharply, Jewish comraunal activity was intensified and the enrolment in Jewish schools rose sharply. Between 1933 and the 1935 Nuremb erg Law·s many still

believed and hoped that the Hitler era would pass. After 1935 fewer and fewer were of that opinion, and emi-

gration was becoming the alternative for more and more
German Jews. In the earlier years a much larger number
of German Jews could have come to Palestine had they

been

ready to leave Germany. This was no longer the

case in the closing years of , the
need of a refuge for German Jewry

1930s, for when the
became most urgent

in the latter half of this decade, the British authorities put more severe restrictions on immigration into
Mandatory Palestine.

.

Jewish emigration from Germany was a push.

migration, as opposed to ~ -pull-migration.

Emigration

of German Jews foliowed the pattern of increased persecution and its subsidence as carried out by the National Socialists against them. This even included a remigration in the early years of the Hitler era. Migration to Palest·i ne was less erratic than the migration
of German Jews to other countries. It was a planned
and organized migration, and as was shown in this work,
decisions to migrate generally preceded the actual migration by many months. Increased participation in Zionist activity and greater communal cohesion among German Jews helped prepare them psychlogically for the

' * For concepts of Push- and Pull migration see David L.

Sills editor, International Enc clo edia of Social
Sciences, Vol. 10 f ew York: The Macmillan Company
and the Free Press, 1968), p. 288.

change in national identity. Hachsharah helped prepare
them for new occupations.

British policy during the years in question
did give spe~ial consideration to the plight of the Jews
under Nazi rule and, if anything, was inclined to favor
immigrants from Central and Western Europe over those
coming from other areas of the world. This preference
was also shown in U.S. immigration law$ which were drawn
up to favor immigrants from the nordic and Anglo-Saxon
countries. In Australia German immigrants were more readily accepted than those coming from Italy, as is revealed in a study by Wilfried Borrie 1 in which he compared the two immigrations. This can be explained by
the fact that the British and societies of predominantly British background preferred immigrants from
societies similar to their own. But the situation of
the Jews in Germany was not the predominant factor governing British policy. It was more closely connected to
Arab opposition to the creatioti of a Jewish National
Home in Palestine and Arab fear that through continued
immigration Jews would become a majority there. The more ·
severe British restrictions on immigration imposed in
the closing days of the 1930s in response to Arab agit ·a tion affected the German Jewish immigration as well
as the total Jewish immigration to Palestine from all
countries.
1 Wilfried David Berrie, Italians and Germans in Australia, A Study of Assimilati-onn( I'" elbourne: F. 'w . Cheshire, 1954)

The policy of the National Socialist regime
during the years in question was to encourage the emigration of German Jews. Emigration to Palestine was also

encouraged, for it seemed promising as an area in

which to relieve Germany of a substantial part of its

Jewish population. Zionist activity within Germany was

encouraged by the S.S. and Gestapo in recognition of
the fact that it promoted emigration. On the other
hand, Germany opposed the creation of a Jewish state
in Palestine. The Foreign Ministry, with the exception
of its Economic Policy Department, ~rgued against the
encouragement of Jewish migration to Palestine. Its position was that it was in Germany's interest to keep
the Jews dispersed and that Palestine should not be permitted to become a power base for them. The Economic
Policy Department held an opposing view, believing that
Jewish migration to areas outside of Palestine, especially to centers of international trade, could harm
Germany much more economically and through propaganda
and press,than to Palestine. Relations with the Ar~bs
and the fate of the Templar colonies also influenced
Germany to oppose th~ creation of a Jewish state there.
The German authorities were quite aware of Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine and believed
that the Templar colonies could not continue to exist
within an independent Jewish state. They feared that
German policy towards its Jews would have prompted
counteraction against the Templars. Germany wanted a

free hand to deal with its Jews and was unwilling to
have her freedom of action compromised on account of
these colonies.

hile migration to Palestine tended

to promote the creation of a Jewish state there, Germany hindered this migration only when definite prospects of a Jewish state becoming a reality were near.
This was .the case in 1937, when the Peel Commission
raised such prospects. Germany was able to encourage
or to hinder this migration by facilitating or obstructing Zionist activities in Germany and through the Haa~

- agreement by easing or blocking the transfer of ca-

pital to Palestine. On .the whole, Germany's main concern regarding its Jews was to be rid of them and make

Germany judenrein. Where Palestine served this goal, migration to it was promoted. The National Socialists
went so far as to assist in the illegal immigration
of German Jews into Palestine.
The Haavara agreement served Germany's goals
by!increas ~ng production, saving foreign currency (by
allowing German Jews to export their capital to Palestine in the form of merchandise but prohibiting the
export of capital in· foreign currency), and by promoting the export of German goods and the emigration of
German Jews, the latter being the primary factor. This
is evident from the Haavara agreement's continuation
after Germany's unemployment was reduced and need for
increased production decreased. This was particularly
the case since exports to Palestine through the Haavara

Agency did not earn Germany foreign currency,
as all goods purchased from Germany were payed ·
for from the Reichmarks deposite~ by German ·
Jews with the Haavara Agency. Foreign currency was
paid to German exporters only where this was required
to cover such outlays by Germany in the manufacture
of the export item. German Jews migrating to Palestine
received more for their Reichsmark holdings than Jews
destined for other lands. There · was considerable opposition to the .Haavara agreement, particularly from
the Auslandsorganisation.:. Opponents of the agreement
argued that it helped promote the establishment of a
Jewish state and did not earn foreign exchange for
Germany, while draini?g goods from the German economy. The agreement's staunchest supporters were the
Ministry of Economics and the Foreign .Exchange Control
Office. But the Haavara activities were not terminated
until the outbreak of World War II, the reason being
that Germany's attitude on this question had been largely dictated by domestic considerations, which were
the promotion of J~wish emigration.
A .highly publicized controversy over the
Haavara agreement arose within the Jewish community,
but within the . Zionist leadership its proponents
prevailed. The~ agreement did. raise ·moral questions
fo~ -the Yishuv, namely was it proper to have dealings

with the persecutors of German Jewry and did the
agreement benefit the National Sccialists and prolong

the Nazi regime? There is no doubt that the
Yishuv stood. on weak moral grounds when it
concluded the Haavara agreement. Much of world
Jewry was boycotting German products and also
sought the support of non-Jews in this matter.
The Yishuv's position was thus not only detrimental
to a united Jewish front in the boycott of German
products, but helped under~ine efforts to obtain
the support of various nations in this effort.
The argument that the agreement helped prolong
the Nazi regime ~y aiding the German economy and
reducing unemployment had some validity, but it
is doubtful that trade with Palestine through the
Haavara was large enough to have an impact on the
German economy sufficient to alter the course of
events. On the other hand Haavara provided major
economic benefits to the Yishuv. The massive
infusion of transfer capital to Palestine helped
build up the country. It also enabled German Jews
to rescue parts of their fortunes and thus
encouraged some to migrate to Palestine. Special
precautions were taken to protect ·infunt industries
in Palestine from German dumping by preventing
the import of the types of goods manufactured
locally. The agreement~

benefits far outweighed

its drawbacks, and where dealings with the National
Socialists were necessary to promote the emigration

L
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of German Jews,and in the final analyses save
Jewish lives, they had some moral justification
as well.
In comparison to other areas of refuge
Palestine had a number of special features. The
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate of the League
of Nations gave international recognition to the
special role Palestine should play in absorbing
Jewish immigrants. Jewish traditi~n and hope was
also strongly connected with this land, the
· historical homeland of the Jewish people. Jews
accounted for approximately one third of Palestine's
population and were able to do more to integrate
these refugees into the Yishuv than other Jewish
communities could in their respective countries.
Although some feelings against the refugees may
have existed even among Jews, it was not of the
intensity or scope that could be found in other
areas of the world. Arab opposition to, and
consequent British restriction of,immigration
, were not directed against the German refugees as ·
such,but were dictated by the aforementioned
general British policy considerations, i.e. British
efforts to appease the Arabs who were -opposed to
any Jewish immigration. Palestine which saw rapid
economic development, partly stimulated by the
immigrants themselves~ was able to absorb the

3

German olim. Most of the western countries were

--

.

suffering from economic depression ~nd unemployment
fJ_

and were therfore reluctant to admit refugees.
Anti-Semitic propaganda by the National Socialists
also had its effect in some of these countries
which consequently put more severe restrictions
on Jewish immigration. Some German emigrants
chose Palestine in the belief that it was the only
area free of anti-Semitism.
The European countries bordering on
Germany were generally only transit areas, while
settlement in overseas countries other than
Palestine was desirable for the German emigrants only
in the developed parts of the world which could absorb
substantial numbers of middle class businessmen and
professionals. The United States, South America, and
Palestine were the areas in which most of Germany's
Jewish emigrants settled. Restrictions in all
three areas prevented the absorption of a more
substantial part of German Jewry there.
The Jewish organization~ and more specifically the Jewish Agency with its Palestine Office in
Berlin and its Central Bureau for the Settlement
of German Jews helped organize this migration and
direct it to Palestine. It acted as the representative of the Jewish people in questions pertaining
to Palestine and dealt with both the German and
British authorities in matters concerning the

migration of German Jews to Palestine. The
policy of the Jewish Agency was gove~ned by
practical as well as humanitarian considerations.
The former predominated at least until Austria
was occupied by the Germans, at which point .
younger able-bodied immigrants no longer received
preference over others. The Jewish Agency was
open to criticism by those denied category C
(labour) certificates, for the British authorities
placed them in the Agency's charge for distribution.
This criticism was not entirely unwarranted, for
political considerations played a role in the
determination of how these certificates were
granted. Although the Jewish Agency denied that
an applicant's past Zionist affiliation was
taken into account, it defended the desirability
of requiring an applicant to have at least a
minimal knowledge of Hebrew. In the case of
German Jews _at least, a young agriculturist or
artisan with some knowledge of Hebrew was very
likely to have been a Zionist. In this respect,
albeit indirectly, the Zionists did receive some
preference. Unfortunately internal politics
within the Yishuv also had an influence on the
granting of certificates. The · group affiliation of
young immigrant pioneers was taken .into account when
they were brought to settlements in Palestine.
Thus 1 if a group affiliated with Mapai had been

brought to the country-, those affiliated with
other political movements would demand that the
next batch of certificates be granted to them.
This meant that the more urgent cases did not
always receive first consideration. The New
Zionists (Revisionists) who were in dispute
with the old socialist dominated Zionist party,
felt particularly discriminated against both in
matters of certifacate an1 fund allocation. Their
criticism was not entirely unjustified and points
out some of the shortcomings of the Jewish Agency's
policy. In the distribution of the category C
certificates German Jews consistantly received
a smaller percentage of certificates than their
representation in the total immigration warranted.
In defence of the Jewish Agency it must be noted that
it did not

have a completely free hand in the

distribution of category C certificates. The
British authorities did lay down some guidelines.
These stressed the employability of the immigrants
and favored younger olim with agricultural or
artisan experience.
In line with its policy that as many
Jews as possible be settled on the land, the
Jewish Agency concentrated its resources on
constructive absorption. It allocated only 6
per cent of its total outlay for social welfare,
and the remainder it spent on integrating the

immigrants into the economy of the Yishuv.
Although practical from an economic point of view
it was a harsh policy which provided little
relief for the new arrivals. These had largely to rely on their own means even during their
most difficult period between the time of their
arrival in Palestine and the time they found
employment.
In order to analyze the absorption
process of the German Jewish immigration we
must consider a number of factors. These include:
1. motivation for migration; 2. the role the
immigrating group expects to play; 3. the new
values accepted by it; 4. the possibilities open
to the new immigrants;

5. the role expected

0£

them by the new country. Then we must see to
what degree the conditions for full absorption
were met by the German Jewish immigrants in the
perspective of the following criteria: a.)
acculturation; b.) personal adjustment of the
immigrants; c.) dispersion of the immigrants as
a group within the various spheres of the
absorbing society.
The motivation of the German olim
was described as a negative one (push migration).
By contrast the pioneers of the preceding aliyot
came to Palestine with an idealistic program
which enabled them to change their social roles

and cultural values more .readily. German Jewry
had developed strong attachments to the German
culture. This included its language, literature,
and status symbols. The motivation for migration
in this instance conformed with a negative
predisposition to change. For unlike the pioneers
of the previous aliyot they did not come with the
ambition to revitalize the Hebrew language and
literature, nor alter the social structure of
their society. Their occupational aspirations,
unlike those of the earlier pioneers, were not
directly c9nnected with the national goals of
the Yishuv, but with their personal economic
security and the status symbols of their former
homeland. Thus even the German -Jews who settled
on the land in middle class settlements often
did so because the purchase of a home and plot
of land pre~ented the most secure way to invest
their limited capital. - Although Palestine offered
them freedom and a refuge, it lacked the economic
and cultural possibilities of pre-Hitler Germany.
These immigrants, who sought to rebuild the
lives they had known in Germany, had to do so
on a much more modest scale and with little
prospect of ever attaining their former position.
For, certainly in their lifetime, and even after,
Palestine would not be able to provide the
opportunities, either in scope or in scale, that

Germany offered. The German Jewish industrialist
could find neither the labour force nor the
market formerly available to him in Germany. The
banker could hardly hope to handle transactions
of the size he may have been accustomed to.
Numerous professionals could hardly exp~ct to
continue to work in their fields which were
rapidly reaching the saturation point in the
Yishuv. They came to a small country which had
neither the population nor resources comparable
to their former homeland.
The institutional structure of the
Yishuv was created by immigrants and it remained
in its formative stage during the first aliyot.
The early immigrants who settled in Palestine had
no fixed institutional framework into which they
could be absorbed. The members of the first aliyot
who had a strong cultural affinity created the

institutional structure of the Yishuv. By 1933,
when the German Aliyah started, such a structure
had emerged. The German olim had to integrate
themselves into an

institutional structure which

was not of their making and which was not conceived
with them in mind.* The kibbutzim, the small-holders
settlements, and the Histadruth were oriented
towards a working class society. The German
immigrants were mostly from the middle class.
The existing institutions were helpful in
• Youth Aliyah was an exception for it was initially
organized to deal with the problems of German
Jewish youth in Hitler's Germany.

integrating these immigrants into the . working
class. On the other hand they did not always
meet the needs of the German olim and new
institutional forms had to be established for
some of these immigrants. This is evident from
the middle class settlements, described in this
work, which were designed to meet the specific

needs of some of the German olim.
The extent of institutional concentration and dispersion serves as one indicator of
absorption. The early aliyot were characterized
by a large degree of dispersion within the

various spheres of society. The population
distribution in the various settlements was based
more on membership in a given pioneer movement
than in a particular immigration wave or country
of origin. The immigration of German Jews did
result in the establishment of settlements almost
exclusively of that group.
While the early Yishuv never developed ·
political parties on the basis of specific immigrant
groups, a predominantly Central European and German
Alivah Chadasha party was formed. The Landsmannshaften of the German Jews on the one hand assisted
in the economic absorption of the German immigrants, ·
and on the other hand helped perpetuate certain ·
aspects of their former way of life.
Youth Aliyah,founded in 1934, contributed

immeasurably to the absorption of a considerable part·

~r

the German immigration. Through this institution Ger-

man youths were educated in agricultural settlements

with a -view to having them settle permanently on the
land.To a less·er extent others received technical training· in an urban setting. Youth Aliyah provided the
framework within which German youth was introduced to
the pioneer ideology of the early Yishuv and thus facilitated ~heir assimilation bi enabling them to become
active members of the pioneering communities. It also
provided for a wide dispersion of these immigrants which
aided in their absorption. This institution, through
the utilization

of German Jewish madrichim, at least

during the early transitional stages, and through its

various other sociological and psychological considerations, was of immense help in the personal adjustment
of .these youths.on the whole,Youth Aliyah was particularly
suitable for the promotion of a productive integration of
German Jewish youth into the Yishuv. It provided these
young immigrants with the education and to a certain degree
indoctrination necessary for them to become p·a rt of the
Jewish community of Palestine. A home environment of the
type their parents could have provided would only have
perpetuated the German culture and social values.
Through the institutions of Youth Aliyah they were taught
the Hebrew language, the geography of Palestine, and the
history of the Jewish people. In all these areas of

knowledge German Jewry was particularly lacking.
The placement of these youths in the households
of Jewish farmers in the smallholders settlements
introduced them both -to a new way of life and
culture

and played an important role in integrating

these youths into the Yishuv.
A majority of Youth Aliyah's graduates
went into the productive endeavors for which their
training was intended. They did come to feel
themselves as part of the Jewish people and nation.
This attests to the general success of Youth Aliyah.
On the other hand problems did arise and Youth
Aliyah had some drawbacks. Initially there was
an overemphasis on agricultural training and an
underutilization of the skills acquired by some of
these youths in Europe. Some of the settlements in
which they were . placed provided inedequate schooling,
and in other cases Youth Aliyah institutions were
unable to satisfy the needs of some of their charges.
The problems of adolescence were compounded by these
youths' separation from their parents~
Without minimizing its deficiencies Youth
Aliyah may still be described as a success, and although
there was room for improvement we must recognize
-

that it was a young organization lacking in
experience. Th'e re was also no alternate institution
to undertake the task of integrating these young

German Jews into the Yishuv.

_ The mass immigration of German Jews did result in a measure

of

in~titutional segregation and a ten-

dency towards isolation in clusters. This applied speci-

fically to those who had reached adulthood before their
migr~tion. The young.e r generation, and foremost those

who came through Youth Aliyah, assimilated more readily.
The retirement homes of the German and Central European
Jews serve as continuous evidence that self-imposed institutional segregation persists among the older generation of German olim• . The dispersion of the German olim

wtthin the various spheres of the absorbing society
was thus shown to be incomplete, particularly where it
applied to those who immigrated as adults.
· The marriage pattern is a valuable indicator -of the immigrant's propensity to integrate. As for
the second generation, over fifty per cent of those
who answered my questionnaire indicated that their
.children married persons of non-German Jewish origin.
Acculturation implies the learning of the
various norms and customs of the absorbing society.
This includes language, dress, and modes of behavior.
The immigr~t must _c onf·orm- to

these sets of behavior

so that he will continue to behave in accordance with
them.The acculturation of the first generation of
adult German Jewish immigrants was limited in scope.
The German language remained a major means of communication, so much so that out of 117 who were asked
whether they spoke German in Israel, all but one re-

plied in the affirmative. Of the German Jewish illl.!nigrants only a very few had a command of the Hebrew
language at the time of their arrival, and even thirty
years later many had still not mastered it. The Germans' ~inguistic shortcoming presented a barrier between them and the rest of the Yisbuv. It even led to
•resentment, for the Hebraization of the Yishuv was a
..

major tenet of Zionist philosophy. The use of German
compounded the resentment, fo~-- many sections of _the
Yishuv identified everything German with Hitler.
To the German Jews their own practices
?nd mannerisms were so important that change became extremely difficult for them. The German culture was
deeply ingrained in them and they were convinced of
its superiority and were thus most reluctant to part

with it. These immigrants had also come from a so-

ciety that had reached the highest level of ·techno-

logy and tllus all the comforts that this implied. They
wanted to transpose these to Palestine, as well as

their exaggerated expectations in matter of civility. These expectations were unrealistic in a land of
pioneers ~nd often led to their ridicule by the latter.

Their for~al mode of dress and titular status symbols
al~- smacked of bourgeoisie standards and clashed with the
open shirts, kha.P-..i trousers, and informa:l behavior of the

pioneers of ~h e e::trlier aliyot. In Germany many of
the Je~s wer e ~ccustomed to look down on their East

European brethren. Despite a lack of Jewish education,
which hindered their assimilation, they considered the
East European Jews to be lagging in culture, and were
therefore less inclined to make up for their own
shortcomings. Their stubborn adherence to their former
roles, habits, and modes of behavior was interpreted
as a lack of mental flexibility on their part by the
rest of the Yishuv.
Although the use of the German language has
continued both orally and in print, i.e. in German language newspapers, a marked change has occurred in other
respects. In dress the German Jews conformed to the ge- .
neral style of the Yishuv and in day-by-day behavior
they have also adjusted, but to a lesser degree. The
personal adjustment of the individual to his occupational role in the country of immigration is related,
as was previously stated, to the motivation for immigration. They did not .come to create a new society but
rather sought security within the framework of the existing social structure. In this respect the German
Aliyah was much the same as all the subsequent aliyot.
The most pervasive motive was the attainment of economic and social security within the existing Jewish community. The motivation of the first aliyot, with minor
exceptions, found no counterpart in later immigrations.
The need to change occupations may have involved giving
up a pattern of behavior, a mode of dress, a style cf
living, and other amenities that symbolize social sta-

tus. Although in distiguishing bet·veen a · positive and
negative disposition to change on the part of German
Jews one must judge individual cases, some general conclusions abo~t the German Aliyah can be drawn. The German youth was absorbed into the working class of Pale·stine without great difficulty. The middle aged middle
class immigrants presented

the

greatest · problem

where occupational adjustment was coDcerned. Large numbers of professionals came to Palestine and had no alternative but to change their occupatibn. Occupational

readjustment meant for many of these refugees not only
~

lower standard of living, but· also a social setback.

This was a particularly severe problem for German Jews
for whom social positions and titles played such an important role. Their negative response to this change in
some cases led to suicide, particularly among middleaged German immigrants. The high incidence of such ca-

ses induced some reporters to describe it as of epidemic proportions.
Another indicator of the German olims' un-

willingness, or inability, to change was their persistence in having their children pursue academic careers. With the development of modern Israel opportunities for German Jews to continue in their professions

increased. This facilitated a more satisfactory absorption of these im~igrants. Not all have been
able to return to their former profession, and resentment persists. This resentment is often given expression
by a criticism of almost everything in modern Israel.

Ma·n y of those who migrated in the 19th cen-

tury from Europe to the United States, Canada, and
Australia did not plan to settle there on a permanent
basis. Some sought to acquire a sum sufficient to purchase a farm or establish themselves_ in another manner
in their homeland.Many actually did return ·. Remigration,
or return migration, ·was not a viable alternative for
the German olim for as long as Germany remained under
National Socialist control.
The question of group identification was less
pressing

for the migrants of the 19th century than it

was for the German olim. The latter were expected by
the Yishuv to identify with it completely, for migration to Palestine implied a commitment to the Jewish
people. This was a particularly difficult adjustment
for the German immigrants who, up to the Hitler era
by and large saw themselves primarily as part of the ·

German nation. Even if they harbored thoughts of return~ng to Germany in better days, they could not
express them openly. By contrast the European migrants
who went overseas to areas other than Palestine were not
forced to make an immediate commitment to their new
countries. In their case remigration was not burdened
with the implications of yored ( one who goes down)

and an immediate change in group identificatfon was
not expected of them. If they chose to remain in their
new homeland it was often left to a succeding generation
to undergo this change. Even in the case of migration
where religious freedom rather than economic better-

ment was the primary motivating factor the question
of group identification presented no special problems,
as the early migrations of the Puritans and Mennonites
to North America show. These never intended to return
to their former homelands but continued to identify
with their own particular group wherever they settled.

Those Geman Jews who remained in Israel came to identify with their new homeland, though not without a good
measure of criticism. This was indicated by their answers in the ~uestionnaire

and by their conversations

with the author. Of all 116 who replied to the question

"do you want to leave Israel?" not one answered in the
affirmative. Of those questioned on their attitude
towards Israel an overwhelming majority gave a positive
response, al though many expressed cr·i tic ism of various
aspects of Israeli society.
· Borrie described the German settlement in
Australia as an example of economic absorption and cultural segregation·. He ascribes · responsibility for preservation of Deutschtum to the German-language press,

German clubs and the Lutheran church, the last being

the · primary factor. The German-language press continued
its existence throughout the 19~h and into the 20th

century. This Borrie interpreted to be as much a symptom of an interest in German ideas and ideals as a
cause. Although the press influenced its

readers,

it could only exist as long as there was a market for
it. Borrie discovered that later German arrivals to
Australia, on whom the Lutheran church had little
influence, still retained a strong attachment to
their nation and had a conciousness of its

impending greatness. By contrast he found that
the Italians who migrated to Australia did not
harbor the same sentimental attachment to their
ancestral homeland. It thus seems that the Germans'

attachment to their n.a tion and culture was a
particularly strong one. The example of the
German immigrants in Brazil gives additional weight
to this theory. Of . all the groups that settled in
that country the Germans · resisted assimilation
most stubbornly. They took pride. in their German
heritage, their German schools, and their way of
• life.In the German settlements created in and
around Blumenau in the middle of the 19th century
seventy five per cent still spoke German before

World War II. Communication with them in Portuguese
~as· difficult. 1 In a law aimed chiefly at the
Germans, the Brazilian government prohibited
instruction in any language but Portuguese. Although
. 1 Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 86.

this law was passed in 1938, as late as 1956

German

schools were to be found in Brazil, staffed by
German teachers. These were unlike ~he schools for
British and North American children which followed
the Brazilian system-. The German schools taught in

German and their curriculum was completely divorced
from the Brazilian educational system! This tenacious
attachment to the German culture,if not nation 1 was
also characteristic of German Jewry. Among the types

of migrations, family immigration seams to be the
most stable. Personal identification is maintained
within the family unit. nstability of migration is
thus ofte~ view9d as a function of the proportion of
women among the migrants."* This characteristic may
also have a role in preserving the immigrants' old

culture,for family life tends to isolate the immigrant
more from hi.s new environment than is the case with
the individual immigrants. Migrating fimilies are
more likely to transplant their domestic lifestyle
than are individual immigrants. There is a greater
tendency to perpetuate the old culture within the
intimacy of the home. This pertains as well. f'or the:

second generation where

the offspri.n gs

.are

introduced

to . their parents• culture and life style. A most
1 Ibid • , p • 8 7 •

• ~additional details see
Milbank Memorial Fund, Selected Studi~s of
Migration Since World War !I. New York: Uilbank
Memorial Fund, 195E.

obvious expression of this was the continued use
of the German language made in the homes · of the
adult immi gr a n t s a s well as its introduction to the
second generation. The widespread knowledge of German among
children of German olim tends to confirm this. An immigration
of individuals is also more likely to result in an inter~
cultural marriage pattern if only becase of the imbalance
between males and females within that group.
The German Je\.v s who came to the United States
during the 1930s came to a developed country. Although be~et with economic problems, it could offer opportunities
commensurab~e with . what they were accustomed to, and with
even greater potentialities. Socially and culturally the
United States provided arr environment, though quite diffe-

rent from that of Germany, still ouch closer to it than that
of Palestine. For the United States was basically a product
of Western civilization. In the United States there were cities
that could cbmpare with those of Germany in size and sophistication, while Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem a.nd Haifa must have see-

med provincial to former residents of Berlin or Hamburg. This

was not an inconsiderable facto~ for German -Jewry ~as
highly urbanized.
Palestine of the 1930s was still very much a product of Middle Eastern society, while the Yishuv itself
was

to

East

European

in

much of assimilated

character and
German

Jewry.

quite

alien

In this

new

environment three langu~ges predo~inated: Hebrew, Arabic,

and English. Practically none of the German J·ews spoke Arabic, few knew Hebrew, and many had only a very limited knowledge ·o r English. There were also climatic and geographic
factors. The United States had much
Germany

in

this

regard.

By

in

common

contrast,

with

Palestine

.

was largely hot and arid and had little similarity with what
these immigrants had known.
The German Jews who played an active role in ·the
highly developed German economy were able to transplant or
start new industries in Palestine and other countries in
wh~c~ they settled, e.g. _ England, This was not an entirely
unprecedented phenomenon. The Huguenots who left France
during the 16th and 17th centuries, brought industries to
wherever they settled. Similarly the Puritans,: and later
Jewish im~igrants from Russia, created industries in the
United States, the latter introducing the ready-made clothing industry.
All the aforementioned cases concern na~ional, religious, or other minorities whose migration was due to fac-

tors other than their economic situation. The German Jews
who migrated from a highly developed to an ~nderdeveloped

c.ountry, such as Palestine, were in a situation unlike
others involved in such a population movement. Certainly
they could not b~ conpared with the colonial settlements
of the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola where a surplus
peasant population was settled on new land

and where they

remained under the rule of the mother country.

The British colonies in Asia. and Africa attracted
individtlals with specific purposes in mind. Those who went
sought to advance

themselves through business ventures, such

as plantations, trading companies, or min5. Others went as

administrators and colonial officials, while remaining Bri.t ish subjects. By contrast, the GE:rman JeY1s who came to Palestine in the 193Os found a country in which the higher administrative posts were occupied by the British, while those
next in line for leadership were members o_f previous aliyot.
Their economic situation and social position experienced a marked
-d ec 1 in e, and their
·relations with their foreier hoo.eland were
severed.
The German immigration was better organized .than
those which preceded it. The Central Bureau was established
as a de~artment of the Jewish A3ency for that purpose. On
the other hand it was largely an immigration of individuals
rather than of groups. It was also the first massive nonEastern European migration to P~lestine. Thereafter other
Central. European, and later Middle-Eastern and NorthAfrican migrations followed. The Ger~an i~igrants thus
found themselves at the edge of this change, to which not
only they, but also the predominantly East Eu.r·opean Yishuv had to adjust.

The German Jewish immigration represented a
rather substan~ial influx of a different cultural group
into a relatively small Jewish community. At the start

or

the 1930s the Jewish population was around 170,000,

and at the end of the decade it had grown to around
460,000. Within that time period approximately 60,000
German Jews migrated to Palestine. The relative size
of this migration would by itself assure that they have

an impact on the Yishuv, but the composition of this
aliyah was as important as its . size.
The German Jewish immigrants included a considerable number of capitalists accounting for 48 per
cent of all immigrants to Palestine in that category
between 1933 and 1938. This amounted to twice their
share of tbe total i~igration in that time period.
These immigrants, through the Haavarah agreement, and
outside of it, brought considerable capital to Pale- .·
stine (over LP 8 million through Haavarah alone). Also
forty one per cent of the German Jewish immigrants belonged to the liberal professions, representing a potentially very valuable resource. By itself the capi·tal brought to . the country by these immigrants cannot
be used as a measure of their economic contribution.

The way this capital was invested is an additional
-indicator of their economic contribution. They invested
a substantial proportion of their capital in industry

· and handicraft (26 per cent for 1933-1934) and

17 per

cent for the same years in commerce •. By contrast their

predecessor~ of the Fourth Aliyah invested only 5 per
cent each in industry and commerce. These German olim
· helped raise standards of production through the introduction of modern European techniques.
The German Jews found conditions in Palestine
much more favorable than their predecessors. Had the

. immigrants of the earlier aliyot not developed the
country to the extent that they had done, it is doubtful whether the ·German immigrants would have been able
to invest their substantial resources so effectively.
An agricultural basis had been established and agri-

cultural settlements developed to a point where they
could absorb new immigrants. Opportunities for export
in various fields had increased as a result of prior
work in the Yishuv. The growth of Jerusalem and Haifa,

as well as the founding of Tel-Aviv, provided the German immigrants with increased opportunities to establish themselves.
The presence of German Jewry in the Yishuv
was felt immediately upon their arrival,if only because
of the impact -of their numbers on the small Jewish
community of Palestine. The early arrivals brought
with them large quantities of belongings and inundated

the major cities with German products. They attempted

to transpose their former lifestyle to the Yishuv,espec~ally
to the cities of Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem. Western
European style stores were opened by them, as well as
modern restaurants and hotels. They introduced a new way ,

1 .

of life to the cities of Palestine,-i.e. middle
class and bourgeoisie in nature. Their contribution
to the arts and to higher education was of major
proportions. They comprised a substantial part
of both the faculties and student bodies in the
Hebrew University and the Technion. rn· the
graphic as well as the performing arts their
contribution enriched the Yishuv. German olim
were re~ponsible for the creation of the Israel
philharmonic orchestra. They provided a majority of
its performers as well as a considerable part of
the audience. By contrast the previous aliyot
put little emphasis

on the arts. Their major

efforts in this direction were concentrated on
the revival of the Hebrew language and literature.
With the passage of time Israel was able to utilize
more fully the large reservoir of professinals
among the German Jewish immigrats. This contribution,
alth0ugh a more gradual one, may have . been even
more important than the initial contribution of ·
German Jewry to the Yishuv •.
The German olim found in Palestine not
only a refuge which saved their lives but also a
homeland with which they were encouraged to identify.
By contrast in Germany no matter how hard they tried
to identify with that nation they were always
considered a foreign body.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Your age.

42
1

~O fl

70 71

4

3 ~3

56 28 59 60 61 62 63 62 66 67 68 69
1 4 2 3 2 6 3
l
3 2

2

4

z4 ~5 876

~7 ~8 429

87 88 89 90 91 93
3 4 2 2 2 1

80 81 82 83 82 86

3 2 5 4 5 4

Total 118

2. Married or unmarried.
Married

99

Unmarried 19

3. Number, sex and age of children.
Had children

82

Had no children

36

Sex of children 86 Males 75 Females 24 did not
specify.

Total 185
+ 14 had

children who died

Sum tota1--rgg
Age 8 11

13

14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

1 2 1 1.

4

25

26

2 2 2 2 3 2 5 1 2 2

27 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 42 43. 44
2 .3 2 3 l ~ 2 2 4 2 ~ 1 3 2 1

6

42 46

1 2

42

48 49

1 4

3

to

~1 - ~2 ~3

45 26 ~7 4

g4:

58 ~9 60 62
1 1

l

~
Number of children per family
4

6
0

2

6

19

36
1

3

2
45

1

0

2

0

13
8

1

4. Did you have other dependents in Germany, e.g.
parents; if so, what was their age?
Yes 86

No 31

5. When did you decide to leave Germany?
1930
1932

1935 14

l

1936

2

1933 47
193~ 12

1939

7

1937
3
1938 15

6. What triggered your decision to leave Germany?
Zionism
Parents

9
1

Does not remember
Nazi Persecution

1

102•

• 3 specified Kristallnacht.
l specified the 1935 Nuremberg Laws.

7. What was yor age at the time?
Age 9 · 14 15 . 16 _17 18 lS 21 22 23 24 25 26
1· . 1 2 l 1 l 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 1

29 30 31 32 33 34 35
2 2 5 3 4 5 7

5

45
46 47 48
4 6 2 4

i2 ~7

49 50 ~l
l 6

36

27 2E
3 2

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3
f8

i .9 ~2

6

8. When did you leave Germany?

1
1932
31
1933
1934 18
1935 12
1936 7

1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

7

8

15

23
3

9. Did you have any alternative to Palestine?
No
Yes

47

52

Did not consider
any alternative

' ...

14

10. If yes please state in order of preference.
Does not apply

61

Brazil • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ]1.
U.S.A. and Africa••·•··•••••••••••••·•·• 1
U.S.A. ................................. . 17
South Africa and Holland •••••••••••••••• l
France
. . ... . .. .
. .. . 3
U.S.A and England••••••••••••••••••••••• 2
England • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4
Italy, Belgium, England, U.S.A .••••••••• 1
England and Switzerland··••••••··••••·•• 1
France and Tunisia•••••·•••·•·•·•·•••·•• 1

.... .. .. . .. . .... .. ...

Sweden arid U.S.A. •

a • • • • .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1

Holland • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
Italy
.. .. . .
. .. . . . .. . .. 1
Australia and U.S.A ••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Holland and U.S.A. •••••••••••••••••••••• 2
Persia
... . . .
.
. . . l
Argentina and U.S.A ••••••••••••••••••••• 1
South Africa
.. . .. . . .. . . .. . 1
Switzerland •••••••••••••••• . . . • . . . . • . • • • 1
Total ··· · 44

... . .. . .. . . . .. . . . .
. . .. .. .. . . ..... . . .. . . . .
.... . . . . . .. . . .
~

(

,..,
r

1

\J

11. Did you go directly from Germany to Palestine?

Year
___..

1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Went Directlz

Did not Go Directli

9

22

15

3

5

2

5

7

.2

6
8

12
2

____,,,,

..

7

11l

ire

• 1 went directly to Palestine in 1932.

•• 2 just passed through other countries.

12. If not where did you go first?
France ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3
Lithuania •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Rumania •••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••••• 2
Le ban on •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3
Switzerland •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Holland and Belgium . • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • 1
Meran, Tirol ••·•···•·••·•·•·••·••·••··• 1
Argentina••••••••••·•··•·•••••••·•••··· 2
Shanghai • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
France and Tunisia•••·••••••••••••••••• l
England and Australia•••··•·••••·•••••• 1
Sweden . .... .................... .- •.••. ~, ....... ~ ••• ~~ . l
Ia tvia ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Czechoslovakia••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Switzerland and Italy • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • 1
Bulgaria•••••••••·••••••••••••••••••••• 1
France and Luxemburg·••••••••••••••••·• 1
Poland • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , 3
England • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Persia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Belgium • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4
Italy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Thailand • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Cuba, Belgium, and France ·••••••••••••• 2
Holland • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Lithuania, Poland, Aus~ria, and Italy •• 1
Holland, Switzerland, and Italy • • • • • • • • 1
Total
42

13. By whose help did you emigrate, privately, or
through organizations?
Privately

89

With help of an organization

26

14. If you had children did they precede you to
Palestine?
20

Yes

Some preceded,some did not

3

Does not apply

60

No or children born in Israel

15. What did your children do when they arrived in
Palestine?
Worked in kibbutz ••••··•••••·••••••••••••·•• 9
Worked as ph otographer•••·••••••••·••·•••••• 1
Went to school •··•·••••••••·••••••••••••••••24
Went to Kindergarden ••••••·••••·•••••••••·•• 5
Was foreign correspondent ·••·•••••••••••·••• 1
worked as musician••··••••••••••••••·••••••• 1
worked as maid ··•···•••••••••••••••••••••••· .1
Architect ••••••·•••••••••••••••••••••••••·•• 1
Silversmith•••••••••••·••••••••••••••••••·•• 1
Worked in agriculture••••••••••••••••••••••· 4
Went to university . •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
worked in factory•••••••••••••••••••••·••··• 1
Business •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l
Worked in family store •••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Bus driver ••••••••••••••••••••
2
Worked in bank·••••••·•••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Went to India as physician•••••••••••••••·•• 1
Worked in university•·•••••··••••••·••·•···• 1
Worked as meteorologist •••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Worked (did not specify) ·•·•••••••••••~••••• 6
s •

1 was a child

•

•

•

66 does not apply

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

16. Were any of your children self supporting

in Germany?
Too young
No

12
36

zrn

Does not apply
Yes

66
8

17. Are you or any of your children college
graduates?

No

67

Yes

51 Individual or offspring
one said husband

18. What languages did you speak?

German
English
French
At least some Hebrew
Polish
Dutch
Spanish
Jewish
Italian
Czech
Swedish
Latin

118

78
45
40

2
2

1

3
3
l

1

3

19. What Jewish Newspapers did you read in Germany?
59
7
28

7

Jildische Rundschau
Centralverein Zeitung
read none.
did not answer

The remainder read a variety of other Jewish

newE:?apers

rn,: ..;.y o.t

them local ones.

20. Where did you settle in Israel?
Ramataim then Jerusalem ••··•·•••••·•••·••• , l
Karkur, Haifa, Jerusalem··•••••••••·•·•·•· 1
Karkur • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Ramat Hashavim, Haifa . ••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Ramat Hashavim ••••••••••·••••••••••••••••• 1
RASSCO Settlement, Kiryat Shemesh, Haifa •• 1
Haifa then Jerusalem••·••••••••••••·••·••• 4
Nahalal, Naharia, Haifa••••·•••••••••••••• 1
Atlit ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Haifa ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 40
Jerusalem ··•··•··••••••••·••••••••••••••••21
Tel-Aviv • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Tel-Aviv, - Hai.fa ,, •••••••••••••••••••••• -• •••• 2
Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Haifa•·•·••••••••••••·•·• 1
Jerusalem, Haifa·••·•••••·••••••·••••••••• 5
Haifa, Naharia •••···••·•••••·•••••••·••·•• 1
Haifa., Kf ar A ta • • • • • •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa••••••••••••·••• 1
Tel-Aviv, Rechovot, Haifa•·••••••••••••••• 1
Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem••••·••••••••••·••••••• 5
Naharia, Jerusalem •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Acco • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Tiberias, Naharia, Jerusalem, Kiryat Bialik 1
Rechovot ••••••••••• o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Petach Tikvah • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l
Rechovot, Petach Tikvah, Rishon Lezion, .
Jerusalem, Haifa•·•·•·•••••••••••••••••••· 1
Herzlia, Ramat Gan, Haifa·••••••••••·••••• l
Kiryat Bialik, Haifa••••••••••••••·••••••• 1
Kiryat Tivon, Haifa•••••·••·•·••••·••••••• 1
Kiryat Amal ·•••·•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Kfar Pines •·•·•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Ben Shemen, Jerusalem••••·•••••••••••••••• 1
Bat Galim, Haifa•••••••••••••••••·•••••••• 1
Kfar Saba, Jerusalem··•••••••••·•••••·•·•• l
Kibbutz Degania, Kibbutz Chanita ••·••••••• 1
Kibbutz Ramat Rachel, Jerusale~ ·•••••••••• 2
Kibbutz Chanita ······••·•••••••••-••••••••• 1
Ein Ba rod, Haifa •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Kibbu~z Maabarot •·•·•••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Kibbutz (did not specify), Haifa •e~••••••• l
Kvutzat Kinneret, Haifa•···••••••••••••••• 1
Kibbutz then village, then Jerusalem·••*•• 1
Pardes Chana, Haifa••·•·••·•~••·••·•··•••· 1
Total

m

21. Did you settle privately at first, or in a camp?

Privately

95

Camp or beit olim

10

Kibbutz

11

22~ Did you have any private means, or relatives in

Israel who helped you?
Had private means or help from friends or
relatives••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••~••• 73
Had no help but .worked and were on their own 36
Had help from Jewish Agency••••••••••·•••·• 1
Some did not apply, e.g. those who came on Youth
Aliyah.

23. What was your average income in Germany?
-Mark per Month

150

Number of Persons

200
250
250-300
260
280
300
400
400-500
450
500-600
600
660-1,000
800
950
1,000
1,250
1,600
2,000
2,100
8 said good incomd.

1
4

l
1
1

3

2
2
1
1
2
1

1
1
1
2
1
1

1

13 said that they were well to do.
2 said low income.

2 said average income.

24. Were you able to bring a substantial part of
your property from Germany with you?
Yes
No
Almost everything
Everything
Some things
Only L 1,000
A small part
25 percent of property
If they had they could have
Nothing
Did not have any

26
40
l
l

5
5

1

l
3
9

13

25. Could you have taken more, less, or the same
amount of property to another country?
Could not take more
25
The same
19
Could take more
14
Only to Palestine could take L 1,000
· nothing to any other country
1
Do: not hknow
26

26. What was your occupation in Germany?
Saleslady in brother~ store•·•••••••••••••• 1 :
Worked in father's store ~·•·••••••••••••·••· 1
Dealer in gold and silver•••••••••••••••••• 1
Managed a business •••••••·••••••••••••••••· 1
Worked in my father's office••••••••••••·•• 1
Teacher • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Book dealer·••·•··••·••••••··•••••••••••••• 2
Bookbinder and leather worker•••••••••••••• l
Worked in instrument factory••••••••••••••• 1
Bank agent • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Teachar and governess ··•·•••••••••••••••·•• 1
Agronomist ••·•·•·•••••••·•··•···•··•··•···· 1
Manager of Schocken Publishing Company ••••• l
Had a sausage factory••••··•·••·•·••••••••• 1
Student •••••••••••··~••··••····••••••••••••12
Lavvyer • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1

Kindergarden teacher •••••••••••••••••••••••
Had a mens' clothing store··•·•••·••··•••••
Supplier emloyed by the government •••••••••
Physiotherapist • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Salesman • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

5

1
1
1

3

Nurse • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Had none • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Dealer in flour·•···••·•···•••••••••••• 1
Assisted husband (physician) ••••••••••• 1
Librarian in an industrial enterprise •• 1
Trustee executor•·•···•••···••••••·•••• 1
Archivist and historian •••••••••••••••• 1
Receptionist •·····•~•··•••··••··•·•·••• 1
Had a shoe store ·••··•·•·····••••·••••• 1
Assisted at the Jewish Museum in Berlin 1
Secretary••••••·•··••··•·•·•••••••••••• 5
Journalist•··••·•••••••••·••••••••••••• 1
Arts and crafts ···•••••••••··•••••••••• 2
Concert singer and teacher ••••••••••••• 1
Lawyer's assistant·••···•·•··•·•••••••• 1
Housewife •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 19
Lived with parents ••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Buyer and store manager•··••••••••••••• 1
Jewelry dealer ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Had women's saloon•·•···••••••••••••••• 1
Worked in husband's business••••··••••• 1
Had a business in ladies garments•·•••• 1
Worked in automobile factory·•••·•••••• 1
Foreman in factory ••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Office manager••·•··••·······•••••••••• 1
· Laboratory assistent ·•··•·•·••••••••••• 1
Worked in husband's store ••·••·••••·••• 1
Worked in office•·••••••••··••••••••••• 1
Clerk ••••••• ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Typographer • •.• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Rab bi • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Physician • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Dentist • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Businessman ••··•••••••·••••••••••·•·•••12
Social worker•••··••••··•••••••••••·••• 5
Dental assistant••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Some added .husband's occupation
Children's doctor·•••••••····•••·••••••
Thysician ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Had his own store•••••·•••••••••••·••••
Had a clothing factory•·•••••••••••·•••
Shoemaker·•••·•······••····•·•··•···•••
Bookbinder
.. .
.
Dealer in metals •••••••••••••••••••••••
Building official ••••••••••••••••••••••
Correspondent ••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Had a cigarette store ••••••••••••••••••
Had a silversmith factory . ••••••••••••••
Had a shoe factory•~•·•·•·•••••••••••••
Lawyer • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

.. ... . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . .

1
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
l
1
1
1,
.J.

27. Did you continue in that field within the first
2 years a'fter your arrival in Palestine?
Yes

38

No

73

28. Did you belong to a Zionist organization in
Germany?
Yes

57

No

59

1 was too young.

29. If yes when did you join?
1
1

1899
1907
1909

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1932
Before 1933

1

1
1
3
1
1

· 1910

1913
Before W.W. I
1914
1916
1918
1919
1920's
1921

1
4

1
1
2

1
4

1

1933

4

6

1934
1935
1936

3
9
2

3

2
1

30. What congregation did you belong to?
Halle a/S .............................. . 1 :.
Northeim in H •••·•••••••••••••••••••·•• 1
Fulda • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Lie gni t z ••••
1
Berliner Grossens Gemeinde ••••••••••••• 1
Israelitische Kultusgemeinde DessauAnhal t • • • . • • . . . . . . . • . • • • . • . • . • . • • • • . • . . 1
Marktfreid am Main••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Dresdener Kultusgemeinde ••••••••••••••• 2
JUdische Gemeinde Sailingen-Baden •••••• 1
Beuthen a/Schles ••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Essen a/Ruhr • • • .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 1
Jttdische Kultusgemeinde Wiesbaden •••••• 1
Liberale Gemeinde Frankfurt a/Main ••••• 1
Siklawe in Pommern ••·••••·•·····•••·•·• 1
Gleiwitz-Breslau ·••·•·····•••·••·•••••· l
Gleiwit~ a/S ••••·•••••••••••••••••••••• l
!t

•

..

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

K8ln a/Rhein • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
Waldenburg in Schleswig••••·•••••••••••••• 1
Frankfurt a/Main (Austrittsgemeinde) •••••• 1
Friedenstempel • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
2
Conservative
. .
... .
. . .. . . . . .. 3
Liberal . .
Jugendbewegung .
. . . ..
1
Congregation of Rabbi Dr. Emil Cohen •••••• 1
Israelitsche Kultus gemeinde ···•••••••••••• 1
Saar C.S.R. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
M8rcbingen in Baden . •••••••••.••.••••.••.•• 1
Rostenburg-Breslau •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Wirtz burg • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
2
Leipzig
Westphalia •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••• 1
Frankfurt a/Main•••••·•·•••••·•••••••••••• 1
Frankfurt Grossgemeinde •••·••••••••••••••• 1
Agudah Frankfurt a/Main••··••••••••••••••• 1
Jildische Religionsgesellschaft Frankfurt •• 1
Allgemeine Jtldische Gemeinde Frankfurt
a/Main
. .
. .
.
. 1
Hauptgemeinde Frankfurt •·••·••••••••····•• 1
Frankfurt a/Oder, later Berlin•••·•••••••• 1
.
.
.
. .
Berlin
.... 25
C.V. Berlin • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Berliner Jildische Kultus8emeinde •••••·•••· 1
Berlin, Lindenstrasse ·•••·•••·••·•·••••••• l
Libe.rale Kul tusgemeinde, Berlin ••••••••••• 1
Ahadat Yisrael, Berlin··••••••••••••••· • • • J.
Habonim, Berlin •••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • 1
Berlin then Frankfurt••·•••••·••••••••• • • • 1
1
Berliner Reformgemeinde ·•·•••••••••·•••
Jildische Gemeinde Berlin, later Frankfurt
a/Main • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
_ Danzig • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Heilbronn ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Breslau • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5
Kassel and Breslau ••••••••••••••.••••••••••. l
K8nigsberg ·•••••••·••·•••••·•••••·••••••·• 1
Israelitisch Religionsgesellschaft, Stuttgart • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Ntlrnberg and Berlin••••••·•••••••••••••••• 1
Ntlrnberg Liberale ·•·••·-··••·••·•••••••••• 1
Emsich a/Rhein . .
.. ... .
. . . 1
Torpen, Ost Preussen ·••••••••••·••••••·••• 1
Saarbrticken • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Disburg • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Hamburg • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Mtinchen • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Wiesbaden • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Ftirth in Bayern • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

. .. .......... .. ... ... .. .. ... .. ... ... ... .. ........ ..... ......... ......
.................. ................ .

.... . . .. . . ... . .. ...... . . . .. . ..
. . . . .... .. . .. . . .... . . ...... .

~

.. .

. .. .. .

.. . . . .. . . . .

31. Did your German Rabbi, if he survived, ever
try to contact you?
Yes

20

No

54

Did not answer

26

Did not apply for others.

32. If your children have married in Israel, did
they marry persons of German origin?
Otherwise,what was the original nationality of
their spouses?
Yes

48

No

63

Russian
1~
Polish
13
C.S.R.
1
American
1
Israeli born with one parent
from Rumania and one from Iraq 1
Morocco
2
Rumania
2
Lithuania
3
Married in U.S.
1
Persia
1
Russian and Polish
1
Hungarian
3
Slovakian
1
English
1
Dutch
1
Sephardic
2
Persian and Bucharan
l
Poland and Israel
1
Poland and Uruguay
1
Czech
2
Israeli born (did not state
where parents ca~e from)
11
Does not apply (have no children or children
unmarried etc.)
70

1/
33. In what communal activities do you engage in
Israel?
None • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 73
Ezra Hadatit and Magen David Adorn •••••••• 1
Bar Kochba, Wizo •·•••••••·••••••••••••••• 1
Kibbutz • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4
Histadruth, Mishmar Ha'am, Wizo ••••••••• 1
Mishmar Ha'am •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Chal u t z • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • 1
Haganah • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
Chevra t chashmal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • • • • • • • • • 1
Hitachduth Olej Germania, ~Wizo ~••••••••••• 1
Youth Aliyah·•••••••••••••••••••••••••• .•• 1
Histadruth Haklalit, Mishmar Ha'am ••••••• 1
The building of Naharia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l ·
Synagogue • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Nashim Datiot, Chevra Kadisha ••·•••·•··•• 1
Irgun Nashim Datiot •••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Bn e i Brit h • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Wi z o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7
Privat Gemeinde • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Hitachduth Olej Germania••·•••••••••·•••• 1
Writes for local newpaper in German, was
in two wars • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
The establishment of Ramat Hashavim, Bnei
Br i th - • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Cancer Society ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Wizo and Bnei Brith •••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Bible teaching and choir singing ••••••••• 1
Social pedagogical • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Political and. economic institutions and
organizations ···•···•··••··••··•···••··•· 1
Teaching adult education ••••••••••••••••• 1
Attended courses and lectures (political,
cultural) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Party member, member of merchants' organization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1

34. Are you religiously observant?
Yes

25

No

68

Religious
Traditional
Progressive
Liberal
Not Orthodox but
religious
Somewhat

3
1
1

11

2

1

35. Did your experience alter your attitude to

;

.

Judaism, either positively or negatively?
Positive

31

Negative

3

70

No

36 •. What · is your present attitude towards a.) Israel
b. ) Germany?
Germany

Israel

Positive
13
Indifferent
17
Neutral
13
Respect
1
Reserved
4
Tolere.:nt
1
Unclear
3
Neutral (has some
good Christian
friends in
Germany)
1
Never returned to
Germany but corresponds with
German friends
1
There is a way
to negotiate with
new generation
2
Estranged
6
Critical
2
Negative
20
Enmity
4

Very Positive
18
Positive :
62
Good
2
At home
11
Positive but
critical
6
anxious about the
development of
Israel in many
1
ways

3?. Did you participate

in underground activities

against Hitler?
Yes

No

1
101

l organized illegal meetings
when adults were taken to
concentration camps.

38. Do you want to leave Israel?
No

Lives in Australia

116

l

39. In Israel, have you maintained contact with
people from your native town?
Yes

89

No

20

Hardly

1

Do you find that such as have survived maintain
any unity? Or are they all blended in the general

Yishuv?
Maintain Unity

51

Blended ·inj the general Yishuv

32

40. Do you speak German in Israel?

Yes

116

No .

1
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,Jamee.-; G. McDonald Pepers, Columbia University, N. Y .
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Published Documents

Palestine Statement of Policy, i:,resented to "Parliame'nt
b_y comm.c,.nd of His l'fla,iesty, May 1939,
T.,ond on: His Ma.j est,v' s Stationary Office,
1939. Cmci. 6019.
Great RritBin. Ti'oreign Office Paners concernin~ the
treBtment 6f Germa~ rationals in Germany,
19~8-1939, presented by the Recret~ry of
State for Foreign 4ffairs to ~arliament
by Commrmd of His ~n~.4esty .. London: His
r~B,iesty' s Stationary Office, 1939 .
Great Britain. Foreign Office. The Work
Swastika from the Bri tish War
together with the ~hite PaEer
Treatment of GermBn Na tionals
~dite bv Moe~s Scone
an
Appelman. New York: Ad Press,

of the
Blue Book,
on the
in German.
Herman
1941.

Reichsgeset~blatt 1933-1938, Berlin: Reic~sminis.
terium des Innern Reich sverlangsamt.
Documents on German Forei~n Policy 1918-1945 Series D
Volume V, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1962.
The High Commission for Refugees (,Tewish and other)
Comin~ from Germany, A Crises in the
Uni ve_rsal World. London. Office of the
High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and
other) Coming from Germ~ny, 1935.
'T'he Figh Commission for Refugees ( tTewish and other)
Coming from Germ~ny. Report Submitted to
the Eighteenth Ordinary session of the
Assembly of the 1,eague of Nations by the
Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm. Geneva,
Sentembet' 1st,· 1937.

Taped Interviews
Taped interview of Reuven Eytan by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of ContempQrary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 2.
Interview of Natan Feinberg by Avraham Margaliot, Oral
History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 3.
Taped Interview of .Nahum Goldmann by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Conteporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 4.
Taped interview of Eliezer Livneh (Livenstein) by
Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the
Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, No 6.
·
Taped interview of Giora Lotan (George Lubinsky) by
Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the
Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, No. 7.
Taped interview of :B,ranz Meyer by Avraham Margaliot.,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 8.
Taped interview of Hans Pameranz by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 10.
Taped interview of Joachim Prinz by Avraham Margaliot,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 11.
Taped interview of Moshe Spitzer by Otto dov Kulka,
Oral History Di vision of the Institute of Contempora.y ,.·
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 13.
Taped interview of Shalom Adler-Rudel by Rivka Banitt,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University if Jerusalem, No 341.
Taped interview of Raanan Melitz by Rivka Banitt,
Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 360.
Taped interview of Eva Michaelis by Rivka Banitt, Oral
History Division of the Institute of Contemporary _
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 361.

Reports and Publications by Organizations
Landauer, Georg, Alijia . Chadasha, Eine Neue Politische'
Formation, Tel-Aviv: Bitaon Ltd., 1944.
(Schriftenreihe Der Alija Chadasha Nr. 1.)
i3rod.ie, Israel B.,, The Hefuse~ Proo~_em and Palestine.

New . York: American Bconomic Committee for
Palestine, 1938.

The American Jewish Committee. The Jews in Nazi
Germanv the Factual Record of their
1--er'·ec;~ti.on b'r 1..,ne 1'~ational Sociali'sts.

Re~-, :or!:: 'i11e ~•:..rrie rican Jewish Committet3, 1933.
The American Jewish Committee, The Jews in Nazi
Gerr."lan.v~pnodbook of Facts Rescirdlng
thej_r Present bttuation. l~ew York: The
Araerican Jewi3h Co~mit~ee, 1935.
Krieger, Seymour, compiler~ Nazi Germany's War Against
the Jews. 1-Jew Yo-rk: A Puolica tion of the
American Jewish Conference, 1947.
Christian .Friends of P'dlestine, Palestine and the
Refugee Problem. Washington n:c.: Christian
Friends of Palestine, 1939.
·
Comite des Delegations Juives~ Das Scbwarzbuch Tatsachen
und Dokumente Die La~e der Juden in Deuts~hland
1933. Paris: Cornite des Delegations Juives, 1934.
Council for German Jewry. German Jews in Palestine,
spe~ch~s ·deliv~red at ··the _Ro~hester Hotel,
March 15, 1936.
Jildische Jugendgemeinschaft Habonim, Noar Chaluzij
Habinjan; Sammelschrift des Habonim. Berlin:
Hechaluz-Verlag, Septemoer 1936.
Bein Dr. Alex, The Return to the Soil. A His tor of
_
Jewish SAttle~Gnt in Israel. Jerusa em: . Youth
and Hechaluz Department of the Zionist
Organization, 1952.
Hechalutz,deutscher Landesverhand, Baawoda. Berlin:
Hrsg. vom Hechaluz,deutscher Landesverband,
August 1933.
Hechaluz,deutscher Landcsverband, Cheruth. Berlin:
Hrsg. vom Hechaluz, deutscher Landesverband,
November 1933.
Hechalutz, Deutscher Landesverband, Werk und Werden;
eine Chaluzische Sa~melschrift. Berlin: Hrsg.
vom Hechaluz, deutschcr Landesverband, 1934.

E~chaluz? deutsc!':le:r- L3.n.des, e_•b?..Ld r Bericht der ~toa!:.a.
l~.-17. B~~lin: . Hrsg. vom Hechaluz,
deut cher LmL.esverba.nd, Qc+ober 1935.
Jtldische Auswanderung, Korrespon~ezblatt fiber

Ausw~nderung und Siedlungswesen~ Berlin:
Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland,
Verlag Schmoller & Gordon, September 1935.
also September 1936.

Jtidische Auswanderung, Korrespondenzblatt fiber ·
Auswanderung und Siedlungswesen~ Berlin:
Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland,
Verlag Schmoller &Gordon, Herbst 1937.
July 1938.
Hitachduth Olej Germania~ Arbeitsbericht 1936 bis 1937,
Jerusalem: Hitachduth Olej Germania.
(pamphlets)
Der Weg der Deutschen Alijah, Rechenschaft, L~istung,
Verantwortung. Tel-Aviv: Hitachduth Olej
Germania v'Olej Austria, 1939.
Immigration of Jews from Germany and Austria into_
Palestine. Tel-Aviv: Association of Jewish
Settlers from Germany and ·Austria in
Palestine, 1939. (A memorandum submitted
to His .Excellency the High Commissioner
in Jerusalem and the Secretary of State
for the Colonies.)
Krojanker, Dr. Gustav, "Der Transfer, eine Schicksalsfrage der zionistichen Bewegung", Schriftenreihe der Hitachduth Ole· Germania. TelAviv: Hitachduth Olej Germania, 1 36.
Aus der THtigkeit der Hitachduth Olej Germania.1936,
Arbeitsbericht. Tel-Aviv: Hitachduth
. Olej Germania, ·1936.
Schmeler, Abraham Israel, Die Umschistungsaktion der
Auswanderun sabteilun im ersten Jahres
Bestandes. Vienna: Israe 1t1sc1e Ku tusgemeinde, 1939.
Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish
Congress World Jewish Congress, Hitler's
Ten-Year War on the Jews. New York:
Frinted by International Press, 1943.
The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for
the Settleoent of German Jews. -Report
to the XIX~h Zionist Congress and to the
IVth Council of the Jewish Agency in
Lucerne. london: Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews in Palestine,
July,. 1935.

J. o.6

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews. Report
to the X:Xth Zionist Congress and to
the Council of the Jewish Agency in
Zurich. Jarusalem: Central Bureau for
the Settlement of Germn Jews in Palestine,
August, 1937.
·
The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the
Settlement of derman Jews. : Report to
the XXIst Zionist Congress and to the
Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine
in Geneva. Jerusalem: Central Bureau for
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine,
August, 1939.
Britschgi-Schimmer, Ina, Die Umschichtun der Jtldischen
Einwanderer aus Deutschland zu st .dtischen Berufen in Pal~stina; .E ine
Untersuchung. Jerusalem: Jewish Agency
for Palestine, Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews, 1936.
Five Years of

Immi ration into Palestine 1934• Jerusalem: Centra Bureau or
the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

------

Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jewish Immi ration into
Palestine from Germ3n durin
1937. Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for ..
Palestine ,Departi:nent of Statistics .,
1938. Bulletin No 2.

Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jewish Immigration into
Palestine from Germany durin 19
38. Jerusalem: Jewish Agency or
Palestine, Department of Statistics,
1939. Bulletin No 3.
·
Pinner, Dr. Ludwig, Ansiedlung von 675 Familien aus
Deutschland in Einzelwirtschaften.
Jerusalem: .Central Bureau for the
Settlement of German Jews und der
Hitachduth Olej Germania, 1938.
Jewish Agency for Palestine, Statistical Tables on
the Distribution ~i ration and
~atural ncrease of the Jews in the
World, with Special Reference to
Jewish Activities in Palestine.
Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1938.

Supe~ M.A5, Arthur Saul, Alonei Yitzhak, A Youth
Vil 1.age in Israel~ t.Terusalem: Printed
under ~he supervision of the Jewish
Agency at the Jerusalem Post Press, No 3.
Die ·Lage dar Juden in Deutschlcirld. Amsterdam: Jewish
Central Information Office, July 11, 1938.
Joint Distribution Committee. Twelve month later; a
ccmplete report on the situation of
the Jews in Germany as observed by
European officers of the Joint Distribution Committee, Morris C Troper
auditor, Joint Distribution Committee
German relief fund of the Joint Distribution. Committee. n.p., 1934.
Joint Distribution Committee~ Summary of activities
of the Joint Distribution Committee;
Jewish problems in Germany and Eastern
Europe since 1933. n.p. 1935.
Joint Distribution Committee, European Executive Offices.
Paris world refugee organizations; a guide
to relief and reconstruction activities
for refugees from Germany. Paris: Joint .
Distribution Committee, 1937.
Joint Distribution Committee. Jewish Constructive
Work in Germany During 1936· Summary
of the Report of the Zentra±ausschuss
fur- Bilfe und lrnfbau . Paris: American
Joint Distribution Committee, European
Executive Offices, March 1937.
Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies or
British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish
Association. The Persecution of the
Jews in Germany. London, 1933.
Supplimentary bullitin Nol, London, 1933.
Palestine a.nd Jewish Emi ration from German • Jerusalem:
Keren Hajessod,
3.
Makkabi hazair, Unser Weg in Zionismus; eine Sammelschrift · des Jildischen Pfadenfinderbundes
Makkabi hazair. Berlin: Deutscher
Makkabikreis, 1935.
PalHstina-Amt Berlin, Alijah; Informationen.1tlr
Paltlstina-Auswanderer. Berlin:
Hrsg. vom Pal~stina-Amt der Jewish.
Agency, Juni 1933. 2 Aufl.

Palttstina-Amt Berlin? Alijah, Informationen filr
Palijstina-Auswanderer. Berlin:
Hrsg. vom Palgstina-Amt der Jewish
Agency, August .1933. 3 Aufl.

PaH!stL s.-Am+; Berlin. Alij ab ; Infor·mationen !Cr
Pal~ c~ina Auswand erer. Berlin: Hrsg.
vom i:-al&stina- c der Jewish Agency,

Oktober 1933.

Aufl.

Fal§stina-Amt Berlin. Al~ jah ; Informationen ftlr
PaHlstina-Aswa.1 erer. Berlin: Hrsg. vom
Pal~stina-Amt der Jewish Agency, Januar
1934. 5 Auf'l.
PalAstina-Amt Berlin. Alijah:; Informationen rar
Pal~stina-Auswanderer. Berlin: Hrsg. vom
Pal~stina-Amt der Jewish Agency, Oktober
1934. 6 Aufl.
PaHistina-Amt Berlin. Alijah ·; Informationen ttlr
Pal~stina-Auswanderer. Berlin: Hrsg. vom
Palgstina-Amt der Jewish Agency, April
1935. 7 -Aufl.
Palttstina-Amt Berlin. Alijah; Informationen ftlr
Pal~stina-Auswanderer. Berlin: Hrsg.
vom Pal~stina-Amt der Jewish Agency,
Februar 1936. 8 Aufl.
Paltlstina-Amt Berlin. PaH!stinensicher Zolltarif mi_t
Zollgesetzen. Berlin: Ubersetzt und
bearbeitet vom Pal~stina-Amt der Jewish
Agency, _- 1936. ~ ·· ~ ·
Pa.l§stina-Amt Berlin. Divisen und Transferfragen;
Nachtrag zur Alijah. Informationen f6r
Pal~stina-Auswanderer. Berlin: Hrsg. vom
PalHstina-Amt der Jewish Agency, Juni
1936. 8 Aufl.
.
.
Ginsberg, Eli, Report to American Jews on Overseas
.
Relief, Palestine and Refugees in the
United States. New York: Harper and Brothers
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